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1. Introduction 
This dissertation is concerned with exploring the historical development of Danish 
regional policy-making focusing particularly on the how change has been generated as 
a result of the interpretation and implementation of the EU partnership principle into 
the Danish context. Within Danish regional policy research, the development of the 
regional policy-making institution as result of the implementation of the partnership 
principle has been characterised by path-dependency and critical junctures, such as 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds constituting the deviation from that path 
(Halkier, 2001). This research proposes an extended framework to confront these 
results. On a more general level, most studies, including the Danish research, of the 
implementation of the partnership principle have been carried out within the multi-
level governance framework with multiple levels of government influencing the 
process. Their focus need to be sharpened based on a re-interpretation of the 
partnership principle definition with different theoretical and empirical implications 
than those proposed by the multi-level governance framework. 
During the past decades, the institutional developments of the EU
1
 have taken a turn 
towards new modes of governing. Policy-making in the EU has become characterised 
by delegation of authority to supranational, sub-national and private actors from the 
nation state, and the appearance of networked forms of governing that spread across 
territorial levels or policy areas (Conzelmann, 2008, 12). These new ways of 
governance and thus the way policy is made, alter the institutional framework in a 
broader sense. From one perspective, policy-making has become an interconnected 
task of different levels of government. Multi-level governance as an approach is 
concerned with the shifts in horizontal relations between state and society and the 
changes in the vertical relations between actors at different levels that have occurred 
in the European Union over the past decades (Hooghe 1996a, Hooghe and Marks, 
2001). A similar perspective on how EU policy-making has influenced policy-making 
and altered the institutional framework in the member states, Europeanization, offers 
a theoretical approach for understanding important changes occurring in politics and 
                                                                
1 The EEC, the EC and the EU all refer to the ‘same creature’. The EEC is the ‘name’ of the initial cooperation 
among the six founding members of European cooperation after World War 2 also known as the European 
Community (EC). The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (EU) and its new three-pillar 
structure where the EU gained more responsibility in some policy areas such as Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). The change in ‘name’ of European cooperation reflected the changed structure of the 
cooperation (Dinan, 1999). When referring to specific events taking place within the EU/EC context before 
1993 the term EC will be utilised, whereas the term EU will be utilised when referring to specific events 
occurring after 1993. 
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society. “Europeanization is understood as “the reorientation or reshaping of politics 
in the domestic arena in ways that reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced 
through the EU system of governance”” (Bache, 2008a, 9). Inherent in this approach is 
that EU policy-making generates change in the member states either constituting 
policy change, institutional change or change of politics, and that the degree of 
change depends on the compatibility between member state and EU policy, 
regulation or practices.  
One policy area has received much attention concerning the consequent complex 
governance and impact on the member states’ institutional structures and relations 
between actors within the corresponding member state policy-making: EU regional 
policy. Many studies have been carried out on the governance of EU regional policy 
since it was first prioritised to be an EU concern in the mid-1980s. The establishment 
of the EU’s regional policy, and the structures that were to guide the management of 
the policy within the member states, has been widely agreed to be highly innovative 
when thinking about ‘governance’ as compared to government (Hooghe, 1996a, 2). 
For the first time a common EC regional policy with EC wide conditional demands was 
introduced forcing the member states to adjust to these demands. Previously, 
regional policy-making was a national level responsibility in which the EC generally did 
not interfere; regional policy support was based on a quota-based approach where 
the member states received a quota of the EC budget for regional development, but 
remained overall responsible for the implementation and employment of the funds 
according to the national level regional development objectives and organisation 
(Bache, 1998, Michie and Fitzgerald, 1997, 16-20). With the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds, this structure changed completely.  
The most noteworthy innovation in this regard is the ‘partnership principle’ which 
requires member states to involve partners at various governmental and non-
governmental, public and private levels in the implementation of EU regional policy in 
national contexts. This principle has allegedly had the most impact on the member 
states in their interaction with the EU on regional policy implementation by reshaping 
governance structures. As such, the emphasis on partnership was couched in the 
language of policy effectiveness, but the changes that this would entail, could 
potentially have considerable political and organisational implications (Thielemann, 
2002, 48). In the words of Scott (1998, 181) “the promise of partnership lies in the 
nature of the polity which it seeks to construct.” It rests upon a shared responsibility 
across different levels of government, and that the Commission conceives the 
member states as more than single entities and imposes a role for sub-national actors 
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which may not be compatible with traditional patterns of governance within the 
member states. 
Since then, a large volume of research has been carried out on how this changed 
organisational framework for implementation and employment of EC/EU regional 
policy has been applied in practice and how it has established new modes of 
governance in the member states (Bache, 2010, Bachtler and Taylor, 2003, Polverari 
and Michie, 2009, Brunazzo, 2007, Kelleher et.al., 1999, Roberts, 2003, Jones, 2001 to 
mention a few). The general conclusion from these studies is that implementing the 
partnership requirements has been a gradual process of adaptation and inclusion of 
vertical and horizontal actors, although member state experiences vary (Brunazzo, 
2007, ECAS, 2009). These studies have also concluded that the specific institutional 
tradition in the member states shapes the implementation of the partnership 
requirements, a point that deserves closer attention because it has consequences for 
the practical implementation of the requirements and may, thus, lead to a different 
conclusion than initially reached. It is not adequate to make such a conclusion without 
investigating matters more closely.  
In order to understand how the interpretation of the partnership principle based on 
the member state’s institutional traditions shapes implementation, it is necessary first 
to return to the actual formulation of the partnership principle. In the 1988 reform of 
the Structural Funds, the partnership principle defined partnership as follows:  
“through close consultations between the Commission, the Member 
State concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter 
at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a 
partner in pursuit of a common goal. These consultations are hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘partnership’” (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88, 
Article 4, §1) 
This definition is clearly open to interpretation, but it may be argued that the 
partnership principle involves specified actors to implement the EC regional policy in 
the member states, which may be regarded as an ‘inclusion’ requirement. 
Partnerships are to be composed of Commission, member state actors as well as 
‘competent authorities’ at national, regional, local and other level in the member 
state. Hereby, an expected multi-level inclusion of actors should be at the heart of 
partnership. Next, the partnership involves ‘close consultations’ between the 
partnership actors, pointing to some kind of relations between the partners regarded 
as a ‘process’ requirement. Thus, partnership is both concerned with the inclusion of 
actors and the consequent relations that these engage in, in order to implement the 
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policy in the member states. However, it should also be noted that the 
implementation of the partnership inclusion and process requirements does not 
necessarily imply that a ‘partnership’ is the actual outcome. According to Åkerstrøm 
Andersen (2006), partnership is not just any process where a number of actors 
operate; it is concerned with ‘partnering’ – a dynamic process of making promises to 
make promises about future cooperation as a reaction to the changing context in 
which the partnership operates. In a sense, it is about mutual relations between 
partners who agree to adjust the partnership along the way according to changes in 
its immediate environment influencing its operation. Accordingly, the Åkerstrøm 
Andersen definition is more than just a formal requirement to include actors and 
limited representation of interests, as the partnership principle allegedly suggests in 
its most narrow interpretation.    
Next it is necessary to investigate the member states’ institutional compatibility with 
the partnership requirements, as it has been argued that the actual implementation 
of these partnership frameworks depends on the interpretation of the member states, 
and how well the partnership structure fits with existing national practices and 
institutional structures (Kelleher et. al., 1999). It may then be expected that specific 
national models of partnership have been developed based on the general 
partnership definition. Exactly because of the expected variations in partnership 
approaches, it is important to notice that an in-depth analysis of each of the individual 
member state institutional structures is required in order to establish these 
differences. This research will initiate such an investigation by looking at one member 
state: Denmark. Denmark is a small member state where it is possible to observe a 
peculiar balance between decentralisation and centralisation in the political system. 
Another criteria for choosing Denmark, is that it is an understudied member state 
compared to member states like Germany, Britain and France which have been widely 
studied. Evidently, the Danish interpretation of this definition and attached inclusion 
and process requirements may influence the practical employment of the principle 
into the existing institutional organisation for regional policy-making. 
1.1 Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to explore how Danish regional policy-making has 
changed during the course of time with particular emphasis on the interpretation and 
implementation of the EU partnership principle inclusion and process requirements. 
The research area is explored through investigation of the following questions: 
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What types of change, if any, have been generated in Danish regional policy-making 
as a result of the Danish interpretation of the organisational requirements of the EU 
partnership principle until 2006? That is, 
 which consequence has the interaction between Danish regional policy-
making and the EU partnership inclusion requirements had for the inclusion 
of and relations between partners in Structural Funds implementation and 
why? 
 to which extent has the coordination between Danish regional policy-
making and the EU partnership process requirements resulted in a 
partnership process? 
Such an investigation will encompass a historical analysis of the development of the 
Danish regional policy-making institution. Focus is thus on how the Danish regional 
policy-making institution has developed independently from the requirements of the 
partnership principle, as well as to identify the changes that expectedly happened in 
the consequent implementation of these requirements after 1988. As the partnership 
principle has been extended in succeeding reforms in 1993 and 1999, it may be 
expected that the changed partnership requirements influence the practical 
partnerships in Danish regional policy-making. Similarly, developments in the Danish 
regional policy-making institution may be expected to influence the practical 
employment of the partnerships. The Danish regional policy-making institution has 
been shaped around increased decentralisation of competences to the regional level 
through different government Acts and public sector reforms, which culminated in a 
wide-ranging reform of the local and regional government responsibilities in 2005 
coming into effect by 2007. The changed set-up also influenced the regional policy-
making organisation in that regional policy-making became a statutory responsibility 
of the regions, whereas before it was been based on voluntariness. Similarly, at the 
regional level a new partnership organisation was set up to implement regional policy 
based on the statutory responsibility of the regions (Halkier, 2008b, Illeris, 2010, 
Gjerding, 2005a and Halkier, 2007). The post-2007 regional policy institution may be 
regarded a completely different set-up for regional policy-making as partnerships 
became statutory and based on a different organisation than before 2007. Moreover, 
in 2006 agreement was reached to implement a fourth reform of the Structural Funds 
for the 2007-2013 programming period. Accordingly, 2006 appears to be a reasonable 
year to make a dividing line framing the historical analysis of the development of the 
Danish regional policy-making institution.  
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It has been argued in existing research of the implementation of partnership 
requirements that gradually the member states’ institutional organisation adjusts 
according to these requirements depending on the member states’ own institutional 
organisation. Thus, it may be regarded as a meeting or interaction between two 
regional policy-making institutions that generates change in one. Understanding the 
historical development of the Danish regional policy-making institution is key to 
understand the interpretation of the partnership requirements, as the partnerships 
are expected to be implemented into the existing Danish regional policy-making 
institution. Implementing partnerships is unavoidable, but the nature of those 
partnerships may vary according to prior experience with cooperation across levels of 
government. Historical institutionalism offers a theoretical perspective for analysing 
the interaction between the two regional policy-making institutions arguing the 
institutional structure is historically rooted, and has gradually developed based on 
both internal (actors) and external (other institutions) conditions and events. Focus is 
on how decisions made in the past shape present decisions, and how institutions may 
change in the meeting with other institutions based on the reactions of actors within 
the institution (Mahoney and Thelen (eds.), 2010, Hall and Thelen, 2009, Pollack, 
2004). Thus, historical institutionalism offers two interrelated tools to utilise in this 
analysis: first it is able to analyse the context and the background to the institutional 
context into which the partnership requirements are implemented. Second, it offers 
tools to analyse the evolving interaction between the two institutions, i.e. the 
partnership principle and the national regional policy institutional structure. As the 
overall aim of this research is to explore and determine the types of change generated 
in the interaction between Danish and EU regional policy-making, historical 
institutionalism constitutes the back bone of the analysis. 
Within the historical institutionalist framework, network governance presents an 
appropriate conceptual tool for analysis of the specific organisation of the regional 
policy-making organisation, expectedly based on a partnership approach. Based on 
the existing institutional organisation of Danish regional policy-making, the 
partnership principle is interpreted and implemented into the Danish organisation, 
expectedly leading to the establishment of partnerships. Arguably, partnerships 
resemble networks in terms of inclusion and relations between actors involved. 
Network governance analyses the inclusion (and perhaps exclusion) of actors in the 
implementation process based on the argumentation of resource dependencies; 
actors are involved in networks because they bring certain resources to the network 
that the network members are dependent on and do not bring themselves (Sørensen 
and Torfing (eds.), 2007, Sørensen and Torfing, 2005 and Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). 
To some extent the network approach is also able to analyse the process aspect of 
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partnerships through network interaction tools: how the roles played by the actors 
and the consequent exchange of resources shape the network process. But in order to 
fully understand how the process requirement of the partnership principle is 
interpreted, a specific variant of network governance concerned with the difference 
between networks and partnerships aids to this analysis. Network relations do not 
necessarily imply partnerships in a way that the partnership principle implies. As 
Åkerstrøm Andersen (2006) argues, partnerships resemble networks but are not 
networks in that partnerships are based on ‘partnering’ as explained above. 
1.2 Structure of the Research 
The following outlines the chapters constituting the research. The research is 
structured according to the theoretical and empirical ambitions of this research. 
The first chapter following the introduction (chapter 1) and methodology (chapter 2) 
can be considered an extended introductory chapter that sets the stage for the 
theoretical and empirical parts of this research. Thus, chapter 3 seeks to describe in 
more detail the backgrounds and ambitions of the research, and may thus be 
regarded as a kind of case description preparing the ground for the theoretical 
considerations in the following chapter.  
Chapter 4 is the review of the theoretical perspectives used for the analysis of the 
empirical data. In this chapter, the theoretical foundation necessary for exploring the 
Danish interpretation and implementation of the partnership requirements and how 
this has generated change in the Danish regional policy-making institution is 
established. Arguably, historical institutionalism and network governance serve as the 
theoretical entry points into this investigation. Historical institutionalism serves as the 
overall theoretical framework for understanding institutional change and stability. 
Change to the Danish regional policy-making institution may be expected as a result of 
the interpretation and implementation of the EU partnership requirements over the 
course of time, both in terms of inclusion of actors as well as in terms of the relational 
processes that are expectedly created from the inclusion of actors. In the historical 
development of institutions, networks are established. In Danish regional policy-
making they are the expected result of the implementation of the inclusion and 
process requirements of partnership. The network governance perspective explains 
the establishment, functioning and governance of networks. A more specific approach 
to networks is presented by Åkerstrøm Andersen (2006) who offers a definition of 
partnerships to be understood within the network framework. Partnerships resemble 
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networks but distinguish themselves from networks in that they are based on what 
Åkerstrøm Andersen labels ‘partnering’.  
Chapter 5 presents a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the 
experience with implementing the partnership principle in the member states since its 
first introduction in 1988. Variation in the member states’ implementation of the 
partnership principle has been found across the research, but agreement is reached 
that generally partnerships have been established in the member states reflecting the 
gradual adaptation to the requirements based on the member states’ institutional 
organisation. This review identifies that existing research has been particularly 
focused on the vertical forms of partnerships, and that horizontal forms of 
partnerships have not been analysed to the same extent. This may be so for several 
reasons. However, this points to one research void, among others, in existing research 
that needs to be filled. Hereby, the aim of the literature review is also to be able to 
firmly situate my research in the existing research by pointing out the contribution of 
this research to the existing volume.   
Chapter 6 is the first of three analytical parts that are interrelated through the 
theoretical foundation, where historical institutionalism frames the entire analysis of 
the development of the Danish regional policy-making institution. Thus, historical 
institutionalism will guide the first sub-analysis towards analysing and explaining the 
specific characteristics of Danish regional policy governance that was established and 
has developed since the 1950s, since these characteristics may influence the 
interpretation of the partnership principle requirements. Historical institutionalism 
should be able to identify specific developments of Danish regional policy governance, 
characteristic of ‘the Danish way of conduct’. Hereafter, it will be possible to analyse 
how these particular characteristics have changed due to coordination with the 
requirements of the partnership principle into Danish regional policy-making, and how 
they may also have shaped the coordination between Danish regional policy-making 
and EU partnership organisations. Therefore, the independent development of the 
Danish regional policy-making institution is analysed in the first of three analytical 
chapters. The historical development of the Danish regional policy-making institution 
was initiated prior to the introduction of the parallel EC regional policy in 1988. The 
analysis of the Danish regional policy-making institution is extended to after 1988, as 
well, as internal changes to the institution also took place independently of the 
parallel EC/EU developments. This analysis is necessary in order to be able to evaluate 
whether the changes to the Danish regional policy-making institution happened as a 
reaction of the establishment of a competing EC level institution, or whether internal 
developments have similarly influenced that development. Moreover, understanding 
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the historical development of the Danish regional policy-making institution is 
necessary as the partnership principle itself highlights the relevance of existing 
institutional, legal and other member state characteristics for its interpretation as will 
be seen in chapter 3. 
Based on historical institutionalist tools, chapter 7 is concerned with the historical 
developments that took place in the interaction between the Danish and EU regional 
policy-making institutions building on the findings of chapter 6. It is found that the 
Danish regional policy-making institution was gradually adjusted to the requirements 
of the EU counterpart leading to increased multi-level governance, a functional 
division of responsibilities and elevation of the regional level. One specific type of 
change is analysed in more detail: the establishment of regional level competences to 
implement regional policy – both national and EU. This is perhaps the most obvious 
evidence of change in Danish regional policy-making after the introduction of the 
partnership requirements in the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds. The 
establishment of the regional level capacity has further consequences for regional 
policy-making in Denmark in terms of inclusion and process. North Jutland serves as a 
case study
2
 of the establishment and development of regional level capacity. Thus, the 
main focus is on the regional level organisational structure in Danish regional policy-
making that had been established since the mid-1980s and its further development 
and institutionalisation. With the changed definition of the partnership principle in 
the succeeding reforms of the Structural Funds, the regional level institutional 
structure can be expected to change accordingly. 
Chapter 8, the final part of the tripartite analysis, is concerned with the development 
of the practical employment of partnerships in Denmark by applying a combined 
theoretical approach of historical institutionalism, network governance and Åkerstrøm 
Andersen’s definition of partnerships. Historical institutionalism is used as a tool to 
explore the historical development of partnerships, whereas network governance and 
Åkerstrøm Andersen serve as a lens through which the interpretation and 
implementation of the partnership principle into networks or partnerships are 
analysed; how are the partnerships composed and why? What are the relations 
among the partners? The partnership principle requires partnerships at various levels 
of government, which has led to the functional division of responsibilities in Danish 
regional policy-making. Accordingly, seen from the Danish perspective, partnerships 
existed on four levels: EU, national, regional and local. Based on this division, 
                                                                
2 The choice of case study is argued for in the following methodological chapter. 
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individual partnerships are explored in terms of development of inclusion and 
process, although emphasis is on the regional and local levels, which according to the 
functional division of responsibilities, are responsible for the actual implementation of 
EU regional policy. It may be expected that the most comprehensive partnerships are 
found at the regional and local levels. Thus, the core focus of this analysis is on the 
development of partnership experiences at the regional and local levels. North Jutland 
serves as a case study of this development. 
Chapter 9 contains a conclusion to the research. In this chapter, an answer to the 
research questions presented in the above is presented. Moreover, a few reflections 
concerning the contribution of this research upon completion of this dissertation are 
offered. 
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2. Methodology 
The following is a discussion of the methodological choices on which the research area 
and the formulation of the research question are based. Furthermore, in recognition 
of the fact that methodology shapes the way empirical data is collected, this aspect of 
methodology is also accounted for and discussed in the following.  
2.1 Hermeneutics 
The aim of this research is to explore the historical process of change of Danish 
regional policy-making until 2006 based on the interpretation and implementation of 
the inclusion and process aspects of the EU partnership principle. Thus, the present 
research is historical in that it explores “the meaning and relationship of events 
[through] primary historical data… in order to establish facts and draw conclusions” 
(Walliman, 2001, 88). In other words, historical research is concerned with discovering 
events of the past and learning how these events have shaped contemporary 
problems, issues or events. An important tool when carrying out such research is 
interpretation and understanding of the events and their meaning. 
Social sciences are concerned with understanding meaningful human action. Within 
the social sciences, hermeneutics, as the ‘art of interpretation’, is the most obvious 
point of departure for such an analysis with its specific focus on processes of 
understanding. Moreover, hermeneutics is about understanding parts of the whole to 
understand the whole and vice-versa referring to the hermeneutic circle (Abulad, 
2007, 11 and 16-7). Understanding involves movement back and forth from the parts 
to the whole. The advantage of applying this approach is that the analyst is able to go 
back to the object of analysis throughout the process again and again as the body of 
knowledge is extended, and revise and reinterpret the body of analysis based on the 
newly-obtained knowledge, thereby extending the understanding of the object. This 
implies that hermeneutic approaches are neither inductive nor deductive in the sense 
that inductive reasoning goes from the specific to the general (conclusions drawn 
potentially lead to the development of new theories) and deductive reasoning goes 
from the general to the specific (with the purpose of testing existing theories) 
(Gadamer, 2004, xvii and Benton and Craib, 2001). In the hermeneutic process of 
working, induction alone is difficult because the researcher often has pre-
understanding that influence the interpretation of the study. Deduction on its own is 
similarly difficult as the hermeneutic movement between parts and the whole (i.e. 
theory and empirical data) does not lead to theory testing as such. Accordingly, the 
hermeneutic process is the interplay between induction and deduction, which is also 
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the basis of this research as will be explicated later. Originally, hermeneutics was 
concerned with the interpretation and understanding of texts, but it has been 
extended to include also verbal and non-verbal forms of communication. Thus, 
meaning is related to people and their actions (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2007). 
Gadamer, a prominent hermeneutic philosopher, offers the most viable framework 
for carrying out this analysis through the process of understanding the historical 
events and circumstances that generate change in the future: “what one understands 
of such a text is thus a product of long years of collective readership and its meaning is 
therefore the work of history” (Abulad, 2007). According to Gadamer, knowledge is 
the product of achieving and understanding the development of history where history 
is the development of a common aim. In order to understand such history, we are 
compelled to make ourselves part of the history out of which it emerged (Gadamer, 
2004, xvi). This implies that understanding is historical and that the nature of human 
beings is historical and open to historical change (Benton and Craib, 2001, 104) 
leading back to the hermeneutic circle process. According to Gadamer’s perception of 
the hermeneutic circle, the new understanding of an object or event makes up a new 
frame for understanding future events or objects that can be revised repeatedly. In 
the hermeneutic process, interpretation and understanding are linked, meaning that 
interpreting a text or an event leads to the understanding of it (Gadamer, 2004, xviii). 
It is inherent in this perspective that human beings are social units or social 
constructions of history. 
2.2 Social Constructivism 
Social constructivism fits neatly into the hermeneutic interpretation and 
understanding of historical developments, as it is concerned with how human beings 
create and manoeuvre in the world (i.e. social reality) through social construction and 
reconstruction. In this sense, social constructivism “underlines the importance of 
double hermeneutics.” (Marcussen, 2000, 8) In other words, what the social scientists 
set out to interpret or understand has already been interpreted in the social world. 
The general framework presented by Berger and Luckmann (1966) constitutes the 
outset of this methodological foundation helping me to frame the choice of my 
theories by offering meta-theoretical propositions.  
According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), social constructivism has three core 
assumptions. First, the individual or the actor is considered to be a social creature 
‘born with a predisposition towards sociality’. The actor thus internalises and develops 
existing knowledge about reality through interaction with other actors, thereby 
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creating and institutionalising new knowledge about reality. Based on these social 
processes, the actor discovers a personal identity. The ability of the actor to 
understand the complexity and variety of the reality (the social world) is not 
unlimited, however. The actor holds limited cognitive capacity which in turn forces the 
actor to simplify, categorise and systematise parts of the perceived world, because 
he/she needs cognitive stability. Therefore, the actor tends to habitualise activity, 
thus embedding the meaning of the activity in routines. Therefore, the actor can 
utilise a series of available instruments to stabilise reality through habits or 
institutions. The same process can be seen with groups of actors who through the 
same process of interaction institutionalise knowledge. This way knowledge becomes 
taken for granted or an assumption by the group. This institution is vulnerable to 
change (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 69-76 and 149). 
The second assumption of Berger and Luckmann is concerned with ‘what we know’, 
reality. What is perceived as reality is continuously reconstructed in a process of 
interaction between actors. Knowledge is context-dependent and relative concept. 
This implies that reality and knowledge develop over time based on the constant 
internalisation of new knowledge in a process of socialisation. In this sense, the actor 
adjusts his/her perception of reality to the constant acquiring of new knowledge 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 175-7). 
The final assumption is concerned with how the researcher makes ‘claims about social 
action’. Here, it is necessary to have knowledge about the relationship between 
structure and agency and realise that they are mutually constitutive. This implies that 
reality is constructed in the social relationship between actors but within the 
framework of social structures. These social structures may be changed by the 
construction of reality, however. Thus, when making claims about social action, it may 
be necessary to ‘freeze’ social structures in order to study the interaction, like it may 
be necessary to ‘freeze’ social interaction in order to study social structures (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, 183-95). According to Berger and Luckmann, the best way to 
understand the relationship between structure and agency in social science is to 
supplement historical studies with contemporary comparative studies – “possibly 
through longitudinal empirical studies of how institutions come about in the first place 
and thicken in social processes.” (Marcussen, 2000, 7) This is exactly the foundation of 
the present study; to analyse the historical institutional development of the 
interpretation and implementation of the inclusion and process aspects of the 
partnership principle into a Danish regional policy-making institution. 
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To sum up, social constructivism provides me with a methodological framework to 
choose theories suitable for application in the empirical analysis: the interpretation 
and implementation of the partnership principle is a social construct made by actors 
or groups of actors who institutionalise their perception of reality. This reality or 
institution may be changed during the course of time as actors acquire new 
knowledge, or as they respond to the changing reality surrounding them. In this 
connection, it is also important to take the relationship between structure and agency 
into consideration when choosing theories. Based on these considerations, historical 
institutionalism and network governance are arguably reasonable choices, as both are 
concerned with how the interaction of actors or groups of actors influences the 
institution or the network. The institution and the network constitute the norms and 
social constructs in which the actors interact. In order to understand the process of 
construction and reconstruction of social reality, one has to study the relationship 
between the actor and the social structures (norms and institutions) in a hermeneutic 
process, or as in my research, the role played by actors (i.e. representing an 
organisation or geographical area or other) in the network and its relation to the 
network and other network members. 
2.3 A Qualitative Approach  
Whereas the above was concerned with the ontological and epistemological 
considerations framing this study, the following section is more concerned with the 
practical employment of the research strategy to be carried out through the 
employment of hermeneutic processes moving from parts to the whole and vice-
versa, in order to be able to consider how actors in regional policy-making create and 
interact in that world leading to institutionalisation and potential change of the 
institution.   
Based on the above considerations, the preferred strategy for this study is a 
qualitative approach. The quantitative approach, in contrast, is not a viable strategy to 
carry out a hermeneutic, social constructivist study, in that quantitative approaches 
are generally concerned with quantity and the question of ‘how many?’ (Miller, 1995, 
154 and Gerring, 2009, 33) The difference between a quantitative and a qualitative 
study of networks is whether the network is treated as the unit of analysis 
(quantitative), or whether the network is seen to compose of units of analysis such as 
actors or organisations within the network (qualitative) (Wassermann and Faust, 
2007). Had I engaged in a quantitative study of the partnership principle 
implementation for instance, I would have been able to establish how one network or 
partnership is organised compared to other networks in other regions, but I would not 
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be able to identify the relational ties inside the partnerships between the individual 
actors and understand how their relations have contributed to the governance of the 
partnership or network. Thus, a quantitative approach is concerned with mapping the 
relations within the network according to dyadic or triadic relationships “to formulate 
mathematical models for behaviour of triples of actors” (Wassermann and Faust, 
2007, 15). In this sense, applying a quantitative approach would for instance lead to 
measuring of network attributes and sorting them into categories, or mapping the 
relationship between the partners in the network/partnership, which is not the 
intention of this study. Moreover, in order to measure quantity, the sample under 
investigation must necessarily be larger than two cases. Rather the aim here is to 
identify and explore the historical development of the interpretation and 
implementation of the partnership principle inclusion and process requirements into 
the existing Danish regional policy-making institution and how this has generated 
change in the Danish regional policy-making institution. This study of historical 
processes requires a qualitative approach that involves the interpretation of processes 
and social interaction that cannot be measured or quantified. Qualitative research is 
most often applied where “the aim of research is to explore people’s subjective 
experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences… [or] in the study of 
processes” (Devine, 1995, 138). Moreover “the distinctive need for case studies arises 
out if the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (Yin, 2003, 2). Moreover, 
qualitative research is the preferred strategy, when the aim is to analyse a case into 
depth rather than large-N cases in a quantitative sense (Gerring, 2009, 48-50): “the 
fewer cases there are, and the more intensively they are studied, the more a work 
merits the appellation “case study”” (Gerring, 2009, 20). 
2.3.1 An Explorative Case Study Approach 
In the first place, the choice of case study approach depends on the type of research 
question posed: research questions focusing on ‘what’ are generally explorative in 
nature; they aim at exploring the patterns in the case in order to make propositions 
for further inquiry (Yin, 2003, 5-6). My research question is based on ‘what’ and an 
interest in discovering new information about the chosen subject. 
Moreover, to my knowledge, no similar case study of the development of Danish 
regional policy-making has been carried out until now. Therefore, my study may be 
regarded as an exploratory case study, in the sense that the aim is to investigate a 
historical process that has not been examined before with the objective of acquiring 
new knowledge of the area of study. Until now, only fractions of that historical 
development have been identified, and often a different theoretical frame of analysis 
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has been employed to investigate aspects of my case. However, a comprehensive 
picture of this development has not been gathered. The explorative analysis of the 
Danish interpretation and implementation of the inclusion and process requirements 
of the partnership principle and how it expectedly has generated change in the Danish 
regional policy-making institution, is an analysis concerned with two parts of a whole: 
first, as argued in the introduction, the interpretation of the partnership requirements 
depends on the existing national regional policy-making institution and its 
development throughout history. Thus, partly, the analysis is concerned with the 
historical development of the Danish regional policy-making institution independently 
from the EC/EU regional policy-making institution developing alongside that arguably 
interfered with the national counterpart when it is implemented into the national 
regional policy-making institution. Second, the analysis is concerned with the actual 
interpretation and implementation of partnership requirements in the interaction 
between the Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making institution and how this 
development is translated into a Danish approach to partnership. 
The aim of this study is not to be able to make generalisations about Danish regional 
policy-making based on one case study, but to explore how the interpretation and 
implementation of the partnership principle in Denmark generated change in the 
Danish regional policy-making institution by employing a new theoretical framework 
that has not been employed in regional policy research before. Thereby, through this 
analysis, I am able to expand on existing theory. Although, voluminous research has 
been carried out regarding the implementation of the partnership principle covering 
many member states, to my knowledge none of these analyses have employed the 
theoretical framework proposed in this research. Despite this, a number of 
researchers have agreed that the member state’s regional policy-making institutional 
organisation is key to understand the implementation of the partnership principle; 
those studies have traditionally employed the multi-level governance approach to 
identify the types of governance generated from the interaction between the member 
states’ and the EC/EU regional policy-making organisations. They have not applied the 
historical institutional approach to understand how the member state’s institutional 
organisation shapes the implementation as their aim differed from my ambition. 
Therefore, based on the exploration of my case this research proposes a theoretical 
framework that may be employed in future research with the same objective. Thus, 
analytical generalisation is to a theory or theoretical framework of the phenomenon 
studied; a theory or a theoretical framework that may have wider applicability than 
the particular case studied (Yin, 2003, 37). In other words, the results of such study 
may contribute to the development of a theory or a theoretical framework to be 
employed in similar case-studies within other member states with similar or different 
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regional policy-making institutional organisations. This implies that the explorative 
case study may be considered both inductive and deductive in approach moving from, 
on the one hand, testing of existing theories through the employment of an empirical 
case study, to, on the other hand, the development or emphasis of the suggested 
theoretical framework based on the conclusions drawn from the case study. 
This analysis is an in-depth single-case study of one region in Denmark with 
‘embedded multiple units of analysis’ (Yin, 2003, 42-3) in order to explore how the 
interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle has developed over 
the course of time in terms of inclusion and process. The region chosen may thus be 
considered the case study, but within that region a number of actors and 
organisations are involved to various degrees in regional policy-making, and thereby 
in the North Jutland partnership for implementing EC/EU regional policy. All these 
sub-units should be taken into consideration when exploring the inclusion and process 
of the partnership as they all individually influence the partnership. These embedded 
units may be regarded as parts of the whole which hermeneutics refers to; 
understanding the whole implies that the parts should be analysed together by 
making connections back to the whole.  
In order to accomplish this explorative case study, I make use of different types of 
triangulation of data by combining knowledge obtained from qualitative interviews, 
analysis of primary documents and secondary analyses carried out by other 
researchers to construct a complete picture of the development, as well as ‘internal 
triangulation’ within the interview data to ensure that the ‘storytelling’ of the 
interviewees is in accordance with the actual partnership process. Qualitative 
interviews are employed in order to go into depth with specific processes and events: 
the interviewees, having been part of the historical development, hold information 
about the process aspect of the partnership principle in particular that is not 
obtainable in either document analyses or secondary analyses. The process aspect of 
the partnership principle is concerned with the relations among the partners included 
in the partnership, which can only be understood and interpreted by the researcher 
through the recollection of those partners involved and not through document 
analysis as relational processes depend on the perception of the involved partners. It 
should also be recognised that the various partners involved may not have the same 
recollection of the same event, for which reason it is crucial to regard several 
perspectives. Thus, the knowledge, understanding and perspectives of the 
interviewees may be used to go into depth with the development of the inclusion and 
process aspects of the partnership in Danish regional policy-making. As this research is 
concerned with the Danish ‘interpretation’ of the partnership principle, the 
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interpretation as it has been perceived by those actors involved in the partnership is 
crucial to its implementation and thus to the answer to my research question. Thus, it 
is possible to ‘internally’ triangulate the findings of the qualitative interviews as the 
interviewees may have different perceptions of the same issue or process. When 
triangulating these different statements, I can ensure that the findings are the facts 
(to ensure validity).  
Moreover, the interviews are used to support the information found in both primary 
and secondary sources and vice-versa concerning the inclusion of actors as well as the 
historical development of the Danish regional policy-making institution. Primary 
documents inform the researcher about the decisions reached concerning the policy 
(such as rules and regulations) whereas other types of primary documents provide the 
researcher with information about the process (such as annual reports). The primary 
documents are used to situate specific developments according date; to illustrate the 
legal development of the Danish regional policy-making institution; as well as to 
illustrate the outcome of the decision-making process pointing towards a 
development. Secondary sources are employed when it has not been possible to 
obtain first-hand information about developments taking place. One of the problems 
with carrying out historical analyses and relying on first-hand knowledge is that the 
actors involved may have difficulty remembering specific events taking place for 
instance 20 years ago. In such cases, the findings can be supported by similar 
secondary research carried out around that time when the actors were actually 
involved in the process. However, sometimes such analyses have not been carried out 
which leaves the researcher with an information void.  
2.3.2 Selecting the Case 
Above, it was mentioned that a single-case study with embedded units has been 
preferred, as it is possible to go into depth with the case rather than settle with a 
more ‘superficial’ comparative or cross-case study. The choice of a single-case study 
appears to be straightforward as the definition of the partnership principle itself calls 
for a complex organisation of relations through its process requirement leading to an 
expectedly proportionate complex organisation of the analysis. In such a complex 
analysis framework, a single-case study is preferred in order to explore every corner 
of this relationship. In a comparative case study for instance, it is not possible to 
explore all relations within the different partnerships and then compare them to each 
other within the timeframe available to this study. In the single-case study, one region 
in Denmark has been selected to explore the historical development of the 
interpretation of the partnership principle inclusion and process requirements, 
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namely North Jutland. First of all, the reason for choosing one region in Denmark, 
rather than for instance three in a comparative case study design, is that a 
comparative case study of three regions in Denmark with different ‘development-
relevant resource configurations’ has been carried out of the 1994-1999 programming 
period. Despite the most-different regional approaches, it was concluded that “all in 
all the situation with regard to inclusiveness and accountability appears to be 
characterised by similarities and consensus: the “rules of the game” are the same in 
each of the three regions, something that suggests that they reflect national 
preferences… a “Danish model” of partnerships with regional economic development 
policy would seem to be in evidence” (Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 81). So, the 
researchers conclude that despite choosing the most-different case study design, the 
evidence found in each region is similar leading to the conclusion that it is possible to 
detect a ‘Danish approach’ to partnership, and that either case may be equally 
illustrative. Thus, this argument lends support to my choice of employing a single-case 
study. It is adequate to explore one region’s experience with interpreting and 
implementing partnership as an illustration of the historical development of Danish 
regional policy-making. Next, a region that has a historical experience with working in 
partnership and that has received EC/EU Structural Funding since its introduction 
should be preferred. In Denmark, only one region has had this experience: North 
Jutland. In fact, North Jutland is a pioneering region in Denmark and had the first-ever 
experience with EC programming and partnership and has since then been engaged in 
EU regional policy implementation. Moreover, North Jutland is an illustrative case in 
that the region is characterised by a versatile business structure with the potential of 
involving a wide variety of actors into the partnership, especially horizontal actors, 
enabling me to acquire a deeper understanding of horizontal relations than has 
previously been the case in most studies of the implementation of regional policy, and 
in particular in the Danish context. 
2.3.3 Planning Data Collection 
When carrying out qualitative research, six types of data sources can be investigated, 
according to Yin (2003): documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation and physical artefacts. As mentioned above, this study uses 
three types of sources, namely qualitative interviews, document analysis and 
secondary research to support the whole picture, when it is not possible to collect 
primary data. The following section is concerned with the planning and execution of 
the qualitative elite interviews used to explore the partnerships in North Jutland, as 
well as elite interviews that illuminate the historical development of Danish regional 
policy-making, both independent of the EC/EU counterpart and the interaction 
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between the two. Elite interviews are the preferred approach as they reveal the 
perception of the involved actors of the inclusion and process aspects of the 
partnership in North Jutland, which the analysis of primary and secondary data may 
not be able to reveal. In an elite interview, the interviewees are selected because they 
hold a specific, professional position in relation to the object of study, like they hold 
special information of the object of study due to their central involvement in the 
network or other organisation (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Interviews present the 
interviewees with the possibility to describe and illuminate specific events, relations 
or processes that may provide a rich set of data of special interest to the research 
seen from an insider’s perspective. The interviews may reveal information that the 
researcher may not have anticipated or have knowledge of as an outsider. 
Accordingly, two types of interviews have been planned and carried out. Both 
interviews are semi-structured, which according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2007) “seek 
to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewees with the aim to interpret 
the meaning of the described phenomena” (translated from Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2007, 45) through the formulation of an interview guide
3
 which focuses on specific 
topics of interest and can contain suggestions to questions. A semi-structured 
interview is a combination of an everyday-conversation and a closed questionnaire. In 
structuring the interviews in this manner, the interviewees are to some extent in a 
position to influence the contents of the interview, while the interviewer is able to 
take the ‘conversation’ in different directions if the interview gets side-tracked. 
Moreover, the interviewer can follow up on statements of specific interest or new 
information that need elaboration. Thus, the interviewer may get information that 
he/she have not expected through the ‘storytelling’ of the interviewees. In this sense, 
semi-structured interviews enrich the empirical foundation of the researcher. Another 
benefit of this type of interview, is that during the course of the interviews I, as a 
researcher, am able to develop the questions to be asked in the next interview, so 
that interviewee X may respond to or elaborate on what interviewee Y told me in the 
previous interview. Thereby, I am able to develop my understanding of the 
partnership organisation, so that every detail is unveiled. It can be compared to 
creating a layer cake: you can continue to put layers on top of layers until the cake is 
done. In the same way, the interviews can be considered layers of information that 
are laid on top of each other until the level of information is saturated. One of the 
pitfalls, however, of semi-structured interviews is that the interviewer is 
‘participating’ in the interview and risk to influence the ‘conversation’. Thus, the 
                                                                
3 See appendix 1 for the interview guides. 
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interviewer has to be careful when responding to the interviewees and remain 
‘neutral’. 
The first type of interview was partly conducted with an interviewee who played a 
central role in Danish central level regional policy-making in order to obtain 
information about the historical development of the independent Danish approach. In 
the analysis of the historical development of Danish regional policy-making, this 
information was combined with secondary and primary documents ensuring validity 
of the information provided by the interviewee as well as to supplement the 
information found in the primary and secondary data. Partly, the first type of 
interview was also carried out at the regional level experiencing a historical 
development of regional level capacity to implement EC regional policy. Here, an actor 
who was directly involved in the planning and establishment of the first-ever regional 
institution was interviewed. The first type of interview was concerned with the 
institutional developments of the national and regional level institutions for regional 
policy-making. The second type of interview was concerned with the historical 
development of the interpretation and implementation of the partnership 
requirements both at national and regional levels with increased focus on networks 
and partnerships. Different levels of government representatives as well as regional, 
sub-regional and private actors were interviewed as partnership is expected to be 
both vertical and horizontal. The criteria for the selection of interviewees are 
elaborated below. The intention with the second type of interviews was to acquire 
access to information about the actual operation of the partnerships seen from the 
insiders’ perspective. Neither primary nor secondary data entirely hold this 
information. Interviewing a wide representation of actors involved in the partnership 
provides me with various perspectives on the same partnership operation, enabling 
me to interpret and understand the complex organisation of such a partnership.  
During September and October 2011, I carried out 19 interviews
4
 with actors from 
national, regional and sub-regional levels as well as private actors directly and 
indirectly involved in the partnerships in Denmark until 2006. 19 interviews appear to 
be an acceptable number as I discovered during the final interviews that the 
interviewees could not provide me with additional information; the level of 
information was saturated. The first steps to select this representation were taken 
during prior experience with interviewing centrally placed actors in Danish regional 
policy-making regarding the preparation of IQ-Net reports in 2004 and 2006 
                                                                
4 See appendix 2 for a complete list of the interviewees. 
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(Hjortnæs, 2004a, 2004b and 2006). In this connection, I acquired knowledge of three 
centrally placed actors that were involved in the implementation of EC/EU regional 
policy for many years. These interviewees have become ‘the usual suspects’ to be 
interviewed to this research. Two of them were situated at the nationally responsible 
agency for coordinating EC/EU regional policy into the Danish regional policy context, 
namely the National Agency for Enterprise and Housing (NAEH). The third actor, who 
wishes to be anonymous in this research, is situated at the Regional Development 
Department at North Jutland County and has been administrating the Objective 2 
Programmes for decades now. These three actors constituted an obvious point of 
departure. 
The next consideration was the representation of actors at different levels and 
between the public-private divide. Arguably, partnership was widest at the regional 
level for which reason the representation of actors should be strongest at this level of 
partnership. The two actors from the NAEH had sufficient knowledge about the 
national level administration of the Structural Funds both in terms of the design of the 
Programmes and the monitoring of them in relation to the Commission. The most 
interesting partnership was found at the regional level implementing the 
Programmes. As the ambition with this research, among other things is to contribute 
to the existing research on the implementation of the partnership principle in the 
member states with a framework for analysing the horizontal partnerships which 
previous research has not convincingly been able to do, representation of horizontal 
actors should be emphasised. The selection of these actors was thus based on the 
gradual obtainment of knowledge about the organisation of the partnership in North 
Jutland through review of existing literature, but when it came to the actual selection 
of actors, minutes of meetings within the partnership organisation and annual reports 
of the partnership were consulted in order to identify the actors being involved. 
Representatives were selected from the list of partners included in the partnerships 
based on the following criteria: geography, private/public, social partners, County 
level, municipal level and politicians/civil servants had to be represented reflecting 
the composition of the partnership. Since I did not know any of these actors, I also 
relied on snowballing, where I during the first interviews asked the interviewees if 
they could suggest other actors that could be relevant to interview. Not all of these 
suggested actors were interviewed if their type of representation had already been 
included. As it turned out, there were a number of actors that were ‘unavoidable’ in 
that they had either been central to certain parts of the process or they had been 
involved in regional policy-making in North Jutland for decades. During the course of 
the interviews, it became clear that some of the selected actors played dual roles in 
the partnership, which emphasised the representation of actors and organisations in 
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the partnership. In other words, the same number of actors represented a wider 
representation than expected in the first place. Generally, everybody has been 
accommodating and only in two cases the actors did not wish to participate in the 
interviews. One actor was too busy due to the 2011 parliamentary election and one 
actor did not considering himself relevant. These arguments were of course respected 
and corresponding representation was found instead. 
The 19 interviews were recorded enabling me to transcribe them subsequently, which 
has resulted in approximately 118 pages of interview summary. Instead of directly 
transcribing the interviews, transcribing them in summary was preferred since direct 
transcription is time-consuming. If necessary, it was possible to go back to the 
recordings to find support of an argument or to find phrases for quoting. Recording 
the interviews and subsequently transcribing them ensures that the empirical data 
found is more reliable in that other researchers can access them and potentially apply 
them to their study. 
During the interviews, the interviewees were asked to draw a sketch of the 
‘partnership’ as they had perceived it. Initially, it was the intention that the 
interviewees was to draw the sketch of the partnership to help me understand the 
complex organisation of it, the inclusion of actors and organisations and their position 
in the partnership, but as it turned out these drawings soon came to provide me with 
much more information than that. Obviously, the interviewees drew a sketch of the 
partnership as was required by the partnership principle in terms of inclusion, which I 
label the ‘formal partnership organisation’, but gradually a picture surfaced in which 
an ‘informal partnership’ was similarly situated around the formal partnership 
organisation with a strong influence on the operation of the formal partnership 
organisation. This sketch further helped me ask elaborating questions about the 
organisations and the relations within as well as between each of them, pointing 
towards a complex web of relations that was both formal and informal. Thus, a rather 
simple question soon turned out to be the most enlightening question of them all. 
Nearly, all interviews became focused on this drawing. Perhaps an unintended 
consequence of posing this question was that it helped spark the memory of the 
interviewees. Drawing the sketch somehow made the recollection of the interviewees 
clearer. It was obvious, how they enthusiastically became involved in the drawing and 
the ‘storytelling’; it was like a trip down memory lane, especially for those who are no 
longer involved in regional policy-making in North Jutland after the new structure was 
introduced in 2005.  
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2.4 Reliability, Generalizability and Validity 
Interpreting data in a hermeneutic sense may be criticised for its inability to generate 
viable and generalizable answers to the research, in that the same case may be 
interpreted differently by different researchers, thereby rendering it impossible to 
present an illustrative answer applicable to similar cases. Often this critique comes 
from the natural sciences applying quantitative research strategies based on a 
positivist epistemological position. The counterargument of hermeneutics is that 
because interpretation “is an art, we are hereby not constructing a set of fixed and 
rigid guidelines for a valid interpretation of a text” (Abulad, 2007, 22), implying that all 
answers may be equally valid as they represent the interpretation of the researcher. 
According to the critics of positivism, i.e. the relativists such as the social 
constructivists, “there is no external reality and only a socially constructed reality in 
which conscious people attach subjective meaning to their actions and interpret their 
own situation and the situation of others.” (Devine, 1995, 140) This implies that there 
is no rational objective science that can establish universal truths and that each actor 
interpretation of a case is equally ‘true’. However, the truth may be relative! In order 
to accommodate this criticism, I argue that the historical processes that have occurred 
in Danish regional policy-making can be analysed both through the interpretation of 
the recollection of actors involved in the process, as well as analysis of primary 
documents that either support or contradict these interpretations. Thus, as argued 
above, different types of triangulation of data depending on the nature of the 
problem may help assist in avoiding the pitfalls of the social constructivist, 
interpretive approach. When more types of data point to the same answer, the 
answer may be regarded reliable, valid and generalizable. 
Reliability “revolves around the question of designing and generating a sample of 
respondents” (Devine, 1995, 142) enabling a later researcher to arrive at the same 
results and conclusions through the employment of the same case study design. The 
best way to ensure reliability is to document the procedures followed in the case 
study (Yin, 2003, 37-9). The documentation of the interview guides and the recording 
of the interviews provide such documentation to this study. However, it should be 
noted that in case the same questions were posed to the same sample of 
interviewees, there is a risk that the result of the interviews may turn out differently, 
as the interviewees may give different answers to the new interviewer, either because 
of trouble of recollection which is always a problem when talking about events that 
took place retrospectively, or because the interviewee has reflected on the previous 
interview and is inspired to see things from a different perspective. Thus, arriving at 
the same results and conclusions may not be possible in the repetition of the 
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interviews pointing towards weak reliability. However, to compensate for this, the 
methodological considerations framing the research may make up for this weakness 
in that the data collection approach has been documented through considerations 
concerning criteria for selecting the interviewees. 
In the explorative case study, external validity is the core concern in order to test the 
generalizability of the research (Yin, 2003, 37). As mentioned above, the aim with this 
study has been to explore how the interpretation and implementation of the 
partnership inclusion and process requirements into the member states has 
generated change in the Danish regional policy-making institution. In order to do this, 
an alternative theoretical framework has been proposed differing from that of multi-
level governance, which had the ambition to investigate types of governance 
generated in the interaction between EC/EU and member states’ regional policies. 
Based on the explorative nature of this research, an underlying aim has been to 
propose a new theoretical framework for such an analysis. Based on the hermeneutic 
process moving from the parts to the whole, the findings of the analysis and the 
theoretical framework should support and develop the focus of each part towards a 
conclusion of the study creating both internal and external validity and consequently 
generalizability. In such an outcome, the theoretical framework may be applied to 
similar case studies of other regions and member states confirming the 
generalizability of this research. In cases where the case study does not support the 
theoretical framework and vice-versa, the theoretical framework has to be adjusted 
along the way to ensure external validity. Alternatively, there is a problem with the 
selected case and its interpretation: to find this out replication of the theoretical 
framework to similar cases must be carried out (Yin, 2003, 37). Hence, the 
hermeneutic circle is extended. 
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3. EU Regional Policy and Its Institutional Impact 
Following the introduction, research delimitation and research questions, the present 
chapter is an extended introduction in which the rationale behind the arguments 
made in the previous chapter is elaborated. The present chapter takes its point of 
departure in the establishment and development of EU regional policy. The policy, 
and in particular the defining principles for its implementation, has consequences for 
the practical employment in the member states. Here, in particular, I attempt to 
discuss how the interpretation of the partnership principle has organisational 
consequences in the member states. As such research has already discussed and 
analysed this, but I suggest that it is necessary to reinterpret this research leading to a 
distinctive framework of analysis that existing research has not had. 
For more than four decades EU regional policy has received attention from both the 
scholarly world and from practitioners. EU regional policy has received this attention 
partly because it accounts for more than one third of the total EU budget and affects 
many policy areas and many potential regional development project applicants. Since 
its introduction, EU regional policy has been concerned with combating regional 
divergences in order to strengthen the EU as a whole as well as individual regions vis-
à-vis international competition. This is partly because during the 1980s, the first ever 
EC regional policy introduced new policy implementation instruments leading to new 
ways of contemplating the interaction between the EC and the member states in 
policy implementation. The common EU regional policy coordinates national and EU 
regional policies by formulating guidelines and establishing certain principles towards 
that end resulting in coordination and interaction between the two regional policy 
approaches in the member states.  
The objective of the first chapter following the introduction and methodology is to 
place the present research within its originating research context; i.e. regional policy 
analysis. It will not provide a state of the art, but offer a discussion of the implications 
of the definition of the partnership principle to this investigation within the regional 
policy-making context, and how it is relevant to reinvestigate the partnership principle 
in order to understand the empirical and theoretical implications this has to the 
analysis of its interpretation and implementation. Before this, the establishment and 
development of a common EU regional policy is briefly sketched out in order to avoid 
taking the partnership principle out of its context. It is important to understand that 
the partnership principle is part of a bigger conditional package in order for the 
member states and their regions to receive financial support for their regional 
development. Likewise, it is important to understand that the common EU regional 
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policy has developed over the course of time following other Community 
developments (such as enlargements and changing socio-economic conditions) which 
in turn may impact the implementation of the policy in the member states along the 
way. 
3.1 The EU Regional Policy Context 
This section serves as an introductory background sketch of how the common EC/EU 
regional policy was established and how it developed into an influential policy that 
interferes with the member states’ regional policies by setting conditions for financial 
support. Especially, institutional and organisational consequences have been 
identified. 
3.1.1 The Establishment and Development of EU Regional Policy  
From its birth, the European Economic Community (EEC) had an awareness of regional 
economic disparities and the problems these may cause for the Community: in the 
Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, although not directly 
referring to a regional policy of the Community, the aim was a ‘… a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion’ (Article 2). 
References were also made to ‘reducing the differences between the various regions 
and the backwardness of the less favoured regions’ (Bache, 1998, 31). In addressing 
these economic challenges a number of financial instruments with a regional 
dimension were set up: the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) (Piattoni, 2008, Evans, 1999, 
Bache, 1998).  
At the beginning of the 1970s discussion regarding an EC regional policy was 
intensified in the EC due to increasing economic and social inequalities in a deepened 
and widened Community. Moreover, it was argued that the absence of a policy to 
address the increasing economic and social inequalities would become a threat 
towards the ambitions of the EC to expand the Single Market into an economic and 
monetary union. It was argued that an additional financial instrument was needed to 
address these problems and demands (Bache, 1998, 36 and Wishlade, 1996, 32). 
Consequently, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) with a size of 1.3 
billion EUA was established aiming to increase regional convergence across the 
Community and to address economic problems of entire regions and territories and 
not just one industrial sector within the member states (Piattoni, 2008, 74). In other 
words, the ERDF addressed regional inequalities “through the participation in the 
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development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions” (Evans, 1999, 68-9). 
Under this scheme, EC regional policy support was based on a quota basis where 
member states could apply for Funds for specific projects. Every member state had 
the right to a certain quota of the ERDF budget and as such the Commission could 
refund the individual member states’ expenses to regional development. Thus, 
member states received a quota of Funds and were responsible of administering the 
support. This implied that the EC regional policy Funds became incorporated into the 
national regional policy approach often replacing national funds for nationally 
prioritised projects. There were no conditions for receiving the money leading the 
member states to be in full control (Illeris, 2010, 199). 
Over the years, efforts were made to change the quota system of regional economic 
reimbursement towards a more comprehensive partly EC controlled scheme. These 
attempts, however, met resistance from the member states which argued that 
regional policy was a domestic policy area (Bache, 1998, 54-66). During the 1980s, 
however, talks were initiated about the establishment of the Single Market, all the-
while the Community was enlarged by three new poor member states. This brought 
about a concern that the poor member states (i.e. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
would be left worse off with the introduction of the Single Market and its 
requirements concerning free market forces. Therefore, there was a demand for 
financial compensation leading to the establishment of an EC regional policy to 
address the problems that the poor member states would potentially come to face as 
consequence of the introduction of the Single Market (Bache, 2008a, 40-1). 
Consequently, uneven regional development being a core obstacle to the 
establishment of the Single Market (and the Single European Act (SEA) establishing 
the Single Market), the SEA included a title on economic and social cohesion legally 
obliging the EC to reduce the disparities between the member states and their regions 
and committing the Council to reform the Structural Funds that had hitherto been 
supporting the ad hoc quota based regional development schemes (Dinan, 1999, 430-
33). This became the basis of the first ever EC common regional policy. 
3.1.2 The 1988 Reform of the Structural Funds 
Thus, it implied that the new regional policy instruments were to redirect EC Funds 
from the wealthier member states to those in more need by focusing support on the 
poor member states in the Southern part of the Community. The reform of the 
Structural Funds was presented in 1988 introducing completely new principles and 
ideas about a common EC approach to regional policy-making to achieve that 
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objective. The objective was to have a more focused and effective regional policy 
through the employment of the Structural Funds by doubling the Funds over a period 
of five years. To ensure the effective and measureable outcome of the policy (i.e. 
decreased regional divergences) a number of conditions were attached to its 
implementation. Perhaps as a demand of the richer member states contributing more 
to the overall EU budget than they received in return in regional development 
support, regional development Funds were associated with conditions for their 
distribution. Also the Commission was interested in value for money (Michie and 
Fitzgerald, 1997, 19 and Wishlade, 1996, 33). 
The Commission designed four principles conditioning and framing the objective of EC 
regional policy and incorporated them into the reform: concentration, additionality, 
programming and partnership. These conditions demanded that in the first place, not 
all regions could be eligible for support. Rather a number of eligibility criteria had to 
be met; the support received from the EC should be supplemented by support from 
national or regional schemes; projects applying for support should be based on a 
multi-annual programme approach that was thematically focused instead of the 
previous ad hoc approach to project applications (Martin, 1999, 80-2, Wishlade, 1996, 
37 and Sutcliffe, 2000, 293-4). Finally, the partnership principle demanded that the 
implementation of the policy should be carried out  
“through close consultations between the Commission, the Member 
State concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter 
at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a 
partner in pursuit of a common goal. These consultations are hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘partnership’” (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88, 
Article 4, §1) 
because the EC approach should be complement to the existing national regional 
policy approaches. This required coordination between the two approaches and their 
institutional contexts. Partnerships should be present in all stages of the 
implementation process; i.e. preparation, financing, monitoring and evaluation. The 
1988 definition of the partnership principle thus established a vertical organisation of 
cooperation that had not been seen previously in many member states.  
3.1.3 The 1993 and 1999 Reforms of the Structural Funds 
Nearing the end of a programming period, the ‘rules’ for the consequent 
programming period were up for redesign. The 1993 reform took place in the context 
of the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty establishing Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the deepening of EU cooperation. At the same time, unemployment 
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and economic difficulties across the EU were increasing, for which reason there was a 
need to increase the funds of the EU regional policy to address these problems: the 
resources were increased to 27.4 billion ECU by 1999 (Wishlade, 1996, 48). Generally, 
the changes to the 1993 reform were minor compared to the contents of the 1988 
reform and the main principles were retained. However, there was agreement to 
make regional policy-making more effective. This implied some simplification of the 
concentration and programming principles (Sutcliffe, 2000, 298). 
When preparing the 1999 reform of the Structural Funds, focus was on the 
forthcoming enlargement by new and relatively poor member states. The instruments 
and principles had to be changed according to the new regional challenges that the EU 
would face. The 1999 reform of the Structural Funds can be considered part of a wider 
restructuring of EU finances to meet the challenges and costs of enlarging the EU. An 
agreement was reached that transferred Structural Funds from existing member 
states to the accession states. A number of adjustments to the previous reforms were 
made based on three aims of reform, namely: 1) that the effectiveness of the financial 
instruments were to be improved by strengthening concentration and reducing the 
number of Objectives as well as improving the management of the Structural Funds 
especially by making the responsibilities of the partners more clear; 2) that the budget 
for economic and social development should be maintained; and 3) that economic 
and social development should be extended to the new member states (EUROPA, 
2001, 1-2 and Bache, 2008a, 44). 
In these reforms, the partnership principle was reformulated and widened to include 
more actors in the process giving it a horizontal character, although simultaneously 
the power of the national level in implementing the partnership requirements was 
gradually strengthened. The 1993 reform of the Structural Funds widened the 
partnership requirements to involve the “competent authorities and bodies - 
including, within the framework of each Member State national rules and current 
practices, the economic and social partner, designated by the Member State” (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93). Clearly, the clause ‘designated by the Member State’ 
can impair the wide and inclusive partnership that the Commission expected and that 
the regional levels hoped for. Likewise, the 1999 reform of the Structural Funds 
included more partners into the partnership definition to include “any other relevant 
competent bodies” (Council Regulation No. 1260/1999, Article 8 § 1). Seemingly, this 
formulation appears to be another widening and deepening of the partnership 
requirements. However, in practise this inclusion may be hindered by the member 
states as an extended clause regarding the national conditions for such 
implementation was added: “The partnership shall be conducted in full compliance 
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with the respective institutional, legal and financial powers of each of the partners” 
(Council Regulation No. 1260/1999, Article 8 § 1). This attachment opened the door to 
increased national level influence on the partnerships as compared to the first 
definition where coordination and cooperation between the two regional policy 
approaches lacked clarification. 
Thus, the creation and development of EU regional policy appeared to develop from a 
member state dominated policy consisting of just one financial instrument, to a 
common EU regional policy that has a strong regional focus aiming at combating social 
and economic inequalities across the EU through geographically targeting resources 
that invest in long-term development projects in the member states. The programmes 
are administered under the principle of partnership that has developed from 
encompassing only the EU, member state and sub-national level actors (vertical 
dimension) to, by 2006, involving horizontal and vertical interaction between, on the 
one hand, regional and local partners and social partners (i.e. trade unions, business, 
voluntary and environmental groups) and, on the other hand, partners in national 
government and the Commission. The contents and structures provided by the 
succeeding reforms of the Structural Funds created a policy implementation process 
that operates in all member states according to existing national practices. Every 
three to six years member states and the Commission are to negotiate the Funds 
available to the member state’s eligible regions. Upon completion, member state 
authorities at different levels prepare regional development plans for each eligible 
region according to the concentration criteria which are then negotiated with the 
Commission. The programmes, then, specify detailed strategies and resource 
allocation for the programmes allocated from the ERDF, the ESF, the FIFG and the 
EAGGF and national and regional funds. Once these programmes and resource 
allocations are approved, they are implemented in the regions. To ensure that 
implementation takes place as planned; Monitoring Committees oversee the process 
and formulate mid-term and ex-post evaluations of the programmes for the 
Commission. This structure implies that the implementation of EU regional policy 
invades national regional making practices, which is the point of discussion in the 
following paragraphs. 
3.1.4 Partnership – A New Form of Policy-Making  
The 1988 reform of the Structural Funds had at least two related implications: first, it 
is important to acknowledge that all of a sudden huge amounts of money became 
available to the regions for their development; money that had not necessarily been 
available to the regions before. This implied that the regions were potentially 
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empowered by the 1988 reform just by the availability of the new Funds but of course 
on condition. On the face of it, it may be expected that the regions and the member 
states would do anything to get the access to the Funds, thereby adopting the 
requirements conditioned by the reform. Of course, receiving the additional Funds for 
regional development would seem attractive to the member states and the regions, in 
particular. But in practise, the requirements for receiving the Funds may be too strict 
deterring member states to live up to the demands. Moreover, it may in fact 
constitute a challenge to some member states to live up to these demands due to lack 
of capacity.  
Second, new forms of cooperation had to be set up in the member states and the 
regions to receive the Funds, especially since the partnership principle stresses 
involvement of new actors besides the member state level authorities. The 
partnership principle has received the most attention, as it allegedly had the most 
impact on the member states in their interaction with the EU on regional policy 
implementation.  
As such the emphasis on partnership was couched in the language of policy 
effectiveness, but the changes that this would entail, would potentially have 
considerable political and organisational implications (Thielemann, 2002, 48). In the 
words of Scott (1998, 181) “the promise of partnership lies in the nature of the polity 
which it seeks to construct.” It rests upon sharing of responsibility across different 
levels of government with the Commission conceiving the member states as more 
than single entities and imposing a role for sub-national actors which may not be 
compatible with traditional patterns of governance within the member states. In the 
words of Getimis, Demetropoulou and Paraskevopoulos “In particular, its impact on 
regional and local policy-making is supposed to be twofold: a direct one, by providing 
increased resources through redistribution and a new set of rules and procedures for 
the formulation and implementation of development policies; and an indirect one, by 
shaping intra-regional interactions and thus promoting local institutional capacity 
through the creation of intra-, inter- and trans-regional networks that support local 
development initiatives.” (2008, 95) The partnership principle and its interpretation 
and implementation is also core to this investigation, for which reason a reinvention 
of the discussion of the implications which the partnership definition may have for its 
implementation is relevant. This discussion is initially based on existing research and 
subsequently brought a step further to accommodate the ambitions of this 
dissertation. 
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Extensive volumes of research have been carried out regarding the implementation of 
the partnership principle after its initial introduction into the member states, and 
subsequent elaborations and theoretical approaches have been developed on this 
basis. The partnership requirement has been central to the development of the multi-
level governance approach by Marks, Hooghe and collaborators (1996). The definition 
of the partnership principle was taken to imply and lead to emerging forms of multi-
level governance. Here, the political implications the implementation of the 
partnership principle on the member states were analysed. The conclusion was that 
the implementation of the partnership principle had varying consequences based on 
the existing institutional structures leading to differing impacts on territorial 
restructuring.  These studies demonstrated that within centralised member states, 
central government sought to limit the impact of the partnership principle, while in 
decentralised member states, sub-national actors were better able to take advantage 
of the partnership opportunities (Marks, 1996, 413). Arguably, it was uncritically 
accepted and argued that the partnership definition represented a new method of 
working together leading to the involvement of actors below and above the national 
level (i.e. multi-level governance) but with varying experiences. Thus, the core 
argument of the multi-level governance approach was that regional political 
responsibility that had previously been a national prerogative was redistributed to 
actors at other levels, thereby creating new forms of relationships between the 
actors. These conclusions were reached on an empirical basis, but lacking a 
framework of theoretical considerations. This is the context in which most studies of 
the implementation of the partnership principle are carried out. They come to similar 
conclusions: that the partnership principle has brought with it restructuring of the 
national regional policy-making structures with varying experience across the EU, 
either towards empowerment of the regional level or a strengthening of the gate-
keeping powers of the state level. Let us have a look at these arguments before 
turning to my attempt to reinvent the discussion of the implications of the partnership 
principle based on a framework including both theoretical and empirical arguments. 
Based on the organisational relations which the partnership principle has gradually 
constructed, two views on the outcome of its implementation have transpired: on the 
one hand, the partnership principle has empowered the regional level, but on the 
other hand, it is argued that the changed formulation of the partnership principle has 
increasingly brought the member state level back in power over the process. These 
contrasting viewpoints are formed on the basis of the definition of and the underlying 
objectives of the partnership principle which leads to varying interpretations. 
Arguably, the partnership principle was the invention of the Commission with its 
monopoly of initiative on institutional structures. Critics have been arguing that the 
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Commission sought to introduce the new (regional/local) level into decision-making 
and implementation by empowering these new actors in an attempt to bypass state 
power thereby creating room for itself (Bache, 2008, 46 and 49 and Hooghe, 1996b, 
100). Thus, it has been argued that the Commission had an agenda of its own, so that 
it would be involved in the implementation of EC/EU regional policy within the 
member states itself. It has been argued that the increased role of the Commission in 
national regional policy-making has created tension with some member state 
governments as the objectives of the Commission have not always been consistent 
with those of the member state (Bachtler, 1997, 84). It has been argued by Scott 
(1998, 182) that “if, as some have claimed partnership ‘has never worked to 
expectations’ this is because these expectations have been constructed in isolation 
from national constitutional context(s)”. 
Two different reasons of why the Commission has sought to define the partnership 
principle in this manner have been suggested. First, the Commission has sought to 
empower the sub-national level so that it could get other information on policy needs 
and processes than the ones that the national level traditionally has provided. Second, 
the Commission is very dependent on other actors for implementation. Therefore, the 
sub-national level in cooperation with the national level and other actors are 
responsible of implementation while also being accountable to the Commission. In 
this sense, the Commission has elevated and empowered the regional level as a 
means of achieving more effective implementation (Goldsmith, 2003, 121). According 
to the huge bulk of research that has been carried out concerning its interpretation 
and implementation, the regional level was included in regional development policy 
for the first time like the European level became increasingly involved in national 
regional policy-making. 
Discussion has focused on regional empowerment (and the evolution of multi-level 
governance), to which extent it has taken and takes place and how this influences 
policy implementation. As a consequence of the new-established governance 
definitions of EU regional policy during the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and 
the subsequent extensions, today there are emerging forms of interactions that are 
less orderly than the traditional relationship between regions, governments and the 
EU that existed prior to the introduction of new governance structures. This implies 
that actors at all levels interact with and influence each other across and between 
levels as well as across policies without any clear cut or extensive patterns or rules. As 
a consequence of the new-established governance mechanisms, most member states 
have regionalised their economic development authorities taking the implementation 
of EU regional policy in a direction of multi-level governance (Goldsmith, 2003, 114-5). 
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Since then, regionalisation has spurred a bottom-up growth of regional and local 
authorities to be involved in regional policy implementation. As a part of this 
regionalisation, it is argued that actors across level of government are working more 
closely together both vertically and horizontally. According to Bachtler, the 
empowerment of the regional level has brought with it an on-going mobilisation of 
resources that might not have been involved otherwise, prompting cooperation in 
which various horizontal and vertical networks have influence (Bachtler, 1997, 86-7). 
The question is whether this in fact constitutes empowerment of the regional level or 
if it is merely a question of entitling the regional actors to be involved in partnerships. 
This all depends on the national interpretation of the partnership principle.  
Bailey and De Propris (2002, 408) argue that a general interpretation is that regional 
and local authorities have not formally been given power in the implementation 
process either because of lack of capacity or because the national level has decided to 
remain in power over regional policy implementation. This is in accordance with the 
argument put forward by Smyrl (1997, 288-90) who claims that the main variables 
that explain empowerment of sub-national actors are found at the regional level; i.e. 
that roles played by regional actors in national regional policy in the years prior to the 
introduction of EU regional policy. In order for the regions to play the role intended 
for them by the Commission, the regional actors required capacity for action. In the 
regions where similar networks already existed, adoption of the EU requirements 
would be easier. Consequently, some regions were better candidates for 
empowerment than others. Moreover, it is argued that only the means of 
empowerment were determined by national conditions and interpretations. EU 
regional policy provided technical and political resources to the regions, whereas the 
financial resources were directly transferred to the national level.  
However, because of the added member state clause it may be argued that “in 
practice, Member States have considerable scope for favouring or hindering 
partnership by providing a wider/narrower definition, by setting certain rules for 
running/monitoring committees and by providing mechanisms in support of partners’ 
involvement.” (Nappini, 2005, 4) Bachtler and Mendez argue that “the evolution of 
cohesion policy over successive programme periods is one of continued policy 
renationalization.” (Bachtler and Mendez, 2007, 536) This means that in contrast to 
the arguments presented before, the member states have also been increasingly 
empowered. As Roberts (2003, 2) argues:  
“Although designed as a single unified package of policies and rules 
applicable across the entire EC, the principles and regulations which 
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govern the operation of the Structural Funds allow individual member 
states and regions considerable latitude both in terms of the design and 
detailed planning of proposed regional development programmes, and 
in the implementation and management of approved programmes.” 
However, Sutcliffe warns that the influence of the member state governments should 
not be exaggerated and that the Commission and regional actors continue to play 
significant roles in EU regional policy-making (Sutcliffe, 2000, 291).  
Ever since the first reform of the Structural Funds in 1988, it has been a concern that 
EU regional policy would be characterised by a democratic deficit and remain 
primarily an EU level responsibility. Therefore, greater emphasis was put on involving 
an increased number of actors in the partnerships such as social partners including 
non-governmental organisations, pressure groups and civil society organisations in the 
succeeding reforms. The idea was that shared (both horizontal and vertical) decisions 
were better decisions (Piattoni, 2008, 86). Adding these partners to the partnerships 
implied for the first time both vertical and horizontal governance opportunities. As 
has been seen, partnerships had been largely vertical involving the Commission, 
member state and the regional levels. At the same time the Commission withdrew 
from some areas of regional policy-making (monitoring programmes and controlling 
finance) leaving more responsibility to national governments in these areas. However, 
in other areas such as deciding the rules of the game and priorities the Commission 
maintained its prime responsibility (Goldsmith, 2003, 126). As such, this was 
considered a step back in terms of multi-level governance and a strengthening of the 
role of national governments in EU regional policy instead. These changes were made 
based on what is considered an improvement of the effectiveness in the management 
of the Structural Funds: “As regards effectiveness and impact, the Commission will 
encourage a better targeted and more operational partnership using the instruments 
selected for that purpose during programming.” (DG Regio, 2001, 8) Arguably, a 
better targeted and more operational partnership is based more and more on the 
existing structures of the member state level, and should be adjusted to these 
accordingly. 
There seems to be a dichotomy or a field of tension between those who on the one 
hand argue in favour of the partnership principle as a window of opportunity for sub-
national actors to be mobilised in EU regional policy implementation and those on the 
other hand who claim that the exact formulation of the partnership principle affords 
the member states with increased powers to control the implementation of EU 
regional policy. Hence, the question is which scenario plays out in practice? A similar 
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question is asked by Bache and Olsson (2001, 217) forming the basis of their study of 
EU policy diffusion in Britain and Sweden: “is the EU’s structural fund policy 
characterised by national policy styles or do we see a tendency towards European 
isomorphy?” They conclude that it is not an easy question to answer since the 
diffusion process possibly ranges from resistance, on the one hand, to imitation, on 
the other. Based on this, they argue that EU Structural Funds policy within Britain and 
Sweden is perhaps a matter of adaptation rather than full adoption of the policy. 
According to Bache (2010), history tells the story of adaptation to the partnership 
requirements. During the first programming period (1989-1993) a number of member 
states were hostile to this innovation, since it invaded national regional policy-making 
territory. This implied that the effects of the introduction of the partnership principle 
were limited during the first programming period. Only few multi-level partnerships 
were established, which led the actors to be involved in a dialogue about partnership 
– a dialogue that was not seen before in some member states. Bachtler argues that 
many member states had difficulty adapting to these new rules, concepts and 
terminology (1998, 647). This pattern of partnership arrangements was varied across 
the EU, both during the first programming period as well as the successive one (1994-
1999). However, during the second period, national partnership practices were slowly 
established across member states (Bache, 2010, 61-2). Still, variation occurred 
depending on the institutional structure of the member state. Within centralised 
member states, central government sought to limit the impact of the partnership 
principle, while in decentralised member states, sub-national actors were better able 
to take advantage of the partnership opportunities (Marks, 1996, 413). A similar, 
more extensive study carried out by Kelleher et.al. (1999) demonstrates that member 
states continue to influence the functioning of partnerships. The study also found that 
in member states with little or no experience with partnerships, the introduction of 
the partnership principle initiated partnerships whereas member states more 
experienced with partnerships, simply implemented and modernised them. These 
initial steps have since then led to learning effects across the member states ensuring 
that regional and sub-regional partners were actually empowered leading to some 
form of decentralisation (Kelleher et.al., 1999, vi-viii and 71). These studies are backed 
by the findings of Bache:  
“Thus, while research suggests that partnership has promoted a general 
shift towards multi-level governance (regional structures established 
throughout the EU, partnerships set up, etc.), the nature  and 
significance of these shifts vary greatly according to differences between 
(and sometimes within) domestic arenas.” (Bache, 2010, 67) 
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It is further claimed that longer experience with the partnership principle leads to the 
more likelihood of deep learning. In other words, the maturity of the partnership 
matters to its magnitude. This is evident during the second programming period 
where member states had had the opportunity to get familiar with the functioning 
and requirements of partnerships for some years, leading some of them to change 
their goals and preferences through the involvement in partnerships and networks 
(Bache, 2010, 67). Along the same lines, Benz and Fürst (2002, 21-2) argue that 
regional development does not take place without policy learning, which implies that 
path-dependent processes are gradually changed by the introduction of alternative 
approaches or interventions. Similarly, the more specific composition of the 
partnership is dependent of learning experiences, but it has also been shaped by the 
extension of the partnership principle that has occurred in parallel with the member 
states getting familiar with partnerships. It is further pointed out that the ability of a 
region or a member state to learn depends on the context: “on patterns of 
interaction, on social and cultural values and ideas, on organizations designed to 
support the generation of knowledge and innovation and, in particular, on the way 
new knowledge is used.” (Benz and Fürst, 2002, 23) 
The above discussion about the partnership principle is, like much other research, 
based on an understanding of the partnership principle as a practical method of 
working together or as “a European institution that the European Commission has 
sought to give normative content” (Thielemann, 2000, 1) involving actors at different 
levels. These interpretations are based on the formulation of the partnership 
principle, which, although it has become more and more precise as a result of the 
succeeding reforms, remains relatively wide and far-reaching enabling member states 
to interpret its implementation as they please. Hooghe (1996c, 2) argues that the 
reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 with the introduction of the partnership 
principle requirements was “a very ambitious goal, given that these uniform 
procedures were expected to work equally well in twelve different political systems” 
for which reason the formulation of the partnership principle turned out the way it 
did. Perhaps, it is best defined in a wide manner allowing each member state to fit the 
requirements into their own context, thus avoiding “to straight jacket the partnership 
exchange into a formal procedure, and especially to jeopardize the liveliness of 
proactive contribution of all participants” (ECAS, 2009, 17). In this sense, the 
partnership principle aims to develop a pluralistic way of governing which should be 
open and adoptable to institutional systems of the individual member states. This 
implies that today emerging forms of interactions occur that are less orderly than the 
traditional relationship between regions, governments and the EU that existed prior 
to the introduction of new governance structures. In turn, this implies that actors at 
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all levels interact with and influence each other across and between levels as well as 
across policies without any clear cut or extensive patterns or rules. Thus, research has 
illustrated that implementing the partnership principle into national institutional 
contexts results in a hybrid of inter-organisational arrangements that are rooted in 
both systems. Arguably, the new governance structures that EC regional policy 
established during the late 1980s and gradually developed in the subsequent reforms 
may have paved the way for change in domestic regional policy governance systems 
so that these may be restructured and adapt to the multi-level governance of the EU 
regional policy. As such, this may prove to be a challenge to the administrative 
structures of some member states, which the Commission had also expected. It was 
not expected that the new governance structures working in partnership would be 
implemented in the first attempt since not all member states were prepared with the 
relevant capacities, rather it would be a gradual process (Bailey and De Propris, 2002).  
These studies call our attention to the idea that the partnership principle is a 
mechanism that creates new opportunities for interaction between levels of 
government and expectedly also the gradual inclusion of non-public actors with the 
wider definition of the partnership principle, which in turn influences ways of regional 
policy-making of member states. This is the point of departure for the following 
discussion of the exact theoretical and empirical implications, which reinitiating an 
investigation of the interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle 
into the member states, has.  
3.2 Revisiting the Partnership Principle 
It is necessary to return to the formulation of the partnership principle and the 
expected governance structures that it requires in order to be able to understand its 
implementation and interpretation by the member states. First, it is necessary to split 
the partnership principle in two parts; one which defines the partnership and one 
which sets the stage for its implementation: the member states’ existing institutional 
structures. I begin with the latter. The partnership principle defines that partnership 
employment should take place in the member states according to their institutional 
and legal backgrounds. This implies, like most multi-level governance research of the 
implementation of the partnership principle has revealed, that member states’ 
institutional contexts matter to its implementation. This cannot be ignored the way 
the multi-level governance approach has done in its theoretical development, 
although its initial ambition was different. The analysis of the implementation of the 
partnership principle is an institutionalist analysis of the interaction and coordination 
between the EU partnership institution seeking to structure cooperation between 
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actors in Structural Funds regional policy implementation, on the one hand, and the 
member state regional policy-making institution, on the other hand. Compared to 
member states’ regional policy-making institutions, the partnership principle is a 
newly constructed institution that functions as a requirement for financial support. 
This challenges the member states’ regional policy-making institution compelling the 
member states to restructure the existing regional policy-making institution according 
to these demands – at least gradually as experience lead to learning. Expectedly, this 
may lead to changes in the existing regional policy-making structures – at least this is 
the case when looking at the 1988 partnership principle definition in isolation. 
However, when bringing the 1993 and the 1999 definitions into the picture, a 
different outcome may emerge. Here, member states have been afforded with 
greater latitude to decide the partnerships to match their existing ways of regional 
policy-making. Subsequently, the way in which partnerships unfold themselves in the 
interaction and coordination between the member states’ and EU regional policy-
making structures depends on the member states’ interpretation of the partnership 
principle according to institutional traditions. Accordingly, it becomes more and more 
pertinent to analyse the implementation of the partnership principle within an 
institutionalist framework. Evidently, both the existing member states’ regional policy-
making institutional organisation and the more precise formulation of the partnership 
principle appear to be parameters explaining the partnership principle’s 
implementation. 
This is in accordance with many studies that have concluded that the specific 
institutional history of the member states is one of the key factors determining actual 
partnership forms (Kelleher et.al., 1999, 35). These studies show the importance of 
nation state level variables (pre-existing vertical and horizontal governance 
arrangements and decentralised vs. centralised state structures) in the 
implementation of the partnership principle into existing practices. In a centralised 
member state the central state has greater opportunity to control the implementation 
of the policy in the national context, whereas in the decentralised member state 
regional actors have greater influence on policy-making compared to the centralised 
states. Institutional arrangements of structures and procedures is one thing, the 
various “different conventions and traditions which exist in the member states 
regarding the roles and functions performed by the public, private and voluntary 
sectors” (Roberts, 2003, 3) is another. This point of view has subsequently been 
supported by a voluminous regional policy literature (Bache, Bachtler, Kelleher et al.). 
Partnerships depend on the availability of resources and competences to be brought 
together and these vary from one institutional context to the other. For instance, it 
may be argued that the partnership principle is potentially implemented more easily 
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into contexts that are already similarly experienced with working in partnership, than 
in contexts which do not have traditions of involving actors below the state level or 
private and social organisations. In the context where partnerships have been 
practiced to some extent or where at least actors at the levels below the state have 
had influence, resources have already been mobilised to be transferred to the new EU 
partnerships. 
The above-cited partnership definitions involve two aspects of the so-called 
partnership. The partnership principle is inclusion regulating in that it prescribes 
which actors should be involved in the implementation of EU regional policy in the 
member states. In the first definition ‘the Commission, the member state concerned 
and the competent authorities designated by the member state at national, regional, 
local or other levels’ are required to be involved in order for a partnership to be 
present. With the subsequent reforms and redefinitions of the partnership principle, 
more and more partners have been included. This inclusion is also regulated by the 
fact that the clause regarding the member states’ interpretation of this inclusion 
according to national institutional, legal and financial powers has been added 
although the member states are the practitioners of regulation - once again 
highlighting the institutional analysis. 
Similarly, the definition of the partnership principle establishes requirements about 
the process of involvement of these actors which is evident in the formulation 
“through close consultations” between the involved actors as well as the extended 
definition in the 1999 reform that “in designating the most representative partnership 
at national, regional, local or other level, the Member State shall create a wide and 
effective association of the relevant bodies, according to national rules and practice” 
(Council Regulation No. 1260/1999, Article 8 § 1, my emphasis). An immediate 
interpretation of these formulations suggests that they refer to the interaction, 
coordination and cooperation between the actors at different levels and that no level 
can act independently. A more nuanced reading proposes that ‘close consultations 
and wide and effective association’ refer to that the actors involved in the 
partnerships should establish cooperation affording influence of the process to all 
actors through contribution and exchange of their individual resources and 
competences representing the potential for deeper transformation of actor behaviour 
and preferences. 
The EU partnership principle and the partnerships which it requires has firmly put its 
fingerprints on the multi-level governance discourse of EU regional policy research 
since its introduction. It is time to go beyond the multi-level governance framework 
51 
 
which was created based on the first partnership definition and revisit the 
implementation of the partnership principle into existing member states’ institutional 
structures. This is necessary as the multi-level governance approach does not directly 
consider the combination of the member states’ regional policy-making institutional 
structures and the inclusion and process aspects of the definition in relation to its 
implementation but is more concerned with how the balance of power between the 
member state level and the supra-national and regional levels has shifted as a 
consequence of new forms of governance in European integration. Accordingly, the 
multi-level governance approach has not taken into account how the interaction 
between the two aspects and the actual interaction within the member states 
between the EU and the national regional policy approaches present a potential for 
deeper transformation of actor behaviour and preferences. This is my ambition. I 
propose a supplementary theoretical and empirical framework for understanding its 
implementation based on the empirical and theoretical analysis of the partnership 
principle highlighted above. To some extent these interpretations of the empirical and 
theoretical implications of the interpretation of the partnership principle are implicit 
in the multi-level analyses that have already been carried out, but they have not been 
articulated and pursued in such detail as I suggest here with the combination of three 
theoretical perspectives to embrace these empirical implications. The theoretical 
framework is based on the fact that, on the one hand, it is crucial to analyse the 
existing national institutional structure that nearly every scholar has agreed is 
conditional in explaining variations in its implementation. On the other hand, the EU 
partnership definition resembles the definition of a network as a mechanism for 
coordinating governance between different actors. But it also involves a process 
which the governance network does not entirely take into consideration. A particular 
variant of this network governance is concerned with partnership as a dynamic 
process always in development and adjusting to the changes in the context in which it 
operates based on longer term objectives. The practical employment of the 
partnerships into the member states depends on these explanatory factors. The 
following chapter will pick up on these arguments in the development of a theoretical 
framework that embraces both the institutional and the inclusion and process aspects 
of the partnership principle disregarded by the multi-level governance approach. 
  
52 
 
 
53 
 
4. Theoretical Perspectives 
When attempting to analyse the way in which the interpretation and implementation 
of the partnership principle has generated change in national regional policy-making, 
the multi-level governance approach appears to be the obvious choice as a conceptual 
tool of analysis. However, as mentioned previously, the multi-level governance 
perspective falls short vis-à-vis the scope of the ambitions of this research. The 
following will specify the shortcomings of the multi-level governance approach for this 
purpose after a short account of the central arguments of the multi-level governance 
perspective. 
Multi-Level Governance 
The multi-level governance approach was developed in the 1980s as a reaction to the 
changes that the EU had undergone with the introduction of the Single European Act 
in 1986 and the consequent establishment of an EC regional policy introducing new 
forms of cooperation with the partnership principle requirements. These occurrences 
challenged the dominant debate between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. In the middle of this debate the multi-level governance perspective 
surfaced (Bache, 2008b, 22-3). 
Generally, the multi-level governance perspective is concerned with the shifts in 
horizontal relations between state and society and the changes in the vertical 
relations between actors at different levels occurring in the EU. In early versions of 
multi-level governance, ‘multi-level’ referred to the increased vertical interactions and 
the consequent interdependence between actors at different levels of government. 
Governance referred to the increasing horizontal interactions and consequent 
interdependence between actors at different levels of government. Thus, multi-level 
governance referred to “continuous negotiation among nested governments at 
several territorial tiers” (Bache, 2008a, 24). Or in other words, multi-level governance 
is concerned with the dispersion of government authority both vertically to actors at 
other levels and horizontally to non-state actors. 
Thus, early versions of multi-level governance centred around the notion that 
authority is spun away from the nation state to the supranational and the sub-
national levels, and that multi-level governance is by and large a by-product or the 
outcome of political pressures that, principally, do not have multi-level governance as 
their goal (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 3-4). However, more recent developed versions 
of the approach are also concerned with the distribution of authority into a less 
hierarchical and more network-like nature of EU policy-making. This has led to a 
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distinction between two possible types of multi-level governance based on the extent 
to which they operate as network-like structures. 
Type I has somewhat federalist characteristics and considers the dispersion of 
authority to take place at a “limited number of non-overlapping jurisdictional 
boundaries at a limited number of levels” (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, 5). Thus, 
authority is relatively stable and focus is on individual governments rather than on 
policies. Moreover, it is argued that these jurisdictions have a general purpose; that 
they gather many functions in one institution such as policy responsibilities, a court 
system and representative institutions (Marks and Hooghe, 2004, 16). Type II 
describes a more complex pattern of governance with “a complex, fluid, patchwork of 
innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions” (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, 5). In this view, 
jurisdictions are flexible and specialised since they need to adjust to the changing 
environment in which they operate. They provide a specific local service which 
requires knowledge and resources that are task specific. 
4.1 Choosing the Theoretical Perspectives 
I am inspired to depart from the preferred explanation of the implementation of the 
partnership principle into national institutional contexts, i.e. multi-level governance, 
in order to present an alternative perspective on the implications that the 
implementation of the partnership principle has on national governance. Despite its 
de-selection, the multi-level governance approach may still be considered a frame of 
reference in which the following theoretical framework is established and developed, 
in that it is acknowledged that the implementation of the partnership principle into 
national contexts has generated change in the member states involving actors above 
and below the member state level, and that interaction between these levels of 
government has been complicated as a consequence of the increased involvement of 
various actors besides the member states. Here, the focus is on the types of change 
generated in the interaction and coordination between the EU partnership 
requirements and the existing member states’ regional policy-making, which the 
multi-level governance perspective never intended to analyse. I argue that it is 
necessary to develop the multi-level governance argument that the organisational 
requirements of the partnership principle has redistributed power away from the 
member state level up to the European level and down to the regional level. There is 
more to it than that: it has expectedly generated institutional change and 
restructuring and in turn established a foundation for new forms of relations between 
actors within that regional policy-making institution. 
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Because the ambition of the multi-level governance approach to evaluate how the 
changed forms of governance in the EU had influenced the balance of power in policy-
making between the member states, the EU and the regional levels, it did not take the 
theoretical and empirical implications into account that inevitably emerge, when 
asserting that variance in the implementation of the partnership principle depends on 
national institutional systems. This argument constitutes the first new aspect put 
forward by this thesis: to analyse the national institutional context into which the 
partnership principle is implemented. As historical institutionalism argues the 
institutional structure is historically rooted and has gradually developed based on 
both internal (actors) and external (other institutions) conditions and events. Thus, 
historical institutionalism offers two interrelated tools for this analysis: first it is able 
to analyse the context and the background to the institutional context into which the 
partnership requirements are implemented. Second, it offers tools to analyse the 
evolving interaction between the two institutions, i.e. the partnership principle and 
the national regional policy-making institution. How does one generate change in the 
other (if any)? The aim here is only to analyse how the partnership principle has 
generated change in the national institutional context (downloading) and the nature 
of this change. Thus, historical institutionalism presents two aspects to be studied: the 
historical institutional context of national regional policy-making structures and the 
type of change generated by the interaction and coordination between the national 
and the EU regional policy institutional structures. It should also be remembered how 
the partnership principle has been extended in the subsequent reforms thereby 
pointing towards a consequent gradual development of the national regional policy-
making institution through involvement of an increasing range of actors, requiring a 
historical institutionalist analysis. This implies that historical institutionalism 
constitutes the back bone of this analysis. 
The multi-level governance perspective concluded that multi-level governance 
between different levels of government has transpired as a consequence of the 
implementation of the partnership principle. This conclusion is of course 
unquestionable, but from my perspective, the suggested interpretation of the 
rhetoric, interpretation and implications of the formulation of the partnership 
principle (as an institution) is central to the theoretical and empirical considerations. 
The multi-level governance approach did not consider that the partnership definition 
holds both the inclusion regulative aspect and the process aspect. Thus, it is crucial to 
employ a theoretical approach that can embrace these aspects. Network governance 
offers tools to analyse the inclusion regulative aspect of the partnership principle: 
network governance analyses the inclusion (and perhaps exclusion) of actors in the 
implementation process based on the argumentation of resource dependencies. To 
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some extent, the network approach is also able to analyse the process aspect of 
partnerships by network interaction tools (how the roles played by the actors and the 
consequent exchange of resources shape the network process). Arguably, the 
inclusion regulative and process aspects of the partnerships proposed by the 
partnership principle resemble network relations.  
However, in order to be fully able to understand the implications of the operation of 
the combined EU and national regional policy-making conditioned by the EU regional 
policy in order to receive the Structural Funds, it is necessary to study the entire 
process of ‘partnering’ as Åkerstrøm Andersen (2006) suggests. It may be argued that 
partnerships cannot be determined by actors not directly involved in the process or be 
expected to spontaneously transpire simply because the partnership principle dictates 
so or because a network of relations is set up; they transpire from independent 
voluntary agreements to cooperate; that is, partners in the partnerships choose one 
another through the organisation and establishment of resources and competences as 
a reaction to the context in which they operate. This cooperation is very much based 
on trust between the partners. This explains why the definition of the partnership 
principle is relatively wide – and needs to be so. It also explains why the clause about 
member state interpretation has been added to the definition. The partnership 
principle offers a frame in which different partners can organise their resources, 
competences and interests in cooperation in order to implement the policy based on 
the established structures that exist in the national setting. Therefore, partnership 
may take different shapes and compositions. These frames may or may not be 
implemented by the member states resulting in varying degrees of influence of the 
partnership principle definition on the established governance patterns in the 
member states. What the partners make of it depends on the context in which it is to 
operate and what the actors make of it. Here, the exact definition of the Åkerstrøm 
Andersen partnership becomes useful. Partnership, or the dynamic process of making 
promises to make new promises in the future about cooperation, sets the frame for 
understanding how the potential network established by the partnership principle is a 
dynamic process dependent on the actors within that network as well as the changing 
external context. Thus, Åkerstrøm Andersen’s partnership definition has both 
theoretical and empirical implications for the interpretation and implementation of 
the partnership principle which the multi-level governance approach does not take 
into consideration. 
The following will present a critical literature review of the three applied theories 
reflecting the core arguments of the theories relevant to the analysis of the influence 
of the partnership principle on Danish regional policy-making until 2006. Next, the 
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three theoretical perspectives will be discussed in relation to their applicability and 
compatibility leading to an operationalization of them.  
4.2 Historical Institutionalism 
So far it has been argued that the institutional context is important to the analysis of 
the development of Danish regional policy-making until 2006. The argument is that 
due to the attached clause of the partnership principle stating that the partnership 
structure should be implemented in the member states according to the member 
states’ existing structures. Accordingly, the institutional structures of member states 
into which the partnerships should be incorporated come to be essential. From a 
theoretical point of view the institutional context is important in that institutions are 
key when tracing the driving forces behind policies and their implementation. The 
study of institutions is an analysis of how organisations acquire value and stability 
over time. In this connection, institutions are more than ‘rules of the game’. They 
distribute power, influence and the definition of interests to actors that in turn shape 
policy-making. In this sense, actors can make positive use of the institution and also 
contribute to its development and change (Jørgensen, 2002, 18-9). These overall 
theoretical considerations constitute the outset of the following theoretical 
framework representing historical institutionalism: that institutions influence the 
behaviour of the actors within them and that the actors are able, via their behaviour, 
to change the institutions. These processes are traced over time. The following will 
rationalise these observations in more detail based on a historical approach to 
institutionalism. The approach itself has undergone refinement over the years as a 
response to criticisms. This development is evident in the review. 
Historical institutionalism is one of the ‘new institutionalisms’ that seek to explain 
how institutions are structural elements of social systems or frameworks that create 
order and stability to social interaction, and also that institutions emerge from and are 
embedded in concrete temporal processes. It is argued that the new institutionalisms 
are reactions to the prevailing behaviouralism of the 1960s and 1970s focusing on 
observable behaviour. It is counter argued that individual behaviour cannot explain all 
the political parts; rather behaviour is institutionally framed. Amalgamation of 
interests is not a simple process; i.e. interests are redefined and integrated according 
to institutions which help frame the behaviour of actors and encourage certain 
choices of action (Jørgensen, 2002, 19). It explains how “institutions, once established, 
can influence or constrain the behaviour of the actors who established them.” 
(Pollack, 2004, 139)  Stressing the historical institutionalist criticism of behaviouralism, 
emphasis is put on power and interests of the actors as well as collective historical 
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choices and their consequences. Historical choices have generated the formation and 
reformation of institutions’ collective decisions (i.e. constitutions, decision structures 
or network formation); decisions then help structure the political process (Jørgensen, 
2002, 21). 
Historical institutionalism defines institutions as “ensemble of formal and informal 
rules, norms and procedures that regulate the political action of collective actors.” 
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2007b, 31) In general, historical institutionalism perceives 
institutions as organisations and the rule that these promulgate. To be more specific, 
four features are characteristic of historical institutionalism: firstly, the approach 
conceptualises the relationship between institutions and the behaviour of individuals. 
Secondly, the approach focuses on the asymmetries of power in connection with the 
operation and development of institutions. Thirdly, the approach emphasises path-
dependence and unintended consequences. Finally, the approach integrates other 
kinds of factors that can influence political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 7). As 
follows, central to institutionalist analysis is how institutions affect the behaviour of 
individuals. In this connection, institutions can be considered to be collective 
processes or relations. 
Institutions are social phenomena that create an uneven “playing field” (Halkier, 2006, 
85) by either limiting the scope for action to some actors or by privileging others with 
a wider scope due to their possession of certain resources. This means that 
institutions affect the strategies and resources of actors in their relations. Actors then 
act according to their own perceived resources and interests within the frames or 
options provided by the institution. “From this perspective actors have the capacity to 
produce effects upon other social actors, operating through strategic employment of 
resources within the rules of a particular social institution.” (Halkier, 2006, 85) 
Interactions between the actors depend on the strategies preferred by the actors in 
accordance to the resources available to them and their perceived understanding of 
the institutional frame in which they operate. In line with this view actors may 
attempt to alter their position within the institutional frame (in relation to the other 
actors) reflecting their power balance. Thus, institutions reflect and reinforce 
asymmetrical power relations among the actors resulting in struggles among the 
actors to influence this power balance as well as the institution (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 
9).  
Two perspectives within historical institutionalism have sought to provide an answer 
to this inquiry: the rational and the sociological perspectives (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 7). 
Apparently these two perspectives have the same aim, but they are based on 
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different means to achieve that aim. The rational perspective will only be mentioned 
briefly here since it will not be applied to my analysis due to its market-based 
approach that seeks to apply economic theory to policy analysis. The rational 
perspective refers to individual behaviour as behaviour for its own benefit – 
individuals are rational utility maximising. With this point of departure, rational 
institutionalism is unable to explain what happens in policy-making. Rational historical 
institutionalism is generally presented by Pierson (1996, 2000) who emphasises at 
length how institutions produce path-dependency. This path-dependent development 
means that institutional decisions made in the past may persist and have unintended 
consequences as they may ‘lock-in’ or shape future actions of actors within the 
institution. In continuation of this argument, institutions are maintained to be more or 
less resistant to change because of the uncertainty related to institutional design and 
because the transaction cost of change is high (Pollack, 2004, 139-40 and 150 and 
Pierson, 2000, 251). 
The sociological perspective, conversely, has a broader time perspective that is able to 
account for the processes that occur in institutionalisation and policy-making and is 
thus able to account for consequences of the historical decisions for future policy 
processes.  
The rational perspective argues that the behaviour of actors is rational, since they 
adhere to the institutional framework in which they navigate, and thus influence and 
limit their own room to manoeuvre. The sociological perspective maintains a differing 
view of ‘bounded rationality’. This perspective is based on the research of Simon 
(1972) called ‘a behavioural model of rational choice’ and then developed by historical 
institutionalists. Bounded rationality perceives of decision-makers as intendedly 
rational. In other words, decision-makers are argued to be essentially goal-oriented 
and adaptive, but sometimes failing to make important decisions because of their 
cognitive and emotional nature. This means that emotions also influence the 
otherwise rational behaviour of humans. Instead of asking a question such as ‘how do 
I maximise my interests in this situation?’; the question sometimes appear to be ‘what 
is the appropriate response to this situation given my position and responsibilities?’, 
the bounded rationality line of thought argues. People may want to make rational 
decisions but sometimes they are not able to. This shows when there is a mismatch 
between the decision-making environment and the choices of the decision-maker 
(Jones, 1999, 297-9). In other words, although human behaviour is rational, it is also 
influenced by a human tendency to turn to familiar patterns of behaviour when 
attempting to achieve objectives. In this sense, a decision may be based on and ad hoc 
situation, which might lead to unfortunate decisions.  
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Two types of limitations describe the behaviour of human beings. First, the limitation 
of human capabilities in respect to information (i.e. misperceptions, misevaluations, 
limited processing of information and limited interest span). The human capacity to 
formulate and solve complex problems is small compared to the scope of some 
problems whose solution is required for rational behaviour. In other words, “with a 
limited information capability an individual only ‘intends’ to be rational, and ‘the 
intended rationality of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the 
real situation in order to deal with it.’” (Kato, 1996, 576) Secondly, the environment in 
which the behaviour takes place influences the simplified model of the real situation. 
This means that the perception of an individual’s rational behaviour and choices are 
framed by an environment of premises that are accepted by the individual as bases 
for his/her choice. Often an institution plays the role of the ‘environment’ (Kato, 1996, 
576). The concept of bounded rationality is useful in understanding the perceptional 
limitation and bias of individuals and relating them to the goal-oriented behaviour of 
these individuals. 
The role of institutions is to provide moral and cognitive guidelines for individuals’ 
interpretation and action. Institutions or organisations exist as possible environments 
in which the intended rational behaviour of actors is encouraged. This means that 
institutions may influence the identities, self-images and preferences of the actors 
within the institution. As such, this means that because the institution may have such 
great influence on the individual actors and their choices concerning the institution, it 
is resistant to re-design (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 8). This also means that the leaders of 
the organisation or institution seek to minimise decision-making costs rather than 
maximise the achievement of the goals when dealing with policy-making as opposed 
to the rational perspective. Though, despite a different motive the end result may be 
the same as in the rational perspective, i.e. that of the preservation of status quo 
(Peters, Pierre and King, 2005, 1285).  
Compared to the rational perspective, the sociological perspective has a softer view 
on the extent to which institutions influence the behaviour of actors within them. This 
perspective also emphasises external factors that influence the behaviour of actors. 
Although actors do not always act rationally according to the framework set by the 
institution as argued by the rational perspective, their behaviour often reflects and 
influences the underlying principles of the institution. This also leads to some kind of 
path-dependence that is difficult to break free from, although based on a more 
positive view on the role of actors. To sum up, in historical institutionalism institutions 
play a crucial role since they shape the actions of the individuals within them and 
likewise institutions are influenced by the choices of the individuals within them.  
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The approach has often been criticised for its fundamental position; especially its 
focus on path-dependence and consequently its inability to explain change. It has 
been criticised from several viewpoints that although the approach has done much to 
try to change the static perception of path dependence that it had from the 
beginning, it is by no means yet ready or able to explain why change occurs. It has 
come as far as to describe which type of change occurs but has not been able to take 
it further (Schmidt, 2008, 2). A similar criticism is offered by Peters, Pierre and King 
(2005, 1277): they argue that the problem is in the definition in that it conceptualises 
change in terms of major events rather than gradual development. This means that 
smaller changes along the way are defined away, even if they cumulatively in the end 
produce significant change. Schmidt (2008) further suggests that historical 
institutionalism lacks tools to explain how, why and when actors within these 
institutions (re)shape their institutions, interests and cultural norms - all of which are 
interrelated. This has led to internal revision of the approach based on the 
acknowledgement of its explanatory limitations. 
4.2.1 A New Way of Viewing Historical Institutionalism 
The following will address some of these criticisms that Thelen (1999) has 
acknowledged in order to present what she argues is a more constructive historical 
institutionalism. She takes her point of departure in the discussion of the equilibrium 
order in relation to path-dependence. 
Thelen acknowledges the criticism that when using the terms of path-dependence, 
unintended consequences, increasing returns, ‘lock-in’ and freezing future actions 
renders the approach static which is in opposition to the initial aim of the approach; 
i.e. policy-making processes are considered to be dynamic since they occur over time 
within institutions. So how does this relate to the apparent static nature of keeping 
status quo in institutions? Is historical institutionalism even able to explain change? 
According to Thelen this can be done by viewing institutions as the legacy of concrete 
historical processes; i.e. that institutions emerge as a result of historical conflict and 
constellations, which bring about change. Put differently, change occurs as an 
unintended consequence of interactions among different institutional orders and 
actors. Thus, change in the institution is both internal and external. This further adds a 
kind of feedback mechanism that has otherwise been missing from the historical 
institutionalist approach (Thelen, 1999, 381-4). 
With respect to the terms ‘lock-in’, increasing returns and others, they represent a 
somewhat negative connotation that Thelen does not think that the historical 
institutionalist approach should have. She contests that path-dependency necessarily 
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leads to these situations where status quo or the equilibrium is the result. She 
suggests two new ways of perceiving path-dependency. First, she argues that politics 
is characterised by disagreement over goals and the, at times, asymmetric distribution 
of power as well as institutions themselves reinforce these asymmetries. This means 
that those disadvantaged by the circumstances may either accept this until conditions 
change or they may work within the existing framework pursuing goals different from 
that of the institution. This is exactly why increasing returns not necessarily lead to 
locked-in equilibrium. Second, she argues that institutions are socially constructed 
(and not just an institutional construct) that include shared cultural understandings 
(shared cognitions and interpretive frames) of the way the world functions, such as 
the sociological perspective reasons. Therefore, when policy makers intend to 
redesign institutions, they are restricted by the embedded cultural constrains in their 
perceptions. This insight arguably helps understand the persistence of particular 
patterns of politics over time. The notion of institutions as shared norms and cultures 
sometimes masks the conflicts among groups exactly because of these shared norms 
and cultures. However, conflicts do occur and will prevail to do so. Therefore, it is 
important for the historical institutionalist approach to acknowledge these conflicts in 
relation to the explanation of change in institutions and political process that 
otherwise seems lacking in the approach (Thelen, 1999, 384-7). 
Consequently, it is necessary to return to and review the ‘critical junctures’ that have 
not been fully explained. In order to do so, Thelen uses supplementary literature to 
develop this insufficient explanation. She argues that issues of sequencing and timing 
should be incorporated into the analysis with particular emphasis on the interaction 
between on-going political processes and the effects of these interactions on for 
instance institutional outcomes. To support this she also refers to literature about 
feedback mechanisms, which have otherwise been weak points of the historical 
institutionalist literature. These additional viewpoints fit well into the historical 
institutionalist approach where political processes are viewed in relation to how the 
temporal ordering of, and interactions among, processes influence institutional 
outcome. However, the problem with the historical institutionalist approach is that it 
tends to assume that the outcomes of the critical junctures are translated into lasting 
inheritances. This happens particularly when the language of ‘freezing’, ‘lock-in’, etc. 
is used. This may be interpreted as a standstill, or a static outcome that cannot be 
changed. According to Thelen, this is a misunderstanding. The political process is 
dynamic (Thelen, 1999, 387-92). 
In relation to this the process of ‘feedback’ to the political process should be 
considered, a process that is also used in for instance the implementation approach. 
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Thelen identifies two types of feedback: functional feedback where once an 
institution is in place, actors within it adapt their strategies to the logic of the system 
so that they reflect and reinforce these. As such, this is a path-dependent 
development that stems from feedback from the behaviour of the actors. The second 
type of feedback is the distributional effects of institutions where institutions magnify 
and reproduce certain patterns of power dispersal. Here, it is emphasised that policy 
feedback positively facilitate the institution and the empowerment of certain groups 
within it over time. Once again the language of ‘lock-in’ and ‘freezing’ may dilute the 
intentional dynamic nature of path-dependency, or that of change, that Thelen 
believes historical institutionalism should encompass. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand the dynamic mechanisms that historical institutionalism incorporates in 
this ‘new edition’ of Thelen since these reproduction mechanisms (feedbacks) sustain 
different institutions in different ways in different contexts (Thelen, 1999, 393-9).  
4.2.2 Continuity and Change 
So far it has been observed that the early version of historical institutionalism has 
utilised inappropriate terms to explain path-dependence instigating unintentionally a 
perception of the approach to be static unlike its ambition to demonstrate a dynamic 
process. Thelen has then sought to address this deficiency by using a different 
vocabulary and by adding feedback mechanisms. However, it may be argued that this 
attempt has not fully solved the problem of its main alleged insufficiency, namely that 
it is unable to explain change. The approach is able to identify that change may occur, 
but not how and why despite Thelen’s attempt as presented above. Since then she 
and Peter Hall have made another attempt to explain this because as they argue: 
“In short, the history of change in the European political economies 
should not be written as if it were entirely as series of responses to 
external shocks. The challenge facing analysts is to see it as a process 
partly endogenous to the character of the institutions developed in each 
nation driven by the unintended consequences that flow from those 
institutions.” (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 16) 
The following will take up this discussion in an attempt to make clear the role of the 
dichotomy of continuity and change. 
According to Hall and Thelen, when attempting to understand change it is first 
necessary to understand institutional continuity or stability. This approach sees 
“institutions as sets of regularised practices with a rule-like quality in the sense that 
the actors expect the practices to be observed; and which, in some but not all, cases 
are supported by formal sanctions.” (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 9) Furthermore, actors 
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are seen to be rational in the sense that they seek to enhance their interests as they 
interpret them according to the rules of the institution. This means that any strategy 
for change may depend on the rules of the institution. On this note, the approach 
does warn that the following is taken too seriously: that institutions determine the 
actions of the actors within it. There is room for critical conduct towards the 
institution and what is considered to be appropriate.  
The sustainability of an institution thus depends on how well it serves the interests of 
the relevant actors. Arguably, when an institution fails to serve the interests of the 
actors it becomes fragile and sensitive to defection from its rules. These interests and 
calculations about whether the interests of actors are properly served are very 
complex depending on a number of considerations, such as whether it is worth 
changing the existing institution. First of all, it takes considerable effort to change the 
institution, and in relation to this there is also uncertainty whether a new institution 
will be able to deliver benefits to the actors and their interests, which is a crucial 
factor sustaining institutional stability. These two considerations need to be balanced 
against one another. Another thing to be considered is that the behaviour of others 
on whom the new institution may depend is also uncertain. At the same time, 
however, actors are not always frightened by uncertainty. They are generally occupied 
with continuous reassessment of their own room for manoeuvre and the interests of 
those with whom they are interacting. Thus, they need to be reassured that the 
institution continues to serve their interests and that other alternatives are not 
available (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 11-13).  
Based on this, Hall and Thelen argue that “this approach has always rejected the 
notion that institutions are automatically stable, even when they are Pareto-
improving, and it associates the maintenance of equilibrium outcomes with important 
political dynamics.” (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 14-15) Also they assume that it is 
dangerous to believe that the institutions were originally created with the aim of 
serving the interests of their actors in the future, which is nearly impossible since the 
interests of the actors change over time. Accordingly, institutions need to adjust to 
the changed interests. This argument brings Hall and Thelen to discuss institutional 
change more thoroughly than has hitherto been done by historical institutionalists. 
Precisely because actors are interested in improving their positions in institutions, the 
latter will inevitably come under pressure. Before continuing the discussion of 
inevitable change, it is necessary to understand what precipitates change, which 
actors are central to it, how it occurs and how the results of change should be 
interpreted. 
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Hall and Thelen refer to the history of change in the European political economy. It is 
argued that events in the international political economy are important stimuli for 
institutional change since these bring about opportunity structures. At the same time, 
much change in the European political economy has been inspired by unanticipated 
effects emanating from existing institutions. But all change cannot be ascribed to 
external shocks as described by early versions of historical institutionalism. The 
challenge that lies ahead is to understand the external as well as internal processes 
that lead to change impelled by the unintended consequences flowing from those 
institutions (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 16).  
Two strategies or types of action are identified leading to possible change; i.e. that of 
defection and re-interpretation. Defection is borrowed from game theory where it 
refers to when an actor that has hitherto followed the practices prescribed by an 
institution stops doing so. When an actor re-interprets the rules of the institution he 
or she gradually changes his or her interpretation of the rules without defecting from 
or dismantling the formal institution itself. For instance, this happens when new 
practices that are not otherwise seen as harmonising with the formal institution are 
gradually accepted. Thus, change may happen without much rewriting of the formal 
rules. A more obvious way to institutional change is reform processes. This is when 
change is explicitly mandated by governments. Because this reform is based on 
political compromises the institution will not necessarily end up serving the interests 
of those who are a part of it. It is argued that actors’ evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of this new institution in terms of strategies and interests will depend on the 
presence of supportive institutions elsewhere in the political environment (Hall and 
Thelen, 2009, 18-21). 
Somehow this is where Hall and Thelen’s discussion of the dichotomy of stability and 
change ends. As such, it has come to the conclusion that change does occur and that it 
is dependent on both external and internal factors and processes and not just 
exogenous chocks. It also identifies that actors are relevant in bringing about this 
change either by defection or re-interpretation of the rules of the institution similar to 
how reform definitely will bring about change. However, although it adds some new 
insights into the otherwise persistent historical institutionalist path-dependent 
perspective, it has not been fully able to clarify what this specific change is and when 
it occurs.  
4.2.3 Institutional Change 
Despite its traditional view that institutional change partly occurs at critical junctures 
or during moments of abrupt, wholesale transformation, and that otherwise path-
66 
 
dependency seems to encourage development along the same paths which are 
difficult to depart from, the historical institutionalist literature has recognised that 
gradual change also occurs. Analyses of stability and change are intimately linked: 
institutional stability is a function of on-going political mobilisation and therefore 
institutions are also vulnerable to change on an on-going basis. The institutional 
context, both external and internal, is the key to understanding the process of change. 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010, xi) argue that change occurs when problems of rule 
interpretation and enforcement give the actors within the institution an opportunity 
to implement these rules in new ways. The following is based on the refinement of 
the above arguments concerning the influence on change and stability of internal and 
external factors. Here, change is mainly seen from within. This new explanation 
redefines institutions in terms of their roles and influence in relation to the actors 
within them and how their interaction may bring about change. 
In order to be able to assume that institutions change as a response to internal shifts, 
it is necessary to define their basic properties providing some dynamic element that 
permits change. Accordingly, institutions may be regarded as distributional 
instruments that are laden with power implications. This implies that institutions are 
power distributional instruments allocating power unequally (some actors are 
distributed resources while others are not). This asymmetric distribution of resources 
necessarily causes tensions internally. Sometimes the creation of an institution 
reflects the motivation of actors with particular resources, but also the conflicts 
among actors with different resources and interests and the institution ends up as a 
reflection of the institutional preferences of those actors. This implies that the 
creation of institutions is a dynamic process where institutions represent 
compromises among the respective actors, which creates an environment in which 
not all actors are satisfied with the end result, which in turn leaves the institution 
vulnerable to shifts. Accordingly, change and stability are closely linked. Those who 
benefit from the existing set up may be interested in continuity, whereas those with 
diverging interests favour change. The effort to maintain the institution is an on-going 
mobilisation of support for the institution (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 7-9). 
It is argued that any given institution that shapes action has unequal implications for 
resource allocation because some actors are distributed resources that others are not 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 8). In fact, in some cases the power of one group of 
actors may be so great that the dominant actors may be able to design institutions 
closely reflecting their institutional preferences. Within this institution a continued 
mobilisation of resources take place in an effort to alter the balance of power 
between actors. The asymmetrical power distribution between actors implies that 
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some actors will be institutional winners while other will be losers. The winners and 
losers have different interests when it comes to interpreting the rules of the 
institution or devoting resources to their enforcement. Therefore, some actors seek to 
maintain the power balance while others seek to alter the balance in their own 
favour. This is often done in coalition with others, Mahoney and Thelen argue (2010, 
29). 
Given this condition of preserving stability, change may occur as a shift in the balance 
of power. A number of examples of this is provided: changes in the environmental 
conditions; that actors may be embedded in a multiplicity of institutions and 
interactions among them may allow for unforeseen changes in the distribution of 
resources; that sometimes the operation of an institution itself generates pressure for 
change so that groups of actors mobilise common resources and interests increasing 
their power to breach existing institutional arrangements (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010, 9). 
Change may also be associated with issues of compliance. Compliance becomes a 
variable that is important to the analysis of stability and change. The preservation of 
an institution depends on the compliance of the actors within it to its contested 
nature of institutional rules. Inherent in the definition of the power distributional 
institution is that actors struggle over meaning, application and enforcement of 
institutional rules which then result in compliance or non-compliance with the rules. 
Institutional rules are ambiguous. Due to this ambiguity actors with divergent 
interests will contest the opportunities this ambiguity provides, because different 
interpretations and implementation may have profound consequences for resource 
allocations and outcomes. Treating compliance as a variable has several implications. 
First, compliance is complicated in that rules can never be so precise that they cover 
all complexities of the possible real-world situations. Then, when new developments 
confuse rules existing institutions change to comply with the new reality. Second, 
compliance is also linked to the cognitive limits of actors. Even when rules have taken 
relatively complex situations into consideration, actors may have information 
processing limitations. Actors cannot be expected to be able to foresee all possible 
future situations that transpire. Third, institutions are rooted in assumptions that are 
often implicit. Therefore, when these implicit assumptions about the institution 
change, the whole institution changes. Fourth, rules are designed to be applied also 
by actors other than the designers, which opens up for change to occur in the 
implementation of the rule. Thus, the ‘gap’ between the rule and its interpretation or 
the rule and its enforcement is generally where change may be expected to occur 
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within the power distributional institutional set up (Mahoney and Thelen (eds.), 2010, 
10-14). 
Having looked at the internal conditions for change vs. stability, it should be 
explicated that change is also influenced by the external political contexts and in turn 
these lead to different modes of institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010, 15-
6) identify four modal types of institutional change: displacement (the removal of 
existing rules and the introduction of new ones), layering (the introduction of new 
rules on top of or alongside existing ones), drift (the changed impact of existing rules 
due to shifts in the environment) and conversion (the changed enactment of existing 
rules due to their strategic redeployment). The following will explain why one type 
rather than another typically occurs. 
Displacement is often referred to as an abrupt change entailing a radical shift (as 
associated with the critical junctures in the earlier versions of historical 
institutionalism) but it may also be a slow evolving process. This is the case when new 
institutions are presented that compete with existing ones rather than replace them. 
The new institutions are often introduced by actors that are ‘losers’ in the existing 
one. Gradual replacement may take place if the supporters of the existing system may 
not be able to prevent defection to the new rules.  
Layering occurs when new rules are attached to the existing ones not replacing the 
institution. It involves amendments, revisions, or additions to existing ones. In cases 
where the logic of the institution is altered as a result of the attachment substantial 
change may occur. Layering often happens when defenders of the status quo (such as 
the member states) may prevent a complete turnover of the institution but not the 
introduction of amendments and modifications.  
Drift occurs when rules remain formally the same all the while the impact of them 
changes as a result of shifts in the external context. If actors choose not to respond to 
changes in the external context the impact of the institution on that context changes.  
Conversion occurs when rules remain the same but are interpreted and enacted in 
new ways. As such this happens when actors intentionally exploit the inherent 
ambiguities of the institution. In this way they can convert the institution into new 
goals and functions. Thus, new elites may come to power and organise the shift from 
within in the direction of their preferred interests (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 16-8). 
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In resisting change, be it displacement, layering, drift or conversion different 
mechanisms are at play. In order to avoid conversion or drift, administrative capacities 
are important since weaknesses in these may create strategic openings for the 
opponents of the rules. In contrast, displacement or layering do not take place as a 
consequence of ‘poor’ administration, but as an intentional strategy on behalf of 
opposing actors attempting to bring about transformation through the backdoor by 
taking advantage of the disjuncture between rules and enforcement (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010, 21-2). 
When analysing change and stability it is crucial also to understand the identity and 
motivation of the actors that bring about change. To begin with, it is actors that are 
disadvantaged by the institutional design that others have shaped, subsequently 
seeking change that they will benefit from. However, this consideration may be too 
simple because the ambiguities inherent in the institution and the uncertainties that 
these generate complicate assessment of who are the beneficiaries and who are the 
disadvantaged actors. On top of that, actors are often involved in several institutions 
leaving them advantaged in some institutions and disadvantaged in others. It is then 
necessary to look beyond this divide. It is further necessary to make a distinction 
between the actors’ short-term and long-term strategies. We should be observant 
concerning the difference between short-term rule-conforming behaviour and the 
overall goal of institutional maintenance. Therefore, change may be an unintended 
consequence of distributional struggles among actors. Four types of actors of change 
are identified: insurrectionaries, symbionts (either parasitic or mutualistic), 
subsersives and opportunists. Each type of actor of change is associated with a 
particular mode of institutional change. 
Insurrectionaries deliberately seek to eliminate existing institutions or rules by actively 
and visibly mobilising against them. They emerge when a group of individuals are 
disadvantaged by multiple institutions that emphasise each other. Insurrectionaries 
are often at play when abrupt patterns of change occur; i.e. critical junctures where 
the institutional status quo is rapidly overturned. Therefore, insurrectionaries may be 
linked to patterns of displacement. 
Symbionts (in both parasitic and mutualistic versions) rely on institutions that are not 
of their own making. In the parasitic version, the actors exploit the institution for 
private gains even when they depend on the existence of that institution to achieve 
that gain. Arguably, while parasites rely on the maintenance of the institution, their 
action contradicts the purpose of the institution, thereby undermining the institution 
over the long run. Parasites are associated with drift. Mutualists also benefit from the 
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rules they did not design using these to advance their own interests. In contrast to 
parasites, mutualists do not compromise the efficiency of the rules or the survival of 
the institution. Rather mutualists violate the letter of the rule to support and sustain 
its purpose. Mutualists are not associated with drift like parasites are, as they rather 
contribute to the robustness of institutions seeking to expand the support coalition on 
which the institution is built. 
Subversives seek to displace the institution without breaking the rules of the 
institution. They disguise what they are really doing by adhering to institutional 
expectations and working within the system. From the outside it may even appear 
that they support the institution. But what they are actually doing is waiting for the 
right moment to actively move towards opposition. In the meantime, they may even 
encourage institutional changes by promoting new rules to the existing ones. 
Accordingly, subversives may be associated with layering or in some instances 
conversion. 
Opportunists have ambiguous preferences about institutional stability. On the one 
hand, they oppose the institutional status quo, but, on the other hand, they do not 
endeavour to change the rules. Instead, they attempt to exploit the possibilities that 
exist within the institution to achieve their goals. Understanding opportunists 
facilitates comprehension of why it is more difficult to change an institutional status 
quo than to defend it. Opportunists are often associated with conversion, as the 
ambiguities in the interpretation and implementation of the rules enables them to 
reorganise these rules in ways that are unanticipated by the designers of the 
institution (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 22-7).  
As well as the types of actors can be associated with a mode of change, they can also 
be associated with a context in which they operate best. Insurrectionaries emerge and 
thrive in any setting, but they thrive the best in a setting with low discretion and weak 
veto possibilities. Symbionts thrive in an environment of strong veto possibilities and 
high enforcement discretion. Subversives emerge and thrive in contexts in which 
strong veto possibilities and few rule interpretation and enactment opportunities are 
found. Opportunists thrive in settings with high level of discretion and few veto 
players to prevent actual institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 28-9). 
Upon explaining the properties and motives of actors that bring about institutional 
change, it should be recognised that these processes are not straightforward and 
operating on behalf of just one actor. Most often a coalition of actors ‘work together’ 
in order to strengthen their position in relation to the institution and those actors in 
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favour of status quo, but also the other way around (defending the institution). Given 
their position as presented above, the actors may either seek coalitions with 
institutional supporters or opponents: insurrectionaries with opponents, symbionts 
with supporters, subversives with either, and opportunists potentially with both or 
neither or a combination of the two (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 30).  
The above review has taken me through a historical narrative of historical 
institutionalist theory. It has developed from solely explaining path-dependence and 
mistakenly attributed a static view of institutional development, to a more refined set 
of thoughts that take into account the dichotomy and relationship between continuity 
and change as well as the importance of both internal and external processes. 
Internally, the institution as a power distributional instrument generates change by 
way of the struggles among the actors that the asymmetries of power among the 
actors produce. These struggles are also based on considerations on part of the actors 
in relation to the perseverance of the institution. According to the path-dependent 
explanation, the rules and norms of the institution shaped the interaction of the 
actors into a path-dependent development supporting the institution. Change only 
occurred as a consequence of external shocks. In this scenario it was not accounted 
for that the behaviour of actors is in fact able to undermine the institution thus 
generating gradual change which the new approach to institutional change has 
highlighted. Generally the historical institutionalist theory presents an explanation of 
how the relationship between the institution and actors influence gradual change of 
the institution. In this light, “institutions are instruments the actors use to negotiate 
the complexity of the world.” (Hall, 2010, 217) Thus, the historical institutionalist 
theory presents an explanation of how the relationship between the institution and 
actors influence gradual change of the institution. Or in other words, institutions are 
guiding and motivating human behaviour. But the opposite is also the case; i.e. that 
human behaviour shape institutions. Therefore, institutions have a dual face.  
On this note, it is time to have a look at a comparable policy management scheme 
that also influences the behaviour of actors within it; i.e. governance networks.  
4.3 Network Governance 
In recent times, the term ‘governance’ has become a widely used and very popular 
term in many types of research such as policy analysis, European integration and so 
on. Governance concepts are used in both domestic and international contexts and 
have been given many connotations and definitions. However, for the purpose of this 
dissertation it is necessary to narrow this list of meanings down to just two, i.e. 
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network governance and multi-level governance. Therefore, the following will 
examine the different types of governance understandings and explain why these two 
are more relevant to this dissertation than the rest before clarifying the details of the 
two approaches. However, first an initial definition of governance is offered: “... the 
continuous political process of setting explicit goals for society and intervening in it in 
order to achieve these goals.” (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2004, 99) Apparently, 
this definition is very broad, but it will be explained, elaborated and delimited in the 
following sections. 
It is clear that political decision-making is no longer confined to the formal structures 
of government. It has been argued that there has been a transformation from 
government to governance. Over the past 10 to 20 years the role of government and 
the environment in which it operates has changed. Public policy-making has become 
increasingly complex due to conflicting values of society as well as struggles over 
values represented in decision-making and policy outcomes. Social and private actors 
have been included in the process as they each contribute resources to address the 
problems society faces. These new actors in policy-making have great resources of 
which the power to obstruct policy interventions is perhaps the most problematic for 
politicians. This has resulted in new forms of horizontal steering of relations across 
networks such as public-private partnerships (Klijn, 2008, 506). This implies that 
“[p]ublic policy is formulated and implemented through a plethora of formal and 
informal institutions, mechanisms and processes that are commonly referred to as 
governance.” (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005, 199-200) The term governance has many 
meanings in different contexts. In general, in the governance literature, governance is 
“concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action” 
(Stoker, 1998, 17). Often the term network is mentioned in connection with 
governance, thus, referring to governance network or network governance. Network 
governance or network governing is present when neither public nor private actors 
have the capacity to address public policy problems alone but are engaged in inter-
organisational arrangements that are characterised by resource dependencies. These 
terms will be investigated below. 
Klijn has reviewed the governance literature over the past 15 years. He reaches the 
conclusion that four different definitions of governance may be traced. Klijn begins his 
literature review with the often-cited interpretations of Rhodes. Rhodes presents six 
understandings of the term governance; i.e. corporate governance, new public 
management, good governance as a socio-cybernetic system, governance as a self-
organising network, etc. Since then other meanings of the term have been added by 
other researchers such as multi-level governance and market governance. Klijn has 
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assembled these meanings to construct four central definitions of governance. These 
four definitions will briefly be outlined below, and later two relevant definitions to this 
dissertation will be explained in more detail. 
1. Governance as good governance or as corporate governance. This definition 
focuses on the proper functioning of public administration ensuring that 
citizens are fairly treated. The emphasis is on the operation of government 
based on the basic principles of the rule of law and not on the manner in 
which it is organised. 
2. Governance as new public management or as market governance. Here 
government should only set goals and not be involved in implementation. 
Implementation should be left to other organisations or actors who can be 
held accountable of their performance. 
3. Governance as multi-level governance or inter organisational relations. In this 
literature which is represented by two strands; multi-layered government or 
inter-governmental governance, agreement is on the fact that it is difficult to 
achieve results in a multi-actor setting. In more or less explicit ways they 
argue that networks are needed to address these problems. Actors at all 
levels (government, regional, public, private, etc.) must be involved in 
addressing the problems since these actors are all affected by policy 
decisions. 
4. Governance as network governance (self-steering and non-self-steering). In 
this literature, little distinguishes governance from governance networks. 
“Governance takes place within networks of public and non-public actors, 
and the interaction between these groups makes processes complex and 
difficult to manage” (Klijn, 2008, 508). Therefore, different strategies to steer 
and manage these networks are required. Focus is on the relations among 
the network actors; their interaction within the network and negotiation of 
the ‘rules of the game’, so to speak (Klijn, 2008, 507-8). 
Despite the different focal points of the four definitions, they all emphasise the 
process of governing (governance) rather than the structure of government as well as 
they emphasise the limits of governmental power. Due to the fact that the first 
definition is de facto unrelated to governance in the sense of a new way of governing, 
as it is merely a normative suggestion regarding the proper manner in which 
governance should be performed, this definition is not useful for my further analysis 
of the implementation of EU regional policy in Denmark. Neither is the second 
definition useful since new public management theories mainly focus on how to 
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improve the existing bureaucracy by way of leaving government out of 
implementation. In the implementation of EU regional policy governments are 
involved in implementation. The last two definitions, however, are highly useful to my 
analysis since their focus is specifically on the complexity of the involvement of actors 
at various levels in the implementation of policy, as well as on their relations among 
each other (both individuals and networks as whole entities). As has been argued 
previously, multi-level governance serves as the framework for understanding and 
placing the theories applied in this dissertation, and not as a guiding theory due to its 
theoretical insufficiencies in taking the national institutional context and the process 
and inclusion aspects of the partnership principle into consideration in its 
development of theory to begin with. Here, multi-level governance serves as a frame 
for understanding that actors at different levels of government are involved in the 
implementation of EU regional policy in Denmark as a requirement of the partnership 
principle; it is not sufficient in analysing change in national regional policy-making as a 
result of the requirement to introduce new organisational structures. The conclusion 
to be drawn from Klijn’s review of the governance literature is that essentially 
governance is “the process that takes place within governance networks. We then use 
the term ‘governance network’ or ‘network governance’ to describe public policy-
making and implementation through a web of relationships between government, 
business and civil society actors.” (Klijn, 2008, 511) Therefore, only one of the four 
governance definitions can be applied here. 
Network governance has its outset in the discovery of non-hierarchical forms of 
governance based on negotiated interaction between a number of public, semi-public 
and private actors. The traditional image of policy-making as a parliamentary chain of 
government, where politicians direct the bureaucracy when regulating society, was 
questioned based on developments in society. The argument reached from this 
finding is that policy-making is more and more characterised by a process of 
negotiations and interactions among a number of public, semi-public and private 
actors that result in a relatively stable pattern of policy-making. It is this type of policy-
making that is referred to as governance networks. During the 1990s, this became a 
new way of viewing policy-making; a view that is presently widely referred to and 
applied. It is reasoned that the inclusion of the most affected actors in the policy 
process will lead to more efficient formation and implementation of policies 
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 3-5). The following will take a closer look at the term 
network governance and what this term involves. 
A governance network is defined as:  
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“1. a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but 
operationally autonomous actors; 2. who interact through negotiations; 
3. which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework; 4. that is self-regulating within the limits set by 
external agencies; and 5. which contributes to the production of public 
purpose.” (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 9) 
This rather precise definition consists of five elements. First, governance networks 
consist of public, semi-public and private actors (such as actors from national, regional 
and local government, political and societal groups, pressure, action and interest 
groups, societal institutions, private and business organisations, etc.) who are 
dependent on each other’s resources and competences. They are also operationally 
autonomous in the sense that they are not directed by others to think or act in a 
certain way. To be a member of the governance network actors must have an interest 
in the policy issues and be able to demonstrate that they can contribute with 
resources and competences that are valuable to the other actors of the network. This 
means that the actors of the governance network are interdependent and 
independent from superior decision-makers for instance which in turn means that 
relations within a governance network are horizontal. This, however, does not imply 
that the actors are equal. Some actors might possess resources and competences that 
other actors do not. Despite this asymmetrical allocation of resources and 
competences and because actors are mutually dependent on each other to make a 
success of the network, nobody abuses their power to exert control over the others 
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 9-10). Interdependency theory claims that 
“[g]overnance networks are results of the strategic actions of independent actors who 
interact because of their mutual resource dependencies and thereby counteract the 
institutional fragmentation caused by NPM.” (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 18) 
Interests and decisions are reached by network actors through internal power 
struggles but the network is held together by the mutual dependency of the actors. 
Second, interaction among network members transpires through negotiations that, on 
the one hand, are bargains and on the other hand are deliberate. Actors may bargain 
over the distribution of resources, but this bargaining must be rooted in deliberation 
in order to facilitate learning, common understanding and coordination for the benefit 
of the network as a whole or the policy issue. It should be noted that these 
negotiations seldom lead to unanimous decisions because of power struggles among 
the actors. Often joint action is based on uneven acceptance of a proposal reached 
despite general disagreement on the issue (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 10). 
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Third, negotiations between the network actors take place within a sort of 
institutional framework: it is a combination of contingently pronounced ideas, 
conceptions and rules but it does not consist of a homogeneous and integrated whole. 
“As such it has a regulative aspect since it provides rules, roles and procedures; a 
normative aspect since it conveys norms, values and standards; a cognitive element 
since it generates codes, concepts and specialized knowledge; and an imaginary 
aspect since it produces identities, ideologies and common hopes.” (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2007a, 10) Thus, a governance network possesses many traits of institutions, 
but is not an institution in itself. This distinction between a network and an institution 
will be elaborated later. 
Fourth, governance networks are relatively self-regulating due to their horizontal 
character. They are neither commanded from the top nor are they regulated by the 
laws of the market. The purpose of governance networks is to regulate a policy field 
based on the institutionalised framework of the network; i.e. the ideas, resources and 
dynamics of the regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework. However, 
this self-regulation does not take place within a vacuum, but rather within a political 
and institutional context that must be considered since it influences the capacity of 
self-regulation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 10). 
Finally, governance networks, as part of policy-making, contribute to the production 
of public purpose within that particular policy field; that is visions, values, plans, 
policies and regulation aimed at the general public (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 10). 
These definitions are general and governance networks may take different shapes 
depending on the political, institutional and discursive context in which they operate. 
They may be loose (informal contacts within the network) or tight (formal contacts). 
They may be intra-organisational or inter-organisational; self-grown of initiated from 
above; open or closed; transitory or permanent; and have sector-specific or society-
wide perspective. Some networks may be engaged in policy formulation while others 
may be engaged in implementation of policy. As is clear, governance may take many 
different shapes, and networks do not necessarily possess all the traits just 
mentioned. It appears that these governance networks have penetrated society in 
many ways. It is argued that “governance networks, at least in some countries have 
become a generally accepted and increasingly used mechanism of governance in our 
complex, fragmented and multi-layered societies.” (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005, 205) 
Governance networks may be seen as a pluricentric governance system because of 
the (asymmetrical) interdependent relationship among the actors of the network. 
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Thus, governance networks may be seen as distinctive from and an alternative to the 
(unicentric) state and the (multicentric) market. Power is located in one place in the 
state, and market regulation is based on an infinite number of self-interested actors. 
Governance networks include a number of interdependent autonomous actors who 
interact in order to produce a public purpose. Within governance networks decision-
making is based on a spontaneous rationality that involves interaction among the 
actors who rely on their interdependencies in order to produce joint decisions/action 
despite their divergent interests. Hence, common decisions are reached through 
production of general trust and political obligation, which in turn become part of the 
self-established norms and rules of the network and not through legal sanctions of the 
state or out of fear of economic loss on the market (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 11-
12). 
Governance networks are an important part in regulating and governing society for 
which reason it is imperative to choose the ‘right’ type of governance mechanisms to 
the policy at hand. Generally, governance networks are seen to be effective in tackling 
different political problems, however, only if they are well-functioning. It is mentioned 
by Sørensen and Torfing (2007a) that efficiency gains originate in the distinct features 
of the governance networks. First, governance networks are potentially proactive in 
that they can identify possible policy problems and opportunities at an early stage and 
thus take action to help solve the problem. Second, governance networks often hold 
information and knowledge relevant for policy-making and public governance that 
other actors further away from the problem do not. Third, governance networks are 
claimed to help establish consensus based on the decision-making milieu of 
governance networks. Finally, it is claimed that if the affected and relevant actors are 
involved in the decision-making process they will develop a feeling of ownership and 
responsibility for the problem, which will lead them to support implementation of the 
policy instead of opposing it (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 12-13). To sum up, the 
interaction among the actors of the network influences the outcome and outputs of 
governance networks. The form and character of the policy output depends on the 
horizontal relations between the network actors. In essence, network governance is a 
complex process involving varying interests, identities and beliefs. 
Because of their unique appearance governance networks are neither organisations 
nor institutions. Governance networks are not organisations because of the 
institutionalised framework: i.e. the regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary 
framework that is constructed through negotiation. Governance networks are not 
organisations because they lack the defining traits of organisations such as a single 
objective, political leadership that imposes sanctions on the actors and a chain of 
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command (hierarchy). Governance networks are not institutions since they do not 
have any clearly defined rules, norms and procedures. Nor do they have any legally 
binding constitution that determines how decisions are made (for instance qualified 
majority voting and the like). Governance networks are not stable like institutions due 
to the nature of decision-making and the fact that members of the network are free 
to leave at any time. However, governance networks are based on an institutionalised 
framework of regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary characteristics that make 
way for the relatively instable, complex interaction among the members (Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2007b, 25-27). Because of this institutionalised framework in which 
governance networks operate, it is fruitful to apply institutional theory in order to 
understand the dynamics of governance networks. In fact, it may even be argued that 
network governance theory may be situated within the framework of institutionalism, 
taking into account that network governance is a more detail-oriented part of 
institutionalism that analyses the interaction within institutions/networks and 
between the actors within them in the policy-making process. Institutionalism views 
actors as collectivities that shape the institution and interact within the frames of that 
institution, whereas network governance is also focused on the behaviour and 
interaction of individuals with each other and the network. This discussion will be 
picked up and elaborated in the operationalization, but for now it is sufficient to 
mention that institutional theory explains the interplay between political agency and 
the structure of their interaction such as presented above, and network governance 
explains the relationship between the actors in this construction. 
4.3.1 The Formation of Governance Networks 
Having established what governance networks are, it is now time to turn to the 
question of how and why governance networks are established. A general answer to 
this enquiry is that “governance networks are products of interactions among more or 
less rational actors that invest in institutional arrangements to improve their capacity 
to implement various policy ideas.” (Hertting, 2007, 45) which is in accordance with 
the historical institutionalist argument about bounded rationality. In other words, 
governance networks are formed as a reaction to the context in which they are to 
operate. A similar view is that they are formed as endogenously ‘bottom-up’ 
responses to their perceived reality (their subjective interests, cultural and normative 
orientations). That is, actors establish governance networks because they believe that 
the network will help them accomplish a common goal (for instance the 
implementation of EU regional policy). In continuation of this argument, it is claimed 
that network formation strategies are based on the before-mentioned institutional 
and normative frameworks of the governance network (Hertting, 2007, 45-46). 
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In terms of network governance formation, different types of mechanisms can be 
identified of which the most obvious is the one of interdependency. Previously it has 
been illustrated how interdependencies are crucial in network governance, but this 
relationship needs to be further clarified in terms of the nature of the influence it has 
on governance network formation. Interdependencies should be perceived as 
incentive structures for governance network formation. To understand this 
relationship it is worth making a distinction between resource dependencies and 
other dependencies that generate strategic externalities. Resource
5
 dependencies are 
present in all networks. Network actors as well as networks themselves are 
dependent on other actors’ resources in order to achieve their goals. This implies an  
exchange of resources among network actors. As such network actors have a common 
interest in achieving the goal of the network and for that reason they seek to secure 
critical resources of the network. To illustrate, actor A is dependent on actor B if A 
needs the resources actor B possesses to create some kind of action. If B at the same 
time needs the resources which A possesses, they are interdependent. Strategic 
interdependencies, by contrast, are not exchanges of resources. In this scenario, the 
actors have the necessary resources themselves to bring about the preferred change, 
but they are dependent on the action of other actors. If actor A’s action is resulting in 
outcomes in the interaction with actions taken by actors B, C and D, then A’s ability to 
implement his preferred action is dependent on the strategic choices of B, C and D. 
The conclusion drawn from this is that interdependent actors cannot implement their 
goals without the assistance of other actors. Moreover, because interactions between 
the actors are frequently repeated, institutionalisation processes occur; i.e. shared 
perceptions, participation patterns and interaction rules develop and become 
formalised (Hertting, 2007, 47-48 and Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997, 6). 
Obviously, resource dependencies and dependencies that generate strategic 
externalities are related, but it is necessary to make the distinction in order to 
understand how the strategic ‘game’ in network governance influences the formation 
of networks. In order to realise a policy goal, it is necessary to form networks of actors 
who possess relevant and interdependent resources as individual actors are seldom in 
a position to achieve that goal on their own. Naturally, it is easier to form a network 
when actors have shared interests, expectations and goals. 
                                                                
5 A resource is understood as something which is 1) controlled by a policy actor, 2) is desired by another 
policy actor, and 3) can be transferred or exchanged in some relevant sense (Compston, 2009, 19)  
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4.3.2 Relations among Actors  
Relations among actors may either be between individual actors or between actors 
that represent an organisation. “Within networks, series of interactions occur around 
policy and other issues. These series of interactions can be called games.” (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000, 139) The position of the players of the game is determined by their 
position in the network and the strategic action in the game. The relationship among 
the actors is largely framed by the rules of the network and resource 
interdependencies
6
 among the actors. Each actor desires something from another 
actor and is prepared to exchange resources in return. The actors, thus, act 
strategically based on their perceptions of the nature of the problem and the desired 
solutions, enabling them to achieve their own objectives within the given 
dependencies of the network. “As actors interact, patterns of resource exchange 
emerge and rules develop which regulate interactions and to extent insulate the 
network from the outside world.” (Compston, 2009, 9) Thus, these games ensure 
cooperation among the actors involved in the network, and the outcome of the games 
is the result of the interactions of actors in the network. A government that interacts 
with private (non-government) actors, who enjoy access to information, legitimacy 
and implementation resources that the government does not, is an example of such 
interaction based on resource interdependencies. Here, an exchange of resources 
takes place to ensure the implementation of a government decided policy. It may be 
argued that it is in the interests of the individual actors to continue cooperation in 
order to keep the network stable and achieve the policy goals. Network governance 
necessitates that cooperation become a working mechanism of coordination. This is 
not always easy (Hertting, 2007, 52).  
A more complex scenario is when actors represent organisations in a network which 
constitutes a structural dilemma where horizontal coordination between the 
organisations is based on negotiation between the representatives of the 
organisations. These representatives cannot act individually; they are monitored by 
the members of their organisation. This means that they must act in the interest of 
the organisation as a whole, thus, possibly put restrictions on their own future 
manoeuvring within the network. The combination of inter-organisational and intra-
organisational decision-making processes makes coordination difficult. In other words 
it may be difficult to ensure horizontal self-coordination (Börzel, 1997, 7). Despite this 
                                                                
6 In a governance network consisting of public and private actors, the relevant literature identifies a number 
of resources to be present: constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, political, informational, economic 
position, knowledge or information, legitimate authority among others (Compston, 2009, 22-3). 
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apparent difficulty in achieving a common goal, networks are able to deliberately 
produce collective outcomes through voluntary bargaining. 
The impact of a network on a policy outcome is a function of the relative power of its 
members and their resources. Obviously, power is a central concept in the resource 
interdependency discussion, which is connected to the possession of resources and 
the asymmetry of power relations that this generates (Klijn, 1997, 21). Achievement 
of the policy outcome thus depends on the cooperation of actors in the network. This 
interaction among the actors, in turn, generates resources distribution among the 
actors that influence the performance of the network. Actors are conscious that their 
resources are necessary to achieve the policy outcome. This puts them in a position to 
veto interaction processes. The greater the veto power of an actor the more 
important the actor is to the policy game. Changes in the distribution of resources are 
also reflected in the policy games of the network. It is inherent in the network process 
that it is an interactive process where actors’ relations change according to the 
context and time in which it takes place thus altering the power balance repeatedly 
depending on the situation. Therefore, an actor cannot be said to be more powerful 
relative to another actor in a network during the entire process. It is also argued that 
the exact exchange of resources and purposes provide the actors with a capacity 
(power) to act; a reinforcement of the network process. Then, by interacting, actors, 
organisations and institutions gain greater power in the network, implying the 
importance of the actors to be active partners in the network.  
At the centre of the power discussion in network governance is resources, the 
interdependedness and the non-hierarchical forms of governance that are inherent in 
the network approach. As such, no actor is more powerful than another and the 
network is not commanded from the top. The approach is based upon the notion that 
each actor involved in the network contributes with resources upon which the other 
actors are dependent in order to obtain a preferred goal. What brings the actors 
together is the interest in achieving a goal and that the goal becomes more easily 
achievable when working together. Accordingly, it must be assumed that actors will 
not involve themselves in power struggles as is the case within the institutional 
discussion; rather they partake in negotiations over a decision on behalf of the entire 
network. “Actors may bargain over the distribution of resources but this bargain must 
be rooted in deliberation in order to facilitate learning, common understanding and 
coordination for the benefit of the network as a whole or the policy issue.” (see p. 75, 
network governance definition) Despite this assumption, some resources may be 
considered more valuable than others to the achievement of the network rendering 
some actors more influential than others (i.e. some actors have more power relative 
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to others). In this connection, the context in which the network operates, influences 
the process and must be taken into consideration. Relations are shaped by the way 
actors perceive of their objectives and roles in the network, their policy preferences 
and past experiences with policy-making. In such a way their relative power is shaped 
by these factors as well as their institutional/organisational connection. Therefore, 
some actors may have more power than other actors vis-à-vis their resources and 
ability to make others dependent on their resources.  
The structure of the network is related to the influence of the resource 
interdependencies among actors within a network on the outcome of a policy, i.e. the 
pattern of relations between actors. The pattern of relations between the actors is 
influenced by network size (number of actors), boundaries (open/closed), type of 
membership (voluntary/compulsory), pattern of linkages (chaotic/ordered), density or 
multiplexity (extent to which actors are linked by multiple relations), clustering or 
differentiation in sub-networks, linking pattern or type of coordination (hierarchy, 
horizontal consultation and bargaining, overlapping memberships, centralization), 
degree of delegation of decision-making to central units by members, and the nature 
of relations (conflictual/competitive/cooperative). Besides structure, it is also implicit 
that the power relations based on resources, needs and organisational characteristics 
(i.e. size, degree of centralization, etc.) among the actors influence the outcome 
(Compston, 2009, 10-1). 
Cooperation does not always happen on its own: “[d]ifferences and disagreements in 
perceptions between actors may cause conflict and block the interaction. Only when 
actors are able to bring their perceptions together and formulate common goals and 
interests will policy games lead to satisfactory outcomes.” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, 
143) Therefore, networks need steering and managing. Steering strategies focus on 
the improvement of cooperation among the actors of the network. Sometimes it is 
even assumed that a successful outcome is not possible without network 
management. The following will take a closer look at the type of strategies to be 
considered when managing networks. 
4.3.3 Forms of Network Governance 
Networks may vary in terms of their structural patterns of relations which are 
influenced by the management and governance of the networks. Provan and Kenis 
(2007) argue that three forms of network governance exist. These may either be 
decentralised or centralised in form or somewhere in-between. A second distinction 
running across the aforementioned three forms of network governance may also be 
made between participant governed or externally governed.  
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The first form of network governance is called participant-governed networks. This 
form is governed by the network members themselves either through meetings 
involving designated representatives of the organisation or through on-going 
uncoordinated efforts by the members of the network. Participant-governed networks 
may be either highly decentralised with all or most members co-operating on a fairly 
equal basis, or highly centralised when the organisation is governed by and through a 
lead organisation which is a member of the network. Shared participant-governed 
networks depend on the participation and commitment of all members, or a division 
of the organisations that are included in the network. Network participants are 
responsible for managing both internal and external network relations, which also 
implies that they collectively make all decisions and manage network activities. It is 
important to have all network members participate on an equal basis for them to be 
committed to the goals of the network. The network acts collectively and is never 
represented by a single entity in the network as a whole (Provan and Kenis, 2007, 233-
35). 
A second form of network governance is through what is referred to as a lead 
organisation. Opposed to shared participant-governed networks, governance through 
a lead organisation occurs when a single member of the network makes key decisions 
and manages network-level activities. As such, the lead organisation provides network 
administration and/or assists the activities of the members of the network in their 
efforts to achieve the network goals. The lead organisation may receive resources 
from its members or seek external funding through grants or government funding to 
finance the cost of network administration. The lead organisation may either be 
designated by the network members or mandated by those who fund the network 
externally (Provan and Kenis, 2007, 235).  
A third form of network governance is the network administrative organisation (NAO) 
model. With this form a separate unit is set up to govern the network and its 
activities. This model is thus highly centralised even though network members 
interact with each other. The NAO works as a network broker in terms of coordinating 
and sustaining the network. Being a separate unit, the NAO is not a member 
organisation that provides its services; rather it is externally governed and established 
either through mandate or by the members themselves. The NAO may be a 
government entity or a non-profit organisation. The NAO may consist of one single 
individual or a formal organisation consisting of an executive director, staff and board. 
The formal organisation often deals with highly complex network-level problems. In 
this form, the board typically addresses strategic-level network concerns whereas the 
NAO executive director deals with operational decisions. Government-run NAOs are 
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intended to stimulate the growth of the network through targeted funding and/or 
network facilitation and to assure the achievement of network goals. An example of 
such a NAO is the administrative unit within the region or at national level that 
administers regional economic development (Provan and Kenis, 2007, 236). 
Having established the different forms of network governance, it is worth 
investigating why one form is preferred over another. A decision is made based on 
what the network members consider effective governance, imitation of others, 
personal preferences and past experiences. Having listed these, it must, however, also 
be remembered that some networks are mandated in a way that de facto alleviates 
the option of choice among the network members. This choice is made beforehand by 
government policy decision-makers based on the form considered to be the most 
effective in order to achieve the policy goal. However, four structural and relational 
factors may influence the choice of network governance form: trust, size (number of 
participants), goal consensus, and the nature of the task. Trust is important in the 
sense that it influences the interaction between the members rendering a goal more 
easily achieved if the members generally trust each other and everyone involved 
shares the same goal. The more members in a network the more difficult it is to trust 
that everybody is working towards the same end. Therefore, shared governance is 
more likely to be effective when participants have a shared sense of trust. It is 
important that trust ties are dense to ensure that members share the perception of 
trust. In brokered governance forms, such as lead organisation or NAOs, trust density 
is often low because they are themselves built around a collection of dyadic ties 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007, 238). 
As mentioned above, the more organisations in a network the more complex 
interactions become since potential relationships increase exponentially. Shared self-
governance is often desirable for network participants since they maintain full control 
over the management of the network, although it is best suited for small networks. 
Shared governance becomes increasingly inefficient as the number of participants in 
the network grow. When this happens it is more suitable to change the governance 
form to centralised network governance; i.e. either a lead organisation or an NAO. 
Network participants are not directly involved in network decisions with a lead 
organisation or an NAO managing the network relations; therefore they do not 
interact directly with one another but with the lead organisation or the NAO. It is 
difficult to estimate the ‘correct’ number of participants for each form of network 
governance, but generally the fewer participants the more suitable is shared 
governance and the more participants the more suitable is the NAO form of 
governance (Provan and Kenis, 2007, 238-9). 
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In the network governance literature, there is a general agreement that goal 
consensus is significant to the ability of networks to perform efficiently (in terms of 
the member involvement and commitment to the network and willingness to 
cooperate). This argument has implications for understanding the behaviour of 
network participants, since network participants must be open to the goals of their 
network and their employing organisation. Such goals may include developing new 
clients, attract funding to the network, address community needs, improve client 
service or it may be process oriented (relations among the participants of the 
network). Despite goal consensus influencing the cooperation within the network, the 
governance of network relationships is perhaps more significant when the 
effectiveness of the network is the objective. Obviously, self-governed networks are 
more likely to be effective if all members agree on the network level goals; otherwise 
there is no point in having a network. Lead organisations and NAOs do not necessarily 
need high goal consensus. In fact, when the level of goal consensus is intermediate to 
moderately low, lead organisation forms are more suitable, whereas NAOs are more 
effective when goal consensus is moderately high. The lead organisation form does 
not require individual organisations to take part in strategic and operational decisions 
for which reason it does not matter whether the organisations agree. Thus, the lead 
organisation is able to maintain the focus of the network when individual members 
are not. By contrast, the NAO form requires high involvement and commitment of the 
members especially since they are often mandated by external partners who also fund 
their activities. It is crucial that they agree in order for the network to be a success 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007, 239-40). 
Obviously, organisations join or form networks for different reasons such as ability to 
perform more efficiently as a unit, etc., but definitely also if joining may lead to 
achievement of goals that are otherwise out of reach. Upon joining a network 
members somewhat share responsibility of the success of the network as a whole, but 
also of the task that it aims at accomplishing. This means that each member is 
required to have task-specific competencies and network-level skills. This in turn, 
increases interdependence among network members. In terms of the three different 
forms of network organisation, shared governance is more likely to be effective when 
interdependence is high, requiring great interaction among the members. Members 
may be demanded to possess skill that they do not have. Therefore, the alternative 
lead organisation or NAO models may be preferred. In these cases, the lead 
organisation or NAO could be regarded as the ‘specialists’. These choices are made 
based on both internal and external demands of task competencies and network-level 
skills. It is the job of the lead organisation and the NAO to develop these required 
skills if they do not already possess them (Provan and Kenis, 2007, 240-1). 
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4.3.4 Meta-Governance of Governance Networks 
Generally, in the network literature, on the one hand, it is agreed that a central 
characteristic of governance networks is their ability to self-regulate. But on the other, 
it is also acknowledged that governance networks must be managed and controlled if 
they are to contribute to efficient government of society. This said, it must be noted 
that the traditional hierarchical steering that sovereign states usually perform is not 
an option in the management of governance networks: it is necessary to maintain the 
self-regulating aspect of networks while managing them. This effort has led to a new 
form of governance referred to as ‘network management’ or ‘meta-governance’ in the 
network governance literature (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 169). 
The above presentation of governance, networks and network governance is based on 
the assumption that networks are self-organising systems that do not need steering 
by government. This view is also present in the network literature. It must be noted, 
however, that the need of government steering depends on the context in which the 
network is set up and operates. For instance, the limits to self-organisation may be 
particularly evident in the EU supranational context. Therefore, network management 
may require certain leadership tasks to ensure the goal of the policy: designing the 
network, diagnosing disagreement, identifying policy alternatives and ensuring that 
negotiation continues (Schout and Jordan, 2005, 210). Network management or meta-
governance attempts to consciously guide governance processes in the networks: it 
aims to initiate, guide and facilitate relation between actors, to generate and alter 
network arrangement so that coordination is improved (Klijn and Edelenbos, 2008, 
200). In this regard, network management must be seen as a complement to self-
organisation rather than an alternative. Network management serves the overall 
interest of the network. 
Network theories have been criticised for considering government organisations to be 
the same as any other organisation and in this respect ignore their role as guardian of 
public interests in public policy-making. But as such, according to network theory, 
government organisations may avoid this pitfall and protect the public interests by 
exercising meta-governance of the networks based on their resources. Governments 
take up a special position due to their access to resources such as sizable budgets and 
personnel, special powers, access to media, and democratic legitimisation (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000, 151). Access to these resources gives them considerable power to 
influence networks. It is assumed that governments are primarily the ones who 
exercise meta-governance. In the network literature, it is discussed, however, 
whether other actors such as private actors, etc. can exercise meta-governance.  
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The governance network literature represents different views on how to meta-govern. 
Some are descriptive while others are prescriptive; some present a hands-on, 
interventionist approach while others present a hands-off, ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
approach to meta-governing; and some forms of meta-governance have low efficiency 
while others have high efficiency. But a general picture can be drawn. There are three 
ways in which governments can and do exercise meta-governance of governance 
networks: by designing networks, network participation, or by framing networks. By 
exercising meta-governance through designing networks governments are able to 
regulate networks by encouraging the establishment of them and to influence their 
memberships. In this way, governments are in a position to influence the composition 
of the networks. By participating in networks governments are able to get first-hand 
information about what is going on in the networks. They are able to influence the 
agenda of the network and thus ensure that the objective of the policy is achieved. By 
framing networks governments are in a position to formulate the overall political 
goals of the network through allocation of fiscal or other resources to the network. 
Also governments can influence networks by way of determining the norms and 
values that condition the governance process, as well as deciding what is relevant and 
important to the network and government respectively (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005, 
229-230). Thus, governments may have great influence on shaping networks even 
when these networks are self-organising. 
These types of meta-governance can also be understood in terms of two types of 
strategies: process design and management on the one hand and institutional design 
on the other. The process design and management strategy assist interaction between 
the actors of the network in the policy process by coordinating interaction and uniting 
the individual perceptions of the actors and so on. The manager’s role is to encourage 
cooperation and coordination based on the given characteristics of the network 
(position, rules, norms, historical tradition, etc.) in order to achieve acceptable 
outcomes of the policy process (Klijn and Edelenbos, 2008, 200). A number of 
principles are identified to support process design: 1) openness. It is important to 
include all relevant actors in the process as soon as possible in order to avoid 
blockage. This also enhances the quality of the process in that information is delivered 
to the network members. 2) safety. Perhaps the biggest concern of network members 
is the protection of their own interests and values. They will only participate if 
cooperation does not undermine their interests and values. The assurance of the 
protection of interests and values is thus mirrored in the process design by an 
obligation to let actors know about changes, exit rules, veto rights, etc. 3) progress. 
Progress may be ensured by agreeing on timetables, important decisions, activities, 
conflict resolution, etc. These means will keep the actors committed to the process. 4) 
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content. The idea behind the network is essential since a good idea may encourage 
the actors to participate and deploy their resources into the process more easily. The 
idea will evolve through the process. The network manager must balance all these 
principles in creating the ‘right’ process design for the network. The tension between 
these principles may leave him/her with a dilemma. The process design may thus be 
adjusted during the interaction process to address possible dilemmas (Klijn and 
Edelenbos, 2008, 201-2). 
Also a number of process management strategies may be considered by the manager: 
1) activation of actors and resources, 2) creation of organisational arrangements, 3) 
guidance of interaction, 4) goal achieving strategies, 5) joint knowledge production, 
and 6) trust creation. These strategies must be considered simultaneously in the 
attempt to find the ‘right mix’ allowing the network process to become efficient and 
facilitate continued interaction. If interaction stagnates, these strategies must be 
adjusted to re-establish the interaction of the actors. The manager must identify 
actors and resource needs before even initiating the process. Once the process is 
initiated, it is important to clarify the goals and interests of the actors warranting that 
solutions for common strategies leading to cooperation can be found. If actors end up 
with different perceptions of the network process and its solutions, a process of 
exchanging and uniting perceptions will be initiated. Next, it is important to develop 
common knowledge for the benefit of the network. It has proven very difficult for all 
actors in a network to agree on the same knowledge; they often tend to question and 
challenge co-participants’ research and knowledge. Therefore, it is vital to have well-
negotiated and shared knowledge in the network. In this way, common assumptions 
are developed. Having established common knowledge, trust among actors must be 
ensured. Trust entails a more or less stable mutual understanding of intentions among 
actors (Klijn and Edelenbos, 2008, 203-6). 
Network strategies based on institutional design are used when the institutional 
characteristics of the network need to be changed for some reason; i.e. the actors’ 
position vis-à-vis each other, introducing new rules or other forms of intervention that 
would change the structure of the network. Thus, the focus is on finding suitable 
institutional design and strategies for the realisation of it. The assumption is that the 
institutional characteristics of the network influence the possibilities of strategies and 
cooperation of the actors. By changing one or more of these institutional rules, 
interrelations between actors of the network may change: the rules are interpreted by 
the actors and thus applied in their interaction with each other. Sometimes this 
creates confusion since institutional rules are often ambiguous allowing some actors 
interpret them differently. These institutional rules develop over time and are created 
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in complex institutional contexts. This means that they are time-consuming and 
difficult to implement and thus not appropriate for achieving changes in the policy 
process that is already in progress. Institutional design strategies may be aimed at 
network composition, network outcomes, and network interactions. Network 
composition may be changed permitting interactions among the actors to change. This 
can either be done through changing the position of the actors of the network or by 
modifying the entire system (access rules, self-regulation, etc.). Network outcomes 
strategies seek to influence the cost-benefit analysis carried out by actors of the 
‘game’ – the choices that they make in cooperation and negotiation; especially in 
relation to their strategic choice that subsequently shapes the outcome. Strategies 
aimed at network interactions seek to influence the rules that control the process in 
networks. In this way, interaction between actors may be facilitated and a framework 
surrounding network interaction may be created (Klijn and Edelenbos, 2008, 207-9). In 
a sense, special attention may be paid to the interrelationships between existing and 
new rules in this strategy. 
Meta-governance or governance management is not an easy task. Many things need 
to be considered when trying to aid progress of cooperation within networks ensuring 
a path to an acceptable outcome according to the goals and institutional design of the 
network. It is also important that the network manager remains a facilitator and does 
not become a network actor. 
Summing up network governance, the theory is preoccupied with explaining the 
relations between actors within networks based on the interdependencies of 
resources held by actors. The theory identifies a number of actors that are usually 
present in a network: public, semi-public and private actors who are dependent on 
each other’s resources. Interaction among these actors is based on the exchange of 
resources in achieving a common goal of the network as perceived by the members; a 
goal that is unachievable individually. This perceived sense of ‘commonness’ guides 
relations so that despite disagreements, a common outcome is always reached. 
Because of potential disagreements that are based on the perceived objective of the 
network on behalf of the members, network management and steering is often 
necessary on behalf of the network as a whole. The raison d'être of the network is 
based on a self-regulating method, but sometimes networks need further meta-
governance from the outside (often from government) in order to be efficient.  
It has been argued that the partnership principle resembles a network in some ways 
but not all, as it involves a partnership process. In order to be able to evaluate 
whether the partnership process requirements are implemented leading to the 
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expected process, it is crucial to have a better understanding of the nature of 
partnerships. The following offers a definition of partnership as a dynamic process. 
Theoretically, this definition can be placed under the network governance umbrella as 
a means to understand what partnership is all about, but it is not an independent 
theory. Partnership may then be seen as an extended form of governance network 
that embraces the process aspect which governance networks do not. 
4.4 Partnership as a Process 
Partnership is no longer restricted to be a requirement of EU regional policy 
implementation. It has been extended to influence various policy sectors and has even 
become a complex phenomenon subject to theorisation and articulation in many 
contexts. In an OECD report on partnerships, it is concluded that partnerships have 
become very popular, but the mechanisms through which partnerships contribute to 
economic development are not fully clear. In the report, partnerships are compared 
to a ‘back box’, where inputs and outputs are visible, but the mechanisms that 
transform inputs to outputs are not. Inputs include local actors who agree to 
participate in the exercise, the programmes that frame the partnerships and the 
funding available to the partnerships for economic development. Outputs, or the 
‘value added’ of partnerships, consists of for instance the number of jobs created, 
business start-ups or people going back to school for further education (OECD, 2001, 
18). So what happens between input and output?  
The following section seeks to provide an answer to this inquiry by presenting and 
discussing one definition of partnership as a general concept that can be applied to 
the partnership principle as well as other types of partnerships. This definition is 
selected as it encompasses a general view of partnership that is applicable to most 
contexts as well as it seems to address the centrality of partnership as a process. 
Other authors have sought to propose ideas and characterisations of the concept: 
“the promotion of joint working between a combination of organisations from 
different backgrounds; the pursuit of a set of commonly held and agreed goals; and 
the assumption that the achievements of the whole exercise will be greater than that 
which can be achieved by the partners acting separately.” (Roberts, 2003, 21) Walsh 
(2004) refers to the partnership approach as “a mobilisation of a coalition of interests 
drawn from one sector in order to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy for a 
defined area or objective” (Walsh, 2004, 9). Also Nappini (2005, 4-7) has sought to 
define and break down types of partnership. She distinguishes between two types of 
partnership; i.e. strategic partnership (closely reflecting the inclusion aspect of the 
partnership principle with its partners at various levels of government) and 
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operational partnership (partnership at a lower level set up specifically to implement 
projects). These different approaches have one thing in common: they all characterise 
partnership in relation to the management of other types of organisations. Clearly, 
these characterisations fit into the general perception of partnership as a different 
form of organisation, but they do not fully embrace the consequences of working in a 
partnership for its inter-relations and its objective. At least the approach of Nappini 
becomes more applicable when placed within the general theoretical approach 
presented here. Having been placed within a more precise definition of partnership, 
Nappini’s approach is able to explain variances according to types of partnership, 
which is not the aim here. Apparently, these approaches present partnership as a 
static approach that ignores the dynamics that partnership encompasses. The aim is 
to study the process of partnership and not to put partnership into categories. In 
contrast, the proposed approach presented by Åkerstrøm Andersen clearly defines 
partnership as a dynamic process that shapes interaction and the future objectives of 
the partnership.  
According to Åkerstrøm Andersen, the danger of partnership is that it has become a 
concept that everybody has a perceived understanding of. It has been stretched to 
become a non-binding, casual metaphor that implies everything that one wishes and 
often we misunderstand each other’s perceptions of partnership. Therefore, 
Åkerstrøm Andersen proposes a general characterisation of partnership that may be 
applied to policy-making and everyday interaction (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2006, 11-2). 
As opposed to the suggested innovation of partnership in the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds, the partnership concept is not that new. During the 1960s and 
1970s, partnership was seen as a relationship of goodwill between private companies 
in the Japanese business world. This understanding of the concept of partnership 
grew to involve articulation of new inter-organisational relationships during the mid-
1980s. It was observed that networks between different actors and lines of business 
create synergies and innovative cultures between the involved parties. Thus, networks 
and partnerships were considered profitable environments. It further developed 
through articulation so that during the 1990s it involved cross-sectoral cooperation. 
Thus, today the understanding of partnership covers cooperation across companies, 
lines of business, public and private sectors as well as policy areas. Partnerships also 
influence across communication systems such as politics, finances, education, health 
and many other (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2006, 12-13). 
Partnerships are seen as equal to community, long-term cooperation, dialogue, 
synergy and utilisation of the mutual differences of the partners. This is in opposition 
to contracts that are considered to be based on more short-term calculation and 
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bargaining. This implies that partnerships are characterised by complex organisation. 
On the basis of this, Åkerstrøm Andersen argues that partnerships can be 
characterised as ‘contracts of second order’, implying that partnerships are some kind 
of contractual arrangement, since the partners involved must have some kind of 
agreement of the objective and operation of the partnership. As opposed to 
contracts, the contractual partnership is designed to handle the fact that the 
circumstances surrounding the partnership are constantly changing. It is important to 
ensure that the contractual relationship never becomes fixated and static; rather it 
remains dynamic. Thus, partnership is considered to be some form of second order 
contracts: contracts to ensure contract evolution. Moreover, partnerships pave the 
way for new relations between politics, finances, health and other communication 
systems (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2006, 15). 
In other words, partnerships can be considered to be a dislocation of the logic of 
contracts. Partnerships are promises about making promises. This implies that 
partners must choose one another before stating promises or drawing up 
agreements. Thus, partnerships are all about aspirations to make contracts with each 
other in the future, about how to make these contracts in the future and how to 
respond to the first order contracts that are made. The key word here appears to be 
development: partnerships are constantly developing as a response to the changing 
context in which they operate. Related to the partnership processes are defining 
goals, responsibility, interpretation rules, dialogue, values and missions of the 
partnership. Partnerships are characterised as referring back to themselves (or in the 
words of network theories ‘self-regulating’ or ‘self-organising’), the (instable) 
conditions that they make themselves and creating their own order (Åkerstrøm 
Andersen, 2006, 128-31). Åkerstrøm Andersen (2006, 188) further argues that 
partnerships can be considered as some form of steering but at the same time it is 
also a renunciation of steering since it is necessary for the partnership to have room 
to manoeuvre to establish its own agenda allowing it to function in the best possible 
manner.  
As such, partnerships can be considered to be systems of opportunities that are to 
some extent influenced by insecurity regarding its existence. This means that 
partnerships produce opportunities for future cooperation, visions and ideas. 
However, the transitory position that partnerships are in also create uncertainty and 
instability in terms of their existence, since partnerships are all about the process of 
creating partnerships or what Åkerstrøm Andersen calls ‘partnerskabelse’. If partners 
do not acknowledge the opportunities of the partnership, the partnership seizes to 
exist, or at least it changes its outlook and functions (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2006, 184-
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5).  The system of opportunities that a partnership creates can be argued to attribute 
a kind of empowerment of partners in a partnership which in essence is all about 
administering and utilising the powers that a partnership affords to the partners 
(Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2006, 190). Then it is important to utilise the powers so the 
existence of the partnership continues.  
As Åkerstrøm Andersen’s concept of partnership illustrates, it has many traits in 
common with governance networks, in particular the overall frame of partnership and 
networks. However, Åkerstrøm Andersen’s model differs as his concepts are based on 
what he calls ‘partnerskabelse’ or translated to English ‘partnering’, i.e. how to create 
partnerships, how they endure based on the partners mutual understanding of 
making promises about future promises, and how they are constantly developing. In 
Åkerstrøm Andersen’s words, the definition of partnership is a fragile system of 
opportunities of second order contracts based on long-term promises to make new 
promises. It must be recognised that reading Åkerstrøm Andersen’s book and other 
partnership literature stresses that partnership as a concept is difficult to define and 
restrict, since it embraces so many aspects and understandings. This is so because the 
partnership concept needs to be all-encompassing implying that it is a general notion 
that may be interpreted or translated in many different ways. Also the dynamic 
characteristics of the partnership concept need to be recognised in the definition. 
Therefore, the definition of Åkerstrøm Andersen also reflects the generality of the 
concept and it encapsulates the general view of partnership. Hence, it appears to be a 
reasonable frame for understanding the term partnership; it is a frame for 
understanding that partnerships are what the partners make of it in their relations 
with each other. Partnership is a dynamic organisation that is self-regulating and 
adjusts to the context in which it exists. Having found a useful understanding to the 
term partnership, i.e. that partnerships are dynamic processes that revolve around 
the interaction in the process and the agreement between partners to make promises 
to make future promises about cooperation, the next step is to operationalize the 
partnership concept along with the other central concepts of the forthcoming 
analysis. Prior to this, a discussion of the compatibility and relations between the 
three perspectives is presented leading to the operationalization. 
4.5 Integrating the Three Perspectives 
The above has presented the relevant arguments of the two theories, historical 
institutionalism and network governance as well as the specific variant of network 
governance (e.g. the definition of partnership as partnering), that can illuminate my 
forthcoming analysis. These two theories share a common ground: that governance 
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has been complicated by the inclusion of actors at different levels (including private) 
in the process, and that the outcome of the process (both policy outcome and 
institutional change) is not predictable because of the web of relations between all 
these actors. This is also the case in practise where new forms of governance are 
required to be set up in the interaction between national and EU regional policies as a 
condition for receiving EU Structural Funds potentially leading to change in existing 
practises. They see this process from different yet related angles, but the process of 
change is of common concern. The following will pick up on this focus on the process 
of change both in terms of how the two theories are related, and how they can assist 
each other in analysing the process of change.  
Now let me begin with the proposition that it is important to understand this analysis 
as a holistic process. As a point of departure I see my analysis as a whole which 
historical institutionalism and network governance (and partnership as a process) can 
elucidate in combination, but for the sake of simplicity and clarity, I divide the analysis 
into three sub-analyses. I have previously argued that historical institutionalism can be 
expected to be used as a lens through which the overall process of institutional 
change and the interaction and coordination between the Danish and the EU regional 
policy-making approaches can be analysed. In support, network governance (and 
Åkerstrøm Andersen’s partnership approach) will inform the analysis of the execution 
of the inclusion and process aspects of the partnership which in turn have implications 
for the types of institutional change that expectedly are generated. Having reviewed 
the two theories (i.e. historical institutionalism and network governance), a clear 
connection, overlap and interrelatedness between the theories appeared. 
Both theories are based on a notion of bounded rationality where actors are not 
perceived as completely rational, rather actors also make decisions based on their 
cognitive and emotional evaluation of the situation and sometimes they even fail to 
make decisions. This implies that human rational behaviour is limited by the 
emotional and cognitive nature of human beings. In turn, this influences how actors 
behave within the frames set by the institution and the network. According to 
Mahoney and Thelen’s latest contribution to the historical institutionalist approach, 
change is brought about (whether intended or unintended) by the actions and 
decisions made by actors within an institutional context that favours certain 
strategies, actors and preferences over others. Similarly, network governance argues 
that networks have an institution-like nature and that actors within them cooperate in 
the overall interest of the network because cooperation aimed at a mutual goal is 
more beneficial than working alone. However, cooperation is also based on resource 
dependencies among the actors, which may result in some preferences being elevated 
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over others. Generally, historical institutionalism and network governance are based 
on the same premises; that the institution and the network structure interaction 
among the actors within them. In this sense, the two theories share a base, where one 
is more concerned with the overall picture and the historical process of change 
shaped by the behaviour of the actors, and the other is concerned with that behaviour 
in more detail in terms of relations and negotiations between them. In other words, 
historical institutionalism is concerned with how the behaviour of actors influences 
institutions and how institutions influence the actors within them. Network 
governance is more focused on how the process of cooperation itself leads to a policy 
outcome rather than the institutional structure in which policy is implemented; this is 
a given. Thus, historical institutionalism provides the overall framework for 
understanding network governance. 
With this knowledge in mind the two theories in unison may be applied to the analysis 
in that they are both concerned with the relation between structure and agency from 
their respective positions; that the institution and network structure the context in 
which relations between actors take place. In this sense, institutions and networks 
shape and influence the behaviour and preferences of actors. The partnership 
principle resembles what can be characterised as institutional structures for 
cooperation requiring partnership to be both including certain actors and a process 
(the ‘partnering’). The partnership principle is thus the structure, whereas the 
partnering and inclusion process may be regarded as the agency. These two interact in 
a dynamic process that generates change over time in the existing national regional 
policy-making institution in accordance with the requirements of the partnership 
principle (and the assumptions of both theories). As the partnership principle is 
extended to include more actors, the process of change in the national institution and 
the employment of the partnership principle in the member states can be expected to 
change accordingly.  
To elaborate on the interconnectedness and similarities between the two 
perspectives, the historical institutionalist perspective may serve as a frame in which 
to understand network governance: when explaining the formation of governance 
networks, institutions play a dual role: on the one hand, governance networks are 
established to defeat the problems of institutional and organisational disintegration 
caused by the implementation of the policy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, 31). In other 
words, governance networks are the outcome of local actors’ struggle with the 
consequences of institutional reform. On the other hand, when these actors have 
established governance networks in overcoming institutional reform, the horizontal 
relations among the actors may lead to the establishment of institutionalised rules 
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and norms for the network that promote interdependency. Hereby, networks are 
institutionalised as part of the overall institution, thereby bringing about change. 
Likewise, when explaining the functioning of governance networks, historical 
institutionalism claims that institutions help stabilise the interaction within the 
network by offering rules, and norms about decision-making, general trust and ways 
in which to resolve conflicts. However, it must be noted that historical institutionalism 
also claims that previous decision-making may prevent new and innovative decisions 
in the future, since the regulative and normative framework of the network may 
reflect old compromises and fails to take into consideration the new context. It is also 
claimed that the institutionalised division of power among the network actors (central 
and peripheral) may even foster the asymmetrical division of resources between the 
network actors. This could lead to marginalisation of some actors that consequently 
perhaps wish to leave the network or it may lead to power struggles within the 
network. 
Moreover, besides these similarities between the theories, they also have different 
focal areas that support each other well. Despite the fact that the historical 
institutionalist approach argues that the behaviour of actors influences and shapes 
the institutions in which they are engaged, the theory is not able to explain more 
specifically the relations and roles played by these actors in the process. This is where 
network governance proves to be a good match, exactly because the aim is to analyse 
the types of change generated by the execution of the partnership principle over time 
in terms of institutional structures and inclusion and process in the attempt to 
implement the EU regional policy in Denmark. The partnership principle affords actors 
with a new institutional structure in which they can organise cooperation with the 
objective of ensuring the implementation of EU regional policy in the member states 
effectively in accordance with the member state institutional traditions. In this case, 
historical institutionalism is not able to explain the relations generated by the 
interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle. Rather the analytical 
strength of historical institutionalism is in explaining the institutional development 
surrounding the partnering and the bases upon which the partnership process is 
based; i.e. the establishment of institutional capacity to comply with the partnership 
requirements (vertical and horizontal). But, in turn, the interpretation and 
implementation of the partnerships generates change in the existing national regional 
policy-making institution.  
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4.6 Operationalization 
The above theoretical considerations give rise to an operationalization of the research 
questions and a presentation of the concepts that have inspired the tri-partite analysis 
of how the implementation of the inclusion and process requirements of the 
partnership principle expectedly generate change in the Danish regional policy-making 
institution. In the following, the key concepts are highlighted in italics for the sake of 
overview. These concepts are central to the analysis through guidance of my data 
selection and collection as well as data analysis.  
Based on the empirical and theoretical choices made and the compatibility of the 
three theories, historical institutionalism will frame the analysis of how the Danish 
interpretation of the partnership requirements generates change in the Danish 
regional policy-making organisation, in particular how the inclusion and process 
aspects affect this process. Thus, historical institutionalism constitutes the overall 
theoretical framework in which the analysis is undertaken, but in order to analyse 
specific aspects of this process historical institutionalism is supported by the 
governance network approach and the partnership definition offered by Åkerstrøm 
Andersen. This is imperative based on the above discussion of the relationship 
between the three approaches and their explanatory forces in relation to each other. 
Historical institutionalism offers a number of concepts that may shape the analysis. 
First is the concept of the institution itself. The institution is central to the analysis of 
the institutional organisation that frames the context in which networks and the 
required partnerships are formed: i.e. institutions shape the behaviour of actors in the 
pursuit of a policy outcome. Likewise, it is necessary to be able to understand the 
term institution in relation to the partnership principle itself, as it has been argued 
that it is ‘a European institution that the European Commission has sought to give 
normative content’. The concept of the institution is associated with an organisational 
structure that determines ‘the rules of the game’. Thus, this is the analysis of the 
encounter between two perhaps different institutions; one that has to be changed 
according to the requirements of the other as a condition for receiving financial 
support – this has implications. This suggests that historical institutionalism frames 
the entire analysis shaping the interpretation and implementation of the partnership 
principle.  
Institutional change is a historical process that can be traced back for decades. This 
implies that institutional development, whether characterised by continuity or gradual 
change defines institutional history. History matters. Thus, change is a dynamic 
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process that occurs over the course of time. According to, and central to, historical 
institutionalism, the process of adaptation or change to EU policies in domestic 
contexts constitutes a process of social learning over time where networks and 
informal institutions (political and organisational cultures and social norms) affect 
actor behaviour and preferences through the logic of appropriateness, which then 
leads them to re-conceptualise their interests and identities hence bringing about 
learning processes (Getimis, Demetropoulou and Paraskevopoulos, 2008, 96). What is 
more, the timing and sequence of these processes is central to the outcome; i.e. it 
matters when and in which order exogenous events influence the behaviour of actors 
within the domestic networks and institutions in order to determine how the 
behaviour of these actors has been changed. From this it may be argued that in order 
to be able to adopt EU regional policy requirements, participation in the policy-making 
process by actors at levels below national level and also even below sub-national 
level, as well as a change of behaviour of these actors is necessary facilitating social 
learning. This implies support of an actor centred theory, which is able to analyse the 
relations within those networks and informal institutions established within the 
national regional policy-making institutions. 
When tracing the process of change, historical institutionalism offers a number of 
concepts to explain that process: the process may either be characterised by path-
dependence or continuity where no considerable change is seen or the process of 
change is gradual. Likewise, the process of change may either be caused by internal 
change of behaviour in the institution due to its power asymmetries or internal 
change brought about by processes external to the institution. 
First of all, the development of the organisation is likely to be characterised by path-
dependency where decisions made in the past shape future decision-making. To 
identify path-dependency, it is crucial to detect a longer running persistent pattern of 
behaviour of the organisation in terms of relations between actors within the 
organisational structure. Alternatively, institutional stability is mentioned in more 
recent developments of the theory to refer to the on-going political mobilisation of 
the institution. 
Second, the organisation may have undergone transformation along the way in a 
gradual process. In Hall and Thelen’s attempt to explain continuity and change, they 
propose three types of change that are possible outcomes of internal manoeuvring: 
defection, re-interpretation or reform. This implies that actors either decide to stop 
adhering to the institution or they re-interpret the rules of the institution. In this case 
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change occurs gradually without rewriting the formal rules. This, however, is not the 
case in the third type of change. Reform is mandated by governments.  
Third, and related to the first two concepts, development, whether path-dependent 
or gradual, is determined by either internal or external events, but in the end change 
in the institution is always internal. Internally the behaviour of actors shapes the 
organisation causing it to change gradually or continue a path-dependent 
development. Here it is relevant to look for potential struggles among actors in their 
attempt to change the organisational structure, or alternatively, accept status quo. 
Also external events outside the institution may result in change inside the institution; 
often these external events cause a more sudden change in the established structure 
of the institution. Such change could constitute socio-economic changes in the 
context leading to alternative organisation as a response to them. Or it may be 
changes in the institution’s relations with other institutions such as the EU 
necessitating restructuring of the existing institution.  
Fourth, relations among the actors within the institution shape the latter. Because 
institutions are laden with power the relations among the actors within them reflect 
the asymmetric power distribution created by the institution. This implies that some 
actors have more power/resources at their disposal when manoeuvring in the policy-
making game. In the case of disagreement with the overall objectives of the 
institution, actors may try to change the objectives of the institution in their own 
direction, thereby increasing their own role in the institutional organisation. It is 
assumed that actors are always looking for an opportunity to improve their own 
position: they need to ensure that the institution serves their interests; otherwise 
they are ready to take steps to adjust the institution. Thus, change in the institution is 
brought about by power struggles among the actors as a result of asymmetries of 
power. It is argued that this institution-led asymmetrical distribution of resources 
determines the roles of the actors in their relations which in turn generates the 
establishment of networks in policy-making for instance through bottom-up 
developments, through power struggles among the actors within the institution or by 
definition of the institution itself. 
Internal change may either be characterised as displacement, layering, drift or 
conversion. Displacement is the abrupt change that often involves radical shifts, but it 
may also be gradual. This is the case when new institutions are presented competing 
with existing ones and not replacing them. Layering is when new rules are attached to 
the existing ones but not replacing the institution itself such as revisions of the 
existing framework. Drift occurs when rules remain formally the same but the impact 
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of them changes as a result of shifts in the external context. Conversion occurs when 
rules remain the same, but are interpreted and enacted in new ways. Here, 
exploitation of the ambiguities of the institutions takes place. 
The analysis of the process of change, in terms of evaluating how the inclusion and 
process requirements of the partnership principle have materialised, on their own 
accord is done utilising tools of the network governance perspective and the 
partnership definition by Åkerstrøm Andersen in combination within the historical 
institutionalist framework. Here, similarly a number of concepts are applicable to the 
analysis. First, network governance identifies a specific range of actors that are 
present in the network: public, semi-public and private actors. These should be 
expected to be present in the partnership as also the partnership principle stipulates 
so. It is important to make a distinction between these types of actors in the process 
in that they individually represent different levels of government and private actors, 
and consequently they bring different resources and objectives to the table. The 
essence of network governance is exactly that policy-making has become complicated 
in today’s world because the implementation of a policy has come to depend on a 
number of actors besides politicians as they individually have insights and information 
that is relevant in implementing the most effective and targeted policy.  
Second, the network actors hold certain resources that are of interest to the network 
as a whole, which explains why some actors are included in the network while others 
are not. In order to be able to analyse the relations among the actors based on their 
resource interdependencies, the resources of the individual actors must necessarily 
be identified. These resources may be constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, 
political, informational, economic position, knowledge or information, legitimate 
authority among others. In this connection, some resources may be more valuable to 
a network than others. The partnership logic implies that all actors with an interest in 
regional development should contribute with their own resources, which in turn 
implies that the distribution of the EU Structural Funds is influenced from below, and 
that the distribution of resources influences the relations among actors in their 
exchange of resources in obtaining a common goal (the obtainment of the Structural 
Funds and consequent projects supported by these) – the policy outcome that is 
assumed to be of mutual interest. Resources are associated with the roles played by 
the actors in the network, which in turn influence the relations between actors.  
Third, despite the assumed obtaining of a common goal, relations within the network 
may not always reflect agreement. One explanation is that the network size is so 
comprehensive that it is difficult to reach an agreement by ordinary negotiation. 
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Another is that despite the overall common goal of the network, the actors within it 
may have diverging interests after all. In such scenarios, a network needs governance 
to reach an agreement, which can be done by the participants themselves, by a single 
member representing the network as a whole, or by a separate unit set up to carry 
out the task. The first form of network governance is participant-governed networks 
where the network is governed from within (the members themselves) either through 
meetings of designated representatives of the organisation or through on-going 
uncoordinated efforts by the members of the network. Alternatively, a different type 
of governance is referred to as a lead organisation where a single member of the 
network makes key decisions and manages network-level activities. A third form of 
network governance is the network administrative organisation model (NAO) where a 
separate unit is set up to govern the network and its activities. Thus, the NAO is not a 
member of the network; rather it is externally governed and established either 
through mandate or by the members themselves. These forms of network governance 
seek to coordinate relations among the actors in obtaining the assumed common 
goal.  
Fourth, sometimes networks are so complex that they need steering or meta-
governance from outside to succeed; this is especially the case in the EU supranational 
context. Meta-governance may be exercised on three levels: by designing networks, 
network participation, or by framing networks. By exercising meta-governance 
through designing networks governments are able to regulate networks through 
encouragement of the establishment of them and to influence their memberships. In 
this way, governments are in a position to influence the composition of the networks. 
By participating in networks governments are able to get first-hand information about 
what is going on in the networks. They are able to influence the agenda of the 
network and thus ensure that the objective of the policy is achieved. By framing 
networks governments are in a position to formulate the overall political goals of the 
network through allocation of fiscal or other resources to the network. Also, 
governments can influence networks by way of determining the norms and values 
that condition the governance process, as well as deciding what is relevant and 
important to the network and government respectively. Either way, intervention from 
outside (most often from governments) structures and influences relations between 
actors within the network.   
It is worth noting the difference between the actors’ short-term rule-conforming 
behaviour and the long-term overall goal of institutional maintenance, which 
especially becomes relevant when analysing the behaviour of actors inside the 
institutional organisation of the network or the partnership. This is exactly what 
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distinguishes a partnership from a network. Networks are based on shorter term 
relations and calculations whereas partnerships are based on long-term promises to 
make new promises about future cooperation (partnering). 
Dealing with the process requirement of the partnership principle, Åkerstrøm 
Andersen (2006) suggests that the process should be perceived as a partnering 
process, where partners choose one another and engage in long-term commitment 
about making promises to make new promises about cooperation in the future based 
on second order contracts. Central to the partnership definition is the partnering (the 
process of creating partnerships) where the partners choose one another and agree 
about future cooperation. Partnering takes place all the time, because the partnership 
changes and adapts to the changes in the external environment. This is a specific trait 
that network governance does not consider. Partnership is what the partners make of 
it. 
Together all these concepts interact throughout the process, consequently shaping 
and influencing each other and thereby generating individual processes that in turn 
expectedly generate overall change to the Danish regional policy-making institution. 
Change is expected to be gradual as the definition of the partnership principle has 
been redefined three times to potentially include more and more actors in the 
partnerships, a condition which the member states also gradually had to adjust to. 
The discussion of the compatibility and applicability of the two theories and the 
translation of the central concepts, which the two theories and the partnership 
definition provide me with concerning how to apply them in the analysis, is illustrated 
in the following model: 
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Model 4.1: Conceptual Tools of Analysis 
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5. Revisiting Partnerships in Practice - State of the Art 
As is well-known, the partnership approach was introduced in EU regional policy-
making as a part of the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and put into practise for 
the first time during the 1989-1993 programming period. At this point partnership 
mainly comprised of a vertical dimension involving besides the member state level, 
the Commission and sub-national level actors. Some argue that the horizontal 
dimension was also present to some extent here, but in a fuller sense it was not until 
1994 that the horizontal dimension became part of the partnership definition 
involving a wider range of institutions to participate alongside the public bodies such 
as social and economic partners. The 1999 reform further strengthened the horizontal 
dimension of partnerships by including economic and social partners as well as other 
competent bodies such as civil society organisations and those responsible of the 
environment and gender equality promotion (European Commission, 2005, 3 and 
Polverari and Michie, 2009, v). During the first programming period, generally, 
member states became familiarised with the partnership operation with varying 
results. Some member states had experiences with working in partnership or 
networks even before the introduction of the approach in 1988, while others had no 
experience at all. However, it has also been emphasised in some studies that a 
number of member states were hostile to the partnership principle and the intrusion 
that this brought with it into existing practices. Thus, the point of departure for the 
implementation of the partnership approach differed immensely. Consequently, 
partnerships set up during the first programming period were often implemented in 
the strictest sense of the definition to accommodate the requirements for receiving 
funding. Nonetheless, national, regional and supranational state actors were brought 
together and some degree of multi-level interaction occurred. In the second 
programming period, familiarity with working in partnership (their relationships and 
modes of working) grew, but the pattern of partnerships remained to be uneven 
across the member states. Even in the run-up to the third reform in 1999, according to 
Bache (2010, 62) the Commission noted that there were still difficulties with 
partnership arrangements. Especially the involvement of non-state actors was not 
satisfactory. In order to accommodate this problem, the Commission sought to 
introduce a new structure of responsibility sharing so that the Monitoring Committees 
(the formal expression of partnership) would have new responsibilities thereby 
including more partners into them (Bachtler and Taylor, 2003, 31-2 and Bache, 2010, 
61-2). “In summary, the partnership instrument in EU regional policy has, throughout 
its 20-year history, consistently sought to promote economic and social cohesion 
through broadening and deepening participation in the policy process.” (Bache, 2010, 
62) 
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The birth of an EC regional policy stirred a particular interest of the scholarly world, as 
it was anticipated that an emergent new governance system would ensue. Both in 
academia and in the practical world, a change from government to governance was 
seen as was noted in the theoretical chapter. Over the course of time, a number of 
actors were drawn into the policy-making scene which had previously been 
dominated by public policy-makers; now a plethora of other non-public actors also 
came to influence the process. The multi-level governance approach grew out of the 
study of the establishment of an EU regional policy and more precisely the 
formulation of the partnership principle. As discussed in a previous chapter (EU 
Regional Policy and Its Institutional Impact), the formulation of the partnership 
principle has brought with it much discussion and research concerning its 
implementation. The multi-level governance approach was the first approach 
attempting to theorise against the background of both the formulation and 
implementation of the partnership principle. The theory holds that the partnership 
principle has introduced sub-national actors and interest groups to the formal regional 
policy process and made them direct participants, which has resulted in re-allocation 
of power resources within the member states (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 85). Since 
these initial studies of the implementation of the partnership principle, a voluminous 
body of studies of the process has been undertaken. The partnership principle has 
received such attention because of the changed governance patterns that it has 
brought with it.  
It appears that partnership implementation in the EU-15 has received much attention 
during the first two programming periods, however, with the initiation of the 2000-
2006 programming period focus shifted towards enlargement. During this 
programming period, the EU was enlarged by 10 poor Central Eastern European (CEE) 
member states that should also be included into the EU regional policy framework. 
The preparation of the 2000-2006 programming period also reflected these concerns: 
“the 2000-2006 programming period for the structural funds was particularly 
significant for a large-scale shift in structural funding to the new CEE member states.” 
(Bache, 2010, 64) Hence, there was a shift in focus from the wealthier ‘old’ member 
states towards the success of including the new member states into the club, thus 
ensuring the latter’s economic development. This shift of focus is also evident in the 
literature in that the volume of research on the implementation of the partnership 
principle in the EU-15 has been reduced in size compared to the research carried out 
in the previous programming periods, and compared to the increasing amount of 
research on governance in the new CEE member states both in terms of the 
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preparation for their membership as well as the actual management of the 
programmes once formal members
7
. The research area has been viewed from many 
different theoretical traditions besides the multi-level governance and other related 
governance theories. However, the aim here is not to review the theoretical 
foundations upon which the studies have been built, but merely to evaluate the 
results of the studies carried out so that I am able to review the regional policy 
studies. Thereby, I am able to position my research in the pre-existing body of 
knowledge of the subject.  
“The number and variety of partnership experiences is so rich that a comprehensive 
presentation of the empirical cases is very complicated, if not impossible.” (Brunazzo, 
2007, 8) For that reason, this literature review is not able to cover it all. It will focus on 
Commission documents on the evaluation of partnership experiences on the one hand 
and academic evaluations on the other hand. These two parallel types of research 
both have a general comparative perspective taking the specific national 
characteristics into consideration and a more member state specific perspective 
where individual member states are investigated more in-depth than is possible in the 
general evaluations of a number of member states. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
Commission evaluations tend to reach rather positive conclusions concerning the 
functioning and implementation of the partnership principle, whereas academic 
research on more in-depth member state specific cases reaches varying conclusions 
regarding its implementation and functioning. Another interesting observation is that 
a considerable amount of academic research is carried out by researchers who are 
also authors of Commission documents and reports. For instance, the Commission 
most often makes use of the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) for carrying 
                                                                
7 In a Web of Science database article search for articles concerned with the ’EU Structural Funds’ a clear 
division of focal points presented itself. I divided the topic of the titles (and when in doubt, the abstract of 
the article) into five categories: articles concerned with 1) the implementation of the EU Structural Funds 
before 2000, 2) the implementation of the EU Structural Funds in the EU 15 during 2000-2006, 3) the 
implementation of the EU Structural Funds in the EU accession countries during 2000-2006, 4) comparative 
perspective between the EU 15 and accession countries during 2000-2006, and 5) a more general 
perspective of the Structural Funds implementation. A total of 289 articles came up where 29 articles were 
concerned with the implementation of the Structural Funds in the EU 15 compared to 55 that were 
concerned with the implementation of the Structural Funds in the accession countries and a less significant 
number of articles were comparative in perspective. The remaining articles were either concerned with the 
programming periods before 2000 or with related topics to the actual implementation of the Structural 
Funds such as the influence of the Structural Funds on the environment, etc. This result shows that nearly 
twice as many articles were concerned with the accession countries’ experience with the Structural Funds 
compared to the EU 15 member states. This, however, is only a general picture and a small specimen of the 
vast amount of literature concerned with the implementation of the Structural Funds. A similar picture can 
be expected to emerge when using a different search title. Therefore, this exercise can be considered as 
illustrative of my point. 
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out its investigations - a policy research centre which employs esteemed scholars in 
the EU regional policy research area who simultaneously also carry out independent 
research. This means that these researchers play two different roles in their work: one 
where their research is directed by the Commission where they are not permitted to 
be too sceptical and critical about the results, and another where they work 
independently and allow themselves to be more critical towards the results. In the 
end, however, both types of research are based on the same data and the conclusions 
are not in complete disagreement. Researchers who tend to be more critical and in 
disagreement are not involved in Commission work altogether; they play a freer role. 
The following review will explicate these assessments in more detail. It will be divided 
into a review of the literature that deals with the implementation and functioning of 
the partnership principle seen from a comparative point of view, as well as there will 
be reviews that are concerned with the more member state specific experiences 
including those of Denmark in a more illustrative account of the principle’s 
implementation into practice. 
5.1 Comparative Partnership Implementation until 2006 
The most comprehensive and systematic study and evaluation of the partnership 
principle that has been carried out is “The Thematic Evaluation of the Partnership 
Principle” by the Tavistock Institute (1999) (with Kelleher, Batterbury and Stern as the 
authors) on behalf of the Commission. The Thematic Evaluation identifies that the 
development of partnership has been a gradual (dynamic) process that was initiated 
in 1988, and in 1999 the status of the partnerships is evaluated. The study identifies 
the impacts of partnership at the different stages of regional policy-making in the, 
then, 15 member states taking their individual contexts into consideration. The 
general conclusion to the study is a confirmation of the positive effects of the 
partnership principle on national practices and that partnerships have become 
embedded in all stages of Structural Funds programming. Partnership has developed 
from a statutory relationship between the Commission and the member state (vertical 
relationship) to a wider inclusion of partners below regional level (horizontal 
relationship). The relationships take different forms characterised by a nexus of 
strategic and operational interaction in the development of programmes, the 
management of programmes and the tasks of programmes themselves. Although a 
generally positive experience, there are significant differences in the participation of 
partners at different stages of the programming. While the study shows positive 
experiences with the partnership principle from its invention in 1988 until the end of 
the third programming period in 1999, the backgrounds to this outcome are also 
considered. A learning period from its initiation has influenced the evolution of 
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partnership in the member states as well as existing constitutional arrangements 
varying from unitary over de-concentrated to decentralised member states. Based on 
the evolution of partnership experiences across the member states, it is found that 
partnerships generate effective implementation, enhance development capacity and 
improve programme actions (Kelleher et.al., 1999, ii-iv). 
On a more specific level, the findings show that “the degree of decentralisation and 
the type of de-concentration occurring in the different Member States inevitably 
shapes the relations between key actors within partnerships and determines the 
competencies and composition of partnerships.” (Kelleher et.al., 1999, viii) Also it is 
found that member states, by and large, continue to dominate and delimit 
partnership functioning through their key roles in both negotiating programme 
content; in determining the extent of the horizontal partnership which is owed to the 
formulation of the partnership principle as well as to ‘compatibility’ between existing 
institutional structures and the institutional manifestations of the partnership 
principle; and in their role of providing secretariats and acting as managing 
authorities. Accordingly, this is the case in different stages of the process both in 
decision-making producing the national operational programmes as well as in the day-
to-day management and implementation of these.  
Likewise, it shows that implementing the partnership principle requires a learning 
process so that the inclusiveness of the partnership can develop from being strictly 
vertical to being also horizontal. In fact, in some cases the partnership principle has 
inspired the establishment and development of a regional tier that was otherwise 
absent. It is concluded that vertical partnership is definitely present in the member 
states, but regarding horizontal partnerships results are varying; especially the 
inclusion of the social partners is limited for reasons of relevance and capacity 
although sometimes they make valuable input to the programme development and 
management. Similarly, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are largely absent 
from the partnerships. In contrast, Monitoring Committees play a crucial role as they 
are a formal manifestation of partnerships in all stages of the process. Although their 
formal role is to oversee that implementation takes place in accordance with the 
overall programme approach and in partnership ensuring effective implementation of 
EU regional development policy, they sometimes also engage in day-to-day 
management in situations where appropriate secretariats are absent (Kelleher et.al., 
1999, 6-7). Therefore, it is argued that “[i]n most countries there is scope for 
substantial improvements in inclusiveness of partnership; transparency of partnership 
functioning; Monitoring Committee functioning; ... partnership at the time of 
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programme development; and partnership at the time of evaluation.” (Kelleher et.al., 
1999, 56) 
A similar evaluation of the implementation of the partnership principle as it was 
extended to involve a higher degree of horizontal cooperation (in theory) during the 
2000-2006 programming period is offered by the European Commission (2005) and 
the EPRC (2008). Here, it is stated that the partnership approach has added value to 
the member states and that despite this fact, some member states still not yet fully 
acknowledged this and implemented the approach. Especially the social partners have 
expressed concern about the practice of horizontal cooperation and their own 
involvement herein. The general picture that is brought forward by the Commission 
evaluation and supported by the EPRC report, though, is that partnerships are thriving 
during all stages of the process from the development of the national Community 
Support Frameworks to the evaluation of the programmes involving partners at all 
levels in both vertical and horizontal partnerships albeit with varying results and set 
ups. The findings establish that other partners besides those required in the vertical 
relationship are involved on a consultative basis. So whether this means that they are 
actually influencing decision-making or whether they are merely participating is 
unclear. The partners involved in the partnerships are selected by the Managing 
Authority (often at the member state level) or in certain cases by regional or local 
authorities through the Managing Authority. The selection of partners is based on 
balanced calculation as to which partners can provide the partnership with relevant 
competences. The fact that the social and economic partners are missing in the 
partnerships is evident in the implementation phase where only a few are offered a 
consultative role. The Monitoring Committees on the other hand provide a good 
example of how partnerships function well without the actual influence of the social 
and economic partners. The composition of the Monitoring Committees varies but 
typically includes the Managing Authority, Paying Authority, regional and sectoral 
policy ministries, regional authorities and development bodies and sometimes also 
trade unions, employer organisations, chambers of commerce, NGOs, educational 
organisations and the voluntary sector. Besides, the Commission is represented in the 
Monitoring Committees although it has no voting right. In some cases, their role is to 
serve as a channel of information to the public. Once again, it is shown that the 
vertical partnerships through the Monitoring Committees are working much better 
than the horizontal throughout the process (European Commission, 2005, 4-11 and 
EPRC, 2008, 1-3). 
Compared to the previous programming period, partnerships were more widely 
represented at the different stages of the process albeit the process was still 
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dominated by the ‘usual vertical suspects’; i.e. central and regional government 
authorities. At the implementation stage public sector actors were dominant in 
member states like Germany and Spain whereas in the UK a wider range of partners 
were included in the process of project appraisal and selection. Management of the 
programmes reflected the national institutional regional policy arrangements ranging 
from a regional government managed approach (i.e. Belgium, Germany and Italy), 
over a region-led approach (i.e. Denmark, France, Sweden, and the UK) to a national 
government led approach (Greece), all with consultation with local agencies, social 
and economic partners and others. Overall, partnership-working improved during the 
2000-2006 programming period with evidence in Spain and France of an emergent 
system of co-responsibility between regional and central governments allowing 
regions to be responsible of more significant tasks in strategy design, monitoring and 
managing. Similarly, in the UK and Sweden partnership experiences were being 
adopted into aspects of domestic regional policy implementation (EPRC, 2008, 4-6). In 
conclusion, the width and depth of partnerships during the 2000-2006 programming 
period varied among the member states based on their respective national 
institutional and administrative contexts: these structures “shaped the relative 
balance between national and regional levels of government, the involvement of 
central State, sub-regional and non-governmental actors and the interpretation of the 
partnership principle in all management and implementation processes from 
programme design to evaluation.” (EPRC, 2008, 19) 
A similar picture is presented in academic research. On the one hand, it has been 
found that the Structural Funds partnerships have had a two-sided influence on 
national practices. First, it has contributed to a change in the structures of territorial 
administration. This has implied a devolvement of management responsibilities to 
lower levels of government or to deconcentrated government offices. Second, 
Structural Funds partnerships have led to changes in the territorial relations between 
organisations and across levels of government. Evidence is found in the manner in 
which sub-national actors have become involved in the planning and implementation 
of the Structural Funds programmes through different types of consultation and 
cooperation. This picture is, however, varied among the member states. Accordingly, 
it has been concluded that the Structural Funds partnerships have had a central role in 
mobilising and supporting regional development institutions and networks resulting in 
bottom-up developments across the member states. These trends are part of a 
broader trend in regional development, i.e. ‘new regionalism’ where the succeeding 
reforms of the Structural Funds have generated a move “away from centrally 
administered aid schemes, targeted in designated areas, towards regional-level 
programmes and strategies developed and implemented by regional bodies (either 
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regional offices of the state or devolved institutions) as part of wide-ranging changes 
to the territorial governance of economic development.” (Bachtler and McMaster, 
2007, 3) Therefore, the partnership principle appears to have had great influence on 
the member states’ respective operations of the Structural Funds programmes 
although with varying approaches and varying extent of inclusiveness (Brunazzo, 
2003, Roberts, 2003, Jones, 2001 and Bachtler and McMaster, 2007).  
However, a more sceptical account of this result is also found in the literature. For 
instance, Bauer (2002) asks himself ‘what happens to partnerships in cases where the 
method of working is not preferred in the member states?’, or ‘what happens if the 
sub-national authorities and the Commission are not natural allies’? In other words, 
will introduction of the partnership principle necessarily be positively welcomed in the 
member states and what happens if it is not? It should not be taken for granted that 
the partnership method is easily adopted. The exact definition and the attached 
clause regarding implementation according to member state institutional structures 
allow for such an interpretation. The only way to find such answers is to pursue a 
closer investigation of how the partnerships function in practice. Similarly, the extent 
to which the EU has had a powerful influence on regional institutional developments 
and relations has been contested by others. The actual influence of the EU relative to 
member states has been challenged. For instance, Brunazzo (2007, 9) finds that 
national governments continue to dominate partnerships in all member states, since 
they are central to the negotiations with the Commission on the national programmes 
as well as they, by definition of the partnership principle, define the involvement of 
the actors in the horizontal partnership. This is further explained by the fact that the 
EU does not regulate the structure and position of regional institutions in member 
states and that the central government, accordingly, has considerable responsibility 
for the way in which Structural Funds implementation is managed. This implies that 
some member states have allowed greater regional involvement than others 
suggesting inconsistency between the vertical and horizontal partnerships.  
If the data provided by this review was put through the machinery of my research 
questions, the conclusion to the study would be that the interpretation and 
implementation of the EU partnership principle has influenced the operationalization 
of member states of the Structural Funds implementation towards a generally 
strongly present vertical partnership. This has developed over the years as the 
member states have gotten familiar with the partnership requirements. It is envisaged 
that the institutional traditions of member states and the compatibility between the 
partnership requirements and the existing governance structure in national regional 
policy implementation determine the roles played by the partners in these 
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partnerships and their relations as well as the competencies and compositions of the 
partnerships. As learning processes have taken place over the years and as the 
partnership principle has been extended to become more and more inclusive along 
horizontal dimensions, the actual operation of the partnerships in the member state 
reflects these developments by including more and more partners in the process. 
These relationships take different forms characterised by strategic and operational 
interaction. Evidence is found in the manner in which sub-national actors have 
become involved in the planning and implementation of the Structural Funds 
programmes through different types of consultation and cooperation. This picture is, 
however, varied among the member states. Despite varying experiences with 
extending the vertical partnerships, a general picture emerges in which the social 
partners still play an insignificant role as they are considered irrelevant and not 
possessing the capacity to be included. This is the result of continued member state 
dominance of the entire process, as argued by more sceptical accounts.  
Having discovered that existing comparative studies have come to the conclusion that 
vertical and horizontal partnerships vary in the member states at different stages of 
the process, it is now time to turn to the closer investigation of these dimensions. 
5.1.1 Vertical, Horizontal and Process Dimensions 
In the EU regional policy partnership literature (see for instance Brunazzo, 2007, ECAS, 
2009, Bachtler and Taylor, 2003, Bache, 2008a) a distinction is made between vertical
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and horizontal
9
 partnerships where differences are found among and between the 
member states according to the different constitutional systems (vertical dimension) 
and the choice of partners made by the national level (horizontal). The predominant 
quantity of research (e.g. Bauer, 2002, Hooghe and Marks, 2001, Piattoni, 2006, 
Roberts, 2003) carried out on the implementation of the partnership principle focuses 
on the vertical dimension, because EU regional policy is the home ground for 
analysing multi-level governance, because there is more evidence found of the 
vertical relationship (perhaps because this is the one more easily detectable), and 
because learning experiences have taken place with the vertical relationship whereas 
                                                                
8 The vertical relationship is most often referred to as the formal relationship that is evident in the 
Monitoring Committees between EU, national and regional level actors as discussed earlier (Polverari and 
Michie, 2009, 5). 
9 Often horizontal partnerships also involve actors across governments as for instance ministries and 
agencies other than those involved in the management of the programmes as well as government 
authorities involved in the programmes as implementing bodies or beneficiaries. Partnerships are only 
considered horizontal as long as the relationship between the partners does not reflect a clear hierarchy 
between these and the Managing Authority (Polverari and Michie, 2009, 2) 
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the horizontal relationship was introduced much later. Others set out to analyse the 
gradual evolvement of horizontal partnerships but end up with the conclusion that 
vertical partnerships predominate (Bachtler and Michie, 1998, ECAS, 2009, Brunazzo, 
2007). Regarding the horizontal partnership, it was not received enthusiastically in 
most of the member states for which reason it has been long under way both in terms 
of including it in the partnership principle definition, and in its actual implementation 
in the member states. 
Partnerships are by definition complex, which is reflected in the fact that there might 
be several ‘partnerships’ within one overall programme partnership: one the one 
hand, every programme can be considered to have a programme-wide partnership 
that is overseen by a formal partnership, i.e. the Monitoring Committee. Even within 
the Monitoring Committees variation is found in the actual composition depending on 
the national interpretation of the partnership principle. “The result has been the 
creation of very diverse Monitoring Committees, ranging from ‘quasi-corporatist 
committees’, where the social partners are authentically involved at every step of the 
decision-making process, to more ‘window-dressing committees’, in which the social 
partners are involved only perfunctorily.” (Piattoni, 2006, 64) On the other hand, a 
number of related sub-partnerships in the day-to-day implementation of and the 
steering and management of the programme have been set up partly as a reaction to 
the introduction of horizontal requirements, and as some researchers claim due to the 
inability of the Monitoring Committee to represent their interests. “There are 
arguably two primary motivations for most public sector organisations getting 
involved in sub-partnerships: first, the wish to directly secure additional resources on 
behalf of those they represent, and second, the desire to influence economic 
development priorities and thus indirectly gain greater access to resources. It is these 
benefits which ultimately give sub-partnerships their momentum.” (Taylor and 
Downes, 1998, 37) In some member states, an additional decision-making committee 
is required for project selection comprising respected and experienced partners (i.e. in 
Denmark, France, Sweden and the UK). For instance, in the UK, this particular 
partnership structure is called co-operation through meso-level partnerships, implying 
that authority is delegated to these sub-partnerships in the day-to-day 
implementation of so-called ‘Action Plans’ (Bachtler and Taylor, 2003, 32-3). These 
complex partnership arrangements that are found across the EU member states thus 
comprise both vertical and horizontal dimensions.  
In the vertical relationship the role of the Commission is outspoken in the decision-
making stage where programmes are designed and approved. Regional governments 
play varying roles according to their position in the national institutional structure, like 
115 
 
local governments do. It is also argued that the national level has been involved in the 
vertical partnership playing new roles compared to previously, since the partnership 
principle has provided the national level with a formalised role in EU regional policy-
making. For instance in the Netherlands and Denmark, vertical co-ordination was very 
limited prior to the introduction of the EU partnership principle and also during its 
early years of existence. Another example is the French case where vertical 
partnership almost appears to be artificially structured and forced in an attempt by 
the French state to please the EU Commission by establishing partnerships and thus 
increasing decentralisation in order to receive the Structural Funds. Here, 
decentralisation trends have upgraded sub-national authorities to fully-fledged levels 
of government with whom the national government draw up the ‘planning contracts’ 
(Contrats de Plan Etat-Région), a device for regional planning and development. At the 
same time, however, at the interface between the European and regional levels, the 
state acts as a mediator, gate-keeper and boundary controller (Piattoni, 2006, 71 and 
Benz and Eberlein, 1999, 338).  
A new invention in the 2000-2006 programming period compared to the previous two 
rounds was the establishment of a Managing Authority which was to be responsible of 
the supervision of the implementation, on-going management and effectiveness of 
the programme. The hope of the Commission was that the introduction of this new 
Authority constituting a link between day-to-day management and the Commission 
would change the relations between the national and regional authorities, thereby 
influencing the vertical partnership dimension. In practice, however, this new 
Authority became absorbed into existing administrative arrangements such as in 
Denmark where the secretariat for the Monitoring Committee, the National Agency 
for Enterprise and Housing (NAEH) took on this responsibility. In Sweden a different 
approach was seen in line with the expectations of the Commission: the Managing 
Authority role has been allocated to the County Administrative Boards thereby 
moving towards a regionalisation of the programme responsibilities. As a 
consequence of this new division of responsibilities, the Monitoring Committees also 
underwent some changes in terms of composition and relations. The Commission had 
no formal voting rights any longer and would only observe. For instance in Germany, 
the Monitoring Committees underwent regionalisation enabling the regions to set up 
their own Monitoring Committees including regional partners. A further advantage of 
the new structure was that the new Monitoring Committees would be able to become 
more thematic in character and thereby ensure more effective programme 
implementation as specific Monitoring Committees can be able to address certain 
aspects of the regional development programmes leading to a widening of the 
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partners involved (strengthening the horizontal partnership dimension) (Bachtler 
et.al., 2000, 62-4 and 71-2). 
Like the vertical partnerships have intensified over the years of EU regional policy 
programming, so has the horizontal inclusion of local, private and social actors, 
although they had a rough start with actual exclusion of key groups and limited 
participation of public bodies. Since then there has been an increasing commitment to 
the value of partnership thereby starting a process of institutionalising and formalising 
partnership. It is concluded that in most contexts, the number of actors involved in 
regional development, beyond a narrow core of principal participants has increased as 
well as the balance of power among them has changed. Concerning horizontal 
relationships, however, it is concluded that social partners and NGOs generally do not 
play a significant role because they lack the capacity to be involved except for in 
Member States such as Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. This conclusion is 
similar to the Thematic Evaluation findings (Brunazzo, 2007, 9-10 and Bachtler and 
Taylor, 2003, 34 and Bachtler and Michie, 1998, 4 and 23-5). A country where this is 
the opposite case is Sweden where social partners are formally included in the 
Monitoring Committees both in the programming and implementation of 
programmes. The problem here, however, is that the social partners lack 
competencies to make a significant contribution to regional development in that they 
have sector-wide and function-wide competencies resulting in the lack of formal 
governance (Piattoni, 2006, 69). 
In her research on the role of civil society in formal and informal partnerships in a 
number of countries, Piattoni finds that within the vertical partnership, informal 
partnerships also transpire and get intertwined with the formal partnership: “while 
informal relations grow everywhere in the interstices of formal procedures, they grow 
differently to fill different fissures.” (Piattoni, 2006, 66) In this sense, the informal 
relations also constituting partnerships transpire from bottom-up as a reaction to 
these partners not being invited into the formal partnership and because they see a 
relevance to the process for themselves. It appears that informal relations are thus 
triggered by the official fulfilment of the formal governance procedures as a 
consequence of lack of satisfactory procedures. This leaves Piattoni with the 
conclusion that “the social partners are left wondering whether their involvement in 
the formal governance procedures makes any sense, has any grounding and brings 
them and their constituencies any real advantages.” (Piattoni, 2006, 72) Thereby, she 
questions the relevance and actual involvement of the social partners in the formal 
partnerships. On the one hand they must be represented as required by the 
partnership principle, but on the other hand either they are not because they are not 
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included, or when they are included they often lack the capacity to make any 
significant contribution to the process.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive comparative research on the horizontal dimension 
of partnership, i.e. “the active involvement of organised socioeconomic groups in the 
various phases of programming and delivery of interventions” (Polverari and Michie, 
2009, 2), is carried out by Polverari and Michie (2009). The study showed that 
horizontal partnerships had increased during the 2000-2006 programming period 
although with varying experiences. Partnership representation has been wide 
throughout the process but especially pronounced during the programme design 
stage compared to the subsequent stages although the vertical partnership remained 
dominant. According to the study, the Managing Authorities considered the horizontal 
partnerships to be working well or at least as well as can be expected in terms of 
compliance with the regulations in their evaluation of the partnership operation. In 
the same breath, it was also acknowledged that involvement of the social and 
economic partners could have been improved. Generally, horizontal partnership 
working during the 2000-2006 programming period constituted a continuation of 
existing practices, e.g. in Denmark, Germany and Sweden, but in some member states 
the partnerships actually widened and deepened, e.g. in Finland. The study concludes 
that “although progress has been made, the partnership principle is not yet widely 
applied, [and] that the limited experience of NGOs and socio-economic partners has 
constrained their ability to participate” (Polverari and Michie, 2009, 8). This means 
that according to the programme authorities interviewed for the study, the rather 
limited involvement of the social and economic partners is based on them simply not 
being considered relevant by the Managing Authority in delegating them power to be 
involved in the process because the programme authorities evaluate that they lack 
the competences to be involved on a similar level as the other partners are; i.e. 
partners who have been involved in regional policy-making for a much longer period 
affording them with longer experience with being involved in regional policy-making 
partnerships) (Polverari and Michie, 2009, 6-8).  
A number of obstacles to the involvement of the social and economic partners and 
thus improved horizontal partnerships have been identified: the most apparent 
obstacle to the wide horizontal partnership is that the formulation of the partnership 
principle does not define how partnerships should function apart from that they 
should be implemented according to established national practices, and that 
partnerships are not binding allowing for varying interpretations and types (i.e. 
participation vs. actual decision-making influence). Second, and related, it is also an 
obstacle that it is up to the Managing Authority to evaluate whether partners are 
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relevant to the partnerships or not and whether partnership in itself is a valuable 
mechanism to regional policy-making. Third, it is mentioned that the vertical formal 
partnership operation may be an obstacle to the horizontal partnerships: the size of 
the Monitoring Committees – involving many partners in the key decisions - may 
make it difficult for the social and economic partners to be heard even if they are 
formal partners of the Monitoring Committees and more so if they are not. The 
acknowledgement of these constraints to the involvement of the social and economic 
partners in horizontal cooperation has led some member states to review their 
practices regarding the limitations of the Monitoring Committees as the main forum 
of interaction between programme management and the partners. In order to 
address this problem, in some regions (for instance in the North-East England region) 
sub-groups of the Monitoring Committees have been set up across the member states 
as a discussion forum for the exchange of information between programme 
management and the partners which meet more frequently than the Monitoring 
Committee (Polverari and Michie, 2009, 11-3 and 19). 
Turning now to the process dimension, the multi-level governance approach 
presented by Hooghe and Marks, claims that multi-level governance is strongest in 
the implementation stage of structural programming (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 85). 
Academic research support this claim: just like the vertical/horizontal division of the 
partnerships, the partnerships also vary according to the sequence of the regional 
policy process; i.e. some partners’ influence is not the same in the decision-making as 
it is in the day-to-day management and implementation of projects. There are several 
stages in which partnerships may operate (Taylor and Downes, 1998, Olson, 2003, 
Benz and Eberlein, 1999, Bachtler and McMaster, 2007). And “any analysis of 
European policy-making which does not carefully distinguish between the different 
stages of the European policy process is prone to produce misleading generalisations.” 
(Thielemann, 2000, 6) 
During the preparation of the programmes for the 2000-2006 period, these are ‘more 
than ever’ managed at the regional level either by regional offices of the state or by 
regional government authorities. Sub-national actors responsible for the 
implementation of the programmes are generally leading the process of defining the 
strategy and of the overall draft of the programmes. In carrying out this task, the 
regional authorities consult socio-economic, labour market, environmental and 
gender-related actors for information that they hold. For instance, in North-East 
England, the SPD Steering Group has set up sub-groups to examine particular aspects 
of the new programme, feeding the SPD Steering Group with relevant information. In 
some member states this process is influenced or even controlled by the central 
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government (i.e. the UK and France) whereas in other member states this is not the 
case (i.e. Germany and Belgium) depending on the national institutional tradition 
(Bachtler et.al., 2000, 22-4, 29). 
The previous comparative studies of the implementation of the partnership principle 
were exposed to the framework of my research, and so is this section. If these studies 
were my data set, my conclusion would be similar to the previous one in that this 
merely constitutes an elaboration of the studies presented previously. The volume of 
vertical studies compared to that of horizontal ones reflects the results generated 
before. Comparatively, more research is carried out regarding the vertical dimension 
because it has proven easier to gather evidence of vertical partnerships. Vertical 
partnerships have been more or less present from the outset, whereas the horizontal 
objective has been more difficult for the member states to come to terms with. The 
varying experiences with horizontal partnerships reflect the central government’s 
ability to shape partnerships based on their like or dislike of a wider partnership. 
Similarly, it is proposed that the vertical partnership itself may be a hindrance to the 
horizontal partnerships. This implies that the broad picture illustrates that horizontal 
partnerships are still immature but growing in terms of inclusion and process. The 
extent to which the horizontal partners influence the process depends on which stage 
of the implementation process it takes place: programme design, day-to-day 
implementation or monitoring.  
5.2 National Perspectives 
Having reviewed the comparative studies of the implementation of the partnership 
principle, it is time to turn to the member state specific analyses in order to see the 
comparative, general analyses in a more detailed light. This section will be a review of 
two member states besides Denmark; i.e. Germany and the UK. These two member 
states have been chosen because they represent opposite ends of the 
centralised/decentralised continuum. Germany represents a decentralised member 
state with its federal institutional arrangements whereas the UK is referred to as a 
unitary, centralised member state. Denmark, on the other hand, is placed somewhere 
in between the two. Therefore, it is interesting to evaluate the developments in 
partnerships’ implementation within the two member states before reviewing the 
Danish case. Does the implementation of the partnership principle reflect the 
institutional tradition in these member states as could be expected?  
In much research it is stressed how national institutional systems and traditions 
influence the implementation of the partnership principle (see for instance Polverari 
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and Michie, 2009, Hooghe, 1996b, Hooghe and Marks, 2001, Blom-Hansen, 2003). 
Here, a distinction is made between those member states with centralised and 
decentralised traditions. Because of the attached clause of the partnership principle 
that partnerships should operate according to member state practices there is scope 
for a strong role of the central government when this was the preferred outcome. 
Generally, member states with federal traditions (i.e. Germany and Austria) have a 
long-standing experience with cooperation between the different levels of 
government and sometimes also with social and economic partners. Likewise, 
member states like Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland have a history of great 
involvement of the social partners in consensus-based policy-making. In these 
member states, it is anticipated that partnership arrangements are adopted relatively 
smoothly. However, in more centralised member states such as the UK, France and 
Italy the partnership approach is expectedly more gradually phased in. Thus, variation 
may be identified according to the different traditions within the member states 
according to the findings of Polverari and Michie (2009, 6). Other researchers have 
supported and laid the foundations to this finding: Brunazzo (2007, 11) claims that 
“the partnership principle does not necessarily clash with a unitary state system and is 
not necessarily linked to federalism.” Thus, it does not need to be a hindrance to the 
implementation of the partnership principle that a member state is centralised. Here, 
Brunazzo makes the point that it is important to look at both the institutional tradition 
as well as the practical implementation of the partnerships: for instance, inclusive 
vertical and horizontal partnerships may be found in otherwise centralised member 
states where such relations may not have been expected. Likewise, restricted 
inclusion of the partnerships may be found in federal states with strong cooperative 
traditions. The principle is simply interpreted and implemented according to national 
institutional and corporatist traditions, because there is “little by way of specific 
guidance as to how these partnerships should operate.” (Roberts, 2003, 23) – there is 
no recipe for partnership. This necessarily implies that partnerships may take different 
guises according to the national interpretation. Similarly, Bachtler and Taylor (2003, 
32) find that the practical interpretation of the partnership principle varies between 
and within member states and that there is now evidence of vertical partnerships, and 
“horizontal partnerships at subnational level have become an established part of the 
landscape of the EU-15 states, whether the domestic traditions have been statist or 
corporatist.” (Bache, 2010, 66) The interpretation is shaped by the responses of 
individual member states and regions based on their institutional arrangements and 
administrative practices among other things. This implies, like Brunazzo suggests, that 
there is no clear link or pattern in the link between the national institutional system 
and the organisation of partnerships, for which reason the member states have to be 
121 
 
investigated individually regarding the institutional characteristics that influence 
partnerships (Thielemann, 2000, 2). 
5.2.1 Partnership Implementation in Germany 
Germany is a federation of autonomous states and allocated significant competencies 
(legislative, executive and budgetary) implying that in Germany, regional policy, like 
many other policy areas under the Constitution, is the prime responsibility of the 
Länder (regional level). In practise, however, regional policy-making is a shared task 
(referred to the Joint Task framework) between the Federal and the Land 
governments because regional development at the Länder level should be 
implemented within the framework of the national objectives. The purpose of the 
Joint Task framework is to provide a consensus-based framework for common and co-
ordinated approach to regional development policy. Both levels work together in a 
Planning Committee, collectively establishing the framework regulations and assisted 
areas and funding criteria, under which regional assistance can be provided to the 
companies and local authorities within the regions. Thus, in regional development the 
Länder and the Federal level work closely together in a common yet differentiated 
approach. This close relationship is further strengthened by a complicated system of 
redistribution of financial resources between the Federal and Länder governments 
and between rich and poor Länder (Schrumpf, 1997, 247 and Ferry, 2003, 16). As a 
consequence of reunification in 1990, the Joint Task of regional policy-making was 
challenged, firstly because different incentives in economic development operated in 
the old and the new Länder, and secondly because the area designation system 
between the two also differed. The challenge was then to create a uniform system 
(Ferry, 2003, 15).  
Ensuring that policies are a member state prerogative has always been a priority of 
German regional policy. This is also reflected in the long-established national regional 
policy institutions, which Germans maintain are the best suited to solve regional 
problems. The promotion of economic development is a defined statutory 
responsibility of the Land governments whereas the Federal republic and the EU play 
supportive roles. There are strong bureaucratic linkages between the Federal and the 
Land levels implying a strong sectionalisation of the policy process which impedes 
bottom-up and intersectionally co-ordinated regional policies like that of the EU. 
Exactly for this reason, some researchers conclude that the partnership practices 
which the EU partnership principle requires constitute an impediment to the already 
existing practices in Germany, which in turn may constitute limitations to the 
operation of partnership (Bauer, 2002, Bauer, 2001, Benz and Eberlein, 1999) as has 
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also been discussed above. Within Germany, considerable differences between the 
Länder in terms of their depth and extent of their relationship with the EU exist; 
especially between the old and the new Länder after reunification (Roberts, 2003).  
Therefore, due to German tradition of responsibility sharing, it was the German 
approach that the intrusion of EU institutions into national policy regimes should be 
minimized. For them the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 marked a degradation 
of their formal powers, for which reason the implementation of it became a challenge 
to most Länder. The Länder had difficulty finding their place and role in the EU 
partnership structure; they thought that there was a mismatch between the EU 
partnership requirements and the already established German regional policy 
governance structures. Both the Länder and the Federal levels felt side-lined. There 
was a fear that the existing joint task sharing between the Land and the Federal levels 
would break down and despite the strong pressure of EU partnership requirements, a 
substantial reform of the joint decision-making structures was not initiated until 1996. 
Then, a reform of the ‘Basic Law’ (the German Constitution) introduced significant 
changes regarding the participation of the Länder in European decision-making 
allowing them to become directly involved in the negotiations with EU bodies. 
However, because these powers did not extend to financial matters, the impact of 
these new provisions had limited effects on the operation of the Structural Funds in 
Germany, though (Benz and Eberlein, 1999, 336 and Schrumpf, 1997, 248 and Bauer, 
2000, 9). 
In Germany unification generated polarisation in that the new Länder, where there 
was a greater central control of the partnerships, constituted a regional development 
challenge and the old Länder, where a more hands-off approach was seen, were 
affected by continuous fiscal demands as a consequence of unification. During the 
early years after unification, the ability of the new Länder to take advantage of 
partnerships was questioned because the local level lacked administrative experience 
and expertise and relied on information and support from Federal government: would 
they be able to participate equally in a partnership? At the same time because of their 
backward position, they were eager to attract Objective 1 funding which they lobbied 
for (Thielemann, 2000, 10-1). In this undertaking, the Eastern Länder sought to 
establish a governance and financial structure that more closely resembled the EU 
requirements rather than following the footsteps of the existing regime in Western 
Germany to meet the demands of partnership to receive the EU funding, which 
created internal tension in the unified Germany (Thielemann, 2002, 52-5). Likewise, 
institutional experiences varied between the two: in the new Länder the pre-1989 
regime was societally detached from institutions of governance, while in the old 
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Länder governance was based on the federal approach with substantial powers 
resting with the Federal government. This implies that partnership in the new Länder 
constituted a challenge to the established practices. In EU matters, ‘co-operative 
federalism’ was employed in which informal co-operation between the Federal state 
and the Länder prevailed and where responsibility of the promotion of regional 
development was a shared task between the two. In the new Länder, however, the 
Federal government played an elevated role compared to the old Länder due to the 
lower level of institutional capacity and performance in these. The Länder played an 
important role in drafting and implementing programmes while Monitoring 
Committees in co-operation with sub-committees set up in each Land primarily 
oversaw the management of the Structural Funds programmes (Kelleher et.al., 1999, 
103-6). 
A region that is often referred to as a positive illustrative case of unfolding partnership 
practices is the North Rhine-Westphalia, the largest Länder in Germany that is 
characterised by being an old industrial region facing a number of restructuring 
challenges. Due to its decentralised character, the Land, like the rest in West 
Germany, was arguably in a favourable position in adopting the partnership principle 
some researchers conclude (Roberts, 2003, Thielemann, 2002). During the first two 
programming periods, the Land witnessed further decentralisation and thus had 
inclusive vertical and horizontal partnerships throughout the entire programming 
process. In the programme design phase, the broad objectives, principles and 
measure were first approved by the regional ministry before being made subject of 
evaluation of a number of regional and local conferences, also including social 
partners established to inform the design process over final programmes. 
Subsequently, they underwent extensive consultation in the region concerning the 
actual implementation of the approved programme involving the participation of local 
interests. In the implementation of the programme, the Land remained responsible 
alongside Monitoring Committees sat up at the federal level to oversee 
implementation (Roberts, 2003, 35-6 and 54 and Bachtler, Downes, Michie, Rooney 
and Taylor, 32).  
A somewhat different story is revealed in the Eastern Länder’s meeting with 
partnerships; their point of departure was different. Thielemann (2002, 55 and 2000, 
1) argues that the new German Länder have been drawn more strongly into European 
regional policy networks, and that the partnership principle helped to legitimise direct 
contacts between the new Länder and the Commission, because at the day of 
reunification they were initially included in Structural Funding under different rules 
than the West. Thus, the partnership principle helped to legitimise sub-national actors 
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in relation to the member state and EU levels. However, it has undermined the 
Federal government’s role as ‘gatekeeper’ between supranational and sub-national 
actors for which reason these developments met resistance. Evidence shows that the 
partnership principle has had significant impact on the Eastern Länder at the planning 
and implementation stages of the EU regional policy process. At the same time, it is 
also discovered how deep-rooted domestic institutions can hinder its implementation 
(Thielemann, 2000, 2 and 21). In the decision-making stage deciding the extent of the 
Structural Funds programmes in Germany, the role of sub-national actors in the 
partnerships was restricted to one of lobbying the national government and to some 
extent also the Commission. In the planning stage, the vertical partnership was 
widened to include more direct participation of the sub-national partners. In practice, 
the Land-level was responsible of the planning of the SPDs which were sent to the 
Commission for approval via the Federal level. In the early years after reunification, 
these relationships only existed on paper. However, after some years of learning and 
training Eastern patterns of regional policy governance soon became similar to those 
of the Western Länder thereby involving sub-national partners and the Länder more. 
At the implementation stage, the Monitoring Committee was the primary mechanism 
for ensuring formal partnership and a clear division of labour existed between the 
Monitoring Committee at the federal level and sub-Committees set up in the Länder. 
Monitoring sub-Committees at the Land level were allowed to decide for themselves 
how to implement the partnership. Generally, this led to an exclusion of the economic 
and social partners from the process. Because of Commission intervention in this 
relationship, the economic and social partners were reluctantly included in the sub-
Committees on part of the Länder resulting in a tense relationship between the 
Länder and the economic and social partners (Benz and Eberlein, 1999, 337 and 
Thielemann, 2000, 8). 
These two cases show that partnerships have been adopted in both Eastern and 
Western Länder; albeit along different paths. Over the years the two approaches have 
converged to become similar. Therefore, similar patterns can now be traced in the 
vertical and horizontal partnership dimensions. This pattern of development supports 
the propositions made by Brunazzo previously where it was argued that there need 
not be a clear link between the national institutional set up and the practical 
implementation of partnerships. Here, a federal member state had two different 
experiences with partnerships depending on the institutional and financial context at 
the local levels. 
In the implementation of the formal manifestation of the partnership principle, i.e. 
the Monitoring Committees, most operational decisions regarding the 
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implementation of partnership in the Monitoring Committees were the responsibility 
of the sub-national level (the Land). Below the Monitoring Committee level, sub-
Committees were set up in each individual Land including members such as 
representatives of the Commission, the Federal Ministries of Economics, Employment 
and Agriculture. The sub-Committees were chaired by the Land Ministry of Economics. 
It should be noticed that the chair of the sub-Committees were in a position to 
appoint further members to the sub-Committees, which led to a deliberate exclusion 
of the social and economic partners from the sub-Committees, because it was argued 
that involving them would make the monitoring work of the sub-Committees more 
complicated. This position, however, has been criticised by the Commission so that 
now the economic and social partners have been granted seats on the Monitoring 
sub-Committees despite resistance from the German Länder (Thielemann, 2002, 56-
7). Thus, a clear division of responsibility was evident based on the Joint Task 
tradition; however, the horizontal partnership was not as strong but developing. 
To elaborate, the inclusion of social partners in the regional horizontal partnership 
constituted a specific problem: the social partners saw themselves as being national 
and not Land associated for which reason they had difficulty representing and offering 
specialised knowledge of regional problems on par with other regional actors who 
were more familiar with regional issues. Therefore, instead of being active 
participants in the regional horizontal partnerships, social partners sought direct, 
informal contacts with Structural Fund administrations and specific departments of 
the regional administration and as such did not pursue any common action with 
similar actors. In the formal partnership of the Monitoring Committees, the role of the 
social partners was one of detachment and disenchantment although they were 
formally included in the late 1990s (Thielemann, 2002, 53 and Piattoni, 2006, 67-8). 
“Even after their formal inclusion into these Committees there are still complaints by 
the economic and social partners who feel that for the Fund managers chairing the 
Sub-Committee meetings, the participation of the economic and social partners fulfil 
merely an ‘alibi-function’ that is meant to show Fund managers’ commitment to 
‘partnership’.” (Thielemann, 2000, 18) Just as Benz and Eberlein have predicted, there 
was a clear separation between the arena of informal intraregional partnerships and 
the more formal vertical partnerships which were based on the German institutional 
structure. “Intraregional partnerships are fostered in regional entities below the Land 
level.” (Benz and Eberlein, 1999, 338) In other words, there was a decoupling of 
regional public-private partnerships co-ordination between the EU and regional 
policy-making in Germany. In the language of multi-level governance, the two 
(horizontal and vertical) dimensions were ‘loosely coupled’ implying that decisions 
reached in one arena did not necessarily influence all decisions in another arena. 
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Had Germany been my case, the conclusion to my study would have been that 
Germany, being a Federal state with clear divisions of power and responsibility 
sharing with the regional level, was challenged by the introduction of the partnership 
principle into national regional policy implementation. A number of factors generated 
this: first, the Joint Task sharing of responsibilities between the Federal and Land 
levels did not fit well with the partnership structure. The role of the regional level in 
the new partnership structure would decrease compared to how it was already 
functioning. Second, economic and governance divergence was elevated with the 
unification of the Eastern and Western parts of Germany, which further challenged a 
common approach to regional policy implementation and consequent partnership 
operation. Thus, a picture emerges in which a dual approach was evident. The 
‘Western partnership approach’ was one in which gradual adaptation to the EU 
partnership requirements took place establishing vertical and horizontal partnerships 
including both the regional and social partners. The inclusion of partners varied 
according to the stage of the process. In the Eastern part of Germany, the partnership 
approach more closely resembled the one preferred by the EU due to the lack of 
these competences in the first place at the regional level, and the consequent need to 
establish such structures to accommodate the partnership requirement in order to 
receive Objective 1 funding. On a general level, initially the Eastern approach was 
more inclusive below the Federal level as well as horizontal partners. However, as it 
turned out over the years with experience (and perhaps by coercion towards a 
homogeneous German approach?) the Eastern partnership soon became similar to 
that of the Western Länder. Here it may be argued that the Federal level had been 
able to protect its own position in German regional policy-making; i.e. re-establishing 
the Joint Task sharing of responsibilities that was challenged by the Eastern Länder’s 
attempt to bypass Federal control. 
5.2.2 Partnership Implementation in the United Kingdom 
In a conclusion of the state of regionalisation in the UK, Ferry (2003, 39) states that 
“the legacy of decades of different approaches to allocating policy responsibilities 
have left a patchwork of overlapping policy remits and competing levels of 
governance with little holistic coordination or rationale. Currently there is a plethora 
of regional agencies and strategies.” With this knowledge in mind, a review of the 
state of partnership implementation in the UK must then also be fragmented, varying 
and maybe even missing in some areas. This interpretation depends on the basis upon 
which the statement is based; i.e. the development of the institutional structure in the 
member state.  
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The UK was until the mid to late 1990s characterised as a centralised unitary state 
with no powers distributed to the sub-national level. During this time, the UK was led 
by the Conservative government leader Margaret Thatcher. John Major took office in 
1992 and was Prime Minister until 1997, when the New Labour came into office. The 
first two rounds of EU regional policy programming were highly influenced by the 
politics of the Conservative governments and especially the Thatcherite ideology of a 
‘free economy, and strong state’. In this view there was no place for the regions as 
they would undermine the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, devolution of powers 
to the regions was out of the question. At the same time, being part of the EU was 
also considered undermining the state’s sovereignty. Another characteristic of this 
period was that because of the priority of markets and marketization, trade unions 
(social partners) were considered in opposition to the Conservative worldview and for 
this reason they were also ‘abandoned’ or at least ignored. Towards the end of the 
Conservative rule, the strong central government loosened its grip slightly on the 
regions by establishing integrated Government Offices in the regions. This move was 
an attempt on part of the central government to address the issue of tying the 
regional level to the central level as a requirement of receiving the Structural Funds 
(Bache, 2008a, 93-5).  
In 1997, the New Labour came into office in strong opposition to the politics of the 
Conservative government presenting its plans for constitutional reform. It soon 
introduced devolution in Scotland and Wales (elected for the first time in 1999) and 
introduced power-sharing assembly for Northern Ireland, a Greater London Assembly 
(in these regions regional policy became the legal competence of the territorial 
administrations) and plans for the creation of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
in the English regions. The role of the RDAs was to 1) promote economic development 
and social and physical regeneration; 2) support business, investment and 
competitiveness; 3) enhance skills; 4) promote employment; and 5) sustainable 
development of the regions, which on paper was modest. It was especially unclear 
which role they were to play in European policies, although inevitably, the task they 
were allocated to promote economic development drew them into EU regional policy-
making. Thus, it appears that the devolution of powers across the country was 
asymmetrical affording some regions with more power than others (Bache, 2008a, 96-
7 and Burch and Gomez, 2008, 90) and that in fact a dual system of administration can 
be identified; a devolved system in Scotland and Wales and a deconcentrated system 
in England. These developments in the governance of politics in the UK led to a move 
towards vertical cooperation that was not present in the dominant period of the two 
first rounds of EU regional policy programming (Roberts, 2003, Jones, 2001, Bache, 
1999, Bache and Olson, 2001).  
128 
 
The Labour government sent out a Consultation Paper in 2003 that described its vision 
on domestic and European regional policy: two views especially should be noticed. 
First, whereas in the past regional policy was defined as a regionally targeted business 
support, the new regional policy should be for all regions. Second, there should be a 
clearer division of powers between the state and the regional/nation levels in which 
the state was responsible for managing the overall macroeconomic framework for 
regional development, undertaking microeconomic reform and providing regions with 
the institutional flexibility and resources to engage in regionally-led policies. This 
implies that regional institutions should be strengthened (Ferry, 2003, 35). These 
events “marked the start of subtle shift in authority as the new organizations began to 
exercise and augment their modest range of powers and resources.” (Burch and 
Gomez, 2008, 90) The following review of the partnership literature in the UK will 
reflect this division of time: one part illustrates the strong central government 
dominance over regional policy governance and towards the end of the second 
programming period a move towards increased inclusion of other sub-national and 
sub-regional partners will be seen. 
At the launch of the EU regional policy in 1988 and the following programming 
period(s), UK regional policy implementation of the Structural Funds programmes was 
thus characterised by a considerable control of the central government: “decisions 
taken at the subnational level were controlled by ‘regional and functional 
departments’ of government which were ‘expected to maintain regular functional 
contacts with their local authorities and other public bodies on the actual project 
selection and as more general contact points for ERDF matters’.” (Bache, 1999, 359) 
The EU partnership principle was not received well by the British government, 
because Britain had already a partnership approach of its own to urban policy with 
differing political values and purpose which the partnership principle conflicted with 
(Bache, 2010, 68). Nonetheless, the partnership principle offered local partners a 
window of opportunity to become involved in regional development policy within 
their own region, and to some extent it generated new partnerships and mobilised 
actors at the sub-national level leading to changes in local economic policy-making. 
Local agencies attempted to access the Funds, stimulating bottom-up developments 
(Roberts, 2003, Jones, 2001, Bache, 1999, Bache and Olson, 2001, Bache, 2008a).  
The EU partnership approach conflicting with the existing British approach resulted in 
the British approach being preferred in EU Structural Funds implementation also. This 
was the scenario until the change of government in 1997 when the UK approach 
became more aligned to that of the EU. During the first decade of EU regional policy 
implementation, the British partnership approach was characterised by horizontal 
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cooperation (reliance on market forces and private actors) at the local level while 
concurrently the role of local government in the decision-making process was 
undermined. Central government appeared to support the establishment of regionally 
focused interest networks while at the same time being in control of the regional 
Government Offices and the financial budget. There seems to be a dichotomy 
between the encouragement of the government to local actors to pursue the 
partnership objective on the one hand, while on the other hand its own actions 
restrict the actual powers of these public-private partnerships (Bache and Olson, 
2001, 223). The strong role played by central government, however, meant that these 
developments were merely attempts to maximise their own share and did not come 
to constitute serious and genuine partnership cooperation in regional development, 
and the overall picture remained one in which the central government was in a 
dominant ‘extended gate-keeping’ position of its powers in all stages of the EU 
regional policy process during the first programming period and well into the second 
where a devolution of powers took place (Martin, 1997, 63 and Bache, 1999, 37) 
Similarly, it is argued that “in practice … many ‘partnerships’ operate in a purely 
instrumental fashion, designed to draw down the maximum possible level of external 
assistance” (Martin, 1997,63) and that “regional networks remained relatively 
immature and regional activity [was] limited to a few functional sectors, with 
economic development predominant” (Bache, 2008a, 113). 
According to Bache (1999), experiences with partnership arrangements both prior to 
and after the devolution of powers varied across the UK. Scotland has had the most 
positive accounts while in England the situation was not as far advanced. The positive 
adoption of the partnership arrangements in Scotland can be ascribed to the 
existence of a long-established territorial ministry and an established pattern of 
regular contacts between the government level and other partners in Scotland. A 
feature that also distinguished the Scottish regions from those in England and Wales is 
that the local authorities established independent secretariats separate from central 
government offices. In England and Wales all Monitoring Committee secretariats were 
provided by central government. In Wales, for instance, it has been reported that “not 
only is the monitoring committee dominated by the Welsh Office but the Welsh Office 
also controls the technical groups which feed the information into a secretariat run by 
the Welsh Office. The whole process is very much controlled by the Welsh Office” 
(Bache, 1999, 36). It is found that the pattern of relations within the Structural Funds 
partnerships in the UK varied across the regions, but there is a general agreement that 
central government was in firm control of key decisions within the partnerships. The 
following will take a closer look at how this worked in practice during the various 
stages of EU regional policy-making within a few representative regions of the UK. 
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In the initial stages of developing the first two SPDs (in 1988 and 1993), the extent of 
participation in the partnerships responsible of producing the SPDs varied among the 
regions. For instance, in the West-Midlands, a region with established regional 
structures, the arrangements that provided the core of the partnership were regional 
authorities, economic and social partners and education institutions alongside central 
government representatives. The voluntary sector and other agencies provided 
specialist knowledge. The partnership here was characterised as a local authority led 
and widely-based partnership approach. A similar approach was found in the 
Yorkshire and Humberside partnership, a region with emergent regional structures, 
although it had a more regionalised base. In these two regions the methods used for 
the preparation of the SPDs reflected the pre-existing distribution of skills, knowledge 
and experience with regional development and the willingness of the regional 
(centrally controlled) offices to contribute to the process. In the drafting and 
negotiation of the SPDs, the central government was responsible and thus in a 
position to overrule regional and local recommendations. This resulted in the pursuit 
of a national agenda rather than the regional agenda recommended by the local 
partners. It was even noticed that the varying regional SPDs across the country were 
similar in appearance and content. This outcome may be attributed to the lack of an 
elected regional government that would be able to represent a regional view more 
strongly. This implies that the lack of a regional government played right into the 
hands of central government thus being able to control the entire process. In the 
negotiation stage, the Commission criticised the one-for-all approach of the SPDs but 
the UK government chose the preferred route.  
In the implementation stage, the organisational structure and assignment of 
management responsibility followed a standardised pattern in most regions. 
Programme Monitoring Committees (PMCs) oversaw the operation of the 
programmes. Each programme was assigned with a Secretariat which in England was 
discharged from the relevant government office. The PMCs should represent the 
partnership between Commission, the member state and the competent authorities 
and bodies in the region. The PMCs are thus comprised of the required members and 
many also included members from the voluntary and private sector, higher education, 
environmental organisation and other regional and local special interest groups. It 
should be noted that the PMCs did not invite the social partners to participate 
because they were not considered relevant in the implementation of the programmes 
by the UK government (Roberts and Hart, 1997, 200-14). There appears to be general 
consent that the partnerships should be representative of regional interests, but the 
relations and power distributions among the partners is an understudied area during 
the first two rounds of programming according to Roberts and Hart (1997, 214) thus 
131 
 
making it difficult exactly to determine whether these regional, local, private and 
other competent partners have played a significant role or whether their participation 
was merely pro forma as Bache (1999, 28) has also suggested: there is a difference 
between multi-level governance and multi-level participation. “While many aspects of 
the partnership arrangements were positive, there was no doubt that central 
government officials were firmly in control of the key decisions.” (36) Bache concludes 
elsewhere that the partnerships were ‘embryonic’ although partnerships had grown in 
importance during the 1990s (Bache, 2008a, 114). 
A case study of the implementation of partnership in the Highland and Islands of 
Scotland has revealed that “the concept of partnership takes a variety of guises” 
(Scott, 1998, 182) ranging from informal consultation to its institutionalisation in the 
guise of PMCs. In drafting the SPD, the Scottish Office consulted a wide range of 
interest groups in the region, but in practice the plan was formulated by a plan writing 
group consisting of Scottish Office departments, regional and district councils as well 
as Highlands and Island Enterprise and Scottish Natural Heritage. In a similar study of 
partnership operation in Scotland it was criticised that the process did not put enough 
emphasis on genuine consultation with the district council and local enterprise 
companies. Moreover, it was criticised that the Scottish Office did not consult the 
other partners in responding to the final version of the SPD before submitting it to the 
Commission (Bryden, 1997, 147). In the implementation of the SPD, a Monitoring 
Committee comprising representatives of the Commission, local authorities, and 
quangos such as Highlands and Islands Enterprise, Scottish Natural Heritage, the 
Scottish Tourist Board, the local Enterprise Companies and the Scottish Council for 
Voluntary Organisations was responsible. Below the Monitoring Committee, the PMC 
was set up, chaired by a representative of the Scottish Office Development Division 
who was also responsible of selecting the membership of the Committee. The PMC 
represents members from local authorities, Highlands and Enterprise Network, 
Scottish Natural Heritage, Scottish Tourist Board, voluntary sector, commercial sector 
and further education besides representatives of the Commission and the Scottish 
Office. Besides the PMCs, advisory groups supported project recommendation and 
selection by offering their specialist knowledge and sometimes these groups invited 
otherwise non-members to participate, but as such it cannot be considered formal 
procedure as they were formally included in the process. Although it appears that the 
partnership was widely represented, reality is that the Scottish Office inhabited and 
chaired every committee or advisory group and remained the ultimate source of 
additional funding to the Structural Funds thereby being in a position to influence 
every decision reached in the partnership (Bryden, 1997, 149). Therefore, Scott (1998) 
concludes that partnership in the Highlands and Islands offers limited opportunities 
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for ‘intermediate’ organisations to become involved and those that were represented 
on the Monitoring Committee were direct consumers of the Structural Funds (Scott, 
1998, 183-8). 
A further point that is made in the UK partnership literature and which is evident in 
the above is that partnerships in the UK were fragmented because of the lack of an 
elected regional government (Roberts, 2003, 24). Partnership attempts made at the 
local level did not seem to have a real significance due to the distance between the 
public-private partnerships at the local level attempting to influence the content of 
regional development programmes and the central government which in the end 
made the final decision. There was not an intermediate regional government that 
could tie these two together and thus ensure that the regional voice was heard. 
Similarly, the regional government could potentially tie the fragmented partnerships 
within the regions together into a common position instead of a range of different 
self-maximising objectives that in the end were not taken seriously by central 
government. A different account is that “in the absence of an elected tier of regional 
government, the need to respond to EU structural-fund policy has encouraged British 
local authorities to work more closely with each other through regional forums, 
regional associations and inter-authority working groups of ‘European Offices’ as well 
as with Government Offices, thus leading to the strengthening of meso-level 
government” (Bache, 2008a, 115). Despite this development, the partnerships 
remained rather narrow in composition in most regions due to the failure to include 
private partners in the partnerships. 
With the restructuring of powers in the UK regional policy area, central government 
relaxed its grip on the partnerships although it did not concede powers completely, 
but merely allowed partnerships to function more effectively: when it was considered 
in the interest of the region, partnership relations could be conducted more 
cooperatively without the firm control of the government office. Hereby, the regional 
level was strengthened (Bache, 2008a, 113). Due to the change in partnership 
approach mentioned above, a political environment in which it had become 
increasingly difficult to ignore the voice of private actors developed thus extending 
partnerships (Bache, 2010, 69).  
Due to their establishment in the late 1990s, the RDAs did not have any significant 
effects on the function of the partnerships during the second programming period in 
the UK. The full potential of the RDAs was expected to be seen in the 2000-2006 
programming period especially since the Structural Funds strategies had to be 
coherent with the emerging regional strategies of the RDAs. Accordingly, there was a 
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potential for increased partnership as a consequence of the extended role of the RDAs 
and the prospective of involving sub-regional and private actors (Bachtler et.al., 2000, 
34). With the establishment of the RDAs, the role of the Government Offices was in 
fact strengthened so, in turn, their role in EU regional policy between the regions and 
central government was more formalised. An important point in time for the RDAs 
was in 2001 when they were handed over the strategic control of the Structural Funds 
from central government thereby expanding the scope of the RDAs. Thus, on the one 
hand, the role of Government Offices in the regions was strengthened while, on the 
other hand, the role of the RDAs in EU regional policy also increased involving the 
inclusion of more partners in the process (Burch and Gomez, 2008, 91-2).  
Apparently, the vertical partnership dimension was strengthened with the devolution 
of powers and the setting up of RDAs in the English regions. This was especially 
evident in the 2000-2006 programming period. Similarly, the horizontal dimension 
which was completely missing during the first two programming periods began to 
develop as a consequence of the changed governance structure following the change 
of government in 1997. However, additional factors should also be ascribed to this 
development: whereas the Conservative government was in opposition to involving 
trade unions into politics, the stance of the Labour government was in contrast to 
that. This opened the door for the trade unions and thus widened horizontal 
partnerships. It should be noted, however, that horizontal partnerships did not pop up 
overnight; rather it was a gradual process of learning that also had varying 
experiences across the regions (Bache, 2008a, 133). 
Also in the English regions partnership working improved because “people have got 
used to working together across sectors…” (Bache, 2008a, 135) After the devolution of 
powers, typically, the regional development strategy was prepared in cooperation 
between regional and local authorities. This strategy provided the foundation for the 
preparation of the draft SPD. In general, the initial draft of the programme was 
prepared by a group of local and regional partners from local and regional authorities, 
chambers of commerce, trade unions, employers’ organisations, universities and 
other relevant bodies. An example of this type of partnership was found in the North-
East England region where below the SPD Steering Group, sub-groups representing 
the various interests in the region were set up to influence and provide information to 
the decision makers.  
In Western Scotland with its longer experience with working in partnership and its 
increased regional powers compared to the English regions, for instance, “there is 
much more joint partnership project working” (Bache, 2008, 133). Here emphasis was 
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put on extensive consultation with a wide selection of partners in addressing the 
challenges of the region (Bachtler et.al., 2000, 29-30). The draft programme was then 
subject to adjustment and approval of the Government Offices and lastly negotiated 
by central government with the Commission. Thus, very early in the decision-making 
stage sub-national (public) partners played a considerable role moving towards an 
increased role of the central government later in the decision-making process. It 
should be noted that private, social partners were not present at this stage.  
In both examples, although a number of horizontal partners appeared to be present in 
the outset of the process, there were still concerns regarding the dominance of 
central government later in the process, which illustrates that the time or process 
dimension is important to consider. It makes a difference where in the process of 
implementation the partners participate with regards to their influence on the 
process. This was particularly the case at the implementation stage where local 
authority elected members and the social partners were excluded from the 
Monitoring Committees (Roberts, 2003, 52 and 55). At the implementation stage, 
however, the partnership was more inclusive along the horizontal dimension 
compared to the initial stage of programme design: the Monitoring Committee was 
the central body representing partners from the Commission, national government, 
regional and local bodies and ‘other interests’. Sub-partnerships were set up to 
evaluate project applications before they were selected solely by the Monitoring 
Committee. The sub-partnerships may be able to give voice to their priorities 
regarding selection of projects and assist in the partnership providing specialist 
knowledge and information about the localities, but in the end this voice remained 
very subtle (Martin, 1997, and Bentley and Shutt, 1997). The secretariat function was 
diverse within the UK; in Scotland it functioned at arm’s length whereas in Wales and 
England this role was played by a central government department (Roberts, 2003, 23-
5). 
According to Taylor and Downes (1998), the member state decided that for the 1997-
1999 round of Structural Funds programming, the Monitoring Committees should be 
encouraged to develop parts of their programmes through ‘Action Plans’ which were 
designed to implement specific (thematically targeted) parts of the SPDs as part of 
making the UK’s approach to EU regional policy implementation more regionalised. 
Sub-partnerships were to be established to be responsible for appraising and 
approving individual projects within their own thematic Action Plan, for achieving the 
objectives of the Plan and for using the designated amount of Funds to the projects. In 
applying this approach, it was anticipated that a number of benefits would be 
generated, among others improved partnership arrangements at regional and local 
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levels. As the Action Plan approach was not obligatory for the implementation of 
Objective 2 programmes in England, the result varied within the member state. Some 
regions adopted the approach completely while others implemented the Structural 
Funds programmes partly through Action Plans while others again did not employ this 
approach. 
In the UK, it is argued that the partnership principle has inspired a development of 
central philosophy from one of de-concentration where power was placed at the 
nationally controlled Regional Government Offices and national government offices to 
one of decentralisation and the establishment of RDAs with a greater regional focus. 
Along the way, the UK government sought to involve a wider range of vertical and 
horizontal partners such as voluntary sector organisations, environmental bodies, 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and chambers of commerce. Social partners 
were excluded, though. The study of the UK partnerships reveals the importance of 
informal networks within the partnership: informal links generated greater 
involvement of local partners in the partnership especially where the central 
government tried to restrict their participation (Kelleher et.al., 1999, 95-9). It also 
reveals a difference in approach between the regions where the Scottish region and 
to some extent also the Welsh region were granted more responsibility compared to 
the English region. It could be argued that the particularities of the UK case may be 
the rationale behind the argument put forward by Brunazzo that there is not a clear 
link between state institutional tradition and the partnership structure. 
As with the German example, I will for a moment pretend that this is my case that 
needs to lead to a conclusion. UK experience with partnerships reflects a highly 
differentiated approach which was based on a number of factors. First it reflects the 
longstanding division of the UK into three regions, i.e. Scotland Wales and England, 
with their individual institutional structures and relations with central government. 
Second, to some extent it illustrates political ideology, where a tighter central control 
was seen during Conservative rule, whereas the central gate-keeping loosened when 
the Labour party came into office in 1997. Third, besides the different approaches of 
the three regions, even within the regions differences in approach existed. Fourth, the 
UK has always had a reputation of being sceptical towards the EU and its intrusion 
into domestic policy, which its regional policy partnership principle certainly 
constitutes an example of. Based on these circumstances, the partnership operation 
in the UK regions provide examples of a slowly developing vertical partnership in 
England with the establishment of the RDAs and a parallel growing importance of the 
horizontal partners in the different stages of the process, although with central 
government continuing to exercise considerable control. In Scotland, on the other 
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hand, a more positive adoption of partnership arrangements was seen which can be 
ascribed to the existence of the long-established territorial government independent 
of central government. The general picture is one in which the UK position changed 
from one of outright opposition to partnerships and a missing regional government 
level towards one in which the regional level was established and to some extent also 
been granted authority, whereby it was possible to implement regional policy in wider 
partnership. Partnership was working better in the Scottish region due to longer 
experience with linking the central level to the regional and sub-regional partners. 
5.2.3 Partnership Implementation in Denmark 
Research on the Danish experience with the implementation of the partnership 
principle is nowhere near as rich as is the comparative studies and the more in-depth 
member state specific studies reviewed above. Obviously Denmark is a small member 
state with relatively few regions to investigate in the first place. Furthermore, 
Denmark is among the richest member states and for that reason it receives 
considerably smaller amounts of Structural Funds compared to other member states, 
which also implies that the regional development programmes within the member 
state are small in size. Lastly, it could be argued that Denmark is not interesting to 
investigate because of its traditions with collaborative and consensus-based policy-
making over the past decades – will the findings be surprising at all or will they be as 
expected? These points suggest that Denmark may be a less interesting member state 
to investigate, but this is not so. Denmark has a long tradition with partnerships and 
has a track record that may be inspirational – not to say that partnerships in Denmark 
are perfect. However, learning from Danish experiences may inspire other member 
states not that advanced in the process to widen and deepen partnership as is seen in 
the Danish case. Research on Danish implementation of the partnership principle is 
only covered by a few researchers: Henrik Halkier is the prime investigator both in 
terms of individual research, but also research in cooperation with other scholars such 
as John Flockhart, Lise Smed Olsen and Charlotte Damborg, as well as part of a wider 
EU regional policy network, IQ-Net, which investigates the implementation and 
management of EU regional policy in its network member states. Besides Halkier, 
whose research is voluminous, Jens Blom-Hansen and Andreas P. Cornett have also 
contributed to its clarification. Reviewing the Danish regional policy-making in 
retrospect, Arne Gaardmand and Sven Illeris are at the front. As the following review 
mainly concerns itself with the period from 1988 to 2006, the research of Halkier and 
Blom-Hansen (also in cooperation with others) will mainly be referred to. 
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In Denmark, there was a clear functional division of power, which reflected the 
Commission’s organisation of the Structural Funds. This implies that each Fund (i.e. 
European Regional Development Fund or European Social Fund) was the responsibility 
of the Ministry which had jurisdictional responsibility of that area. The responsibility 
was, however, delegated to a government agency which was responsible for designing 
national plans and programmes of the Structural Funds activities in Denmark. 
Moreover, the government agency was responsible for communication with the 
Commission and of setting up Monitoring Committees as well as evaluation and 
monitoring of the programmes. Day-to-day implementation of these programmes 
entailed appraisal of projects eligible of the Structural Funds. The responsibility of this 
task differed among the Funds where the ESF administration was mainly 
decentralised: it was administered at the County level (regional level) in committees 
comprising a wide number of partners. Within ERDF administration a number of 
regional committees were allocated the responsibility of selecting projects for 
subsequent central level approval. This structure operated throughout all 
programming periods from 1988 until 2006, although during the 2000-2006 
programming period the structure was modified so that the practices of the ERDF and 
the ESF administrations were customized (Halkier and Olsen, 2008, 2 and EPRC, 
2008b, 2). At the decentralised level, the activities of the ERDF and the ESF were 
administered by the County Councils providing individual coordinated secretariat 
functions to the two Funds. Hence, there was a certain overlap between the two 
Funds. This needed to be so, since both ERDF and ESF support Objective 2 activities 
and duplication or overlap of projects had to be avoided. These activities took place 
within networks (composed of partners that reflected relevant regional and local 
interests) positioned in the vertical structure of public policy-making. Regional 
Objective 2 Committees (one for ERDF and one for ESF) evaluated projects and 
nominated them for approval of the national level responsible agency. A distinction 
needs to be made between the ERDF and the ESF regional committees: the ESF 
regional committees were in a position to decide individual applications which the 
ERDF regional committees could not; they merely recommended projects to the 
national agency responsible (Blom-Hansen, 2003, 49-51, and 88 and Yesilkagit and 
Blom-Hansen, 2007, 511-2 and 516). 
The networks involved in Danish Structural Funds programmes were comprised of 
public, private and social actors at the regional and local levels. Their involvement 
varied depending on the phase of the political decision-making process. In developing 
national programmes, the drafts for the programmes were prepared by cross-
ministerial working groups in which external interests (sub-regional and private) were 
represented, before a wider range of partners were consulted about its contents. The 
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lead in the this process was found at the regional level where the County Council 
(regional government) organised consultation with local government and the private 
sector resulting in new policy initiatives for the draft document. Parallel to the 
preparation of the national programme, regional actors were involved in a process of 
drafting the regional Programme Complement with coordination and meetings 
between national and regional administrators. In negotiating the contents of the 
programmes with the Commission, central level was once again responsible. Once the 
contents were approved by the Commission, administration was mainly a decentral 
prerogative. During the 1994-1999 programming period, the responsibility of project 
evaluation was firmly situated with the regional level before formal approval of the 
selected applications in terms of issues of legality by the managing authority at central 
level (Blom-Hansen, 2003, 50, 88 and 90; Halkier, 2001, 330 and EPRC, 2008b, 5). This 
was also the case during the 2000-2006 programming period where “the NAEC 
[national level managing authority] focus was on setting very broad priorities and 
undertaking legal control, while practical implementation and content-related tasks 
(including setting programme Priorities and selecting projects for support) were 
undertaken at the regional level.” (EPRC, 2008b, 2) 
At the national level, the Monitoring Committee of the ERDF part of the Objective 2 
Programme in Denmark was composed of the Commission, other involved Ministries 
beside the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (which is overall responsible), 
social partners, regional partners and sometimes particular NGOs (Blom-Hansen, 
2003, 90). Due to the absence of a uniform national programme and the presence of 
individual programmes for regions receiving the Structural Funds, authority was 
delegated from the national level Monitoring Committee to the regional level 
regarding impact monitoring where the Regional Executive Committees, representing 
a wider partnership having a finger on the regional pulse, undertook that task. The 
national level Monitoring Committee driven by the national level managing authority 
remained in charge of financial monitoring (EPRC, 2008b, 4 and 7-8). 
In the case of Denmark, according to the Thematic Evaluation which has been based 
on documentary research as well as interviews with central partners along both the 
vertical and horizontal dimension, evidence shows that previous experiences have 
been central to partnership in the 1990s, and that partnership was recognisably 
decentralised so that the state did not interfere in the operation of partnerships at the 
regional level where the horizontal partners met (Kelleher et.al., 1999, 111-2). The 
Danish approach to EU regional policy-making and partnership, in particular, could be 
ascribed to two major events at the national and international scene. First, the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds marked the time when existing national institutional 
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structures met new requirements. Second, in 1991 the national regional policy 
institutional structure was adjusted to the new requirements. Prior to 1991, it was 
Danish approach to regional policy that the state was responsible which meant that 
decisions on area designation and individual project applications were made by 
central government (represented by the Regional Development Directorate) with only 
little input from the regional actors; they were merely executers of the policy. After 
1991, regional policy-making came to be a shared responsibility between three tiers of 
government: the EU level, central government and regional authorities (Illeris, 2010, 
52; Halkier, 2001, 323-4 and Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 42). Even before this 
termination of national domination of regional policy decision-making, bottom up 
developments in the national political landscape transpired pushing for gradual 
involvement of these actors. So the involvement of sub-national and private actors 
was a gradual process since before the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and 
especially after where a large number of relatively small organisations, regional and 
local government, a host of quangos and wide range of public-private partnerships 
pushed for the process, but strengthened by the 1991 central level decision to 
terminate central level dominance and thereby legalising the involvement of sub-
national and private actors (Halkier, 2001, 332-3). Halkier concludes that “the internal 
division of labour between the national and regional levels now places Denmark 
among the most decentralised countries in the EU with regard to Structural Funds 
programming … with central government deciding to rely on sub-national actors for 
both political authority and financial, informational and organizational  resources in 
key parts of the policy process.” (Halkier, 2001, 331) The current Danish approach to 
administration of the Structural Funds has been characterised as ‘controlled 
decentralisation’ within a multi-level governance setting. It is, thus, one of shared 
management with the regions exercising significant powers for regional development 
but within a framework determined by the central level taking place in “loosely 
coupled networks, overseen by central government but dominated by regional/local 
governments and their associated organisations.” (Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 47) 
During the 2000-2006 programming period, a similar picture appeared: a wide range 
of actors had the opportunity to influence the contents of the SPDs including the 
social partners. Each EU Programme Complement region had its own organisational 
structure. However, all regions had set up mandatory regional Executive Committees 
to evaluate and recommend projects for support. These Executive Committees 
comprised mainly of actors at the regional level. To ensure a wider partnership, a sub-
committee, i.e. the Regional Steering Committee was set up and assigned the 
responsibility of regionally-driven initiatives sponsored by the County Council. Thus, a 
clear division of power between the two individual Committees was present: the 
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Regional Executive Committee made formal recommendations whereas the Regional 
Steering Committee laid down general priorities for projects. For instance in North 
Jutland, like in many other regions, preparing the region’s programme complement 
(being part of the nation-wide Objective 2 programme), a number of thematic 
working groups were set up to provide contribution. These working groups consisted 
of relevant organisations such as municipalities, Aalborg University and the business 
community. The regional level continued to be responsible for project appraisal and 
selection whereas the national level managing authority was only involved indirectly 
in carrying out eligibility control. In this set up, the partnership also comprised social 
partners excluding gender and environmental actors, which the 1999 formulation of 
the partnership principle suggests thereby constituting some kind of horizontal 
partnership. The environmental and gender actors were not considered to be relevant 
in the partnership as focus was on economic sustainability (Olsen and Halkier, 2008b, 
8, 13, 23) 
Concluding on the Danish approach to partnership, it is clear that it has been 
characterised by on-going development since the 1960s due to strong corporatist 
traditions dating back to that time:  
“the greatly increased number of actors involved in regional 
development activities has undoubtedly led to partnership arrangements 
becoming much more prominent, both in terms of vertical relations 
between different spatial tiers of governance, horizontal development 
networks within particular regions, and of “micro partnerships” around 
individual development  bodies and initiatives” (Halkier and Flockhart, 
2002, 50) 
In the same breath, it is noted that this was not a uniform approach; rather 
partnerships existed in many different guises across Denmark. In later research, the 
approach has been characterised as a ‘specialised stakeholder’ approach in which 
actors expected to make a significant contribution to a particular task were invited to 
participate, while those with a peripheral contribution were less likely to be invited, 
unless it was required by EU Regulation (EPRC, 2008b, 4). In evaluating the existing 
Danish research of partnership experiences, it is found that nearly all documents (see 
for instance Halkier and Olsen (2008), EPRC (2008b)) and articles have been based on 
documentary sources as well as interviews with partners along the vertical dimension. 
It is conspicuous how the representation of perspectives of the horizontal partners is 
generally missing in the research which leads me to conclude that the findings appear 
to build on a weak foundation and that consequently a more thorough examination of 
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the interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle in Denmark is 
indeed needed.  
5.3 Placing My Research 
Having reviewed both the comparative studies of the implementation of the 
partnership principle and the more member state specific analyses, it has become 
obvious that my research distinguishes itself from the overall partnership literature 
primarily due to the extended theoretical foundations on which it is built, although it 
is based on some of the same premises that have been presented above. The above 
reviewed research mainly focuses on the vertical dimension of partnership either by 
coincidence or by choice. Little research is fully devoted to the practical 
implementation of horizontal partnerships compared to huge amount of research on 
vertical partnerships. It is important to make such a distinction. Vertical partnerships 
nearly by definition are present in all member states whereas horizontal partnerships 
are developing as concluded in the above. As such, this conclusion cannot be 
questioned; however, the actual and critical review of the operation of these 
partnerships in terms of inclusion and process is missing in the literature. It is merely 
demonstrated that this and that partner is present in partnership and others are not 
on either dimension, but it is not analysed what their actual role in the partnership is. 
For instance, the vertical partnership is present in the form of Monitoring Committees 
in all member states and they must comprise a certain number of actors representing 
a certain variety of actors as laid down by the partnership principle. But the relations 
within these partnerships are not analysed in terms of roles and relations, although it 
is established that the dominant partners herein are governmental actors at various 
levels leaving little room for non-governmental actors. How is it possible to come to 
that conclusion without considering the relations between the actors, which some 
must have done? For instance it is often concluded that “whether, in the context of 
MCs, the partnership principle has made any real impact at all in terms of fostering 
meaningful non-governmental involvement” is questioned (Batory and Cartwright, 
2011, 703). I think these are necessary conditions in order to be able to evaluate to 
which extent the ‘partnership’ in fact constitutes a partnership with everything this 
entails (inclusion and process). Partnership should not be considered a condition or a 
situation or a number of actors placed together but a process of cooperation against 
which it should be analysed. This is where I can contribute with my research design. 
Like research has demonstrated that vertical partnerships exist and horizontal 
partnerships are developing, it is concordantly concluded that the member states’ 
individual institutional structures influence the implementation of the partnership 
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principle. This is so because of the formulation of the partnership principle leaves 
decisions concerning the composition of the (horizontal) partnerships to the member 
state according to existing institutional structure. This cannot be questioned either. 
However, what existing research does not take into consideration is that the 
institutional structure, either the national or the partnership approach itself, has 
undergone development both prior to the introduction of the partnership principle in 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds as well as along the way of partnership 
implementation. Here, institutional development may also influence the 
implementation of the partnership principle as the historical institutionalist account 
suggests. In my research this is an important influence on the interpretation and 
implementation of partnerships as partnerships are seen as a dynamic process that is 
influenced by the context in which it operates. Thus, partnerships are constantly on 
the move, as Åkerstrøm Andersen’s partnership approach suggests, influenced by the 
internal process and from external developments within its operational and 
institutional context which the historical institutional and network governance 
approaches establish. The historical institutionalist account offers tools to investigate 
the institutional developments of the overall context, i.e. national regional policy-
making institutional traditions and the interpretation of the partnership principle in 
terms of change in the national regional policy-making institutional structure whereas 
the network governance account informs the analysis of the inclusion and process 
aspects of the partnerships when implemented into national contexts.  
The combination of the three theoretical approaches, i.e. historical institutionalism, 
network governance and the partnership approach presented by Åkerstrøm 
Andersen, makes it possible to investigate the vertical and horizontal dimensions and 
their relations in partnering in Denmark  more in depth than has presently been done 
by others. The aim is to be able to explore the institutional change generated by the 
interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle. Accordingly, the roles 
of and relations between the actors in the partnership are thus analysed based on the 
interaction between the partnership principle and the national regional policy-making 
institution. 
Thus, the theoretical considerations made in my research have shaped the analysis of 
the interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle leading to a more 
comprehensive framework of analysis than seen elsewhere, while its choice of case 
also distinguishes it from other studies. As mentioned in the Danish review, research 
on the Danish experience with the partnership principle is very modest, for which 
reason this piece of research intends to make a considerable contribution to the 
existing volume. This research offers insights into partnership practices in Denmark 
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since the introduction of the partnership principle in the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds as well as a comprehensive review of institutional experiences within the 
national regional policy-making institution and its interaction with new requirements 
from the EU until the end of 2006. 2007 is a landmark in Danish policy-making and 
likewise in regional policy-making in that a comprehensive reform of the national and 
regional institutional structures came into force re-mapping the internal 
governmental levels so that the number of regions and municipalities were reduced in 
an attempt to make policy-making more efficient as well as redistributing 
responsibilities among the levels of government. Hereafter, regional policy could be 
expected to become significantly different. Although present research has concluded 
that this is not the case; the difference is merely that the new Growth Fora are 
statutory partnerships rather than voluntary, as has been the case in the previous set 
up (Illeris, 2010, 56). It would make up another Ph.D. dissertation or a future piece of 
research for me to engage in this investigation. Therefore, my research ends in 2006 
and with the end of the third EU programming period it is an analytically coherent and 
plausible time to conclude my research. 
To sum up, my research offers four contributions to existing research: 
 It takes an historical and dynamic and process-oriented point of view on the 
process by integrating and combining historical institutionalism and network 
governance 
 It provides deeper insight into the process aspect of the partnership principle 
as suggested by the approach by Åkerstrøm Andersen  
 It investigates the horizontal perspective by presenting a wider 
representation of the partners by including the horizontal perspective on par 
with the vertical perspective that has been carried out so far 
 It analyses an understudied member state that institutionally is placed 
somewhere in the middle of the centralised/decentralised continuum 
To conclude, my study of how the partnership principle is interpreted and 
implemented into existing national practices and how this interpretation is generated 
into action may bring new insights to the more general debate and perception of 
partnership operation within the multi-level governance framework. Hopefully this 
study can bring about a discussion of the relationship between partnership 
perspectives, theories and applications in relation to the governance debate. 
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6. Danish Regional Policy-Making – Organisation and 
Objectives 
The first sub-analysis that seeks to provide a preliminary answer to the research 
question is concerned with the Danish regional policy-making institution and its 
historical developments until 2006. This particular focus is based on the discussion in 
the first chapter following the introduction and methodology, ‘EU Regional Policy and 
Its Institutional Impact’, concerning the importance of taking the member states’ 
institutional structures into consideration when empirically analysing the implications 
of implementing and interpreting the partnership principle in the member states. It 
was argued that the regional policy-making institutional context in the member states 
determines the member states’ interpretation and employment of the partnership 
principle, in accordance with the partnership principle which states that ‘the 
partnership shall be conducted in full compliance with the respective institutional, 
legal and financial powers of each of the partners’. Based on this discussion, it is 
imperative to analyse the specific member state’s regional policy-making institutional 
characteristics in order to be able to further analyse its coordination with the EC/EU 
regional policy-making partnership requirements, and the potential changes that 
coordination generates institutionally in terms of partnership inclusion and process. 
Thus, the first sub-analysis is an analysis of the historical development of the Danish 
regional policy-making institution based on historical institutionalist tools of analysis, 
setting the stage for the following analysis of the interaction between and 
coordination of the Danish and EU regional policy-making institutions. A specific focus 
is on how the Danish organisational structure in regional policy-making has developed 
over time in terms of organisation and objectives. 
To achieve the before-mentioned aim, the analysis is divided into three sections. The 
first section presents the development of the Danish constitutional structure from 
when the Constitution established the basic rights of Danish society and the political 
organisational structure through which Denmark is managed until 2006. Before 2006, 
the organisational structure in public policy-making has been reformed a few times. 
The constitutional context makes up the institutional frames into which Danish 
regional policy-making is managed. Thus, the second section is concerned with the 
historical developments that have influenced the Danish regional policy-making 
structure since the post-War period until 2006 as a response to internal and external 
events. Section two is sub-divided into three time periods reflecting specific events 
that have shaped the respective period; i.e. the period of state dominance, the 
transition period towards multi-level governance and the final period where the 
national approach is reformed as part of a wider public policy-making and local 
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government re-organisation. The Danish regional policy-making analysis traces a 
gradual development of the institutional context presented by the third section 
through the lens of historical institutionalism. It concludes that this development is 
based on continuity and gradual change towards a multi-level governance structure 
that is rooted in Danish traditions for cooperation. This is achieved by elaborating on 
the previous two analyses of the Constitutional and regional policy developments as 
well as other aspects presented later.  
All of these sections are based on the historical institutionalist framework of analysis 
in that the focus is on how the development of institutions has influenced Danish 
regional policy-making. The individual sections are structured according to the core 
argument of historical institutionalism that history and institutions matter as well as 
the core concepts presented in the theoretical operationalization. The data analysed 
in this analysis is primarily based on secondary literature where other researchers 
have presented the findings of their research, and in addition I make use of primary 
sources such as government documents supported by personal interviews with 
centrally placed actors in Danish regional policy-making. All this information is 
gathered and compared to each other in balancing actual events and then evaluated 
from a historical institutionalist point of view before being summarised here. 
6.1 The Danish Public Sector Governance Structure 
In order to be able to understand how the historical Danish organisational structure 
influences the interpretation and implementation of EU regional policy partnerships in 
a Danish context, it is necessary to base this analysis on the theoretical framework 
provided by historical institutionalism. Thus, the core focus of the subsequent analysis 
is on institutions, their organisation and the development which they undergo during 
the course of time as a consequence of the historical choices actors make based on 
internal and external events.  Similarly, Jørgensen (2002, 4) argues that the Danish 
organisational structure is historically based on “socially embedded norms, traditions 
for finding common solutions, and institutional consensus building”. These norms and 
traditions can be traced back a long time. The Constitution is an institution that 
frames the behaviour of the actors in policy-making and thus the policy-making 
process. As institutions may influence the identities, self-images and preferences of 
the actors within the institution, institutions may have such great influence on the 
individual actors and their choices concerning the institution that it is resistant to re-
design. It may be argued that this is the case with the Constitution and the norms and 
traditions that are associated with it; these norms and traditions are historically 
rooted and have not been changed significantly over time. Thus, when the general 
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frame of the Constitution (public policy-making institution) is so embedded in the 
actors within that institution and the institutional structure which it frames, it is highly 
influential on the development of those actors and public policy-making. This implies 
that the Constitution may be expected to have considerable influence on public 
policy-making and the behaviour of actors within public policy-making. 
The Danish organisational structure is rooted in the Constitution which dates back 
from 1849. The Constitution introduced freedom of speech, assembly and religion as 
well as parliamentary democracy. Hereafter, powers were separated into a 
legislature, an executive and judiciary part. In continuation of this separation, an 
administrative reform was implemented, appointing government, abolishing existing 
departments and introducing ministerial rule, and rationalising the administrative 
structure (Jørgensen, 2002, 31). It has been revised three times since then, last in 
1953. Generally, the organisational structure is based on three tiers of government: 
the central level, the regional level and the local level. Powers have been delegated to 
the regional local levels from the state so that they to some extent can manage their 
own affairs although the state is responsible for law making and budget planning 
(Greve, 2006, 162-4). In addition, as regional agents of national law and state 
executive authority, the regional authorities are not directly subordinated to these 
state authorities. Rather, regional management, being a political elected council, is 
accountable to the citizens although the elected councillors are both politicians and 
administrators.  
Prior to the 1970s, the Danish organisational structure was best described as a central 
state with a strong belief in central planning and administration, however, this picture 
has been altered with a number of reforms of the organisational structure launched 
since the 1970s. The first reform established 275 municipalities (the local level) and 14 
counties (the regional level) and transferred important tasks to the sub-national 
levels. This organisational structure was set up as the demographic map changed 
during the 1950s and 1960s where many people moved from the rural areas to the 
cities. Denmark used to be an agricultural country where up to 80 per cent of the 
population lived in the rural districts while only 20 per cent lived in the larger cities 
and the Capital. However, this picture changed in the 1960s and the main part of the 
population now lived in the cities. Consequently, some municipalities became much 
more populated and had to face great administrative challenges. They were simply 
not equipped to deal with the new tasks that followed their growth. The movement 
from rural to city areas also posed challenges to the regional level administration in 
that some regions were composed of larger rural areas compared to other regions. 
This implied that these regions would be more sparsely populated and the foundation 
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for the growth of the region disappeared along with the individual region’s 
competitiveness. Debates took place during the 1960s regarding how to reform the 
existing structure and establish a new more effective structure. The primary 
conclusion was that the municipalities and counties were too small to take care of the 
tasks that they were authorised to carry out. A second conclusion was that new 
counties were to comprise both rural and town areas in order to ensure equal 
regional development across the country. A third conclusion was that in order for the 
municipalities and counties to be able to perform effective management, these were 
to have a certain sustainable size. Thus by 1
st
 April 1970 the Local Government Act 
entered into force based on these conclusions (Strukturkommissionen, 2004, 17-26 
and Gjerding, 2005a, 2). Arguably, external (socio-economic and demographic) 
changes led to the need to revise the organisational division of responsibilities of 
public policy-making. In this sense, external events put pressure on the existing 
organisation of public policy-making changing the institution to accommodate these 
external pressures. This can be considered an example of reform as historical 
institutionalism describes this type of change: the institutional changes were initiated 
by government and consequently led to additional organisational reorganisation. 
With the new municipal and county landscape in place, the opportunity to increase 
the transfer of state tasks to the municipalities and counties surfaced. This process of 
decentralisation was initiated simultaneously with an investigation carried out by the 
Commission for Local Government Act. A committee formed by the government was 
charged with the responsibility of investigating the opportunities of transferring 
increased competences to the municipalities and counties following the establishment 
of the new municipal and county map. This investigation led to the first local 
government reform in 1970 (Strukturkommissionen, 2004, 27-28). 
The aim of the first Local Government Act in 1970 was to transfer functional 
responsibilities to local and regional governments as well as to increase their 
autonomy and discretion and to some extent also to enhance the motivation of local 
and regional politicians and bureaucrats (or in other words giving them a feeling of 
ownership) by granting them authority to collect taxes. This reform can be considered 
a strengthening of the regional level, which in practise “meant both an intended 
expansion of the scope for local decision-making and increased local autonomy 
pursuant to the removal of regulations authorizing central government agencies to 
overrule local decisions” (Christensen, 2000, 392). The municipalities and counties 
became responsible for all important welfare services such as day care for children, 
the elderly and primary education (municipalities) and psychiatric and general 
hospitals and secondary education (counties). Perhaps the most striking change with 
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the reform was that the regions were granted the responsibility to levy taxes, as 
mentioned above, to finance their expenditures and thus making them less 
dependent on central government. Prior to the 1970 system, regional governments 
had to finance their activities with partially regional income and property taxes and 
conditional grants from the central government. Accordingly, the regional 
governments were mainly financed by central government, which implied that the 
counties were not really autonomous prior to this reform. Despite that the regions 
were granted the autonomy to levy taxes in the 1970 local government reform, these 
funds were not adequate to finance the operation of the counties on their own. They 
still relied on for instance funding from the national level and also later the EU level, 
for certain policy objectives such as regional development. Despite this, the 1970 local 
government reform initiated a gradual transformation of the administrative units and 
structures of the Danish public sector towards increased decentralisation (Greve, 
2000, 393). 
The 1980s and 1990s also saw reforms of local government although these have not 
received as much attention as the one in 1970s that laid the foundation of the new 
local government map. The reforms that took place since the mid-1980s have been 
called ‘the silent local government reforms’. With these reforms, the regions were 
delegated more responsibility, some of which had been removed from the municipal 
level and transferred to the counties such as environmental planning and control, 
health security, general education for the youth, health education and special 
institutions of education and care for children with special needs (Gjerding, 2005a, 2). 
Accordingly, based on these public sector reforms, modernisation of the Danish public 
sector was a continued transformation of public administration and constitutional and 
organisational structures/forms of government and in particular reorganisation of the 
local and regional government levels. This implied new roles for the political and 
administrative actors at these levels. Although these changes to the organisational 
structure and division of responsibilities is characterised as ‘reform’, the historical 
institutionalist interpretation of such developments may rather be ones of layering 
where new rules are attached to existing ones but not replacing them. 
Since the 1980s, the reorganisation of the local and county levels in Denmark can be 
characterised as one from local ‘government’ to local ‘governance’, implying 
“structural change from one formal authoritative centre of public decision and policy-
making at the local level (‘government’) towards a multitude of more or less 
autonomous entities, public as well as private institutions, associations and actors, 
networking within their respective domains of policy-making (‘governance’)” (Hansen, 
2001, 110). A shift from the traditional vertical relationship between local, regional 
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and central levels towards more horizontal relations and interactions took place since 
the 1980s. A further involvement of municipal and regional associations in 
negotiations with the state over national legislation and regulation was also seen 
since the mid-1980s. Besides decentralisation and delegation of authority to the local 
and county levels, decentralisation also took place from the local levels to other more 
or less self-governing entities below the municipal level that worked together with 
municipal authorities. Along the same lines, Rhodes concludes that the successive 
public reforms since 1970 have sought to strengthen participation of sub-national 
actors in an already decentralised system (Rhodes, 1999, 350). 
The Constitution has granted the regional and local levels some influence over their 
own affairs; a responsibility that was gradually extended although the government 
level remained the most influential actor in public policy-making as it was responsible 
for the financial envelope. This enabled the government level to exercise power over 
the regional and local levels resulting in an asymmetrical power relationship. This is in 
accordance with historical institutionalism which argues that the institution 
necessarily generates asymmetries of power, and that this uneven relationship brings 
about power struggles among the actors within the institution regarding its objectives, 
potentially leading to different types of changes to the institution. The Constitution as 
an institution gradually changed the asymmetrical relationship between the three 
levels of government towards increased decentralisation as a result of a number of 
successive public sector and local government reforms. Although a picture emerges 
with increasing transfer of competences to the regional level, this level was not 
completely independent as it continued to interact and negotiate with central 
government about overall public finances and services, and local decisions about goal 
and economic frames had to fulfil negotiated agreements with central government. 
But as Jørgensen argues, the regional level was in a strong position: “Danish local 
government has, in a way, become a guarantee against strong power concentrations” 
(Jørgensen, 2002, 35). Arguably, part of the public sector reforms was on the one 
hand an increase in the level of decentralisation, but on the other also a strengthening 
of the centralised level in that the scope for ministerial intervention in the day-to-day 
implementation of policies was concurrently increased in the reforms, because the 
government level continued to determine the distribution of the additional state 
funds to finance regional activities besides the taxes that government itself collected. 
As a matter of fact, some kinds of power struggles were seen despite the stability of 
the Constitution (institution) and the gradual transfer of power away from the 
government, in that bottom-up developments can be traced throughout time. These 
bottom-up developments may have influenced the decision to extend the 
151 
 
competences and responsibilities of the regional and local levels, as the historical 
institutionalist approach would argue. Especially during the 1980s, bottom-up 
movements were strengthened and a shift from the traditional vertical towards more 
horizontal relations and interactions occurred. Further involvement of municipal 
associations in negotiations with the state over national legislation took place. This 
was particularly seen in some policy areas such as regional policy as the following 
section will show. 
Another picture has emerged as a result of the succeeding local government reforms 
since the 1970s, namely one in which there was a clear distinction between politics 
and administration. This implied a clear separation of the roles of elected politicians 
and public administrators where the elected politicians were responsible for politics 
and political decision-making; i.e. “the making of overall goals and objects for the 
general development of various public services and tasks of the municipality” 
(Hansen, 2001, 116). The public administrators, on the other hand, were responsible 
for administrative decision-making; i.e. “operational management and running of 
concrete service provision and tasks performance in accordance with the political 
goals of the elected councillors.” (Hansen, 2001, 116) Much of this separation 
occurred because the local government reforms brought about increased workloads 
for the regional councillors whom then encouraged a development of sector 
specialisation as well as transfer of responsibility to other actors at the regional level. 
Thus, a horizontal pattern of cooperation within and across regional and national 
policy-making developed since the early 1980s, from when, as mentioned, the 
traditional vertical relationship was challenged but not completely eliminated. 
This was the picture up till the early 2000s when a new government took office. This 
government wished to change the existing organisation of the public sector. It was 
argued that a simplification of existing practices was needed. Therefore, preparations 
for a reform of the local governance structures were initiated in 2002. Then, in 2007, a 
structural reform of the local and county level governments entered into force 
reducing the number of municipalities and counties and redistributing their 
competences accordingly. In this structure, competences were removed from the 
regional level to the municipal and state level, thereby restricting the authority of the 
regions. The core responsibility of the regions became to manage the hospital and 
psychiatric sectors and to manage and coordinate regional development. The right to 
impose taxes was removed from the regions and instead the regions were to have 
their expenses financed by block grants from the state, state activity-related subsidies, 
local basic contributions and local activity-related contributions (Thomsen and 
Nielsen, 2008, 88-93 and 97-9. This reform will be presented in more detail in the 
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following section under the heading ‘Reforming National Regional Policy’ (see p. 172) 
as this reform was also highly intertwined with a reorganisation of the organisational 
structure of regional policy-making.  
To conclude on the development of the Constitutional organisation of public policy-
making, since the birth of the Danish Constitution in 1849, the Danish organisational 
tradition was one characterised by a decentralised unitary state with a strong 
participation ethic. Gradual constitutional change and transfer of power generating 
transitions to new modes of governance occurred which was also rooted in a 
participative tradition where common solutions were preferred - often from below - 
for decades. The above illustration of the development of local and regional 
government authority since the Constitution defined the position of the local and 
regional governments in the national organisational structure in 1849 has shown that 
in the context of demographic, socio-political and economic developments, the scope 
of responsibility of local and regional governments was extended considerably. This 
led to increased independence from central government by the expansion of the 
competences to include the responsibility to manage their own affairs, to levy taxes to 
finance their own affair through reform and subsequent layering of new rules to the 
existing institution. Thus, a gradual development of decentralisation along both 
vertical and horizontal lines in public policy-making has been identified. It may be 
argued the that continuity has been the preferred solution because the specific 
structure where the local governments had their place in the organisational structure 
from its very birth has not been challenged by altered power distribution within the 
institution; rather it has been gradually extended in the succeeding public sector 
reforms. Furthermore, this development leaves no case for argument or rule 
interpretation by the involved actors. It is the confusion about the ‘rules of the game’ 
and the altered power balance that generate change in the institution. But there has 
always been consensus about that relationship. On this note, it is safe to conclude 
that the institutional development of public policy-making has been one of gradual 
change towards increased decentralisation in the public sector. 
Having drawn up a sketch of the general organisational structure in Denmark, it is 
time to turn to the more specific regional policy organisational structure that is set 
within the constitutional structure of public policy-making. In correspondence with 
the constitutional organisation of public policy-making is characterised by gradual 
development, it may also be expected that the various forms of public policies have 
undergone a similar development although each area of public policy has specific 
characteristics. In order to make such a firm conclusion, each public policy area must 
be analysed.  
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6.2 Regional Policy - a National Concern  
Expectedly, administration of Danish regional policy was also characterised by gradual 
change. Therefore, the analysis will be divided into three time periods reflecting 
different events and developments during these that are central to understand how 
they generated the gradual development. The first time period was characterised by a 
national regional policy approach where the government level was the dominant 
actor. During the course of time, however, bottom-up initiatives gathered speed in 
response to their lack of direct influence on their own regional fate. 1991 is often 
referred to as an epoch-making year as the state dominant approach to regional 
policy-making was terminated completely. Accordingly, events occurring around 1991 
are at the core of the second time period analysis in that they framed the 
organisational context of the 1990s and well into the 2000s. The previous period was 
characterised by events that lead to change and so was the middle period. The third 
time period was centred on a decision to reform the public sector including the 
regional policy-making structure. During this period, the Danish approach to regional 
policy that was established and advanced over the course of time was reformed, 
legally assigning the regions responsibility for regional policy-making. Working in 
partnership became a statutory task of all actors involved in regional policy-making. 
6.2.1 A Centralised Regional Policy Logic 
The history of Danish regional policy can be traced back a very long time ago, but the 
historical sketch here begins in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The establishment of 
the policy reflected the historical, political and economic development and the 
increased need to address regional development problems that arose due to changes 
in the economic map. As will be seen, regional convergence or divergence was at the 
centre of regional policy both in terms of its establishment in the Danish context and 
in terms of its subsequent policy objectives. Notably, the post-war regional 
development policy development reflected a perception that systematic regional 
development should be a state level responsibility (Illeris, 2010, 26). The beginning of 
this period was influenced by the post-war period where unemployment was high and 
the distribution of unemployment across the country was uneven; a fact that was also 
at the centre of the general political debate at the time. Especially in the rural areas, 
unemployment was high due to the decreasing demand for products such as peat and 
lignite that were used during the war. Thus, in 1949, a Labour Market Commission was 
established to investigate conditions in the labour market and make proposals to 
solve the problems. Where the unemployment problem had hitherto been a national 
problem, it became a regional problem. Larger areas (such as the municipalities of 
North Jutland) facing huge unemployment problems over a long period of time were 
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identified, implying that some areas had greater unemployment problems than 
others. Regional disparities were an urban-rural issue. To add to the problem, the 
large export-oriented agricultural sector witnessed a rapid mechanisation during the 
1950s which further increased the spatially concentrated unemployment problem. 
The Labour Market Commission concluded that unemployment was higher in some 
areas than in others because mobility from these areas was not high enough, leading 
the Labour Market Commission to argue that those areas with high unemployment 
rates needed an active local policy (lokaliseringspolitik) to support local businesses 
with for instance more lax conditions for loan, increase and repayment.  
The increasing unemployment problem led to the first Regional Development Act 
(Egnsudviklingslov) in 1958 (Gaardmand, 1988, 71-5, Aalbu et.al., 1999, 25 and Illeris, 
2010, 26). The objective of the Regional Development Act of 1958 was that the state 
should “support productive employment in those areas of the country that are lagging 
behind due to industrial development or that are facing special economic difficulties 
through technical and financial advice when preparing projects and when financing 
the implementation of the projects.” (translated from Gaardmand, 1988, 74-5) Thus, 
the objective of the Act was dual: to support and promote mobility (labour market 
policy) and to promote business development in areas with high unemployment (local 
industrial policy). There was recognition that regional development was not only 
concerned with industrial policy but also with the linkage and interrelationship 
between labour market policy and industrial policy in order to generate regional 
development. The Regional Development Act may then be considered the first 
institutionalisation of a Danish regional policy-making approach. The Danish regional 
policy-making institution thus framed regional development activity towards more 
even development of the country in setting policy objectives and creating 
organisational structures. 
Responsibility for these initiatives rested exclusively with the state level through the 
newly established Regional Development Council (Egnsudviklingsrådet) consisting of 
representatives from the relevant ministries and interest organisations. The Regional 
Development Council was responsible for providing technical and financial advice as 
well as submit recommendations for national support of projects that could generate 
productive employment in those areas of the country that were lagging behind 
(Halkier, 2008a, 2). Independently and concurrently, a number of regional 
development councils such as North Jutland Business Council and West Jutland 
Development Council that brought public and private actors together in the 
promotion of regional development were established as a reaction to the increased 
unemployment problems of the 1950s. To begin with, the organisational structure 
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within the Danish regional policy-making institution was dominated by the 
government level; the regional level merely played ‘unofficial’ roles outside the formal 
institution or an insignificant role inside the institution. According to historical 
institutionalism this reflected the asymmetrical distribution of powers based on the 
institutional objectives. This may potentially constitute a platform for future power 
struggles if actors within that institution do not agree with the objectives. 
The 1958 Regional Development Act marked the beginning of a new epoch in Danish 
regional policy-making and debate; it initiated a new way of thinking about regional 
development (egnsudvikling) towards a more balanced development outside the 
capital. The Regional Development Act became influential on regional development in 
Denmark until 1991 when the organisational structure for regional policy-making was 
changed. Until then, the main features of the Act remained generally the same 
although few additions were made over the course of time. The state designated a 
number of support areas in which private businesses could apply for support for 
productive investments.  
After the enactment of the Act, the economic landscape changed in the early 1960s 
because the prices of raw materials to be used in the industries were reduced which 
combined with the cheap and available labour and industrial capacity, rendered 
expansion of the industry possible. Positive economic developments and regional 
development debates in the 1960s led to the reinforcement of the 1958 Regional 
Development Act in 1962, where it was concluded that regional development should 
encompass more than industrial development: trade and services businesses were 
guaranteed loans and businesses facing conversion due to changed market conditions 
and the like were also eligible of support. Another revision took place in 1967 in which 
it was decided that decision-making competences should be transferred to the 
Regional Development Council so that its decisions were managed by a Directorate 
under the then Ministry of Trade and Industry. To carry out this task, the Regional 
Development Directorate (Egnsudviklingsdirektoratet) was established and placed in 
Silkeborg in Jutland (Gaardmand, 1988, 75-84 and Illeris, 2010, 28). These two 
revisions or reinforcements of the 1958 Act can from a historical institutionalist point 
of view be labelled ‘layering’ as the subsequent reinforcements merely added rules to 
the existing institution without turnover of the existing framework. 
Following the early Regional Development Act revisions where a gradual transfer of 
competences to the regionally based Regional Development Council in Silkeborg in 
Jutland took place, the regional political context during the 1970s and early 1980s was 
characterised by a number of bottom-up developments outside the formal institution: 
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several municipalities and counties established business councils as a response to the 
decreasing economic situation after the oil crisis in 1973-4, similar to the efforts made 
in the 1950s as a reaction to the increasing levels of unemployment. The business 
councils were engaged in supporting existing businesses and entrepreneurs in an 
attempt to counteract the negative development within their own area, outside the 
scope of national level regional development responsibility, alongside national 
initiatives to address the regional development problems (Illeris, 2010, 32). These 
developments were based on earlier experiences with public-private partnerships 
(Development Committees) that were set up to give advice to companies from 
outside in order for them to establish themselves in the region during the 1950s 
(Halkier, 1998, 17). Initially, these Committees were merely advisory and promotion-
oriented, but from the mid-1980s local and regional governments became actively 
involved in economic regional development. Because of the limitations of the counties 
to grant direct subsidies to individual companies, the regional development policies of 
the counties principally supported the stipulation of advice and infrastructure in the 
regions. Thus, counties were involved in regional development programmes rooted in 
their own internally established programmes or projects in cooperation with other 
regional actors that aimed at providing advice, training or improving general 
conditions for business within the region, but not as legally part of the Danish regional 
policy-making institution although their activities may have influenced its operation 
(employment of the policy objectives). Other measures were taken so that local 
authority was made responsible for solving the unemployment problems; local labour 
market councils were established within the counties transferring authority from the 
Ministry of Labour with similar responsibilities. Thus, external developments were 
gathering speed, challenging the existing regional policy-making institution dominated 
by central government. 
In 1985, another Act revised and reinforced the previous ones; an additional example 
of layering to the existing regional policy institution. Previous guarantee schemes 
were supplemented with loan and subsidy schemes. The role of the Regional 
Development Directorate was technically changed from that of an independent 
Council to office subordinated to the Industrial and Business Agency (Industri- og 
Handelsstyrelsen) which was a new structure bringing together a number of Agencies 
directly and indirectly concerned with regional development such as the Regional 
Development Agency (Egnsudviklingsrådet) and the Agency for Technology 
(Teknologirådet) (Lodberg, personal interview and Gaardmand, 1988, 88 and 92). This 
changed structure of bringing together different Councils related to regional 
development further signalled a national concern that regional policy was about much 
more than industrial policy, and that these different perspectives needed to be 
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brought together in order to address the problem of uneven regional development in 
Denmark. The objective of the institution was reinforced. 
This development should be seen in the light of the previous decision to establish the 
Regional Development Directorate in the first place as well as the decision to place it 
in Silkeborg. This move signalled two things: first, it signalled that a balanced regional 
development was high on the political agenda by taking the lead in moving one of ‘its 
own offices’ out of office so to speak. Second, decentralisation being an objective, the 
Regional Development Directorate would then be closer to where development was 
taking place. In other words, this can be seen as both a reorganisation of a state 
organisation attached to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (decentralisation) as well 
as an attempt to move regional development institutions closer to or into the regional 
development areas. So it was a decentralisation of competences, authority and the 
work force (Gaardmand, 1988, 97). Based on the layering logic, these developments 
clearly supported the existing regional policy institution and the relations between the 
actors within it by emphasising the position of central government but it may also be 
argued that the first steps were taken towards decentralisation in the elevation of 
regional level. This move signalled a central level recognition of the increased 
importance to listen to the needs of the regions. To some extent the voice of the 
regions was being heard by central government. 
In 1982, a new Conservative-led government came into office, which was forced to 
change its focus due to socio-economic developments towards increased public debt 
and deficit on the balance of payments. In 1986, these developments made the 
Conservative Prime Minister introduce what is known as the ‘potato diet’ 
(kartoffelkuren) where public and private spending cuts were enforced to put the 
national economy back on track. According to Brask Pedersen (personal interview), it 
was decided to stop financing specific activities of the regional development initiatives 
of the Regional Development Act in 1988 to help finance public debt, alongside 
considerable reduction in funds for regional development. Although the Act was no 
longer fully financed by the state budget, it was not terminated. According to Brask 
Pedersen, it was a matter of national policy: it was argued that at that point in time 
there was equal regional development in Denmark (the most-Western parts of Jutland 
had benefited greatly from the Regional Development Act funds over the years) so it 
was no longer necessary, nor could it be justified to finance regional development like 
this when the national budget was suffering. So at this point in time, an important 
instrument for regional development in Denmark was gradually entering into a 
process of change. The regional development logic based on equal development 
disappeared with the financial instrument for the time being. The recollection is partly 
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supported by the statistics of national policy programmes expenditure on regional 
development between 1972 and 1992 as calculated by Halkier (2001, 327): 
 
Evidently, the national funds for regional development were considerably reduced 
from 1984 to 1985 and remained on a steady level until 1988 when the funds were 
additionally reduced confirming Brask Pedersen’s recollection of events, that during 
the time of the ‘potato diet’ it was time ‘to count the pennies’. In order to have a 
clearer understanding of these events and how they consequently influenced the 
gradual process of terminating the Regional Development Act, the backgrounds to 
these statistics should be consulted. Based on the annual reports of the Regional 
Development Directorate activities of the years 1982 to 1991, it is clear that regional 
development funds were split into two objectives: one focusing on direct subsidies for 
businesses and for moving, whereas the other was in the form of loans to 
municipalities for industrial development (Industriministeriet, 1987, and Industri- og 
Handelsstyrelsen 1988). The weighing of funds for one or the other type of activity 
changed in 1985, until when loans had made up the larger part of the funds. From 
1985, considerably more funds were spent on direct subsidies compared to loans. In 
1984 for instance, the division was approximately 74 million DKK for direct subsidies 
and 185 for million DKK for loans compared to in 1985 where direct subsidies were 
funded by approximately 117 million DKK and 28 million DKK for loans 
159 
 
(Industriministeriet, 1984, 3 and Industriministeriet, 1985, 3). This change of priority 
implies that the otherwise heavy commitment of loans was diverted into direct 
subsidies, which was more cost-effective. Loans were more cost-effective compared 
to direct subsidies, so even with a reduction in the total national level expenditure; 
the net gross expenditure remained the same when the loan disbursement was 
reduced considerably. The result was more regional development per net DKK 
compared to loans. Until 1989, this was the distribution of the funds. In 1989, the 
division was fifty-fifty (Industri- og Handelsstyrelsen, 1989, 4). These statistics support 
the claim of Brask Pedersen in that it may be argued that there was a clear indication 
of change in focus in regional policy-making during the years of the ‘potato diet’, from 
one where businesses and municipalities were offered considerable amounts of funds 
for loan to their development towards a significant cut-down of these loans in 1985 
from 185 million DKK to 28 million. Moreover, it supports Brask Pedersen’s argument 
that it was not sustainable to fund regional development with loans when the state 
budget itself had overspent (lent too much money itself, so to speak).  
A further piece of evidence which points towards a gradual phase out of the Regional 
Development Act before its actual termination in 1991, was that in the Finance Bills, 
according to priorities on  regional development, the direct subsidies supporting the 
construction and expansion of businesses (direct injections into the veins of 
businesses) were removed from the budget in 1987 compared to the previous years’ 
implying a change of future focus of the policy altogether (Finansministeriet, 1986 §17 
and Finansministeriet, 1987 §17). Arguably, the direct funding for business was 
removed, as the objective with EC funding in Denmark during this period had the 
same objective. When Greenland withdrew from the EC, these funds became 
reallocated to the remaining parts of Denmark. Therefore, when receiving additional 
EC funds for the same objective, the Danish government arguably prioritised to cut 
back the direct funding as this area was being covered by the EC funds instead. 
Accordingly, this can be considered a strategic manoeuvre by the Danish government 
to reduce its spending without compromising the overall regional development. 
Moreover, when analysing the ‘discourse’ in the Finance Bills of 1987 
(Finansministeriet, 1987) and 1988 (Finansministeriet, 1988) the overall frame of 
activities changes from being ‘business economics’ (erhvervsøkonomiske 
foranstaltninger) in 1987 to being ‘industrial development’ (erhvervsfremme) in 1988 
which is another indication of a gradual development in a process towards a change in 
focus. It should remembered that this year was the first year that EC funds featured 
on the national budget for regional development, which may have influenced this 
change of rhetoric. 
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Simultaneous with these developments, an EU regional policy was in the pipeline. 
Whether this development was considered in the national decision to close down 
nationally financed development initiatives is difficult to say. This point will be 
discussed more detailed in the next chapter on the interaction and coordination 
between Danish and EU regional policy-making. At least it prompted the regional and 
local actors to think differently about regional development; that they needed to work 
more closely together with each other across government levels and the public-
private divide in order to ensure regional development with a minimum of national 
level support. These developments may be characterised as conversion as formally 
the rules remained the same (i.e. the Regional Development Act was not abolished), 
but the rules were interpreted in new ways, both by central government when 
reducing funds for regional development, and by the regional level in their working 
closer together leading to increased establishment of regional level competences to 
become increasingly involved in the otherwise state dominated regional policy-
making institution.  
Ever since its introduction, administering regional policy was a central level 
responsibility despite bottom-up attempts to gain influence on regional development. 
Albeit none of the continuous challengers have had enough momentum to serious 
challenge and erode the centrally dominated regional policy-making. Bottom-up 
attempts to have greater influence on their own regional destiny were partly spurred 
from experiences from the influential local governments as well as a reaction to 
economic developments. The municipalities within the regional development areas 
expanded their activities and set up a number of business councils and business 
offices aiming at attracting regional development funds to the municipalities. 
Independent business councils and offices were set up outside the regional 
development areas. Though these developments did not really alter the power 
relations among the government levels in regional policy-making until 1991, they 
should not be ignored as they were developments that later became important to the 
regional political organisational structure. The seeds had been sown for potential 
encounter between the centrally dominated regional policy structure and parallel 
‘underground’ bottom-up developments. Evidently, the regional policy structure until 
1991 was characterised by layering and conversion emphasising the role of the state 
level compared to the sub-national actors. The overall Danish organisational structure 
was characterised by gradual change, and so was the regional policy structure until 
1991. 
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6.2.2 Terminating the Centralised Regional Policy Logic 
Based on the above analysis, phasing out nationally financed business support under 
the equal regional development logic was the first in a sequence of developments 
leading to the termination of the Regional Development Act in 1991. This implies that 
the conversion that took place during the mid-to late 1980s was gradually extended to 
a reform of the existing institution. As mentioned above, during the time of the 
‘potato diet’, actors at the regional and local levels were forced to think differently 
than hitherto. This resulted in new approaches to regional development in the forms 
of programmes that incorporated projects with a longer duration under a common 
theme or approach compared to the previous individual project applications, which 
resulted in uncoordinated developments in each of the sectors of initiatives and 
incoherent development. Thus, the programme approach was based on bottom-up 
reactions to the limited access to funding for individual projects, other socio-economic 
events at the time and similar trends across Europe. Especially regions like North 
Jutland and Lolland were hit hard during this time due to closure of shipyards 
resulting in increased unemployment rates that had to be brought down.  
Then, in 1991, the Regional Development Act was terminated and the focus on 
national regional policy changed as a result of the gradual developments analysed 
above: central government incentive schemes were terminated and the right of 
municipalities and counties to manage the business promoting policy which they had 
already been engaged in, was legalised (Illeris, 2010, 52). The termination of the 
Regional Development Act was initiated by central government as a consequence of 
its previous manoeuvre and prioritising as well as pressure from other actors within 
the regional policy-making institution. Along with the termination of central 
government exclusive responsibility of regional decision-making, the objective of 
regional policy had also gradually changed: the aim became to improve the 
competitiveness of Danish companies rather than the region as a whole implying that 
all regions would benefit and not just the ones lagging behind although there was still 
a small part of regional policy that remained targeted at the weakest regions co-
funded by the multi-annual programme approach of the EU Structural Funds. From 
then on this became a consensual approach to regional development (Halkier, 2008a, 
3). Hence, the reform of the regional policy-making institution was both concerned 
with change of regional policy-making objectives and organisational structures and 
relations. Interpreted from a historical institutionalist perspective, the 1991 
termination of the Regional Development Act was a type of reform that was 
mandated by government based on political compromises and manoeuvres in difficult 
economic times analysed above; political influence from the availability of additional 
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funds from the EC; and the bottom-up movements during the 1980s. Accordingly, the 
1991 termination of the Regional Development Act was a process that had gradually 
been under way since the mid-1980s, and maybe even rooted in the early bottom-up 
developments during the 1950s. 
From 1991, Danish regional policy became more complex than ever before. The 
position of the regions in the regional policy structure was elevated as a consequence 
of the 1991 termination of national dominance including them in the policy process in 
such a way that they were capable of designing programmes, setting up institutions 
and shaping individual projects. Before they were excluded from the policy process 
altogether and were utilised as executers of the national policy objectives. Thus, a 
scenario developed in which a particular Danish model of bottom-up regional policy 
became present. Especially since the early 1990s, focus has been on public-private 
partnerships that involve a large number of relatively small organisations, including 
both regional and local government organisations, a host of quangos and a wide range 
of public-private partnerships, which arguably was based on the experiences which 
the counties and municipalities made when working together with private actors 
during the 1980s (and even back to the 1950) and were forced to think differently 
about regional development during the ‘potato diet’ (Halkier, 2001, 332 and Damborg 
and Halkier, 1998, 91).  
Likewise, the role of the state changed following the termination of the Regional 
Development Act. Before 1991, regional policy-making was a state level responsibility 
implying that decisions on area designation and individual project applications were 
taken exclusively by central government (represented by the Regional Development 
Directorate in Silkeborg) with only little input from the regional actors; they were 
merely executers of the policy. After 1991, regional policy-making came to be a 
shared responsibility between three tiers of government: the EU level, central 
government and regional authorities. The regional office in Silkeborg, subordinated to 
the Industrial and Business Agency (Industri- og Handelsstyrelsen), changed its name 
to the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry (DATI) (Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen) 
symbolising the change of focus from direct support for businesses towards a more 
integrated approach towards economic industrial development policies 
(erhvervsfremme), which was concerned with promoting the general framework 
conditions (education institutions, research, innovation, etc.) for businesses as well as 
it provided the DATI with increased competences in national regional policy-making 
(Lodberg, personal interview).  
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The most important general responsibility of central government was to ensure 
accessibility to business and technological services: the deconcentrated, but not 
preferential, distribution of national business and technological services was provided 
by an existing network of regionally based Technology Information Centres (TICs). 
Each TIC consisted of appointees from business organisations and to some extent also 
the trade unions. They were funded by central government and co-funded by regional 
actors. This measure was available to all businesses across the regions, also businesses 
in weaker regions. The TICs focused more on softer forms of initiatives such as advice 
and networking contrary to the direct financial support of the businesses. In addition, 
the national level became responsible for so-called ‘fire-fighting’ when the 
‘Notification Pool’ was established in 1996 as an attempt to address potential urgent 
problems; i.e. temporary advisory assistance to areas threatened by substantial 
industrial closures. The fund was administered by DATI and the National Labour 
Market Authority. Local Employment Services and the regional TICs could apply for 
funding from the Notification Pool (Halkier, 2001, 328 and Halkier and Flockhart, 
2002, 47-8).  
Thus, by introducing the new approach to regional policy-making, central government 
generally discarded its role as a redistributor of private business activity between the 
regions, and instead it adopted a less influential role as an information 
provider/‘supervisor’ working in some kind of partnerships with regional, sub-
regional, private and social partners. Despite an apparent retraction of the state in 
regional policy-making and a consequent elevation of sub-national actors along the 
increased influence of the EU level, the role of the government should not be 
underestimated. According to Halkier, the role of the state was strengthened by the 
end of the 1990s because it became “more active regarding the increasingly detailed 
organisation of regional business development, especially based on the wish to 
promote the coordination of the multiple activities that have surfaced in part within 
the individual region and in part across existing administrative boundaries through 
cross-regional initiatives, [etc.]” (translated from Halkier, 2008a, 5). 
Prior to 1991, the overall approach to regional development policy was one 
characterised by hierarchy with the state level dictating events, whereas after 1991 
(or perhaps rather 1988 with the implementation of EC regional policy into the 
national context) the relationship was one characterised by network interaction. This 
new sharing of responsibilities will be discussed to greater extent below in relation to 
the interaction between EU and Danish regional policy-making. But for now it is 
relevant to sum up the immediate changes in the following table: 
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Table 6.1: Danish Regional Policy Developments  
Dimensions 
Level 
Traditional (till the late 
1980s) 
New (from the early 1990s) 
European Strategy Inter-regional 
redistribution 
Inter-regional 
redistribution 
Resources Co-fund national 
programmes 
Regulate national 
subsidies 
Spatial discrimination 
Significant source of 
finance 
National Strategy Inter-regional 
redistribution 
Regional competitiveness 
Resources Spatial discrimination 
Control key policy 
resources 
Control own programme 
resources 
Regulate EU/regional 
programmes 
Co-fund European 
programmes 
Regional Strategy Active investment to 
locality 
Regional Competitiveness 
Resources Control own 
programme resources 
Co-fund European 
programmes 
Crucial informational and 
organisational resources 
Source: replicated from Danish Technological Institute, 2002, 9 
Clearly, a new more complex pattern of regional policy-making transpired after the 
change in organisational division of responsibilities in regional policy-making. 
According to Halkier and Flockhart (2002, 42-3), the organisational structure after 
1991 was significantly different from the one before 1991 in that the number of actors 
influencing the process was increased, thereby removing the exclusive right of the 
central government to manage regional policy. A structure that resembles a multi-
level network including public actors at all levels of government as well as private 
actors was established, which was able to influence the various aspects and stages of 
the process. 
To support this development, the Local Government Development Act 
(Kommunefremmeloven) was put into force in 1992, where it was legalised which 
areas of competences the municipalities and counties were to have in the new 
governance structures. The 1992 Act designated collective business services within the 
region as a field in which sub-national actors could be involved (Lov 383, 20.5.92). As 
such, the role of the regional level in regional policy has not always been legally clear 
until after the reform of national regional policy in 1991 and the following 
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Government Act in 1992. Thus, for the first time, sub-national development initiatives 
were legalised. Though the Act legalised the competences of the municipalities and 
counties, these competences were voluntary; an important point in the analysis of the 
inclusion and process aspects of partnerships, because, opposed to the EU system of 
regional policy, Danish national regional policy-making was based on voluntary 
participation of actors (Lodberg, personal interview). Hereafter, it was specified that 
besides what the regional and local levels were not allowed to do, namely to grant 
financial assistance to individual companies, their functions were to be: to engage in 
‘collective business services’, that is, measures that target all or a group of companies 
within an area (Aalbu, Hallin, Mariussen, 1999, 26-7). Thus, having their role in 
regional development legally defined, the regional level had the opportunity to get 
increasingly involved in the development of their own ‘neighbourhood’. The 1992 Act 
may be considered as layering on top of the existing institution that was reformed in 
1991, where the new Act merely emphasised the institutional organisation that the 
1991 reform established; in other words it may be regarded as an additional layer to 
the existing institution. 
As mentioned above, the early 1990s saw an increase in bottom-up initiatives, which 
were supported by the 1992 Government Act on regional policy activity where 
regional authorities were increasingly allowed to become participants in regional 
development (Halkier, 2001, 332). Despite this, not all counties committed equally to 
regional development and some committed themselves earlier than others. It was 
seen that some counties started their involvement in regional development policy in 
regional planning and/or training programmes for the unemployed, which gradually 
developed into policy initiatives directed at private businesses in the region. It may be 
argued that the availability of EU funds in the late 1980s further encouraged counties 
to increase their involvement in regional development; a point that is further 
discussed in the section on the coordination of the Danish and EU regional policy-
making structures. 
One of the consequences of the new forms of governance in regional policy-making 
was that the regions were afforded with increased competences on regional policy 
implementation and, consequently, some degree of self-management. From a 
national perspective there was a risk that the regional administration would not live 
up to its regional policy responsibilities and instead do as it pleased. Thus, until the 
mid-1990s the DATI sought to ensure its own involvement in regional policy by 
appointing a DATI representative as a member of the regional Executive Committee 
that made the decisions regarding support for projects. Through its presence in the 
Executive Committees, the national level was able to supervise that things were done 
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correctly. The state did not completely give up its control with the regions as it 
remained part of day-to-day management and decision-making, despite that it had 
become a regional level responsibility after 1991, where the division of labour 
reflected a clearer vertical division of functions between the different levels. Over the 
years, this structure caused some tensions between the regional actors and the DATI 
representative, resulting in a re-evaluation of the relationship. The question is 
whether the practical employment of the institutional reform of the Regional 
Development Act in terms of organisational reorganisation undermines the conclusion 
reached above, where it was argued that terminating the Regional Policy Act 
constituted a reform; obviously, one thing is institutional intentions another is 
practical employment. As such, this structure can be characterised as a re-
interpretation of the institutional structure of the Regional Development Act, but 
apparently this only took place on a trial basis, since after a few years practise, it was 
considered unnecessary to continue to carry out this concealed supervision as the 
regional administrations appeared to be able to live up to their responsibility (Lodberg 
and Gregersen, personal interviews). Thus, from this time, regional policy-making in 
Denmark became essentially a regional level responsibility with the national level 
acting as a coordinator via the Ministry for Trade and Industry and Coordination in the 
strictly Danish regional policy-making context. Accordingly, it was not until this point 
in time that Danish regional policy-making was truly characterised by multi-level 
governance. 
Clearly, 1991 was a turning point in the development of the Danish regional policy-
making institution. Apparently, overnight the centrally dominated system of regional 
policy government was reformed into a system characterised by multi-level 
governance with the three (four) levels of government influencing regional policy-
making equally – or at least according to some functional division of responsibilities. It 
appears that an external shock occurred when the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds suddenly made additional EC Funds available for regional development in 
Denmark with the conditional requirement of decentralisation and new forms of 
governance. However, another reading of these events is that a gradual development 
was spurred by a number of factors that had been smouldering for some time within 
and external to the system: first of all, the externally generated financial crisis of the 
1980s, and the ‘potato diet’ that was implemented as the financial and political 
solution to the problem initiated a snowballing gradual process of change. 
Subsequently, a decision to stop financing significant parts of the Regional 
Development Act (i.e. direct business investments) as well as gradually phasing out of 
funds for the Regional Development Act was made. This, in turn, lead actors at the 
regional and local levels to mobilise as a reaction to both the financial crisis and the 
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increased unemployment that this brought about, and the fact that they were forced 
to think differently without the funds for their development. Finally, the Local 
Government Act was terminated as a next step in that process. Thelen and Mahoney 
explains in their most recent version of historical institutionalism: the creation of 
institutions is a dynamic process where institutions represent compromises among 
the respective actors, which creates an environment in which not all actors are 
satisfied with the end result which in turn leaves the institution vulnerable to shifts. 
Accordingly, change and stability are closely linked. Those who benefit from the 
existing set up may be interested in continuity whereas those with diverging interests 
favour change. The effort to maintain the institution is an on-going mobilisation of 
support for the institution. Thus, the centrally dominated institution was challenged 
by gradually developing internal and external movements and events thereby 
overturning its foundation. The power balance shifted towards a more favourable 
position of the regional and local levels. The government level went from being 
predominantly a provider of financial subsidies to primarily acting as a regulator of 
regional and local initiatives. A new foundation was built both in terms of domains 
and aims.  
In 1993, a new Social Democratic government came into office and further priorities 
for regional development in Denmark were put on the agenda. One of the first steps 
was to establish a new Ministry, the Ministry for Trade and Industry and Coordination 
with Mimi Jakobsen as the overall responsible Minister of coordinating different policy 
areas that were relevant in regional policy. Thus, the new Minister was following the 
path already laid down with an increased focus on coordinating all policy areas 
relevant to and with influence on regional policy. However, the means to achieve that 
end were new implying conversion of the existing institution. In this Ministry, Jørgen 
Rosted was then employed as a centrally positioned civil servant in Danish regional 
policy; the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. According to 
Lodberg (personal interview), Rosted had a vision of creating an independent Danish 
regional policy without considering the parallel EU developments in regional policy-
making. These initiatives marked the beginning of a new approach to thinking about 
regional policy in Denmark; it represented a paradigm shift. The termination of the 
Regional Development Act, its focus on direct support for businesses and the exclusive 
responsibility of the government level over regional policy initiated this paradigm 
shift. The Ministry of Trade and Industry and Coordination and Rosted only put words 
into action and attempted to bring together the different policy areas that had 
influenced regional policy into a coordinated approach involving actors at sub-national 
levels on par with government level actors. To some extent Danish regional policy-
making was based on consensus that it was important to coordinate relevant policy 
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areas to regional policy, and that an increased range of actors needed to be involved 
in its implementation reflecting the changed functional division of responsibilities 
between the different levels of government. The approach to ensure such objectives, 
notably, was completely new, according to Lodberg (personal interview). 
One of the visions that Rosted had was that the government civil servants in the 
Silkeborg and Copenhagen offices should take a more proactive approach and get 
more in touch with what was going on at the local and regional levels in order to be 
better able to provide the best possible framework conditions for regional 
development. It was argued that it was important to have a precise diagnosis of a 
given problem before it could be addressed. The diagnosis was best made with a 
finger on the local pulse, also by those who were not directly situated in the areas. 
While having a strong regional focus, it was also recognised that it was crucial to 
coordinate these regional initiatives under a common national umbrella of regional 
policy-making. The diagnosis was that many uncoordinated developments in each of 
the sectors could be identified based on previous approaches under the Regional 
Development Act, and that there was a need to gather actors both vertically and 
horizontally in a common approach. Suggestions to involve a number of actors were 
made such as the employers’ organisations, trade unions, the relevant business 
organisations, education institutions as well as regional and local actors. It should be 
noticed that involving these actors should take place based on voluntary participation 
and bottom-up initiatives; it was crucial to bring the relevant actors into play. In 
practise, this implied that if for instance a county mayor chose not to invite all of the 
above actors, the national level did not interfere and force through participation. This 
was what local democracy was all about (Lodberg, personal interview). It may be 
argued that a national approach to partnership or networks was articulated and 
implemented for the first time based on previous experiences of actor involvement at 
regional and local levels in regional policy implementation and bottom-up 
developments throughout time. 
In continuation of these developments, the Danish government published the first 
‘The State of the Danish Regions’ (Regionalpolitisk Redegørelse) in 1995, an annual 
report which aimed to propose strategies to improve regional conditions for 
businesses and to suggest new initiatives to coordinate regional development policy 
(i.e. business policy and labour market policy) between the municipalities, the regions, 
the state and the EU levels. The recommendations of the report reflected the visions 
of Rosted regarding the coordination of the policies and involving subnational actors. 
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The report suggested changed roles for the actors in regional development and 
ensuring a more efficient dialogue between these actors in regional development so 
that the activities of the respective actors at the different levels were coordinated 
having a common aim. According to the report, regional policy was a broad policy area 
that needed coordination and simplification in order to be more efficient in achieving 
its overall aim: the growth opportunities of the individual regions. The report 
concluded that it was important to create a common organisational focal point that 
involved both the municipalities, counties and the state together – a type of 
organisation that may be referred to as network or partnership (Erhvervsministeriet, 
1995, 7-10). 
The 1995 report marked the beginning of annual reports that are used for taking stock 
of past experiences and suggestions for further action in regional development within 
the country. It may be argued that with this initiative, regional development and 
regional policy definitely became a central policy area in the national political context 
with particular attention to its influence on national and regional development. It may 
also be argued that with the intention to systematically reflect on regional 
developments, the possibilities for change and adaptation within the policy areas and 
the administration of them grew reflecting a national objective to adjust and react to 
changing conditions in society.  
Towards the end of the 1990s, more concrete initiatives towards implementing the 
visions of the 1995 report on ‘The State of the Danish Regions’ were launched. Three 
large industrial political partnerships between the Ministries and the regional level 
shaped national regional policy-making: the first initiative was based on a report on 
the state of the Capital in terms of regional development. This was materialised into a 
partnership between all relevant Ministries and counties within the Capital focusing 
on how Copenhagen should develop in the future. Based on this, a number of 
industrial political initiatives were launched. Following this initiative, it was suggested 
to create a similar partnership in Jutland and Funen as well as other regions of the 
country. This partnership was referred to as the Jutlandic-Funen business cooperation 
(det jysk-fynske erhvervssamarbejde) between the counties and municipalities of 
Jutland and Funen and the relevant Ministries. These partnerships were all based on 
the logic of Rosted stipulating that the national level (Ministries) must be brought to 
the regional level in order to secure their finger on the pulse. Many of the focus areas 
were attached to a variety of Ministries, and so the challenge was to bring these 
together and move them into the regions in preparation for supporting industrial 
development. It was argued that there would be more accuracy of the national 
initiatives if those responsible for its implementation were present at the local and 
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regional levels where implementation took place. This relationship worked both ways 
in that the regional and local levels were moved closer to the decision-making 
national level. Thus, there was a close dialogue between the national, regional and 
local levels in these initiatives.  
The organisational structure established for this cooperation was based on a steering 
committee including representatives of the counties, municipalities, the social 
partners, education institutions and the Ministries. The work of the steering 
committee resulted in two products: a report that dealt with a diagnosis of what 
Jutland-Funen should focus on in the future and an action plan based on the diagnosis 
with eight focus areas. On an operative level, eight working groups mirroring the 
contents of the eight focus areas were established to generate concrete proposals as 
how to operationalize these plans, consisting of representatives of municipalities, 
counties, education institutions, etc. depending on the focus area. This offers a 
specific example of a Danish approach to partnership that differed from that of the 
EU. It differed in that the actors that were present in the Danish partnership did not 
represent any political or other interests; they were part of the partnership because 
they wanted to make an effort to establish such a large initiative. Perhaps the most 
conspicuous difference was that before entering into this cooperation none of the 
involved actors were guaranteed any funds to support their ideas in the end. But as it 
turned out, all ideas were implemented and supported by the different Ministries. The 
entire process can be considered an experiment into a partnering process that was 
aiming at bringing the state and regional levels closer together. The key actors were 
the counties and municipalities, but in the operative part of the process all were equal 
(Lodberg, personal interview). 
Like the previous period was characterised by gradual change in the form of layering 
and conversion, so has the decade of the 1990s been characterised by gradual change 
leading to the changed role for the state and regional levels in regional policy-making 
along with the objectives of the Regional Development Act. On the face of it, it might 
appear that a dramatic change to the institution took place as discussed, but based on 
the gradual bottom-up developments of the 1980s and the political effects of the 
‘potato diet’, a gradual movement towards increased influence of the regional level 
took place. Historical institutionalism describes these gradual developments as either 
reform or layering which were specific types of gradual change. It may on the one 
hand be characterised as reform as the change to the existing institution has explicitly 
been mandated by government. Only governments are in a position to terminate acts 
and replace them with alternatives. On the other hand, a nuanced reading is that the 
type of change that took place around the 1991 termination of the Regional 
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Development Act was layering, when new rules were attached to the existing ones 
not replacing the institution. In cases where the logic of the institution was altered as 
a result of the attachment substantial change may occur. Layering often happens 
when defenders of the status quo (such as the member states) may prevent a 
complete turnover of the institution but not the introduction of amendments and 
modifications. In the case of the termination of the Regional Development Act, it 
might appear that substantial change occurred as the governance organisation 
overnight developed from being dominated by the state level to a multi-level 
governance organisation. The fact is, however, that the post-1991 institution did have 
different characteristics, though they were not completely new. The bottom-up 
developments during the 1980s and the phasing out of the financial support for the 
Regional Development Act point in the direction of gradual change towards an 
alternative institutional organisation with changed roles and responsibilities for the 
involved actors. Thus, layering took place over some years leading to that end result. 
6.2.3 Reforming National Regional Policy  
In 2001, an election replaced the previous Social Democratic led Government with a 
Liberal one led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This marked a turn in national policy-
making organisation but not so much in regional policy-making. With the new 
government, a number of Ministries changed name and function, such as the previous 
Ministry of Housing was merged with the Ministry of Business Affairs which led to the 
DATI changing its name equally to the National Agency for Enterprise and Housing 
(NAEH) in 2002. The path already trodden in terms of policy objectives continued to 
be the preferred direction and it became even more focused. The newly appointed 
Minister of Economic and Business Affairs, Bendt Bendtsen, set up nine regional 
growth coalitions (vækstsamarbejder) that basically reflected the Danish peripheral 
areas that were already assisted by the EU Structural Funds. From a national point of 
view, it was considered important to offer the specific peripheral areas additional 
funding for their development in that the government wished to put additional focus 
on the peripheral areas of Denmark. This further strengthened the conclusion that 
regional policy and the national partnership philosophy was based on consensus 
(Lodberg, personal interview). 
This consensus-based approach of partnership or networks was also evident in a 
regional development policy report published by the Danish government in 2001, 
which sought to establish the basis upon which future Danish regional development 
policy should be carried out: first of all it outlined how different levels of government 
had different responsibilities and resources available, and from this it was concluded 
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that all these different tiers of government were important pieces of the regional 
development puzzle in Denmark. Furthermore, it was claimed that “industrial policy 
success within the individual regions requires not only resources and political means. 
To a great extent it requires initiative, leadership, organisation and cooperation. 
When these factors are present, one can speak of partnership” (translated from 
Regeringen, 2001, 44). The Danish government defined the necessary conditions for a 
successful regional development policy: partnership. Accordingly, it was evident that 
partnership and consequent successful regional economic development was placed 
high on the national agenda. It was further distinguished which actors and conditions 
should be present in the partnerships:  
 Public and private actors 
 Districts, counties and ministries 
 Attention and commitment among the key decision makers 
 Agreement among the partners concerning a long-term and ambitious 
agenda for regional development 
 Regional anchoring and ownership of regional development 
These propositions were based on past experiences, where partnerships proved to be 
a condition for successful regional development (Regeringen, 2001, 44 and 59) and 
further elaborated in the individual regional programmes, where each region 
presented and explained its strategies in order to obtain the overall national goals for 
regional development. Inspired by and based on international experiences with 
partnership, the Danish government guaranteed that it would look into the 
possibilities of improving the existing partnership and extend them further in the 
future (Regeringen, 2001, 57-8). Thus, the organisational structure of Danish regional 
policy-making was emphasised and continued.  
Moreover, the 2000s was a decade that saw a comprehensive reform of the regional 
and local governments in terms of geography, competences, governance structures 
and partnership. In 2002, the Liberal government formed the Commission on 
Administrative Reform (Strukturkommissionen), which was assigned to analyse and 
suggest an alternative approach to the division of tasks between the state, regional 
and municipal levels of government. The idea was that “the existing division of labour 
across the three-tier system of government had become obsolete in terms of cost 
effectiveness and the degree of professionalism in public administration. 
Subsequently, larger units of sub national government were needed.” (Gjerding, 
2005a, 4 and Illeris, 2010, 54) At the same time, this reform was also about two other 
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improvements: first it was concerned with how to make the hospital sector function 
more cost effectively in terms of organisation and division of labour, a responsibility 
that had rested with the counties. Second, it was concerned with the objectives of the 
above-mentioned regional development policy report, where it basically was argued 
that compared to international standards, disparities between the Danish regions 
were insignificant and that a future regional policy should only focus on the peripheral 
areas within the regions rather than the regions themselves, which reflected the fact 
that differences in wealth between especially the Capital city area and other regions 
in Denmark still existed (Gjerding, 2005a, 4-5 and Halkier, 2007, 1). The objective of 
the Danish government to target support to regions that were facing difficulties that 
they could not themselves solve to be competitive in national and international 
contexts was once more confirmed in the 2003 annual report (Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2003, 2). It seems that this objective was and continued to be 
the foundation of Danish regional policy-making since 1991 emphasising the 
development of the institution. It was further argued that regions should increasingly 
have better conditions for the implementation of this objective so that they were 
ensured a stronger role in regional policy-making. Concurrently with national regional 
condition changes and the international environment changes, the focus of national 
regional policy also changed increasing the development of the whole region, 
improving the conditions for the businesses in it and not just particular individual 
companies. 
All of these analyses pointed in the direction of a fewer regions/counties and 
municipalities and a changed division of responsibilities between them. The 
Commission suggested six potential models to pursue from these analyses, and 
subsequent political negotiations in the Danish Parliament resulted in a narrow 
agreement between the government parties. The opposition feared that the set-up 
would be too centralised and would not support the preferred model of the 
government (Gjerding, 2005a, 6). 
The result of the reform was that the local government map changed from one which 
presented 275 municipalities and 14 counties to one where 98 municipalities and 5 
regions now operate. This reduction in number forced municipalities and counties to 
unite depending on their population size, which in some instances created tensions 
and difficulties of finding a shared path. They were forced to find new ways of working 
together by merging their respective organisational traditions (Halkier, 2008b, 1 and 
Illeris, 2010, 54). The regions are not just amalgamations of the old counties; they are 
much more than that as is presented below. 
174 
 
Regarding the regional development aspect of the reform, a Business Development 
Act (Lov om erhvervsfremme) was passed by government on June 16
th
 2005 replacing 
the 1992 Local Government Act with the aim to strengthen the development of 
Danish industry across the country. In a sense, this Act may be interpreted as a reform 
of the existing system, but a more nuanced reading is that, rather, it is a type of 
layering to the existing institution in that, generally, the rules remained the same in 
terms of the objective of the regional policy-making institution: the aim was to ensure 
development in all regions and not just the backward ones. The regional approach 
should reflect the regions’ individual challenges and possibilities although some 
(peripheral) regions will be given preferential treatment (Illeris, 2010, 56). The overall 
aim was to promote five strategies: 
1. To adjust and develop the framework conditions for business growth, 
international cooperation and international trade 
2. To promote the adjustment of the industrial structure regarding competition, 
environmental issues and the general development of society 
3. To support regional level industrial growth and employment  
4. To strengthen the cooperation between public authorities in industrial policy 
5. To develop cooperation between government and private business on 
industrial adjustments 
The above focus areas of the Business Development Act, and accordingly future 
regional policy-making, mirrored the initiatives and logic that had been inherent in the 
way of doing regional policy since the early 1990s. Thus, it was an extension of 
previous practices although cooperation between private and public actors was 
emphasised stronger here; it offered a stronger role for private actors compared to 
previously. Like before, it was essential for prosperous regional development that the 
key actors (individuals and organisations) in regional policy are involved in the process 
(Gjerding, 2005b, 2).  
To support this logic, a Danish partnership approach was established by law and 
materialised in the statutory Growth Fora (Vækstfora) to develop regional 
development strategies and action plans focusing particularly on six priority areas: 
innovation, ICT, entrepreneurship, human resources, tourism and development of 
peripheral areas that was to function as input to the elected regional councils 
regarding development measures. The Growth Fora was to recommend projects for 
support of the Structural Funds to the NAEH. One Growth Forum was to be placed 
within each of the newly established regions as well as one at the national level. This 
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became the scenario in all regions except for the Capital area which after the reform 
includes the remote island of Bornholm, a previously independent county, thus, 
instead two Growth Fora were to be set up (one for the Capital area and one for 
Bornholm). The Growth Fora were to represent actors at regional and local levels, the 
NAEH representing the national level, as well as private actors such as the trade 
unions, employers’ organisations, education institutions and the corporate world 
among others. This point in the direction of a reform of the regional-policy institution, 
in that previously regional policy-making at the regional level was a voluntary task, but 
after the enactment of the 2005 Business Development Act, regional policy-making 
became a statutory task of all regions. This structure involves closer statutory 
relations between the three tiers of government. In fact, the Growth Fora and the 
government signed a ‘partnership agreement’ regarding their cooperation in regional 
policy-making, indicating that the regional level is an equal partner with the national 
level. The responsibility for regional policy continues to reside with the Ministry of 
Economics and Business Affairs, but the statutory responsibility of regional policy now 
rests with the regions (a responsibility that was previously a voluntary undertaking), 
according to the Business Development Act. Thus, the Business Development Act did 
not alter the organisational set-up for regional policy-making in Denmark 
considerably, it merely legalised it. The intention was to create a more simple 
organisational structure for implementing regional policy in order to avoid too 
complex processes when involving a broad spectrum of actors. Likewise, it was the 
intention to secure that partnership is present in all regions including those where 
regional policy had only been an insignificant concern. Temporary Growth Fora were 
set up and began to operate by 2005 representing a transition period between the old 
system and the new when the ‘real’ Growth Fora entered into force by 1
st
 January 
2007 (Gjerding, 2005b, 3, Halkier, 2008b, 1, Halkier, 2007, 3-5 and Illeris, 2010, 54-6). 
The Business Development Act presented the first time ever that Danish politicians 
legally employed the concept of partnership when describing the preferred way of 
working together (Lodberg, personal interview). It may be argued that partnership 
had been present in national regional policy-making for decades, but with the 
Business Development Act it was legalised. It had been a specific national way of 
working together that reflected the partnership logic, but seen from a Danish point of 
view it was instead referred to as consensus regarding how to make regional policy 
based on voluntariness rather than coercion. Partnership in this new model echoes 
both the national voluntary way of working together, as well as the partnership model 
presented by the EU partnership principle based to some extent on coercion. The 
most conspicuous difference between either two and the new model is that “this 
model is obligatory in all regions, including the more economic prosperous regions, 
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and that the municipalities are allowed an important role within both financing and 
implementation of regional business development” (translated from Halkier, 2008a, 
5). 
An additional change related to the one of working in partnership is that this new 
organisational structure integrated local, regional, national and EU economic 
development activities into a single coordinated and programme-based structure that 
reflects the EU model of Structural Funds programming. Previously, national and EU 
programmes, in particular the latter, ran parallel without much coordination such as 
the Jutlandic-Funen business cooperation and the parallel Objective 2 programme. 
This may have been the case because not all parts of the regions were eligible of 
Objective 2 funding despite the need to support those areas additionally from a 
national or regional point of view. So after 2007, a legal coordination between the two 
approaches took place. 
Generally, the 2000s witnessed a gradual development of the path laid down in 
previous years especially concerning the objective of the policy, but also regarding the 
organisation of policy-making that was placed within a new local government 
organisation. The 2005 Business Development Act can be characterised as layering to 
the existing regional policy institution, in that the voluntary character of cooperation 
in regional policy-making was made statutory as an addition to the existing institution. 
The most conspicuous difference is that regional policy-making became a statutory 
responsibility of the regions compared to the voluntary character that it had before. 
Working in networks or partnerships was emphasised pointing towards the conclusion 
of a gradual development towards new, statutory forms of governance involving both 
vertical and horizontal actors in regional policy-making. 
6.3 A Concluding Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
The above analysis of the development of the Constitutional and regional policy-
making contexts has repeatedly emphasised the gradual developments that took 
place herein. This conclusion is reached based on a number of historical 
institutionalist arguments explaining gradual development. 
An interpretation of the development of Danish regional policy through the lens of 
historical institutionalism points in a direction of a policy that has a long tradition of 
submission to centrally management due to its financial objective (traditionally a 
national prerogative). Eventually, it was transformed into a system of multi-level 
governance where actors at all levels of government as well as horizontal actors were 
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influential in the Danish regional policy-making institution. Despite this apparently 
dramatic transformation, the general approach in Danish regional policy-making was 
one characterised by gradual change in many respects. The analysis illustrated how 
the development of the Danish regional policy-making institution was characterised as 
a sequence of consecutive, different types of gradual change such as layering, 
conversion and reform. 
This historical institutionalist based analysis illustrated how the Danish regional policy-
making institution was framed within the stable Constitution. The Constitutional 
framework of public policy-making gradually extended competences to the regional 
level in public policy-making, taking its point of departure in the position that regions 
have had in the Constitutional structure ever since its introduction. Increased 
decentralisation was the preferred course. The same decentralisation course 
appeared to have been pursued within the regional policy-making institution but 
against different backgrounds. Danish regional policy-making was first 
institutionalised in 1958 with the first Regional Development Act specifying the 
objectives and the organisation of the institution. In 1991, the Regional Development 
Act was reformed amending both the objectives and organisation of the institution. 
This development took place against a series of gradual developments during the 
1980s in particular, although some initial steps towards this change were taken 
already during the 1950s with the bottom-up developments that occurred outside the 
formal regional policy institution. Accordingly, the apparent abrupt change to the 
Danish regional policy-making institution can be considered a gradual development 
that ended in reform based on gradual layering in the years preceding the reform. 
Likewise, the 2005 local government reform changed the organisational map of public 
policy-making including regional policy. Arguably, the changes to the regional policy-
making institution that were initiated during the mid-2000s were rooted in the 
development of the existing regional policy-making institution, which had been based 
on voluntary involvement and responsibility of regional policy by the regional level. 
This was extended to emphasise regional policy objectives by making their 
implementation statutory and obligatory to all regions. Moreover, the organisational 
structure that was practised over the years was also formalised into statutory 
partnerships pointing towards layering to the existing institutional organisation.  
The overall conclusion to be drawn here is that Danish regional policy-making has had 
a 50 year history of gradual development illustrated as a rather weak but sustained 
curve with internal and external events influencing the process. This is the background 
against which the interaction and coordination between Danish and EU regional 
policy-making is analysed. 
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Throughout the analysis of the Danish regional policy-making institution, it has been 
argued that the parallel development of the EC/EU regional policy may have had 
influence on these developments, but so far it has not been possible to base these 
arguments on any empirical foundation. The following chapter takes up this ambition 
in analysing the interaction and coordination between the Danish and EC/EU regional 
policy-making approaches based on the Danish interpretation according to the 
institutional, legal and financial context of Danish regional policy analysed here. 
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7. The Interaction between Danish and EU Regional Policy-
Making 
Whereas the previous sub-analysis was concerned with the national approach to 
regional policy-making and how institutional structures have developed since the 
1950s, the second sub-analysis takes its point of departure in the findings above, 
namely that national regional policy-making has been characterised by gradual change 
with internal and external events influencing the process. Based on these 
developments, focus here is on the effort to harmonise Danish regional policy-making 
with the parallel EC regional policy that has developed since the 1970s but arguably 
has come to have considerable effect on member states’ regional policy-making since 
the first true EC regional policy was introduced in 1988 with the attached 
requirements for its implementation. That EC regional development funds were 
conditioned by a number of principles may have initiated a process of adaptation or 
change to the member states’ regional policy-making institutions as they may not 
have been based on the same premises. This is what regional policy research 
illustrates: that some member states had regional policy-making structures that were 
better able to absorb the EC requirements than others while others did not have the 
capacity to meet these requirements (Kelleher et.al., 1999, Bache, 2010, and Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001). Nonetheless, adaptation was required. In the Danish case, 
adaptation also took place leading to change in the existing regional policy-making 
institution. It was a gradual adaptation towards increased involvement of actors 
(multi-level governance) and common policy objectives. Thus, the second sub-analysis 
is an analysis of the historical development of the interaction between Danish and 
EC/EU regional policy-making institutions based on historical institutionalist tools of 
analysis. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section offers an analysis of the 
interaction between Danish and EC/EU regional policies from the mid-1970s until 
2006, where focus is on the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds as this may be 
considered the most comprehensive institutional change in the external context of 
Danish regional policy-making. A reaction to the challenging institution was also seen 
in 1991 when state level dominance over Danish regional policy-making was changed. 
Arguably these events are related. However, as the analysis illustrates, other 
circumstances also shape the coordination effort. The most noteworthy change that 
took place was the elevation of the regional level and its establishment and 
development of capacities to implement regional policy; e.g. national, regional and 
EC/EU. The second section is concerned with the establishment and development of a 
regional approach to EU regional policy implementation as a reaction to the 
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circumstances analysed in the development of Danish regional policy-making during 
the 1980s and the parallel introduction of EC regional development funds. Somehow 
by coincidence the regional level became elevated independent from national level 
regional policy-making objectives and organisation thereby initiating a gradual process 
of institutionalisation of regional level competences to implement regional policy. 
Thus, it analyses the establishment of the regional programme approach independent 
of the national regional policy approach in the conjuncture between regional bottom-
up initiatives and rising ideas at the EC level about improved structures for the 
implementation of EC regional policy based on national quotas; this involved the 
establishment of a programme approach and an organisational structure for its 
implementation. Arguably, the gradual institutionalisation of regional level capacity to 
implement regional policy set the stage for the development of a regionally anchored 
partnership or network structure that formed the point of departure on the threshold 
to the 2000-2006 programming period and the analysis of the interpretation and 
implementation of the partnership principle in Denmark in terms of inclusion and 
process.  
These sections are based on the historical institutionalist framework of analysis in that 
the focus is on how the development of challenging institutions has influenced the 
Danish regional policy-making institution in the interaction between the two. The 
individual sections are structured according to the core argument of historical 
institutionalism that history and institutions matter as well as the core concepts 
presented in the theoretical operationalization. The data analysed here is mainly from 
primary sources such as government documents and regional development 
programmes as well as backed by personal interviews with centrally positioned actors 
in Danish regional policy-making at regional and national levels. Secondary literature 
where other researchers have presented the findings of their research is also utilised. 
All this information is gathered and compared to each other in balancing actual events 
and then evaluated from a historical institutionalist point of view and ultimately 
summarised here. 
7.1 A Gradual Reorganisation of Danish Regional Policy-Making 
Having drawn a clear picture in which a specific Danish national approach towards 
regional policy-making in cooperation with voluntary actors across levels of 
government and private actors, it should not be forgotten that a parallel approach to 
regional development emerged with Denmark entering the European Communities 
(EC) in 1973, and with the EC gradually introducing an approach to regional policy-
making and further extended it. This section analyses how the introduction and 
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parallel development of the EC/EU regional policy generated change in Danish 
regional policy-making in terms of organisation and objectives. A development can be 
traced already from the mid-1970s when the first regional development instrument 
was established in the EC. Danish regional policy-making has been characterised by 
interaction between the two approaches and a gradual development of a system of 
multi-level governance based on the developments of the Danish regional policy-
making institution analysed in the previous chapter and the challenging institutional 
organisation and objectives presented by the EC regional policy. Focus in the present 
chapter is mainly on the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and how it presumably 
has influenced regional policy-making in Denmark. This reform is arguably the most 
influential event on national practices as it precedes the 1991 termination of the 
Regional Development Act and changed the organisational structure for its 
implementation. It is obvious to make a connection between the two events, but as it 
turned out other circumstances also affected the outcome. Besides this specific event, 
other occurrences also characterised a gradual development of the interaction 
between Danish and EU regional policy-making institutions in terms of their 
organisation. Accordingly, the following section is structured in line with the 
categorisation of these events prior to the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds; the 
period from the reform until the end of the second programming period in 1999; and 
the period from 2000 to 2006.  
7.1.1 Denmark – a Member of the European Community  
The period until the end of the 1980s witnessed an attempt to root regional 
development in national policy where a gradual bringing together of regional planning 
and regional development support took place. A change of focus towards financial 
incentive programmes with a redistributive objective so that backward regions were 
favoured over the more prosperous ones was established. It can be argued that 
already at this point in time, national regional development programmes had 
redistributive properties with special attention to the problem areas, much like the 
adjacently developing EC regional policy. But still considerable differences occurred 
which seem to have been reduced after the entry of Denmark into the EC: towards 
the end of the period regional development policy seemed to have gained greater 
momentum reflecting the influence of EU quota schemes on national regional 
development initiatives. Thus, in terms of objectives, the two approaches to regional 
policy-making were already at an early stage similar. 
In Denmark, having entered the EC in 1973, the Community’s regional policy 
objectives came to influence national priorities, objectives and practices, in that 
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Danish regional policy became assigned to EC regulation although EC regional policy 
was implemented within the Danish institutional structure regulated by national 
legislation and the Constitution. In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, EC regional 
policy was mainly based on national schemes and it was not until 1988, EC regional 
policy became an independent instrument with real influence on national regional 
implementation. In 1975, the EC established the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) to accommodate demands from Britain, a member state with huge 
regional differences, concerning compensation for its large contribution to the EC 
budget (a demand that was put forward as a condition for membership) which 
afforded the member states with an opportunity to apply for support to regional 
development from the EC. The aim was to support regional development in the 
member states through a system of national quotas that were employed as either a 
reimbursement of expenditure or as co-funding to improvements to regional and local 
infrastructure. This implied that the projects eligible for support had to be approved 
by the European Commission and that the member state level was responsible for its 
implementation (Illeris, 2010, 29). As it turned out, the EC regional development 
quotas became an extension of existing national regional policies rather than a 
separate programme in its establishment or in other words a means to finance 
national policy objectives. This was also the case in Denmark (Halkier, 1998, 13-4).  
Nevertheless, being an EC member affected Danish regional policy-making. For 
instance, national support for regional development was cut back (but not completely 
abolished due to the requirement of the EC for the member state to be able to 
provide additional funding to the EC Funds) thereby making the EC funds the most 
important form of economic support for the Danish regions (Illeris, 2010, 52). It 
should be recalled that this took place during the time of the financial crisis in 
Denmark and implementation of the ‘potato diet’ where funds to support projects 
within the frames of the Regional Development Act were gradually phased out. With 
the prospect of receiving additional funds from the EC for regional development it 
might seem like a strategic decision made by the politicians at the time. Parallel to 
these events another thing happened that might have influenced this decision equally. 
Until 1984, Greenland was the only region within Danish territory that received 
assistance from the EC but when Greenland withdrew from the EC in 1984 other 
regions within Denmark came to receive the funds from the EC instead. The Danish 
government decided that all regional development areas in Denmark should be 
eligible of EC support in addition to the support the state already provided (Illeris, 
2010, 199). The main part of EC support was concentrated in North Jutland and parts 
of Viborg, South Jutland and Bornholm counties. For the first time Danish regions had 
access to EC funds for their own development, which inspired them to become 
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increasingly responsible for and influential on their own development. Arguably, these 
changes occurred as a response to the Danish membership of the EC.  
Though, never articulated out loud by politicians and their civil servants (Lodberg, 
personal interview), the availability of EC Structural Funds and the fact that the whole 
country potentially became eligible for EC funding, must, arguably, have been 
computed as part of the overall national strategy. Thus, this presented the 
opportunity to reduce the national funds for regional development, while continue to 
uphold the level of funding. As EC funds were attached with the additionality 
condition, politicians could not openly claim that they had disregarded this principle. 
Therefore, officially they argued that they continued to infuse national funds into 
regional development objectives to be additional to the EC funds. In this manner, 
from its introduction EC regional policy affected national policy-making both regarding 
the regional political objectives but also national strategic manoeuvring. At this point 
it was not a matter of implementing the policy according to the requirements put 
forward by the EC as there were no requirements as such, but a matter of substituting 
national funding with EC funds; a decision that has had enormous consequences since 
then. The Danish regional policy-making institution was in the process of gradually 
being changed. 
The most obvious change that has been generated in the coordination between 
Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making institutions in terms of organisation is the 
inclusion and elevation of the regional level in the institutional organisation. The 
involvement of the regional level has been a gradual process that was initiated already 
during the 1980s as has been argued in the analysis of the development of Danish 
regional policy-making based on bottom-up developments and conversion of the 
Danish regional policy-making institution. This conclusion is supported by the 
subsequent analysis throughout history of regional policy-making coordination in 
Denmark. Due to the prospect of receiving funds from the EC for their regional 
development, Danish counties were encouraged and inspired to create 5 year national 
development programmes as supplements to already existing projects that did not 
necessarily have long-term objectives. By this invention, the regional level came to 
enjoy a central position in Danish regional policy-making already in the mid-1980s. 
This will be analysed in more detail in the following section which deals with the 
establishment and development of regional competences to meet the EC regional 
policy vertical partnership requirements as well as the regional level attempting to 
take destiny into its own hands. Here it is sufficient to mention that bottom-up 
developments occurred in the regions as a consequence of the availability of EC funds 
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among other things when the corresponding national funding was reduced leading to 
new approaches to implement regional policy than had hitherto been seen. 
EC Structural Funds administration formally became incorporated into Danish regional 
policy-making when the EC implementation structure became formalised in the 
national structure. In 1985, central government decided that the administration of 
most ESF applications were to be decided at the regional level, whereas decisions 
regarding applications for ERDF projects were to be recommended by the regional 
level. In practical terms this meant that central government remained responsible for 
national and EC regional policy schemes although the regional level was given the 
opportunity to suggest applications to these programmes, and although the EC 
programmes became the overall frame in which regional development projects should 
take place. As such, it may still be suggested that ERDF and ESF programmes were 
merely an extension of national policy in the beginning of their operation despite the 
regions had been offered an opportunity to influence their own destiny - at least until 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds. Not until then did they become a parallel 
source of funds (Danish Technological Institute, 2002, 6). Accordingly, the main impact 
of the EC on the national regional policy structure until the 1988 reform was the 
availability of additional funds and the experimental establishment of regional 
programmes, both of them generating regional mobilisation within the state level 
controlled structure. These developments certainly laid the foundation to introduce 
new forms of organisation in Danish regional policy-making. 
The developments in Danish and EC regional policy-making until the 1988 reform of 
the Structural Funds laid the foundation of the interaction between the two 
approaches in the following decades of regional policy-making, although Danish 
regional policy-making does not appear to have been significantly changed by the 
existence of EC regional financial instruments until then. At this point in time, EC 
regional ‘policy’ was not yet a policy, but merely a financial instrument without any 
organisational or political requirements for which reason coordination was not 
required to the same extent. Regional policy-making remained a state level 
prerogative where the member states including Denmark thankfully received the EC 
funds and employed them according to their own wishes and structures. Despite this 
fact, the regional level was responding due to internal developments in the Danish 
regional policy-making institution, such as the phasing out of national funds for 
regional development as a consequence of the ‘potato diet’ as well as the sudden 
availability of EC funds in 1984 when Greenland withdrew from the EC. As such, a type 
of ‘conversion’, in historical institutionalist terms, of the Danish regional policy-making 
institution was under way as the regional level mobilised against the dominant central 
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level. This was the background against which the interaction between Danish and EC 
regional policy-making should be analysed after the introduction of partnership 
requirements as well as the programme approach which arguably have shaped the 
overall objectives of Danish regional policy-making. 
7.1.2 Responding to the Introduction of European Community Level 
Regional Policy   
In 1988, the EC launched its first regional policy to be implemented in the member 
states. It was a requirement to implement 5-6 years programming periods in contrast 
to the preceding ad hoc applications for individual projects by municipalities and 
businesses without a common regional development objective (or budget periods) 
where a quota was allocated for specific programmes with different objectives, 
measures and priorities. Naturally, the Commission was interested in value for money 
and, therefore, detailed programmes were to be decided in partnership between the 
Commission, the member state and sub-national partners and then carried out during 
the programming period. In order to implement these programmes working together 
across levels of government and across the public-private divide was a prerequisite for 
success. Thus, partnerships were to be set up at different stages of the policy-making 
process. It was required that in each region a committee (an ‘Executive Committee’) 
was to be set up consisting of representatives of the Commission, the government, 
and the regional council in partnership (Illeris, 2010, 203). Denmark was somewhat 
prepared for this development based on the bottom-up developments of the early 
1980s, and because some regions had already tried to adopt a similar multi-year 
programme approach as an experiment prior to the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds. This development will be further elaborated in the following section analysing 
the establishment and development of regional level competences to implement EC 
regional policy.  
It may be argued that the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds constituted a window 
of opportunity for new policy-making organisation approaches to regional policy. It is 
reasonable to agree with Halkier (2000a, 231) who treats the development of the 
Structural Funds as “a change in the external environment to which Danish actors 
responded”. It is clear that the availability of new funds for regional development 
increased the interest in regional development programmes (potential for regional 
development had thus increased with the prospect of additional funds) and as a 
requirement to receive these funds regional actors must be involved; it may then be 
argued that the regional actors that had not been legally included in national regional 
policy-making before, had a reason to justify their influence on regional development 
in the EC context. It must be remembered, however, that it was far from all regions 
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that were eligible for Objective 2 funding, which implies that it was only a 
requirement to engage in partnerships in those regions receiving the funds. In the 
remaining regions such initiatives were not required, implying that the state could 
potentially remain the dominant actor controlling the national approach in a 
considerable part of regional policy-making. This may have generated a two-track 
development in the organisation of regional policy-making. In the end, this may have 
constituted a problem in that it was ineffective to have two different systems dealing 
with the same policy issue: it would require two different administrative systems 
dealing with the implementation of state funding for either the purely national 
approach to regional development or the EC partnership approach regulated by EC 
rules. Therefore, it may be argued that coordination between the two approaches was 
needed to avoid duplicate administration. Arguably, the existing institutional structure 
had been under pressure from below and top-down for some time resulting in the 
1991 conclusion of the Regional Development Act.  
Thus, after 1991, the preceding, predominantly state dominated regional policy-
making institution was changed in that roles and responsibilities among the actors 
involved in decision-making and implementation were reallocated. With the parallel 
developments of EC regional policy in mind, this ‘dramatic’ change might have been 
brought about by external events other than the ones it has been ascribed to in the 
analysis of the development of the Danish regional policy-making institution. It is easy 
to draw the conclusion that an external shock as defined by the ‘old’ interpretation of 
historical institutionalism operates with, has caused such a revision: in path-
dependent developments such as the development of national regional policy-making 
until 1991 characterised by a continuous development along the same path, an 
external shock generated this radical development so that the actors within the 
organisational set up had changed their interests and preferences as a consequence of 
the introduction/enforcement of new actors into the existing structure. Simply the 
power distribution that the institution afforded the actors with changed interests and 
roles due to the new composition of actors within the organisational structure. Either 
these three structures (EC, national and bottom-up local) were to be run parallel in 
order to stay on the traditional path of central dominance or they had to be merged 
leaving that path. The first solution did not seem feasible in that an amalgamation of 
EC, local and national regional policy was unavoidable due to the partnership 
requirement to receive EC Funds. Rather, a more correct reading is that according to 
the ‘new’ interpretation of historical institutionalism by Thelen and Mahoney (2010, 
xi) this change has been gradual rooted in internal and external conditions. It is argued 
that change occurs when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement give the 
actors within the institution an opportunity to implement these rules in new ways. As 
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such, the rules had changed with the introduction of EU requirements into existing 
Danish regional policy-making as well as the challenging bottom-up reactions also 
questioned the existing rules. Therefore, their reading of the development is that a 
gradual change has occurred because some actors have been given the opportunity 
from outside of the existing institution to have more influence which was in 
disagreement with existing rules. When some of the actors affected by the 
institutional structure, did not find it reasonable to adhere to that structure, it was 
unavoidable to change the institution accordingly resulting in displacement of the 
existing institution.  
It is reasonable to argue that the EC organisational structures did aid to the change of 
the pre-1991 regional policy structure – but so did the bottom-up developments 
during the 1980s and other national policy decisions that had gathered speed during 
the course of the 1980s as analysed in the previous sub-analysis of the development 
of Danish regional policy-making. They were all interrelated and equally influencing 
the gradual development of the Danish regional policy-making organisation. Until 
1991, Denmark had two independent regional policy approaches; one of primarily 
state control of decision-making and another emergent multi-level approach in 
regions receiving the Structural Funds; two approaches that could not continue to be 
run in parallel. Therefore, they were harmonised gradually becoming one approach of 
multi-level organisation involving actors at EC, regional and national levels. It may be 
argued that the government made this strategic decision as a reaction to the fact that 
the regional level was increasingly taking over some of the responsibilities of the state 
level while at the same time; the EC level introduced its own instruments for financing 
regional development in the member states. Thus, the state may have seen two 
windows of opportunity for the change of the regional policy-making institution in 
Denmark: one where opportunity gradually presented itself for the state to transfer 
some of its responsibility to those actors who willingly would do the job while 
simultaneously being more in touch with the actual state of regional development. 
The other window of opportunity opened itself when the EC gradually introduced its 
new ideas for a reformed regional policy since the mid-1980s and promises of the 
availability of funds for otherwise nationally prioritised regional development. The 
1991 termination the Regional Development Act and its institutional organisation may 
then be seen as a gradual development that had been under way for some time 
stretching back to the 1980s before the reform and based on the opportunity to 
respond to internal and external events in the existing regional policy-making 
institution. The coordination leading to the 1991 displacement of the Danish regional 
policy-making institution led to legal adoption of this new organisational structure. 
Historical institutionalism would label this type of change displacement in that new 
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institutions had presented themselves competing with existing ones and not replacing 
them. The new institutions are often introduced by those actors who are the ‘losers’ 
in the existing one; in this case both the regional and EC level actors. Gradual 
replacement may take place if the supporters of the existing system are unable to 
prevent defection to the new rules or alternatively that the supporters of the existing 
system, i.e. the Danish government, may not actually want to do that. Thus, 
displacement of the existing institution was based on the logic of substitution; that 
the state disappeared and allowed itself to be squeezed out. 
Similarly, the objectives of regional policy-making have been adjusted accordingly: 
prior to the 1991 termination of the Regional Development Act, Danish regional 
policy-making was based on regional development (egnsudvikling) as more balanced 
development outside the capital with focus on the development of regions. This was 
different compared to the objectives after the termination of the Regional 
Development Act where the development and competition of businesses within the 
regions became the overall objective. This development definitely took place after 
1991, but initial steps were seen in Danish regional policy-making as a consequence of 
Danish regions receiving the support that Greenland gave up with its withdrawal from 
the EC as is argued in the analysis in the previous chapter. 
In many respects, the objectives of Danish regional policy after 1991 became similar 
to those of the EC although Danish civil servants in regional policy-making at the time 
probably would not agree to this statement. From 1991, Danish regional development 
policy was based on three types of initiatives rooted in three respective levels of 
organisations: EU Structural Funds programmes, regional business development 
initiatives as a supplement to the EU programmes and national initiatives in the form 
of decentralised advice services to businesses across the country. It may be argued 
that while Danish regional development policy prior to 1991 had the objective of 
ensuring more equal employment terms, the objective after 1991 was rather to focus 
on the competitiveness of businesses within the regions with special attention to the 
weaker regions. Generally, the objectives pursued include increasing employment, 
strengthening the small and medium size companies (SMEs) and improving 
international competitiveness with economic development as the most important 
goal. Similarly, the instruments to achieve the objectives changed. Emphasis was put 
on initiatives such as consultancy and network formation while direct grants to 
individual businesses were reduced (Halkier, 2001, 328-33 and Halkier and Flockhart, 
2002, 43-50). 
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Thus, it is reasonable to claim that EC regional policy, and its objectives and 
requirements all together gradually changed Danish regional policy-making practices 
in such a way that a legal structure was set up in Denmark after 1991 that was similar 
to that of the EC institution in terms of organisation and objectives, and that 
interaction between the two approaches took place based on internal or external 
conditions in parallel – a process that was developing since the mid-1980s. How this 
structure functions more precisely in practise (whether the partnership process 
reflects inclusion and process) is the concern of the following chapter. It is too soon to 
offer a definite conclusion as to how the partnership principle has affected Danish 
regional policy-making – a few more steps of analysis need to be presented, but for 
now it may be argued that despite that it has often been referred to how the 
introduction of the partnership principle has advanced the role of sub-national actors 
in regional policy-making, evidence in the Danish case shows how bottom-up 
developments occurred to some extent before the introduction of the partnership 
principle in the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, and also concurrently with the 
actual implementation of the reform and similar bottom-up developments throughout 
Europe (Damborg and Halkier, 1998, 85). So in Denmark, the advancement of the 
regional level cannot solely be ascribed to the introduction of the partnership 
principle. Rather, involvement of sub-national actors has been a developing process 
due to bottom-up developments that were initiated in the 1980s, the 1988 
partnership principle establishing a role for regional and EC actors in the 
implementation of the policy; the preceding national decision to phase out national 
regional policy activities within the framework of the Regional Development Act 
similar to those of the EC objectives during the ‘potato diet’; the consequent need to 
mobilise regional interests and resource to accommodate this decreasing support; as 
well as later supported by the national level granting the counties responsibility for 
this area.  
It is possible to conclude from the above analysis that the national organisational 
context into which the partnership principle was implemented presented an 
institutional organisation characterised by gradual development towards increased 
decentralisation and increased involvement of regional actors in the policy-making 
process. Evidently being a member of the EC and a beneficiary of the Structural Funds, 
Denmark was obliged to adjust to the requirements of the EC regional policy. This led 
to a gradual development and interaction between two parallel, yet similar 
approaches into a specific Danish approach to regional policy-making based on a 
tradition of participation, a gradually developing decentralisation process (bottom-up 
developments) and a programme approach. In other words, there is no doubt that the 
post-1991 institutional structure was completely different compared to its 
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predecessor, but this does not necessarily mean that this remarkable change was 
brought about by equally dramatic events; it might have been under way for some 
time.  
It is evident that since 1991, three tiers of government were involved in regional 
policy-making in Denmark: overall national level authorities were responsible for 
regional policy since it was subject to national legislation. The European Commission 
and regional and local authorities were also involved. On behalf of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry (DATI) was involved in 
managing EC programmes in Denmark. This involved a shift from central 
administration being responsible for implementation of regional policy to a more 
coordinating role for that level. The sub-national level, however, took the opportunity 
to become increasingly active in implementation since then. The availability of EC 
Structural Funds combined with additional national and regional funding in itself 
created an incentive for cooperation in that the administration of these three types of 
funding created “a mutual resource dependency between the three tiers of 
government involved” (Halkier, 2001, 330), a viewpoint that is supported by Yesilkagit 
and Blom-Hansen (2007, 507) who claim that Danish regional policy-making has 
become a multi-level activity in which European institutions set the general rules, 
regional authorities participated in decision-making and together with the state level 
they were mutually dependent on each other’s resources.  
Having terminated its near-monopoly of implementation in regional policy-making in 
1991, central government changed its own role. From 1991 onwards its role became 
to ensure that the EC/EU regional policy programmes were in accordance with on the 
one hand national regulation and, on the other hand, with the requirements of EC/EU 
regional policy; i.e. the priorities and measures of the programmes, the partnership 
principle and the general communication with the Commission. Where the state used 
to be responsible for spatial designation, this role became regulated in considerable 
detail by the Commission. Regional and local actors dominated the implementation 
process based on their organisational and informational resources: they decided and 
recommended project application within the framework of the regional and national 
Objective 2 Programmes and communication with sub-regional actors both private 
and public in the design process. Also, the sub-regional level became gradually 
involved in regional policy-making: regional business organisations, social partners, 
local authorities and public research and training institutions became included in the 
design and implementation of regional policy. Halkier (2001, 331) concludes that “the 
internal division of labour between the national and regional levels now places 
Denmark among the most decentralized countries in the EU with regard to Structural 
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Funds programming compared to those reported in other member states.” In the 
same breath it must be noted that variation occurred between ESF and ERDF project 
administration where ESF administration appeared to be more decentralised than 
ERDF projects (Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 44).  
When the first round of programming ended in 1993, it seemed a good time to 
evaluate the coordination between Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making so far 
and for considering what to do next. This was increasingly relevant as an ensuing 
reform of the Structural Funds in 1993 emphasised and extended the 1988 
framework. EC regional policy and its partnership organisation were here to stay! The 
report made on behalf of the Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry on ‘the State of 
the Danish Regions’ set out to asses developments so far and to suggest future 
directions for regional policy in Denmark. It sought to evaluate and suggest strategies 
to improve regional conditions. One of the central concerns of this report was how 
Structural Funds administration and EU regional policy should interact with national 
regional development policy and administration. The EU had played and would 
continue to play a role in Danish regional development. According to the report, the 
involvement of regional actors was expected to be crucial to the implementation of 
the policy in Denmark like it was in national regional policy-making since 1991. In this 
connection it was emphasised that the administration of regional policy in Denmark 
preferably had to warrant that the wishes of the counties and municipalities were 
taken into account while ensuring coordination between EU, national and regional 
policy objectives. It was concluded that a unified strategy was needed involving 
coordination between four levels: the EU, the state, the regions (including both 
county councils and regional level state offices) and the municipalities. The report 
identified the Structural Funds partnerships together with existing state level 
institutions to be the inner core of regional development policy in Denmark and that 
new initiatives were to be adapted to these partnerships. As such national level 
institutions were to be integrated and adapted to the EU partnership requirements. 
Thus, increased coordination between the national, regional and EU approaches was 
the aim.  
Regarding the administration of the Structural Funds, the 1995 report referred to two 
critical audits carried out on behalf of the government, which proclaimed that the 
administration of the ERDF and the ESF had not been satisfactory so far because of 
the fact that the two Funds were administered by different responsible Ministries (i.e. 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Employment) that had different 
approaches to the administration due to different demands from the Funds and 
different legislation within the different policy areas. It further suggested a functional 
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division of responsibilities ensuring that the national level was overall responsible for 
the administration of the Funds and regional implementation was to be an exclusive 
right of the regional level. It would also be important to ensure that the local level and 
private actors had access to the process such as the regional business consultancy, 
labour market representatives, labour market boards, education institutions, among 
others. At the same time, it was considered crucial that the regional level continued to 
maintain constant communication with the national level, so that, on the one hand, 
the regions upheld significant influence on the implementation of the programmes 
and, on the other hand, the administration interests of the state responsible of the EU 
programmes were preserved (Erhvervsministeriet, 1995, 149-154).  
The statements of the 1995 report clearly highlighted continued need for coordination 
between the national and EU approaches to regional policy-making indicating that the 
process of coordinating and adjusting the two approaches to each other (perhaps 
more likely adjusting the national approach to the EU requirements) was a gradual 
process initiated by the introduction of the partnership requirements in the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds, and subsequently legalised in the 1991 termination of 
the Regional Development Act and state influence on regional policy. It is also 
noteworthy that the regional level increasingly was to become involved and was 
henceforth assigned authority to implement the policy, like the inclusion of sub-
regional actors was also emphasised. This emphasis reflected the extended inclusion 
definition of the partnership principle towards horizontal cooperation – but according 
to national interpretation. Thus, involving horizontal actors appeared to be a Danish 
priority as well, arguably based on the participative tradition in Danish public policy-
making as referred to in the analysis of the development of the Danish Constitution. 
To emphasise this process, a set of regulations for the ERDF and the ESF programme 
partnerships were adopted by Parliament where existing practices were merely 
institutionalised. The different levels came to be responsible for different parts of 
implementation: the Ministry of Development was the responsible authority for the 
administration of the Structural Funds as well as for additional state financing and 
coordination of these, whereas decisions on project funding were based on the 
evaluation and recommendations of the regional authorities. Arguably, the discussion 
that formed the basis upon which these regulations, as well as the above 1995 report, 
were made took place in the context of a system that was already operative. The 
turning point for this development was the changed role of the state and the regional 
levels in regional policy-making in Denmark. Since then, a process of coordination 
between the national and EU approach to managing regional policy programmes took 
place. These two initiatives (the 1995 report and the 1997 regulations) can be 
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considered as manifestations of this process; or in the terminology of historical 
institutionalism, layering took place where additions were made to the existing 
institution not changing or replacing the institution. So in this sense, EU regional 
policy had great influence on the organisation of Danish regional policy-making since 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds. 
The decade from the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds was one of increased 
coordination between Danish and EC regional policy-making based on the bottom-up 
developments during the 1980s. In historical institutionalist terminology, the decade 
was characterised by a process of gradual institutional coordination between the two. 
As the analysis of the development of the Danish regional policy-making institution 
illustrates the institution underwent a gradual development, which to a considerable 
extent was driven by internal events. When coordinated with the EC regional policy-
making institution, external events naturally influenced the internal relationship 
between the actors within that institution. Accordingly, internal and external 
circumstances influenced the organisational change in the Danish regional policy 
institution towards increased regional level involvement at the expense of central 
level dominance. Whether this development would have taken place independent of 
the external influence of the EC regional policy-making institution is difficult to 
evaluate. But according to centrally placed actors in national level regional policy-
making in Denmark, this would probably be the scenario after all due to bottom-up 
reactions within the nationally dominated institution (Lodberg, personal interview). 
The fact of the matter is that Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making had been 
coordinated leading to the elevation of the regional level in Danish regional policy-
making. Facing the 2000-2006 programming period, the Danish system of 
management and implementation could best be described as one of ‘coordinated 
decentralisation’ pursued by a small network of small single-function development 
bodies (Danish Technological Institute, 2002, 8) or as Halkier and Flockhart (2002, 47) 
categorise the specific Danish bottom-up regional policy-making model during the 
1990s: “loosely coupled networks, overseen by central government but dominated by 
regional/local governments and their associated organisations”. Thus, networks were 
seen at the regional level implementing the policy while the national level was 
responsible for supervising these networks ensuring efficient policy implementation in 
line with EC requirements. 
7.1.3 Institutionalising the Partnership Organisation 
The interaction between Danish and EU regional policy-making during the 2000-2006 
programming period was based on past experiences and the developments analysed 
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above. Where the previous two sub-sections were based on analyses of different 
events and circumstances internal and external to the Danish regional policy-making 
institution, the present analysis of the 2000-2006 programming period is based on the 
contents of the Objective 2 Programme for Denmark in terms of organisation and 
objectives. As the Objective 2 Programme highlights, its framework is based on 
previous experiences with implementing Objective 2 Programmes, and therefore also 
on the existing organisational frames analysed in the previous section. It is reasonable 
to argue that the contents of the Programme reflected the institutions for 
coordinated regional policy-making between Danish and EU approaches. Arguably, the 
Danish Objective 2 Programme institutionalised cooperation and partnership thereby 
influencing its institutional structure and cooperation as well as the overall objectives 
of the regional policy-making. The Programme took into consideration national and 
regional development challenges as well as it organised its objectives and organisation 
within both Danish legislation and EU regulation into a coordinated effort. Based on 
this argumentation the structure for its implementation and the objectives of 
cooperation are analysed in terms of how interaction between the two took place 
leading to the gradual development of a system of multi-level governance with 
vertical and horizontal characteristics within the objectives of the Programme. 
The Programme took its point of departure in previous experiences with 
implementation of the programmes and the development (and lack thereof) that 
these have generated, as well as in the analysis and prediction of future challenges for 
the regional development of the country based on the socio-economic situation in 
1999 when the Programme was prepared and negotiated. The process of designing 
the Programme will not be dealt with here as this will be part of the forthcoming 
analysis of the partnership (inclusion and process) in the implementation of the 
Programme. It is recognised that the design of the Objective 2 Programme was based 
on preceding negotiations and cooperation between different actors relevant to the 
process based on the EU and national regulation concerning regional policy actor 
involvement and distribution of responsibilities. And it is also recognised that the 
contents of the Objective 2 Programme reflected the priorities and interests of the 
actors involved. It should at this point only be noticed that the Programme is the 
outcome of a partnership process as described in the EU Regulation 1260/99. This 
section is only concerned with the contents and organisational structure of the 
Programme resulting from that preparatory work. 
During the 2000-2006 programming period Denmark had one Objective 2 programme 
targeted at areas with structural problems (therefore not the entire country), which 
was sub-divided into five Programme Complement areas - four of them compatible 
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with the County Council areas (Bornholm, Funen, Stortrøm, and North Jutland) and 
one Programme covering the remaining designated areas (only parts of regions or 
counties) in Jutland (Ringkøbing, Southern Jutland, Viborg and Århus). In total, the 
Programmes received 439 million Euros of EU funding and national and regional co-
funding. Of the 439 million Euros, 142 million Euros came from the ERDF resulting in a 
71/29 divide between ERDF and ESF funding (Halkier and Olsen, 2008, 3). The figure 
below illustrates which counties and municipalities were eligible for Objective 2 and 
transitional Objective 2 funding.  
Figure 7.1: Objective 2 Areas for the 2000-2006 Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: replicated from Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a 
The Objective 2 Programme emphasised a close coordination of the overall industrial 
and labour market policy through “interaction between businesses, central, regional 
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and local authorities, labour market councils, business councils, research and 
education institutions, technological institutes among others that on a daily basis 
work with strengthening the regional industrial and employment development” 
(translated from Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 30-1). This interaction should be 
based on networks between and across the private-public divide (vertical and 
horizontal). It was important that the regions themselves set up this structure based 
on their own experiences and existing structures (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 
31). Thus, the Objective 2 Programme established a partnership along both vertical 
and horizontal lines as well as a continuous emphasis on the regional level in the 
partnership. 
Similarly, the Programme established partnership cooperation based on a functional 
division of responsibilities that was also identified in the previous programming 
periods (especially the 1994-1999 programming period where the 1991 framework 
was institutionalised and had been employed for some years). Different Ministries 
were to be responsible for ERDF and ESF administration within the Danish institutional 
structure reflecting the policy areas which the Funds addressed and related to in 
Danish public policy-making. In Denmark there was no specific regional policy budget 
but regional policy-making relied on financial resources from other policies in 
complementation with the EU Structural Funds. The Structural Funds were normally 
implemented as part of other national policies such as labour market policy, 
industrial, agricultural or education policy. This was a specific condition in Danish 
regional policy-making that is essential to take notice of. As the two financial 
instruments were concerned with different political priorities these were also 
reflected in their individual ministerial affiliation. The objective of the ESF was to 
support labour market conditions in terms of combating un-employment, improving 
the qualifications of the workforce, education and entrepreneurship (Beskæftigelse & 
sociale anliggender, 2003, 4) for which reason the Ministry of Employment was overall 
responsible for the administration of all ESF activities in Denmark. However, 
administration was decentralised so that all administrative levels were involved. This 
responsibility sharing was legalised in the ‘Lov om administrationen af tilskud fra Den 
Europæiske Socialfond’ (Lov 254/2000) which was adopted in 2000. Concerning the 
objectives of the ERDF, this Fund supported projects that were more concerned with 
improving the conditions of the businesses in the region compared to other regions 
and other states (COWI, 1999, 21). The ERDF was administered by Minister of 
Economic and Business Affairs who delegated authority to other levels of government 
(see ‘Lov om administration af tilskud fra Den Europæiske Regionalfond’ which was 
adopted in 1996) (Blom-Hansen, 2003, 88-9). Although both Ministries delegated 
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authority to other actors, the level of decentralisation varied between the two: the 
ESF was the most decentralised (to the regional level) and the ERDF to the DATI.   
To begin with, the Minister of Employment delegated authority to the National Labour 
Market Authority (NLMA), although during the 2000-2006 programming period the 
responsibility was gradually transferred to the DATI, which after 2003 became the 
National Agency for Enterprise and Construction (NAEC) in an effort to improve 
coordination of the administration of the Structural Funds. Similarly the Minister of 
Economic and Business Affairs has delegated authority in his area to the NAEC. This 
implies that two different Ministries were involved in the implementation of Objective 
2 Programmes in Denmark during the 2000-2006 programming period, which tended 
to complicate matters: involvement of two Ministries with two parallel and perhaps 
different approaches to this task and perhaps also different traditions of 
administration in general, very likely complicated the process of achieving the same 
end. Arguably, this division of responsibilities was based on the argumentation 
presented in the analysis of the development of Danish regional policy-making where 
different policy areas were related to regional development and therefore 
coordinated in a common regional development effort. Moreover, this division of 
responsibilities reflected the different focal points of the two Funds such as labour 
market policy and industrial policy.  
In the Objective 2 Programme it was noted that past experiences with divided 
responsibility of ERDF and ESF administration and implementation between two 
Ministries and consequently two state level authorities (NAEC and NLMA) had proven 
difficult, for which reason, during the 2000-2006 programming period, the challenges 
with divided responsibility had to be overcome. This implied that during the 2000-
2006 programming period the NAEC gradually (completely in 2003) took over 
responsibility for ESF administration and implementation (Poulsen, personal 
interview). Hereby, a better coordination between the two individual administrations, 
with the Danish regional policy approach being the responsibility of the NAEC, was 
ensured and better utilisation of the Funds was expected.  
Despite that overall responsibility for the Objective 2 Programme rested with a central 
actor, the implementation of the Objective 2 Programme in Denmark was not a 
central government privilege. Contrary, responsibility was shared with the 
regions/counties (sub-national administrations) of North Jutland, Southern Funen, 
Lolland-Falster, Bornholm and some small islands spread across Denmark. The NAEC 
became the organiser and facilitator of networking at national, inter-regional and sub-
regional levels interacting with the Ministries on the one hand and sub-national actors 
198 
 
on the other hand. The authority was responsible for coordination, programme 
design, cooperation and negotiations with the Commission, appointing Monitoring 
Committees, control and steering, reporting to the Commission as well as the 
administrative contact to the relevant Ministries and region, etc. (Halkier and Olsen, 
2008, 2).  
The programme also specified which key actors, besides the responsible national 
level, should be involved. The programme established that regional level 
administration was responsible for day-to-day implementation. County Councils were 
responsible for organising regional-level partnerships as well as offering 
administrative support to the NAEC through their regional programme secretariats. 
Each region had its particular organisational setup, but generally County Councils had 
been key actors in the implementation of both the EU Structural Funds and national 
regional development since the 1991 adjusted institutional framework. Applications 
for Objective 2 ERDF/ESF funded projects were evaluated by regional Executive 
Committees within the counties as well as they provided secretarial assistance to the 
NAEC. There was a difference, however, in the ERDF and ESF administration. In the 
ESF administration, the counties’ Executive Committees decided individual ESF 
projects applications, whereas in terms of ERDF projects, the Executive Committees 
only recommended projects to the NAEC which made the final decision. In Objective 2 
Programme implementation, the Executive Committees were composed of civil 
servant representatives of the county, local authorities, employers and employees 
organisations (and the de-concentrated labour market region in the ESF Committees). 
Parallel to the regional Executive Committees, regional Steering Committees (all 
members were politicians) provided the political back-up to decisions and suggestions 
made by the regional Executive Committees and they made the final decision as to 
which projects to recommend to the NAEC. In this sense, the regional Executive 
Committees became a kind of informal ‘trial authority’ to the evaluation of project 
applications or in other words an advisory body to the deciding Steering Committee 
(Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000b and Yesilkagit and Blom-Hansen, 2007, pp. 511-
517). This was a specific Danish regional level institutional organisation that had 
developed in the Objective 2 regions as will be seen in the following section 
concerning the establishment and development of regional level capacity to 
implement EC/EU regional policy. 
As a requirement of EU regional policy implementation, Monitoring Committees 
needed to be established to supervise the process and to report to the Commission. 
The Objective 2 Programme prescribed that the Monitoring Committee, which was 
represented from all five Programme Complement regions, should be composed of 
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representatives from central government (NAEC and NLMA), relevant Ministries (i.e. 
Ministry of the Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries and the Ministry of Employment), the regional level, social partners 
(employers’ and employees’ associations) and interest organisations as well as the 
Commission with the NAEC being the Secretariat for the Monitoring Committee 
(Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000b). 
In Denmark, an administrative structure was established reflecting the organisation 
principle of the Commission as well as the Danish institutional counterpart. This 
meant that each Structural Fund was anchored in the Ministry responsible for the 
relevant project area. Often the decentralised level was included in the administrative 
structure as the responsible party in the main part of the day-to-day administration. 
“The Danish setup for Structural Funds administration over the 2000-06 period did not 
fit easily in a simple centralised/decentralised dichotomy but can perhaps best be 
described as ‘co-ordinated decentralisation’ with the NAEC being the overall 
coordinator but also the County Councils having a coordinating role, which gradually 
evolved since the introduction of Structural Funds programming in the late 1980s.” 
(Halkier, 2009a, 3) ‘Coordinated decentralisation’ refers to a multi-level setting that 
implemented policies which resemble decentralised regional policy but only in 
designated areas. The complexities of the Danish implementation structure may be 
illustrated as follows: as the Structural Funds activities, either ESF or ERDF, were 
supposed to have one common regional development objective, the coordination of 
the administration of these funds took place at several levels. First, coordination was 
carried out in terms of the programmes themselves (both internal in the programmes 
themselves and external in relation to the Commission); i.e. preparation of 
programmes of in the day-to-day management of the programmes and selected 
projects. Second, coordination took place in relation to the individual Funds. As the 
two Funds were the responsibility of two individual Ministries having different 
practices and traditions, administration here needed to be coordinated to avoid 
overlap. Finally, coordination between actors at various levels resulted in the specific 
partnership set up in Danish regional policy-making. Thus, coordination appeared to 
be central in Danish regional policy-making. The distribution of responsibility areas of 
the four levels of government in EU regional policy implementation can be summed 
up in the following table: 
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Table 7.1: Structural Funds Administration Responsibilities 2000-2006 
Level of 
Government 
Policy Design Implementation 
European   establish ground rules  responsible for the 
Structural Funds 
Central government  provides national 
regulatory framework 
 forwards proposals to 
the Commission 
 suggests overall 
policy design 
 matching funding for 
subsidies to firms 
 legal control of ERDF 
applications 
 undertakes ERDF 
payments 
Regional 
government 
 organises 
consultations with 
social partners 
 develops policy 
initiatives 
 drafts programmes 
 co-funding for framework 
projects 
 processing applications 
 recommends ERDF 
applications 
 decides ESF applications 
Sub-regional 
government 
 represented in 
regional committees 
 comments on draft 
proposals 
 co-funding for framework 
projects 
 represented in regional 
committees 
Source: replicated from Halkier, 2000b, 234 and Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 44 
This table clearly illustrates the functional division of responsibilities that were 
established and developed over the years following the 1991 termination of the 
Regional Development Act and state level dominance. Due to these divisions of 
responsibilities, partnerships on several levels may be present. This will be elaborated 
in the final sub-analysis of the practical interpretation of the partnership principle. 
It is easy to conclude that coordination between the Danish and EU regional policy-
making approaches took place during the 2000-2006 programming period based on 
both approaches. The focus was on the increasing inclusion of actors below the 
national level, both public and private actors (horizontal cooperation), and on a more 
clear functional division of responsibilities between the different levels of government 
(vertical division). Coordination reflected the extended requirements of the EU on the 
one hand, but it has also evolved as a gradual process with the increased transfer of 
responsibility to the regional level, dating back to the first bottom-up developments 
during the 1980s caused by internal and external circumstances in Danish regional 
policy-making, as established above. Layering to the existing coordinated regional 
policy institution took place as a result of the succeeding reforms of the Structural 
Funds in 1993 and 1999, pointing in the direction of a gradual development of 
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regional policy-making in Denmark after the introduction of the parallel EU regional 
policy-making institution towards increased institutionalisation of EU requirements. It 
appears that the initiated process during the mid-to-late 1980s with the bottom-up 
developments, the availability of EC Funds and the gradually developing institutional 
structure for its implementation was gradually adopted into the Danish regional 
policy-making institution shining through in the 2000-2006 Objective 2 Programme. 
Like the organisation of EU regional policy-making in Denmark evolved as a gradual 
process, so did the objectives of regional development. Arguably, the objectives with 
regional development set the organisational framework, as regional policy-making 
partnerships were based on the inclusion of ‘relevant’ sub-national and private actors. 
The focus areas of regional policy implementation thus determined who was 
‘relevant’. This was reflected in the Objective 2 Programme for Denmark during the 
2000-2006 programming period.). According to the national Programme, the objective 
was to defeat regional imbalances and “strengthen the conditions for a development 
and conversion which ensures prosperity, employment, and equality, as well as a 
sustainable environment in regions with structural problems.” (translated from 
Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 29) Thus, the overall aim with regional 
development in the Objective 2 regions in Denmark was to promote development 
focusing on improving employment, equality and sustainable environments. This 
objective was based on the analysis of the socio-economic conditions in Denmark as 
mentioned above as well as the overall objectives of the EU and national regional 
development objectives. Thus, it should be noticed that a special focus was on 
equality and environmental
10
 development as the 1999 reform of the Structural Funds 
also emphasised. A special national focus was on the coordination of different policy 
areas relevant to regional development such as industrial policy and labour market 
policy. These problems were incorporated into the strategy of the Objective 2 
Programme dividing them into four focus areas or Priorities that guided regional 
development efforts and tied the two Funds to specific project types. Underlying this 
division of projects into themes was also the attempt to coordinate ERDF and ESF 
activities to avoid overlap (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 29). 
Priority 1 concerned the overall development of the region; i.e. the framework 
conditions of the region. This strategy took its point of departure in the strengths and 
development opportunities in the existing business structure. The ERDF alone 
                                                                
10 Sustainable development was incorporated as a theme into the Amsterdam Treaty, thereby requiring that 
all EU's financial instruments contribute to a sustainable development of the member states 
(Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 30). 
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supported this priority (Regeringen, 2006b, 37 and Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 
36-7). 
Priority 2 was concerned more specifically with business development emphasising 
support for existing companies as well as the formation of new ones. Especially the 
SMEs engaging in activities such as research and development, product development 
and conversion for their own development and positioning in the region could apply 
for support. Crisis-torn SMEs could not apply for support. The ERDF alone supported 
this priority (Regeringen, 2006b, 37 and Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 38-40).  
Priority 3 was concerned with the development of competences and human 
resources. This priority was specifically directed at regions that lagged behind in terms 
of level of education, average income and unemployment rates. The objectives of 
priority 2 were to be merged with the development of human resources to implement 
the activities in the existing and new businesses. The ESF alone supported this priority 
(Regeringen, 2006b, 41 and Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 41-8). 
Priority 4 was concerned with technical assistance supporting investment in for 
instance hardware and software that enabled the partners to accommodate the 
requirements of Structural Funds administration, supervision and evaluation of the 
programme and expenses to the salaries of additional staff. This priority was financed 
by both the ERDF and the ESF (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 48-9). 
Each of the first three Priorities were sub-divided into more specific Measures that 
went into detail with the objectives of the Priority. Measures spelled out projects and 
target groups eligible to apply for funding under the Priority. In the national Objective 
2 Programme, these measures were not elaborated but merely highlighted. The 
measures were region-specific for which reason they were incorporated into the 
regional Complement Programmes.  
The overall objectives with regional policy-making in Denmark were based on the 
institutional framework which the EU offered but adjusted to the requirements and 
challenges which the specific regions in Denmark faced. This implied that regional 
development was set within the EU regional policy-making institutional framework 
but interpreted according to national and regional demands for development and 
parallel regional policy objectives in order to avoid overlap. This was also practise in 
the previous programming periods. As the EC/EU changed the objectives with its 
regional policy over the years as a reaction to the changing economic context, these 
changed objectives were incorporated into the Danish strategy accordingly, indicating 
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a gradual development of the objectives of regional policy-making in Denmark as well. 
From a historical institutionalist point of view these developments may be termed 
layering in that additions have been made to the previous objectives of the policy, 
which fits well with the interpretation that the organisational structure defined by the 
Objective 2 Programmes can also be characterised as layering. It has been argued that 
the objectives of the policy set the frame for inclusion (organisation). 
The above analysis shows that the interaction between Danish and EC/EU regional 
policy-making was a gradual process initiated during the 1980s with the bottom-up 
developments spurred by the phase out of nationally supported regional development 
under the Regional Development Act and the availability of EC funds to support 
regional development that could not otherwise be supported. The most conspicuous 
outcome of the coordination between the two approaches was the establishment and 
gradual development of regional level capacity to be responsible for the 
implementation of regional policy whether Danish or EC/EU. This development has 
established increased vertical and horizontal cooperation along the way as the 
requirements of the EC/EU were extended, but also as the Danish experience with 
new types of organisation increased. Related to this development was the increased 
functional division of responsibilities between the different levels of government (EU, 
national and regional). The EU level was responsible for determining the financial 
envelope and decided the rules of implementation (such as partnership 
requirements). The national level withdrew from a dominant position in regional 
policy-making to a more coordinating role between the EU and regional levels. The 
national level was responsible for coordinating EU rules and requirements in 
accordance with Danish rules and legislation. The regional level, in contrast, 
increasingly became responsible for the practical implementation of EU, national and 
regional level regional policies. From a historical institutionalist perspective, the 
gradual development of the joint regional policy-making institution in Denmark as a 
result of the introduction of parallel EC structures for implementation may be 
regarded as process of displacement that took place in 1991 when the Danish regional 
policy-making institution changed its outlook considerably. But evidence point to the 
fact that this process was not as abrupt as has been analysed in literature before, 
rather this transformation of the Danish regional policy-making institution was rooted 
in a sequence of gradual changes that took place within it based on internal and 
external conditions prior to 1991. Also after 1991, gradual change took place based on 
the 1991 displacement with a series of layering to that institution based on extended 
requirements of the EU as gradual adaptation to these requirements leading to the 
elevation of the regional level in Danish Structural Funds implementation. 
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The following section takes its point of departure in the establishment and gradual 
development of regional level capacity by offering a case-specific analysis of the first 
region reacting to the changing circumstances and events during the 1980s leading to 
the establishment of capacity to implement regional policy. 
7.2 The Establishment and Development of Regional Level 
Institutional Capacity 
This section analyses the establishment and development of regional level 
institutional capacity as a specific illustration of how the coordination between Danish 
and EU regional policy-making has generated change in the Danish institution. North 
Jutland serves as the case study here as this was the first ever Danish region to react 
to the changing circumstances during the 1980s in the context of socio-economic and 
political change. Similarly, North Jutland is the only region in Denmark that has 
continuously received support from the EU, thereby rendering it possible to trace a 
historical development. Moreover, North Jutland has often been regarded a model 
region to other Danish regions in terms of institutionalising capacity to implement 
regional policy as well as the establishment of specific network relations within that 
structure (Brask Pedersen, personal interview). The present section is divided into 
sub-sections according to the stage in the development process. The first sub-section 
is an analysis of the establishment of regional level capacity that precedes the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds. The analysis of the second sub-section is centred on 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and its implementation in North Jutland. The 
final sub-section analysis is concerned with the evolving emphasis on and 
interpretation of the established institutional structures after the 1989-1993 
programming period. The core of this analysis is on the establishment of regional 
capacity prior to and surrounding the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, as this is 
where the foundation to the organisational structure that has been operating in the 
subsequent programming periods was laid. Naturally, the organisation has been 
adjusted along the way according to different circumstances such as internal 
considerations regarding its composition and relationship, external requirements such 
as socio-economic changes, changes in the national institutional organisation of 
regional policy-making in 1991, or partnership requirements from the EC/EU. 
Therefore, a process of institutionalisation of the regional level capacity to implement 
and coordinate national, regional and EU regional policies has gradually occurred. This 
was the most remarkable change to the Danish regional policy-making institution as a 
result of the interaction between Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making. 
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The first counties to become deeper involved in regional development were the ones 
facing the most unemployment during the 1980s – among these were North Jutland 
(with the highest unemployment rates), Viborg and Bornholm. The fact that 
unemployment was higher in these counties, that national support was phased out 
and that they were likely to receive EU funds to address the problem instead inspired 
the counties to increase their commitment to regional development by initiating their 
own regional development programmes (Damborg and Halkier, 1998, 84-5). The 
counties handled these bottom-up initiatives in different ways. Some counties (i.e. 
Storstrøm and Southern Jutland counties) were only involved in drawing up general 
priorities of regional development and setting up a pool from which regional actors 
could apply for funds to support their individual projects and left implementation to 
external bodies, while other counties (i.e. North Jutland, Viborg and Copenhagen 
counties) developed their own plans with very specific priorities of action with funds 
earmarked for specific purposes, but also left implementation to external partners. A 
third approach has also been identified where counties (i.e. Århus and Frederiksberg 
counties) drew up detailed development programmes and plans for activities and 
undertook the implementation themselves, as opposed to the other two approaches 
either through their own administration or through decentralised centres with little or 
no freedom of operation. Despite these differences in approach, all counties were 
determined to play a more active role in regional development from the late 1980s 
onwards (Damborg and Halkier, 1998, 89-90). North Jutland was the first region to 
develop a programme in cooperation with the EC. 
7.2.1 The NordTek Programme – Regional Level Capacity Building by 
Coincidence  
In North Jutland, the first experience with its own approach to regional development 
programmes was based on a coincidence; two parallel events led to the establishment 
of the first regional development programme in North Jutland and in Denmark as a 
whole. During the period of EC quota based regional policy in the member states, the 
normal procedure was that individual projects were negotiated with the Commission 
through the Regional Development Directorate in Silkeborg. However, during the mid-
1980s, self-appointed initiative groups with the aim to promote a specific project 
sought bilateral contact with the Commission in an attempt to influence its decision to 
grant EC funds to the project. These initiatives were taken because the normal 
procedure was lengthy; it could take years before a project was launched. Therefore, 
these initiative groups attempted to bypass the long process by lobbying the 
Commission directly (Hesselholt, involved in the design and the development of the 
NordTek programme, personal interview).  
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At the same time the Commission was also not satisfied with the time consuming 
work of approving individual projects. Structural Funds administration had to be 
simplified. Ideas about decentralising administration to the member states were 
emerging during this period; in fact they had been latent for years. A Danish civil 
servant within the Commission suggested that it could be possible to engage in 
longer-term projects or programmes in the member states to avoid the bureaucratic 
implementation process of the quota set up (Poulsen, Head of the regional policy 
department at NAEH, personal interview).  
As it turned out, the North Jutland project initiative groups and the Danish 
Commission civil servant met in Brussels and ideas and cooperation developed from 
here. It was agreed that the Commission civil servant was to be stationed in North 
Jutland in order to set up a programme with a durability of five years together with 
North Jutland County Council and that administration of the programme should 
consequently be decentralised to the regional and national levels. The objective of 
such cooperation was to experiment with the ideas to set up a programme that could 
make up the frame for related projects that could run for more than one year as had 
been the previous practice. It was argued that administration would then be 
simplified, but how this was to be done exactly was something to be tested in the case 
of North Jutland. The so-called NordTek programme (short for ‘det Nordjyske 
Teknologiprogram’, the ‘North Jutland Technology programme’) which framed this 
experiment was based on the initiatives made by the lobbying groups, socio-economic 
conditions in North Jutland, the changing conditions in national regional policy-making 
and discussions among the authorities and organisations of the region regarding the 
initiation of an active and focused business development policy based on regional 
conditions and needs (Poulsen and Hesselholt, personal interviews and Olsen and 
Rieper, 1991, 20).  
The logic behind the NordTek programme, which was running from 1986 to 1991, was 
based on the realisation that the destiny of regional development in North Jutland 
had hitherto been in the hands of the merciful state level regional development 
support, but now it was time to take control of the situation and become responsible 
for one’s own future development and to change the image of being an 
unemployment void. This had been the case for nearly 40 years. At the same time, a 
number of businesses had closed down in North Jutland especially around the largest 
city Aalborg, resulting in increased unemployment and a sudden need to set up new 
places of employment. It was time to work together to address these challenges. The 
business structure of North Jutland was composed of a substantial number of small 
and medium sized businesses and a few larger ones, but no businesses that were big 
207 
 
enough to act as an engine of growth in the region (or to absorb the unemployed 
labour force). Rather than being centred on a large independent business as the 
driving force for business development, trust was put in the relatively new University 
in Aalborg to inspire innovative ways of thinking about business development. It was 
realised that in order to face such great challenges and to improve regional business 
development in North Jutland it was necessary to stick together – this was “common 
sense” (Hav, County Mayor, personal interview). Quickly a culture developed in which 
cooperation was the solution to the problems. All actors affected by the business 
closures united in a common approach (Pedersen, personal interview). This culture of 
cooperation became the basis upon which the implementation of the NordTek 
programme as well as all future regional development programmes was built. The 
NordTek programme was an attempt to actively promote business and employment 
development in North Jutland through a number of concrete strategies based on 
introduction of new technology and mobilisation of knowledge, energy, imagination 
and the business structure of the region. The NordTek programme was a business 
development programme which ensured coherence between individual projects 
related to business development (Nordjyllands Amtskommune, 1985, 3-9 and 20). 
The plan was to organise cooperation between all parties (private and public, 
businesses and the University) who in one way or the other were involved in the 
labour market or production in order to generate a mobilisation of knowledge, energy 
and imagination within the region to improve the employment situation and North 
Jutland’s overall position in Denmark as well as internationally. The strategy was 
focused on developing industrial environments through the increased employment of 
new technology and education of the labour force. The programme had four 
objectives: 1) to strengthen the economic and business structure of the region; 2) to 
strengthen qualifications of the work force; 3) to provide support for product 
development including products such as health and environmental control; and 4) to 
promote North Jutland in neighbouring Norway and Sweden in order to attract high-
technology companies to the region (Nordjyllands Amtskommune, 1985, 5 and 
Jensen-Butler, 1992, 898). The means to achieve this strategy was to establish and 
develop advice centres and networks in the region to strengthen the transfer of 
technology and knowledge to the businesses in the region. This initiative separates 
itself from previous concurrent (other regions’) approaches in that it was built on a 
‘double modernisation strategy’, where both the business structure and the individual 
businesses were improved through a policy initiative resembling a kind of 
decentralised industrial or technology policy. Also, it was based on a multi-annual 
approach with thematic objectives that had not been custom in Denmark at the time. 
208 
 
As such, the NordTek programme was ahead of its time: no other region had similar 
approaches.  
A bottom-up approach like this had not been seen until then; perhaps it may be 
argued that it would not have been welcomed by the state level in a state dominant 
regional policy system, but the availability of EC funds provided a window of 
opportunity for the increasing involvement of regional level actors. These were the 
first steps towards building regional policy-making competences at the North Jutland 
regional level as well as the entire country to address future challenges (Halkier, 2008, 
28-9). Interpreted from a historical institutionalist perspective, external and internal 
conditions influenced the existing national institutional structures so that new 
regional institutional structures were set up. These conditions were primarily external, 
but in turn the external conditions influenced the internal relations in the existing 
institution towards dislocated power relations. The regional level mobilised itself and 
challenged the dominant national level. In this sense, a competitive organisation 
within the national level regional policy institution was in the making. These 
developments may, like the ones discussed in the previous section concerning the 
interaction and coordination between the Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making 
institutions, have influenced the 1991 termination of state level dominance of 
regional policy-making towards a more functional distribution of responsibilities 
among the levels of government involved and the increased influence of the regional 
level in Danish regional policy-making since then. Similarly, the North Jutland 
experience may have inspired other regions to pursue similar strategies that 
altogether may have challenged the nationally dominated regional policy institution. 
The NordTek programme developed during the functioning of the Regional 
Development Act but also when the latter was in the process of closing down, thereby 
decreasing national funding for regional development and also putting limitations on 
the scope of project applications. To stay within the national regional development 
framework, projects had to be direct financial injections into the veins of businesses. 
As the authors of the NordTek programme did not have many prospects of applying 
for this type of support as it was closing down, they had to consider alternative 
sources of funding. Instead, national funding could potentially be substituted by EC 
funds. In order to attract these funds the programme had to be structured and 
formulated to meet the requirements for receiving these funds. Neither type of 
funding could be taken for granted but it was nevertheless an option to apply for 
both. Therefore, the approach was that individual projects within the framework of 
the NordTek programme were to be materialised followed by application for funds. 
Naturally, it was hoped to attract as many funds as possible. In the end, the 
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programme received funding from the EC, regional and local government levels as 
well as private investors amounting to a total of 372 million DKK (Poulsen, personal 
interview, Nordjyllands Amtskommune, 1985, 52, Halkier, 2008, 28 and Gaardmand, 
1988, 96). In this sense, the NordTek programme became a counterpart to national 
regional policy initiatives – a bottom-up initiative. Hesselholt (personal interview) 
assesses that had it not turned out this way, and had the Commission civil servant not 
been stationed in North Jutland at the time, the programme might have ended up as a 
national programme instead, thus, postponing the introduction of EC programmes in 
the member states. In this sense, the NordTek programme was as important to the 
future of the EC plans to gather and redesign the Structural Funds as it was to the 
future adjustment of national regional policy-making. Had the NordTek programme 
been a national programme, it would not have had such significant influence on future 
regional policy-making, because it would have been implemented within nationally 
dominated structures leaving the regional level without initiative to establish regional 
level capacity to implement the programme itself. This is a significant observation. 
Here, the foundation of future coordination between Danish and EC/EU regional 
policy-making was laid illustrating the bottom-up developments analysed in the above 
section on the coordination between Danish and EC regional policy-making preceding 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds as well as the previous analysis of the 
development of Danish regional policy-making. This further illustrates the connection 
and relation among the regional, national and EC levels within the coordinated 
regional policy-making institution in Denmark. 
The NordTek programme came to constitute the overall framework in which 
individual projects operated or as the evaluation of the NordTek programme labelled 
it: “the programme constitutes an administrative/political umbrella covering the 
operative projects…” (Olsen and Rieper, 1991, 37). Thus, the NordTek programme was 
an amalgamation of a number of independent yet related projects. Creating and 
implementing this programme was a process that was initiated when the Commission 
civil servant was stationed in North Jutland. The contents and the composition of the 
eligible projects within the frame of the NordTek programme that have created the 
basis for the programme application to the Commission was prepared by the County 
level in cooperation with the municipalities in North Jutland, local trade promotion 
officers, the North Jutland Business Council, Aalborg University, other regional 
organisations as well as national authorities. Through standardised procedures this 
programme application was forwarded to the Regional Development Directorate 
before it was sent to the Commission which then approved the application and 
granted the programme 95 million DKK. Because the programme was supported by 
the ERDF, the main objectives of the NordTek programme arguably reflected the 
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requirements of EC Regulation (Council Regulation 1787/84, articles 10 and 15). 
Having established the financial envelope, and the objectives and strategies of the 
programme, implementation was the next step. The implementation process was 
close cooperation between the applicants for projects and the managers at the 
regional level in preparing the project, approving it and employing it in the business. 
Hopefully, the project would bring about positive developments for business and 
North Jutland as a whole (Olsen and Rieper, 1991, 21 and 37). 
In order to administer the programme at regional level, a Steering Committee, an 
Executive Committee and a secretariat for the NordTek programme were set up. This 
was a completely new organisational structure at the regional level. The NordTek 
Executive Committee was composed of representatives (civil servants) from both the 
regional and national levels as well as private actors, but chaired by the Director of the 
County civil servants (amtsdirektøren). Similarly the Steering Committee, a political 
body, was composed of representatives from the EC, national and regional levels as 
well as private actors, but chaired by the County Mayor (Olsen and Rieper, 1991, 189-
90). Besides these two Committees, a secretariat placed at the North Jutland County 
Council operated as a secretariat for the two Committees. The procedure was that 
applications for projects were first dealt with in the secretariat and then sent to the 
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee then evaluated the projects and 
singled out eligible candidates. Lastly, the Steering Committee made the final 
decision. Thus, the processing of projects was a hierarchical process starting from 
below with a clear functional division of responsibilities.  
As it has turned out, the specific structure with both an Executive Committee (which 
was a requirement of the regulative framework shaping the programmes and their 
implementation) and a Steering Committee has come to be a specific North Jutland 
organisational solution to partnership. No other region in Denmark has had a similar 
set up with both Committees. The raison d’être of the Steering Committee was that 
regional development implementation in North Jutland should have political backing 
(Halkier, 1997, 7). In contrast, Executive Committees in other regions have been 
composed of a mix of elected politicians and technical-administrative staff (civil 
servants). In North Jutland, a separation of the two functions was considered relevant. 
It is tempting to argue that the reason that the structure was developed like this in 
North Jutland was the fact that it was invented in the NordTek experiment where EC 
staff had a chance to influence the composition of the partnership in their own favour. 
But in reality, this may not be an accurate argument as mentioned, socio-economic 
conditions in North Jutland at the time were in such a poor state that is was a 
necessity to work together in this way and the role of the Commission civil servant 
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and the EC level framework might just have been a way to justify the process against 
central level dominance. As will be seen, the Steering Committee came to have other 
related functions as its scope of responsibility and its role developed during the 
course of time, but it remained central to the regional implementation process. Thus, 
the organisational structure found in the following programming periods was rooted 
in this experimental structure of the NordTek programme as will be seen. 
Evidently, both Committees were composed of a wide range of relevant actors to the 
promotion of regional development in North Jutland. However, it appears 
conspicuous that the Steering Committee, legitimising the implementation process, 
was inhabited by six out of 21 members from the national and EC levels. The 
composition of the Steering Committee was to some extent a copy of the national 
structure for managing national regional development policy, but it was also 
influenced by the EC requests. Conversely, the Executive Committee appeared to be 
more regionally anchored with only one national representative. It was a partnership 
dominated by regional actors, but the presence of national and EC level actors in the 
partnership should not be ignored. This points in a direction of an emerging 
experience with working in partnership, which may not be very surprising given the 
developing culture of working closely together in the development of the region as 
portrayed above. Decentralisation of competences from the EC level to especially the 
regional level was taking place, but at the early stages not in its fullest sense. 
Decentralisation only took place to the extent where overall responsibility for the 
implementation and approval of projects was still the responsibility of the national 
level. It could be speculated whether the function of the national level actors in the 
Steering Committee was to monitor that the programme proceeded according to the 
plan agreed with the Commission or whether the aim was to ensure that 
implementation took place in accordance with national legislation correspondingly.  
An alternative reading is that as this was an experiment concerning programming and 
decentralisation that challenged the existing Danish way of doing regional policy (i.e. 
through the Regional Development Act structure), the national level still wanted to 
maintain some control over regional policy-making despite its regional and EC level 
anchorage. The NordTek organisation resembled the institutional structure involved in 
national regional policy-making, although additional regional actors were involved 
reflecting the need to take action on regional needs. As discussed above, the national 
level was very influential in the process, thereby not allowing the regional level to 
completely take regional development into their own hands. In this sense, the 
institutional framework for national regional policy-making was extended in the 
regional set up. The EC also influenced the institution in that it required a regional 
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Executive Committee to be set up. As the new structure had to be implemented into 
regional non-existing structures, the regional level had to evaluate which structure 
would serve the region best based on the challenges that the region faced. This 
decision was based on the need to stick together to solve the problems. Thus, an 
institutional structure based on both national, EC and regional requirements was set 
up in the experiment. The first steps were taken towards a new institutionalised 
organisation of Danish regional policy-making with regional level capacity. The 
regional level capacity resembled an inclusive partnership along both vertical and 
horizontal lines of cooperation mainly based on bottom-up initiatives, but backed by 
the availability of EC funds leading the national level to take a coordinating position. 
Thus, by some coincidence North Jutland became a pilot study region for the 
Commission’s decentralisation and programme ideas. It may be argued that as these 
ideas had been latent in the Commission for some years, the Commission had been 
waiting for the right occasion to implement its ideas. That North Jutland became a 
pilot study region might not have been such a coincidence after all. North Jutland was 
a region known for its cooperative traditions in public policy-making (between the 
social partners and the government levels) (F. Christensen, personal interview) and 
the Commission wanted a model region with representative and cooperative 
experience; a region in which it would be easy to experiment with the emerging 
partnership objectives of the Commission. It was necessary to find a region in which 
the experiment would be a success. Another consideration the Commission might 
have made was that it was necessary to have some model programmes in North 
Europe that could be exemplary to the export of the programme and partnership 
ideas to the remaining member states, so the experiment had to be a success. In the 
end, the experience with the NordTek programme in North Jutland was arguably a 
great source of inspiration to the contents of the following reforms of the Structural 
Funds although other similar experiments might also have influenced the Commission 
perspectives (Poulsen and Hesselholt, personal interviews). Also in Denmark, the 
NordTek programme and the overall experiment with programming and working in 
partnership inspired other regions to adopt a similar approach, but this was not until 
years after the NordTek programme. For instance, Viborg County sought to copy the 
North Jutland approach in the EVA programme that was established in the run-up to 
the 1994-1999 programming period (Brask Pedersen, EU consultant in Viborg County 
1993-1998, personal interview and Halkier, 2008, 29). 
These events also had significant impact on future regional policy-making in North 
Jutland. First of all, the socio-economic conditions of the mid-1980s have inspired a 
specific way of cooperating in North Jutland in the overall interest of the region. A 
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strong tradition of working closely together with all actors affected has developed. 
Secondly, the NordTek programme has been the launching pad for an independent 
North Jutland regional policy consisting of measures with particular attention to 
support specific problems in the region. The new focus of regional policy was on 
stimulating the development of existing businesses through the supply of new 
knowledge enabling them to better compete in the Danish and international markets 
compared to the previous focus on direct subsidies to private businesses. Thus, 
regional policy came to embrace both labour market policy and industrial policy, 
which has been a specific characteristic of the North Jutland regional policy 
throughout time, but at the time it was unusual in a national context. The interplay 
between these two policies had not been seen in any other region at the time, and it 
was not until a decade later that a similar national approach towards coordination of 
all relevant policies to regional development was seen (see p. 168). Thirdly, the 
NordTek programme has been the initiator of the programme approach in North 
Jutland as required by the subsequent 1988 reform of the Structural Funds. The 
NordTek evaluation concludes that “NordTek is not an experimental programme that 
stops when the funding ends… A considerable part of the NordTek programme should 
accordingly be expected to be carried on after the termination of the programme 
period in 1991 with innovation for the region and the entire country” (translated from 
Olsen and Rieper, 1991, 17). Thus, the NordTek programme was already at this time 
considered a regional level institutional framework in the making; a programme to be 
extended into the future. Fourthly, and related to the first, experiences with an 
administration structure including the County, municipalities, educational institutions, 
labour market actors and businesses within the region inspired future implementation 
of EC/EU regional policy in North Jutland.  
During the operation of the NordTek programme, the challenge for regional 
development increased in that one of the largest work places in Aalborg, Aalborg 
Shipyard, was closed down in 1988. The shipyard closure affected the neighbouring 
municipalities in that many of the unemployed resided in these areas. One 
municipality that was specifically affected was the neighbouring Sejlflod municipality 
that lost its main source of revenue from taxes paid by the shipyard workers. It 
became an objective to find alternative sources of finances to the municipality. It was 
not considered sufficient to invest in new businesses in the area as they might also 
close down; alternative ideas had to be brought to the table. Here it was decided to 
involve the population of Sejlflod in the process of generating future growth and 
dynamic. This initiative resulted in the programme ‘Developing Sejlflod’ (Sejlflod i 
udvikling), another example of cooperation among actors in regional development 
responding to an immediate problem and an example of the notion that cooperation 
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was the way ahead for improved conditions for the region. The ‘Developing Sejlflod’ 
initiative has since been considered to be one of the foundations on which the future 
‘Aalborg Region Network’ is built. The municipality of Aalborg has since set up 
cooperation with its neighbouring municipalities on improving business conditions 
with the aim of supporting each other in difficult times, rather than steal work places 
from each other. The argument was that it was more productive to support the 
thriving businesses in the area than to establish competitive business in another area; 
in the end both businesses may end up closing down as a result of the competition. 
Arguably, the neighbouring municipalities will also benefit when businesses in other 
areas thrive in terms of tax payers, etc. In addition, the thriving businesses may be 
able to absorb the unemployed workforce thereby ensuring stability within the 
business sector (Simensen, personal interview). Besides local and regional initiatives 
to turn the situation around, the area received funds from the ERDF under the 
heading of the Renaval programme; an EC programme that was designed to support 
areas affected by negative development in areas depending on ship-building. A 
number of programmes under the ERDF sought to support specific areas that were 
dependent on specific lines of industry such as ship-building, mining and steel 
industries (Inforegio, 2008, 12).The Renaval programme was an independent 
programme set up to support the area around Aalborg after the shipyard closure in 
establishing new work places. The implementing actors were similar to the ones 
involved in the NordTek programme as the NordTek Steering Committee also acted as 
a Steering Committee for the implementation of all other EC Structural Funds 
programmes during the 1980s. This points in the direction of a strengthening of 
regional policy institutional establishment and development in the region, as well as 
emphasising the need to cooperate and coordinate in order to deal with the potential 
challenges that North Jutland would face. A regional policy institutional structure and 
approach was definitely in the process of being engineered at the regional level.  
A further indication of institutionalised structures for regional policy implementation 
is the fact that similar programmes were initiated during the late 1980s such as the 
Renaval programme employing the same structure. It can be considered an 
institutionalisation of regional level capacity in that several initiatives were launched 
during the 1980s, all supported with EC funds to address the negative socio-economic 
developments in the region. As all of these initiatives were anchored in the same 
organisational structure and the same assembly of actors, evidence points in the 
direction of a coordinated effort towards the creation of a regionally anchored 
institution for regional development. The NordTek programme and the structure for 
its implementation, like the parallel programmes at the time, may in this sense be 
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considered an institution that influenced the future composition and decision-making 
of actors and relations that were formed within it.  
From a historical institutionalist perspective, the institutionalisation of regional level 
competences to implement regional policy supports the above-analysed bottom-up 
developments that influenced the Danish regional policy-making institution in 1991. 
Thus, the bottom-up developments and the establishment of regional level capacity 
were based on internal manoeuvring among the actors involved in Danish regional 
policy-making. As such this internal behaviour resulted in a change to the existing 
institution towards a displacement of the existing institution as analysed above. 
However, from a regional level point of view, it may also be argued that a complete 
new regional policy-making institution within the frames of the overall Danish regional 
policy-making institution was in the making responsible for its own development. The 
experimental character of the NordTek programme initiated such a process. 
Since the success of the NordTek programme, the two-pronged regional development 
strategy laid down in the NordTek programme has been pursued, but the continued 
success of the strategy should also be seen in the light of other factors such as the 
presence of the necessary resources (innovative actors among private businesses and 
Aalborg University). Not only has the strategy been pursued strictly, the organisational 
set-up has also become a template for other programmes. The internal organisation 
was characterised by the increased involvement of a wide range of social partners in 
line with the regional, national and EU partners (Halkier, 2008, 30). This is illustrated 
in the following analysis of the implementation of the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds in North Jutland. 
7.2.2 The 1988 Reform of the Structural Funds – Institutionalising Regional 
Level Capacity 
Having terminated the NordTek programme, a number of experiences had been 
drawn from the administration of it. As mentioned, its operation and structure 
arguably inspired the Commission to reform the Structural Funds (the ESF and the 
ERDF), so that they in combination could support a balanced regional development in 
the member states. In this connection it should be remembered, however, that other 
factors also influenced the decision to establish an EC regional policy, such as the 
inclusion of two poor member states into the Community, the demand from Britain to 
receive compensation for its contribution to the overall EC budget as well and the 
Delors I package and the Padoa-Schioppa/Cecchini report suggesting a reformed 
structure for the Structural Funds (Inforegio, 2008, 8-9). But in this context the 
experiment carried out in North Jutland and regions in other member states such as 
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France and Ireland strongly inspired the contents and requirements of the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds (Roberts, 2003, 8). Especially, the principles of 
programming and partnership were tested in North Jutland. In some form these 
experiences were included into the reform of the Structural Funds able to fit the 15 
member states, at the time, which has already been discussed. As was also discussed, 
the organisational structure set up in North Jutland to administer the NordTek 
programme could be characterised as a premature partnership involving relevant 
actors along both vertical and horizontal lines. The partnership principle in its original 
form only required vertical organisation, so in this sense the North Jutland way of 
cooperating was ahead of its time vis-à-vis partnership principle requirements. 
Perhaps it was not a coincidence that North Jutland was chosen as a pilot study 
region. It could easily be speculated whether the intentions of the Commission was to 
create a wide inclusive partnership already at this time, but the member states were 
not ready to accept and adopt such a wide ranging structure. Therefore, the 
partnership principle was designed in such a way that it was possible to fit the 
structure into all member states’ own structures. 
The overall ambition of the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds was to reduce spatial 
disparities implying that it became necessary to target regional development funds in 
the neediest regions that were primarily situated in the Southern part of Europe 
(Dinan, 1999, 430). It should be remembered that the reform of the Structural Funds 
took place in the context of enlargement of the Community with three poor member 
states during the 1980s (i.e. Greece, Spain and Portugal). Therefore, the Northern part 
was not expected to receive comparably the same amount of Structural Funding. Seen 
from the North Jutland point of view, they did not initially expect to continue to be 
eligible of funding, but as the experiments with the NordTek programme in North 
Jutland and other similar projects in northern European regions were supposed to act 
as models for the rest of the eligible regions, it was considered necessary to keep 
some of these model regions in the new structure, even though they might not need 
the Funds. North Jutland was not an obvious beneficiary region in the new structure. 
As it turned out, however, six municipalities in North Jutland (i.e. Aalborg, Aabybro, 
Brønderslev, Dronninglund, Hals and Sejlflod – the same covered by the Renaval 
programme) became eligible to receive Objective 2 funding together with Lolland 
which had experienced similar crises during the mid-1980s (Hesselholt, personal 
interview). The allocation of funds to North Jutland and other Northern European 
regions should be seen in a wider perspective of negotiations forming the basis of the 
financial envelope for regional policy in the member states; it was a matter of high 
politics. In the first place, EC regional policy was a demand of the poor member states 
as compensation for the disadvantages of the Single Market to the competitiveness of 
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the poor member states. Britain and Germany, wealthier member states and net 
contributors to the EC budget, demanded compensation for agreeing to the Single 
Market as well, although they sympathised with the poor member states’ argument. 
The end result of the so-called ‘Delors I package’ was that regions within both 
Northern and Southern member states received funds, although Southern regions 
were favoured (Dinan, 1999, 433-4). It is evident when investigating the statistics of 
the dispersion of the Structural Funds that the core beneficiary member states during 
the 1989-1993 programming period were Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece receiving a 
total of 33 billion ECU of the 69 billion ECU that the Structural Funds made up 
altogether (Inforegio, 2008, 13 and Bechgaard et.al., 1993, 4). 
The 1988 reform of the Structural Funds was launched in the middle of the NordTek 
programme, which arguably made it easy for the regional administration of North 
Jutland to employ the Objective 2 Programme in North Jutland, as an organisational 
structure was already functioning. Experiences from the NordTek programme could 
be transferred to the Objective 2 administration. Likewise, many other individual 
programmes like the Renaval programme were appearing during the late 1980s to 
accommodate the regional problems of unemployment that were increasing, all of 
them able to employ the same organisational structure. These experiences point in a 
direction of a relatively smooth adoption of the requirements of the EC regulation 
framing the implementation of the policy in the member states. It was advantageous 
that North Jutland acted as a pilot region for the Commission experiment. Also at the 
national level, i.e. the DATI, the experience with dealing with the establishment and 
operation of the NordTek programme made the transition towards the new regime 
smoother. As such, Denmark was prepared for the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds and the requirements to implement EC regional policy, as a more 
comprehensive organisation had been rehearsed beforehand. 
Experience with the NordTek programme was both positive and negative. It was 
realised that it was necessary to make a more clear-cut distinction between the state 
approval of the projects and the regional day-to-day implementation. From a regional 
point of view it was evaluated that it was not desirable to have state level actors 
present in the regional Steering Committee any longer. Equally the state level had had 
time to see for themselves that the regional administration was able to run 
administration professionally, and that the regional administration had learned what 
the state (and EC) level accepted in terms of projects and the like, enabling regional 
administration to make its own judgements. This was the basis upon which the 
organisational structure in the first Objective 2 programming period was formed. The 
bottom-up developments during the 1980s also inspired a different composition of 
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the regional partnership than was required in the operation of the NordTek 
programme. Considerations about the future structure for Objective 2 Programme 
administration were also based on the desire to adopt the Structural Funds approach 
rather than the national Regional Development approach. Experience had shown that 
the funds from the Regional Development Act had externalised business expenditures 
by supporting the construction of physical buildings. The kick-effect was that many 
new businesses had moved to North Jutland because they could receive regional 
development support here. Arguably, these types of businesses were disloyal and 
ready to move to another place when a better opportunity presented itself. 
Therefore, these businesses were not naturally anchored in the existing business 
structure. This was not a desired outcome in the future. Thus, the aim was to create 
growth engines in the existing business structure so that businesses were 
strengthened and would stay in North Jutland instead of moving to other regions or 
even abroad. In this way it was also hoped that the unemployment void would be 
obliterated. These considerations were important to the organisation of the 
administration of the Structural Funds programmes in North Jutland at the time. 
Considerations regarding how to prioritise regional development initiatives in the 
programme influenced the way the partnership should be composed. It was important 
to include actors that were directly affected by these programmes (the regional 
problems which they attempted to address) in their daily work and thus had a finger 
on the pulse as to which priorities to make. It was crucial that these actors were able 
to make strategic and selective decisions regarding eligible projects with the potential 
to generate growth in the region. Actors at the national level were not in a position to 
make such evaluations. These decisions had to be regionally and locally anchored. It 
could also be argued that being directly involved in their own development; the 
regional and local actors would have a sense of ownership of the process (Hesselholt, 
personal interview). 
Thus, the NordTek organisational structure was to some extent developed in the 
Objective 2 Programme, although it was adjusted according to the above 
considerations. From a historical institutionalist perspective layering is taking place 
adding rules to the existing regional level institution that was established with the 
NordTek programme but with a regionally anchored organisation. It was considered 
important to establish a political body that was able to act as an umbrella body of the 
North Jutland County regional development programmes and the Structural Funds 
programme in order to coordinate the two approaches. The political body was to be 
placed under the County Council which was responsible for a number of constitutional 
tasks. It was necessary to establish a structure that could embrace the fact that the 
tasks that the County was responsible of (i.e. according to the Local Government Acts 
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and the Constitution) were different from the tasks associated with regional industrial 
policy and the administration of the Structural Funds; regional policy-making had not 
hitherto been the responsibility of the regional and local levels. Structural Funds 
administration was oriented towards promoting growth, dynamic and management of 
the businesses in the region. The Steering Committee came to act as such a body, 
implying that decision-making competences were transferred to the Steering 
Committee from the County Council (Hesselholt, personal interview). As such the 
County Council became responsible for regional policy implementation, but it 
assessed that it would not itself be able to implement the policy effectively as the 
County Council did not have knowledge about the specific needs of individual 
businesses of the regions or other relevant focus areas. Also, the Executive Committee 
was extended. Thus, voluntary delegation of competences to the two legitimising 
Committees (political and civil servant) and a secretariat sat the organisational frame. 
The fact that these organisations, i.e. the Steering Committee, the Executive 
Committee and the secretariat aiding the two Committees, were formalised with 
Orders of Businesses demonstrates that a regional institution was set up.  
In order to create such a body, availability of varied specific (human) resources was 
considered vital. First of all, national level actors were excluded from the set up as 
discussed above. Second, a standardised partnership model as the one suggested by 
the partnership principle was not the preferred solution, as it was feared that it would 
push cooperation in the Committee towards traditional solutions to the regional 
problem; rather, alternative approaches were preferred. The intention, based on the 
objectives of the Objective 2 Programme, was to generate growth in the existing 
business structure naturally rooted in the region. In order to legitimise such a process, 
it was crucial to invite actors that were knowledgeable of the groups or circles of 
people that were driving and directly involved in business development in the region, 
and these people might not be included in the partnership definition. This was clearly 
a bottom-up attempt to break free from the national approach to regional 
development through the Regional Development Act. Therefore, the Steering 
Committee was not composed according to traditional parity structures, but on a 
weighing of actors with relative knowledge and contact with business development. 
The relevant actors included in the Steering Committee were: representatives of the 
County, the municipalities, social partners and personally designated industrialist 
actors. 
The personally designated industrialist actors had special knowledge of the business 
structure, and compared to the other groups of actors they were in majority 
(Hesselholt labels them ‘industrialists’). The structure was not so much based on the 
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resources of interested parties but on actors holding certain knowledge and 
innovative skills. This implied that the social partners were not so strongly 
represented. It was not the intention to squeeze the social partners in this design; 
rather it was preferred to set up an organisation that was based on representation not 
based on the formal rhetoric of the organisations as has been hinted above, while 
more focused on achieving a common regional development aim. It was also 
important that the interests of the businesses and other beneficiaries or development 
drivers were represented in the decision-making process. The argument for choosing 
this structure was the overall aim of creating a North Jutland approach to regional 
development that was based on the selective prioritising of development projects that 
were naturally rooted in the North Jutland business environment. Although Hesselholt 
somehow excuses the ‘underrepresentation’ of the social partners, the fact that they 
were included altogether exceeds the requirements of the partnership principle. 
According to Hesselholt, it was the intention of the Commission already at this point 
in time that the social partners should be included in the partnership principle 
definition, but as it turned out they were not included in the EC Regulation. Thus, it is 
evident that the North Jutland partnership was well ahead of its time despite the 
‘underrepresentation’ of the social partners. Moreover, it was the intention that the 
Steering Committee should only consist of a limited number of actors enabling them 
to know each other well and ensuring an internal gravitation of ideas and sharing their 
respective philosophies concerning how to administrate the funds (Hesselholt, 
personal interview, and Bechgaard et.al., 1993, 4). As mentioned above, 
administration of the EC/EU programmes were all subject to the same organisational 
structure. This implied that the gallery of characters was repeated in the Objective 2 
Steering Committee and the overall politically responsible Steering Committee for 
regional development in North Jutland. The overall responsible Steering Committee 
was named the North Jutland Development Fund (Nordjyllands Udviklingsfond, NUF)
11
 
and established with Orders of Business. Like the function of the Steering Committee 
was extended into the Objective 2 Programmes, so was the function of the Executive 
Committee. The relation between the two Committees was also extended. With this 
particular organisation between the Steering Committee composed of politicians and 
the Executive Committee composed of civil servants, it was argued that regional 
political consensus would be strengthened, consequently strengthening the regional 
                                                                
11 From now on reference to NUF signifies the Steering Committee that is both responsible for coordinating 
regional, national and EU regional policy initiatives and the Steering Committee responsible for approving 
Objective 2 projects. 
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actors vis-à-vis the national level also. In this sense, the national level would be less 
likely to disregard the North Jutland preferences. 
7.2.3 The Continued Development of Regional Level Capacity 
It has been difficult to collect data concerning the programming period immediately 
after the first programming period, as on the one hand, the interviewees had difficulty 
recollecting details from this time. On the other hand, it proved difficult to access 
documents from this period as the County’s data-base did not contain documents that 
old. Some documents had become inaccessible as result of the reorganisation of the 
local governments during the 2005 reform and the consequent reorganisation of 
digital information. Besides, the County level/region is by now more preoccupied with 
the present programming period and to some extent also the previous one, for which 
reason old paper material had been destroyed. Therefore, the analysis of the 
development of the North Jutland regional institutional structure is based on the 
1994-1999 Objective 2 Programme for North Jutland. Here, the 2000-2006 Objective 2 
Programme is not analysed as this would be repetition of the same task in the 
forthcoming analysis of the inclusion and process aspects of partnership during the 
2000-2006 programming period. Moreover, the contents of the national Objective 2 
Programme analysed in the previous section sets the frame for partnership operation 
in North Jutland as well. The analysis of the contents of the 1994-1999 Objective 2 
Programme is arguably sufficient to support the statement that the regional level 
institution for coordinating and implementing regional, national and EU regional 
policies was extended leading to a complex organisation for the implementation of 
partnership. 
The Objective 2 Programme for the 1994-1999 programming period in North Jutland 
repeated the organisational structure which the first Objective 2 Programme had 
established. NUF was the politically responsible body. The Executive Committee was 
engaged in coordinating “a close cooperation between the main interests in the 
business development in North Jutland county” (translated from COWI, 1999, 38) 
through the evaluation of project applications. Before such an evaluation was made 
different specialist advisory groups (in the areas of industry and service, education 
and tourism) offered specialist knowledge regarding a project’s future perspectives 
for generating growth and regional development. So, an evaluation and approval of a 
project was a three-staged process in close cooperation among the relevant actors 
that had been present in the set up since the NordTek programme. This organisation 
differed slightly from the previous organisation where no specialist advisory groups 
were attached to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee and the 
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specialist advisory groups were composed of civil servants; the Executive Committee 
had a narrow representation of the County, the Association of Municipalities in North 
Jutland and the social partners (i.e. both employers and employees organisations). 
Thus, this organisation was repeated from the previous round of programming. NUF, 
legitimising the process politically was composed of politicians with a wider 
representation of North Jutland County (including the County Mayor as chairman), of 
the municipalities, of North Jutland Business Council, of the social partners and 
personally appointed representatives of the North Jutland business environment.  
It is clear that the representation in the Steering Committee for the 1994-1999 
programming period was extended compared to the previous round involving also 
representation of the business sector although anchored at the municipal level. The 
widening of the North Jutland regional policy institution can be considered a 
strengthening and development of the institution as a result of layering that took 
place before this programming period. 
After the 1991 termination of the national approach to regional policy-making and the 
acceptance of regional and EC approaches, the established regional structure became 
legalised and institutionalised into the national regional policy-making institution. 
Regional partnerships were here to stay, and the North Jutland regional organisation 
was extended with the same composition and role played by the Committees 
although with some minor changes compared to the previous period. Similarly, the 
1994-1999 Objective 2 Programme defined the regional level partnership to have the 
same construction as in the previous programmes where a functional division of 
responsibility was preferred between the Executive and the Steering Committees. 
Continuing the first established network organisation with NUF and the Executive 
Committee suggested that this structure was developed and rehearsed for two rounds 
of programming and a culture of cooperation had been firmly established. 
7.3 A Concluding Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
The institutional developments which took place at the regional level must be seen 
within the national level institutional framework and its coordination with the EC/EU 
regional policy-making institution. Thus, the developments here were shaped by the 
overall institution in which they occur. The analysis of the coordination between the 
Danish and EC/EU regional policies illustrates that coordination gradually led to 
institutional change through displacement and layering, so that new vertical 
organisation and functional division of responsibilities among the involved levels were 
generated. Among other things, these types of change were rooted in the bottom-up 
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developments during the 1980s in Danish regional policy-making. The analysis of the 
development of Danish regional policy-making emphasises this conclusion, but at the 
same time it also accentuates that the establishment and development of regional 
level competences took place ahead of the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds 
formally establishing a role for the regional level in Danish regional policy-making. 
In North Jutland, the establishment of regional level capacity was based on the 
NordTek programme as an experiment and EC support, but the development of the 
North Jutland regional policy-making institution was based more on their own 
regional experiences, which of course were inspired by external conditions and events 
(such as national policy-making, the 1988 reform, etc.). The tradition in which 
everybody cooperated to solve problems in North Jutland was the most influential 
characteristic of the development of the North Jutland regional policy institution, 
especially in the coordination of national, regional and EC/EU regional policies into a 
specific North Jutland regional policy-making approach. It has proved that the 
cooperative tradition in North Jutland was the driving force for the institutionalisation 
of regional level capacity. Moreover, the cooperative tradition was the lens through 
which partnership was interpreted: in North Jutland, it was tradition to cooperate 
closely with relevant and interested partners to the achievement of a common goal of 
regional development of the entire region. This gradually developed into a specific 
variant of partnership or network organisation in North Jutland. 
The conclusion to this analysis is that regional level capacity to accommodate the 
implementation of EC/EU regional policies, partly dependent on national and on 
EC/EU regional policy-making institutions, was established and continuously 
developed into a specific North Jutland regional policy institution. 
Based on this analysis, within Danish regional policy-making, three interrelated 
regional policy-making institutions came to exist: 1) the Danish regional policy-making 
institution independent from the EU framing all regional policy-making activity and 
institutions; 2) a Danish approach to a coordinated regional policy institution with the 
EU leading to a functional division of responsibilities; and 3) specific regional level 
institutions implementing coordinated regional policies (Danish, regional and EU). 
Apparently, three regional policy-making institutions exist in Denmark, but due to 
their interrelatedness, they all function within the same overall framework of the 
Danish regional policy-making institution coordinating regional policy-making in a 
complex network. Regional policy-making has become a complex organisation of 
three independent but related initiatives that were primarily financed and regulated 
by the EU level, coordinated at the national level, and implemented at the regional 
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level all with their institutional characteristics. The development of these ‘sub-
institutions’ shaped each other: the regional level institution was established as a 
reaction to internal struggles in the Danish regional policy-making institution. The 
development of the Danish regional policy institution was also shaped by the parallel 
developing EC/EU regional policy-making institution, leading to development of a 
culture of working in partnership, the difference being that partnerships in Danish 
regional policy-making were voluntary whereas partnerships in EC/EU regional policy 
were (and are) obligatory as defined in EU Regulation. Finally, the coordinated 
regional policy approach has roots in both the Danish and the EC/EU regional policy-
making structures. Thus, in Denmark, the regional policy-making institution developed 
into a mishmash of networks operating at different levels of government (and 
institutional levels) in vertical and horizontal relations with each other within the 
coordinated regional policy-making approach. 
To conclude, an institutionalisation of a specific North Jutland approach to partnership 
based on voluntary delegation to a formal network that resembled the definition of 
the partnership principle took place through an approach that was ahead of its time. 
The partnership set up in the NordTek experiment was wider than that required in the 
first reform of the Structural Funds involving both vertical and horizontal actors. 
Despite this, the North Jutland partnership changed over the course of time as 
experience with this type of cooperation increased and new rounds of programming 
changed the objectives and instruments of the policy. It was a continuous 
development of increased involvement and extension of the members of the 
voluntary Committees, and interdependence between actors has increased with the 
institutionalisation of governance practices. Thus, facing the 2000-2006 programming 
period, the partnership may be expected to reflect these experiences which the 
contents and governance structures presented in the Objective 2 Programme also 
point towards. This is the basis of the forthcoming analysis of the interpretation and 
implementation of the partnership inclusion and process requirements. 
Arguably, the most relevant institution to analyse in terms of inclusion and process is 
found at the regional level, which has the most complex organisation. Investigating 
vertical partnerships, though, it is necessary to analyse all levels in relation to each 
other, but regarding horizontal organisation, the regional level is the most convincing 
place to find this type of organisation. 
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8. Partnership – Inclusion and Process 
This chapter presents the analysis of the implementation and interpretation of the 
partnership principle into the coordinated Danish and EU regional policy-making 
institution, as analysed in the previous two sub-analyses, and how it was unfolded 
into partnership inclusion and process. The previous analysis illustrated that the most 
obvious change that occurred in Danish regional policy-making was the establishment 
and development of regional level competences to implement and coordinate Danish 
and EU regional policies. Moreover, the analysis illustrated that the coordination of 
Danish and EU regional policies gradually generated a functional division of 
responsibilities for the operation of the Structural Funds in combination with the 
parallel Danish approach. This took place in order to avoid duplication of two similar 
systems. Basically, these developments were rooted in the bottom-up developments 
that took place in the 1980s and supported by events occurring simultaneously, such 
as the gradual reduction of funds to support regional development under the Regional 
Development Act, the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds demanding that 
partnership structures were set up to implement EC regional policy (as a condition for 
receiving the funds). Hereafter, a vertical structure for Danish regional policy-making 
was set up and the regional level was acknowledged as an equal partner in regional 
policy-making. Based on the new vertical structure for regional policy-making in 
Denmark and the functional division of responsibilities, horizontal cooperation 
developed leading to the conclusion the most appropriate level to detect and 
scrutinise partnership was the regional level.  
Thus, the present analysis takes its point of departure in the functional division of 
responsibilities, the vertical structure and the horizontal cooperation at the regional 
level and focuses on the 2000-2006 programming period although the experience 
with partnership during the preceding programming periods from the NordTek 
programme is also briefly analysed in order to be able to grasp the influence on the 
developments of the 2000-2006 programming period and how it has shaped the 
partnership during the 2000-2006 programming period. Arguably, the implementation 
and interpretation of partnership during this programming period have roots in the 
institutional developments during the 1980s and a gradual development of the 
regional level institution for its implementation as identified in the previous sub-
analysis of the coordination between EU and Danish regional policy-making leading to 
the expectation that the partnership was changed accordingly.  
To complete such a partnership analysis, the following analysis is divided into 5 
sections, where the first is the analysis of the partnership developments in North 
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Jutland from the NordTek programme until the threshold of the 2000-2006 
programming period. It is natural to return to North Jutland as this is where it all 
began, and as North Jutland is the only region that has received Objective 2 funding 
ever since. For that reason it could be expected that a stable structure for 
partnerships to operate in has been built, which is supported by the analysis of the 
institutionalisation of regional level competences. The second section is concerned 
with the overall frame of the following analysis of the 2000-2006 partnership 
interpretation: it argues how partnerships existed on many levels and how they were 
related, leading to vertical and horizontal interaction thereby introducing and 
explaining the structure of the subsequent sections. The third section is concerned 
with the analysis of the European level partnership, how it operated and determined 
the partnerships in the member states. Similarly, the fourth section analyses national 
level partnership. Here, focus is on the coordinating responsibility of the state level in 
formulating and designing the regional development programmes for the country, and 
in monitoring the implementation of the programme. Clear partnership relations are 
found between the state level and the regional and EU levels. In section five, 
constituting the core analysis of the Danish partnership, I return to the case of North 
Jutland in the evaluation of the employment of the inclusion and process parameters 
of partnership.  
Whereas the previous two sub-analyses were based only on historical institutionalist 
tools, the present analysis is based on historical institutionalism, network governance 
and Åkerstrøm Andersen’s partnership definition where network analysis moves into 
the foreground. The data used for illustration here comprises interview material, 
based on a semi-structured interview guide, with representatives of the North Jutland 
partnership as well as centrally placed representatives of the national partnership. 
The questions asked mainly reflect the theoretical terminology of the network 
governance and partnership approaches, although some questions reflect the 
historical development that has taken place throughout North Jutland’s partnership 
experience. These representatives have been carefully selected so to represent a 
broad selection of organisations in the partnership; varying roles and positions in the 
partnership organisation; and varying time perspectives in terms of membership 
(some have been included since its establishment while others have only been 
included during the 2000-2006 programming period). This implies that the data for 
analysis comprises a rich body of transcribed material based on ‘storytelling’ of the 
interviewees of their experiences with working in the North Jutland and national 
partnerships. Moreover, the interviews are supported by primary documents such as 
annual reports, Regulations, minutes of meetings in the partnership, orders of 
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business and the like. Hereby, I am able to analyse the expected gradual development 
of both the inclusion and process perspective across levels of partnership.       
Carrying out this analysis can be compared to putting together a jigsaw puzzle with 
many pieces. The experience of all the interviewees are part of the same picture of 
partnership, and they each contribute with their own piece that has to be placed 
correctly in order for the jigsaw puzzle to become complete. Additionally, primary 
sources also constitute pieces that either fit with or support the pieces of the 
interviewees. Sometimes the pieces have to be placed in a certain order for it to make 
sense and for them to fit together with the other pieces. In the end, they all make up 
the jigsaw puzzle of the partnership. The following is my attempt to put this jigsaw 
puzzle together.    
8.1 Partnership Experiences until 2000 
This analysis takes its point of departure in the final argument presented in the 
previous chapter on the interaction between Danish and EU regional policy-making, 
and how the regional level had been elevated to establish regional level competences 
for its implementation that the most appropriate level to detect and analyse the 
interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle is at the regional level. 
Thus, based on this argument, the following analysis of partnership experiences until 
2000 is focused on the regional level. It relies primarily on secondary research but is 
supported by the recollection of the interviewees. In this connection, it should be 
noted that it is always a problem to recall events 10-20 years ago; sometimes only 
fragmented recollections will present themselves. Accordingly, the interviews must be 
supplemented with research carried out retrospectively when things were taking 
place. This implies that the arguments presented in the following analysis are based 
on the research framework of others, which may not be quite in line with my 
framework of analysis. In the ‘Revisiting Partnership in Practise - State of the Art’ 
chapter it was argued, based on the review of literature concerning Danish regional 
policy-making, that existing literature mainly focused on the vertical organisation of 
partnership. The horizontal aspect was recognised, but not analysed in the same 
detail. Thus, a thorough analysis of horizontal partnerships was lacking. This implies 
that my contribution to the Danish regional policy-making research presents a new, 
more thorough angle on the perspective. Therefore, relying on other scholars’ 
research to investigate the historical development of partnership in Denmark renders 
this investigation incomplete. In particular, existing research has not focused as much 
on the process aspect of partnership as I do, which in turn makes it somewhat difficult 
for me to evaluate the development of the process to the same extent as the inclusion 
228 
 
aspect, which is documented in several Programmes and Regulations. The process, in 
contrast, remains a recollection of the partners. Based on this line of argument, the 
following analysis of the development of partnership until 2000 is mainly concerned 
with the inclusion aspect – at least until the 1994-1999 programming period, where 
the recollection of the interviewees is better and where related research has been 
carried out. 
8.1.1 Partnership Experiences in the NordTek Programme 
The NordTek programme became the launching pad for an independent North Jutland 
regional policy consisting of measures with particular attention to support specific 
problems in the region. The new focus of regional policy was on stimulating the 
development of existing businesses through the supply of new knowledge enabling 
them to better compete in the Danish and international markets compared to the 
previous focus on direct subsidies to private businesses. Thus, regional policy came to 
embrace both labour market policy and industrial policy, which has turned out to be a 
specific characteristic of the North Jutland regional policy in general, but it was 
unusual at the time in a national context. The interplay between these two policies 
had not been seen in any other region at the time, and it was not until a decade later 
that a similar national approach towards coordination of all relevant policies to 
regional development was seen (see chapter p. 168). The specific North Jutland 
regional policy framework determined the partnership in that it defined the actors to 
be included in the partnership or network. 
The previous analysis has illustrated that the experimental NordTek programme was 
an experiment into both programming and organisation. In order to administer the 
programme at regional level, a Steering Committee, an Executive Committee and a 
secretariat for the NordTek programme were set up. This was a completely new 
organisational structure at the regional level. The NordTek Executive Committee was 
composed of representatives (civil servants) from: 
 North Jutland County 
 the Regional Development Directorate in Silkeborg  
 North Jutland Business Council 
 Aalborg University 
 North Jutland Information Technology Council (Nordjysk Informatikråd) 
 Technological Information Centre (TIC) 
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Thus, the Executive Committee was composed of members representing both the 
regional and national levels as well as private actors, but chaired by the Director of the 
County civil servants (amtsdirektøren). Similarly, the Steering Committee, a political 
body, was composed of representatives from: 
 Aalborg University  
 the Labour Market Board for North Jutland County 
 the Ministry of Labour 
 DATI 
 the Commission 
 the Ministry of the Interior 
 the Association of Municipalities in North Jutland County 
(kommuneforeningen i Nordjyllands Amt) 
 the Ministry of the Environment 
 North Jutland Business Council 
 North Jutland Information Technology Council (Nordjysk Informatikråd) 
 the national level Information Technology Council 
 three members of the Finance Committee (økonomiudvalget) of North 
Jutland County Council  
 the County Council general administration (fællesforvaltning)  
 six personally appointed members (appointed by the County Mayor) 
The Steering Committee was composed of members representing the EC, national and 
regional levels as well as private actors, but chaired by the County Mayor (Olsen and 
Rieper, 1991, 189-90). Evidently, both Committees were composed of a wide range of 
relevant actors to the promotion of regional development in North Jutland, but it is 
also conspicuous how the Steering Committee legitimising the implementation 
process was inhabited by six out of 21 members from the national and EC levels. The 
composition of the Steering Committee was to some extent a copy of the national 
structure for managing national regional development policy but also influenced by 
the EC requests. The Executive Committee, however, appeared to be more regionally 
anchored with only one national representative. It was a partnership dominated by 
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regional actors, but the presence of national and EC level actors in the partnership 
should not be ignored. This points in a direction of an emerging experience with 
working in partnership, which may not be so surprising given the developing culture of 
working closely together in the development of the region as portrayed above. This 
was the first indication of a vertical partnership. 
Besides these two Committees, a secretariat placed at the North Jutland County 
Council acted as secretariat to the two Committees. Procedure was that applications 
for projects were initially contended with in the secretariat and then sent them to the 
Executive Committee which pointed out eligible projects before the Steering 
Committee made the final decision. Thus, the processing of projects was a hierarchical 
process starting from below with a clear functional division of responsibilities. The 
specific structure with both an Executive Committee (which was a requirement of the 
regulative framework shaping the programmes and their implementation) and a 
Steering Committee has come to be a specific North Jutland organisational solution to 
partnership. No other region in Denmark had a similar set up with both Committees; 
rather they only have the Executive Committee. The organisational structure set up in 
North Jutland to administer the NordTek programme could be characterised as a 
premature partnership involving relevant actors along both vertical and horizontal 
lines. The partnership principle in its original form only required vertical organisation, 
so in this sense the North Jutland way of cooperating was more advanced already at 
this time than required by the partnership principle. The organisational structure 
found in the following programming periods was rooted in this experimental structure 
of the NordTek programme as will be seen in the following. 
8.1.2 Partnership Experiences during the 1989-1993 Programming Period 
In the previous analysis of the development of regional level competences to 
implement regional policy in North Jutland, it was argued that the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds was launched in the middle of the NordTek programme. This 
arguably made it easy for the regional administration of North Jutland to employ the 
Objective 2 Programme in North Jutland, as a functioning organisational structure was 
already in place. Experiences from the NordTek programme could be transferred to 
the Objective 2 administration leading to a great extent to an extension of the 
partnership organisation of the NordTek partnership, at least in terms of structure. As 
such, the County Council became responsible of regional policy implementation, but it 
assessed that effective implementation of the policy had to be carried out by another 
body, as the County Council did not have the necessary knowledge about the specific 
needs of individual businesses or other relevant focus areas in the region. Therefore, 
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decision-making competences were transferred to the Steering Committee 
(Hesselholt, personal interview). In 1992, the Steering Committee changed its name to 
the North Jutland Development Fund (Nordjyllands Udviklingsfond, NUF) but 
extended its role and decision-making competences. Also, the role of the Executive 
Committee was extended. Thus, voluntary delegation of competences to the two 
legitimising Committees (political and civil servant) and a secretariat continued to set 
the organisational frame although representation within this organisation was 
changed. 
In terms of inclusion and exclusion of actors, the EC and national level actors were 
excluded from the implementation process at the regional level, which made room for 
an increased number of regionally anchored actors with varying interests and 
attachments to regional development. Considerations regarding how to prioritise 
regional development initiatives in the programme influenced the way the 
partnership was composed. It was important to include actors that were directly 
affected by these programmes (the regional problems which they attempted to 
address) in their daily work and thus had a finger on the pulse as to which priorities to 
make. A standardised partnership model as the one suggested by the partnership 
principle was not the preferred solution as it was feared that it would affect 
cooperation in the Committee towards traditional solutions to the regional problem; 
rather alternative approaches were preferred. The intention, based on the objectives 
of the Objective 2 Programme, was to generate growth in the existing business 
structure naturally rooted in the region. In order to legitimise such a process, it was 
crucial to invite actors that were knowledgeable of the groups or circles of people that 
were driving and directly involved in business development in the region as these 
people might not be included in the partnership definition (Hesselholt, personal 
interview). Similarly, it was considered crucial to include geographical representation 
of the municipalities as the whole region was to be covered by one representative of 
the Aalborg area which was considered the driving force of regional development in 
the NordTek programme as well as a municipality representation of the remaining 
areas. This implies that at this point in time, the interpretation of the partnership 
principle and how it was translated into a North Jutland partnership exceeded the 
partnership requirements, as it was based on other considerations, as illustrated by 
the previous analysis of the development of regional level competences such as the 
need to stick together to address the challenges spurred by business closures and 
unemployment problems. This partnership was based on an evaluation of which 
resources were needed in the partnership in order to implement a successful regional 
development policy. 
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8.1.3 Partnership Experiences during the 1994-1999 Programming Period 
The Objective 2 programme for the 1994-1999 programming period in North Jutland 
repeated the organisational structure which the first Objective 2 Programme had 
established. NUF was the politically responsible body while the Executive Committee 
was engaged in coordinating “a close cooperation between the main interests in the 
business development in North Jutland county” (translated from COWI, 1999, 38) 
through the evaluation of project applications. To ensure the quality of the evaluation, 
different specialist advisory groups (in the areas of industry and service, education 
and tourism) offered specialist knowledge regarding a project’s future perspectives 
for generating growth and regional development. Therefore, evaluation and approval 
of a project was a three-staged process in close cooperation among relevant actors 
that had been present in the set up since the NordTek programme. This organisation 
differed slightly from the previous organisation where no specialist advisory groups 
were attached to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee and the 
specialist advisory groups (such as North Jutland Business Service, (deconcentrated 
central government bodies) and the NOVI Science Park in Aalborg) were composed of 
civil servants. The Executive Committee had a narrow representation of (COWI, 1999 
and Halkier, 1996, 6-8 and 11): 
 the County (chair of the Committee) 
 the Association of Municipalities in North Jutland 
 the social partners (i.e. both employers and employees organisations) 
Thus, this organisation was repeated from the previous round of programming. NUF, 
which made the process politically legitimate, was composed of politicians with a 
wider representation:  
 three representatives of North Jutland County (including the County Mayor 
as chairman) 
 three representatives of the municipalities 
 two representatives of North Jutland Business Council 
 two representatives of the social partners  
 five personally appointed representatives of the North Jutland business 
world  
It is clear that the representation in the Steering Committee for the 1994-1999 
programming period was extended compared to the previous round, involving 
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representation of the business sector also although they were anchored at the 
municipal level. Like the partnership definition was extended and widened inclusion 
wise, so was the membership of NUF. Arguably, parallel extensions of the two 
institutions took place, but perhaps not necessarily as related processes. 
Considerations regarding the widening of NUF may not have taken place because the 
partnership definition was extended, but rather because of the tradition of working 
together in North Jutland on regional development and because the relevant and 
interested parties would be invited to participate. Halkier (1996, 8) concluded that 
“partnership in North Jutland appears to be a triangular relationship between the 
county, industry and representatives of local areas”, thereby involving both private 
and public actors based on the gradual development of the partnership since the 
NordTek Programme to include wider and deeper representation of regionally and 
locally anchored actors with special interest in and affected by regional industrial 
development. Especially the involvement of the industrialists (industrial actors 
representing the business sector) was considered important in the partnership as they 
held information concerning the needs of the industry since they had a finger on the 
pulse (Hesselholt, personal interview). Simultaneously, it should be noticed that the 
municipalities had three representatives compared to two actors in the 1994 NUF 
organisation reflecting a transpiring need to address geographical disagreements and 
differences. It was also a response to the initiative of the geographical areas to set up 
municipal networks. Defined by geography, three groups of municipal networks were 
formed to pool resources in the common generation of project applications. 
Vendsyssel Udviklingsråd (VUR) was situated in the Northern part of the region 
whereas Himmerland Udviklingsråd covered the Southern part of the region. In 
between these two peripheral networks, the Aalborg Region Network was situated 
(Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 56 and Halkier and Damborg, 2000, 96-7). 
Within the formally required partnership consisting of the Executive Committee and 
NUF, the most influential partner was the County Council as it played several roles in 
the partnership: primarily, it was the largest financial sponsor of projects; it was 
responsible of the implementation of the Objective 2 programme; it had voluntarily 
delegated decision-making authority to NUF and the Executive Committee, implying 
that it remained overall responsible of the decisions reached within the partnership; 
and through the Regional Development Department it offered secretariat functions to 
NUF and the Executive Committee. Moreover, sub-regional actors in economic 
development were represented primarily as municipality councils with business 
advisory services in association with local business actors. Similarly, the social partners 
were represented in both Committees implying their importance to regional 
development decision-making in North Jutland. 
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Based on the inclusion of these different actors in the partnership, Halkier and 
Flockhart (2002, 58), identify three types of partnership: strategic partnerships such as 
NUF and sub-regional networks that were established during the 1990s (VUR, HUR 
and the Aalborg Region Network); institutional partnerships implying the connection 
between the Committees and the private sector actors outside the partnership 
organisation (the industrialists); and project partnerships that were more short-term. 
Thus, within the overall partnership approach in North Jutland during the 1994-1999 
programming period, Halkier and Flockhart have identified different levels and types 
of partnerships into a complex organisation of different networks that were related to 
each other criss-cross. Unfortunately, the study does not go into detail with the 
nature of such relations, but argues that the partnership was based on the County 
Council perspective to include ‘the relevant actors’ and ‘all interested parties’, which 
suggests that the partnership in terms of inclusion was very open to the entrance of 
new interested partners as long as they contributed to the process through their 
resources (financial, organisational or informational) (Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 60-
1).  
A similar study carried out by Halkier and Damborg (2000, 103-9) argues that the 
relations in North Jutland regional policy-making during this programming period was 
based on four resource dependencies: authority, finance, information and 
organisation. For instance, they identify the establishment of sub-regional networks 
among municipalities (VUR and HUR) as an attempt to pool resources in relation to 
the County on the one hand but also the Aalborg area on the other. Additionally, they 
label the exchange of resources between the partnership organisations and 
surrounding partners, which the partnership (i.e. NUF, the Executive Committee and 
the secretariat) have created for an implementing purpose, as ‘complex’ and based on 
ad hoc evaluation of the situation as well as some resource dependencies. These 
patterns of relations reflected horizontal cooperation between the municipalities 
within the sub-regional networks as well as among the organisations created by the 
partnership organisation with the purpose of implementation, as some of them 
directed themselves to the same clients. Vertical cooperation also took place, 
especially between the County Council and NUF as well as NUF and sub-regional 
actors. According to this study, it appears that cooperation in North Jutland regional 
policy-making towards the implementation of the policy was characterised by several 
relations among and between actors directly involved in the decision-making 
organisation (i.e. NUF and the Executive), but definitely also with actors surrounding 
that organisation without a clear mapping of these relations. Everybody who was 
‘relevant’ and interested in regional development within the framework of the 
Objective 2 Programme was invited to be involved in the process; or established to 
235 
 
perform specific tasks to the organisation by the organisation; or self-established to 
counter-weigh the relative power of other partners. Somehow, a picture emerges in 
which regional development efforts were of two types: either coordinated long-term 
efforts through the partnership organisation or uncoordinated ad hoc efforts 
concerned with shorter-term efforts. Thus, it was a network of relations among and 
between organisations formally responsible of regional policy-making in North Jutland 
(i.e. the Executive Committee and NUF) and those situated outside the formal 
organisation. 
Some indication of the interpretation of the partnership process is found in Halkier’s 
1997 study: within the triangular partnership, a division of responsibility was present 
for the processing of project applications generated from the businesses in the region 
which dates back to the NordTek programme. The Steering Committee (i.e. NUF) and 
the Executive Committee made up the core decision-making bodies which single out 
project applications eligible of funding. Through a hierarchical line of work, from the 
secretariat through the Executive Committee to NUF, the applications were prepared 
to make them eligible, singled out and in the end recommended to the DATI for 
Structural Funds support. At the ground level, the secretariat had the immediate 
contact with the applicant businesses, which together with these actors, prepared the 
application, sometimes with the advice of the abovementioned advisory committees. 
This implies that the role of the secretariat was to feed the decision-making system 
with project applications suitable for evaluation. The applications were sent to the 
Executive Committee which in most cases formally evaluated the eligibility of the 
applications and recommended them to the DATI, but sometimes NUF was brought 
into the decision-making regarding acceptance of the decision made by the Executive 
Committee in cases of doubt and disagreement (Halkier, 1997, 10-11).  
8.1.4 A Combined Historical Institutionalist and Network Governance 
Analysis of the Interpretation of Partnership until 2000 
Within the regional policy implementation (institutional) structure, a network of 
relations transpires although it has not been analysed directly. The network 
governance approach argues that the relations between actors in a network are 
influenced by its composition and the resources brought to the network by actors 
among other things. Here the focus has been on the composition of the two 
Committees (Steering and Executive) and how the inclusion of actors into this 
organisation has changed. 
The regional level institutional structure can be considered a growing network of 
relations between regional, local and private actors to become involved in the 
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development of the region. Therefore, the institutional structure formed the 
framework in which network relations took place. Evidence points in this direction, as 
new actors not previously seen in regional policy-making became gradually more 
involved and purposely invited by the County Council instead of the latter taking 
responsibility of the policy singlehandedly. The benefits of working together were 
bigger than the County Council working alone and alternatively, the implementing 
actors working alone which indicate that the partnership organisation in North Jutland 
resembled a network. Due to the socio-economic conditions in North Jutland during 
the 1980s, actors became dependent on each other’s resources for partly their own 
development but also the development of the region as a whole. The delegation of 
competences to ‘relevant’ actors by invitation to implement the policy established 
network relations, as these actors were intended to bring their resources and 
knowledge to the table, resources and knowledge that the County Council did not 
necessarily have itself. It must be remembered that the County Council was a 
politically elected body expected to be responsible for all tasks assigned to it by the 
Constitution and subsequent public policy and local government reforms. Regional 
policy had not been a responsibility assigned to the regional level until then. 
Therefore, a coordinated regional effort had not been employed. Setting up such 
structures for the coordination of a regional approach to regional policy-making as 
well as the growing EC regional policy had consequences. Thus, the institutional set up 
to coordinate this effort initiated a process of change from government to governance 
in which networks became central at the regional level. 
With the decision to change the organisation in terms of composition after the 
experiment with the NordTek programme, a regional level network definitely saw the 
light of day. This is particularly clear in the raison d’être of the Steering Committee in 
how it became integrated with NUF and how responsibilities for that Committee were 
extended. It fits neatly with the definition of a governance network presented in the 
theoretical chapter, namely that networks consist of public, semi-public and private 
actors that are interdependent and negotiate within the externally given institution-
like frames, but is not an institution since it is self-regulating. Generally, the 
composition of the partnership in the first Objective 2 Programme following the 
NordTek programme increased the involvement of regional, local and private actors 
seen in the NordTek programme, but national level actors were excluded thereby 
firmly anchoring the network in the region rather than in the national institutional set 
up. Moreover, certain actors were considered more relevant than others in this 
structure; it was important that the composition of the Committees reflected the 
focus areas of the programmes as well as the areas within the region in need of 
development. Actors involved in these areas were considered ‘relevant’ as they could 
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bring resources such as information about the specific needs and political back up to 
the process. These considerations regarding the composition of the implementation 
structure, or the partnership, exceeded the requirements of the partnership principle 
which was first introduced with the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds. It was argued 
that the partnership principle defined cooperation in a more traditional partite 
manner, which would affect cooperation and implementation in North Jutland in a 
negative way in that the right projects with the greatest potential for generating 
growth might not be preferred. Additionally, the fact that the responsibility for 
implementation of regional policy was delegated from the County Council to 
voluntary Committees, and that a functional division of responsibilities between the 
two was preferred, indicates that a complex partnership organisation was in the 
making. This structure implied coordination and network relations between the two 
Committees and the County Council that are not analysed here. It is sufficient to say 
that the structure established following the first round of Objective 2 programming in 
1988, set the context for future complex relations and interaction exceeding the 
partnership requirements of the EC. From a historical institutionalist point of view, the 
partnership organisation established in the NordTek programme was re-interpreted 
leading to conversion of the existing partnership organisation.  
A similar result can be found in the analysis of the 1994-1999 Objective 2 Programme 
continuation of the partnership organisation, despite the addition of advisory actors 
outside the formally required partnership organisation. Like the inclusion of actors 
into the two Committees, the involvement of organisations outside the formally 
required partnership indicates layering to the institution as explained by the historical 
institutionalist perspective. From at network governance point of view, the 
partnership organisation developed into a network that invited more and more actors 
into the network, based on their resources such as information and financial 
resources relevant to the overall North Jutland regional development strategy, and 
not so much based on the requirement of the partnership principle as the partnership 
organisation itself exceeded these requirements ever since its establishment. Other 
regionally focused arguments have formed the basis of such decisions. As the above 
analysis has only briefly touched upon the process aspect of the partnership, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether the process has undergone the same gradual 
development as the inclusion of actors into the partnership organisation. However, 
based on the recollection of the interviewees, working closely together has always 
been central to regional policy-making in North Jutland based on the need to stick 
together in difficult times (Hav, Pedersen, Lang, personal interviews). Based on the 
gradual inclusion of more and more partners into the partnership organisation, the 
web of relations among them must arguably become proportionally complex 
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indicating that the process aspect of the partnership must have developed 
accordingly. But the finer details of how the process has developed are difficult to 
ascertain in the absence of extensive interview data. 
8.2 The Funnel-Shaped Partnership Model 
The previously analysed conditions and events have created an environment of multi-
level governance in which actors at all levels of government participated, i.e. 
European, national, regional and local according to their functional responsibilities. In 
academic literature, the term ‘institutional thickness’ (meaning a sizeable number of 
institutions involved and interrelated) has often been argued to be a prerequisite for 
successful regional economic development. So far it may appear that the Danish case 
is a typical example of institutional thickness or as the Commissions prefers to term it: 
partnership. It has been contested, though, whether institutional thickness is 
necessarily a benefit for regional economic development. The coexistence of all these 
institutions supposedly “impedes policy coordination, spawns competition between 
the organisations – and, ultimately, creates confusion among private sector clients.” 
(Halkier and Damborg, 2000, 92) However, I would claim that the success of regional 
economic development, and to some extent the nature of partnerships, depends on 
the organisation (inclusion and process) of this institutional thickness. I do not 
necessarily see the involvement of actors as an impediment. They may, in fact, also 
bring many resources that may be relevant and necessary for the cooperation to be 
fruitful. Despite of, or because of, the institutional thickness present in the Danish 
case, the inclusion and process of partnerships are dependent on a number of factors 
related to the institutional thickness: resources and, related hereto, the composition 
of the partnerships (which partners bring which resources?), the organisation of the 
partnerships, the relations between the networks within the partnerships 
(formal/informal), the authority given to the partners, etc.  
This analysis will take its point of departure in the funnel-shaped partnership model 
that the National Agency for Enterprise and Construction (NAEC) uses to illustrate how 
Structural Funds administration has been organised in Denmark (Gregersen, personal 
interview). It is based on the understanding that Danish Structural Funds 
administration is a multi-level governance organisation.  
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Model 8.1: The Funnel-Shaped Partnership Model 
The NAEC model of partnership is divided into four partnership levels reflecting partly 
the functional division of responsibilities in Structural Funds administration in 
Denmark, and partly the direction of the line of work in the process: the policy 
originates from the EU level which is then implemented in the member state, where 
the national level is responsible of its implementation according to the EU regulation 
and national practices, and the regional level is responsible of day-to-day 
implementation of the policy in cooperation with the local level. As such, it is a 
traditional vertical top-down interpretation of Structural Funds implementation in 
Denmark. Although this might appear to be a static way of seeing things, the dotted 
lines illustrate that this is not the case; it is in fact a dynamic, flexible system that 
works across levels of partnerships. The different levels do interact with each other. 
The dotted lines also illustrate that the policy seeps through the system from the top 
to the bottom ending up with regional development as an outcome. 
The NAEC partnership model can also be seen to illustrate the importance of the 
different levels of partnership in relation to each other, the width and depth of 
partnerships in relation to the different levels and the individual level’s influence on 
the process. With this interpretation the EU level is the most important level in the 
Structural Funds administration partnership in that this level provides the overall 
financial, organisational and legal framework in which implementation of the policy 
takes place. Below that level is the national level partnership centred on the Ministries 
responsible of the administration of the ESF and the ERDF in Denmark and the NAEC 
which has been delegated competences from the Ministries. At the regional level, 
day-to-day implementation takes place involving a wide range of actors. Also the local 
partnerships influence the process but not equally as much as the regional and 
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national levels. This interpretation may not be the best illustration of how things really 
take place. Rather, it is the other way around, in that the partnerships at the bottom 
are wider and more influential on the outcome than the ones at the top. The levels 
above are always in a position to veto or undo a decision or recommendation made at 
lower levels, still emphasising the hierarchical subordination of the levels of 
government. 
Additionally, this model does not illustrate potential horizontal relationships. I am not 
sure, though, that a single model is able to encompass such a complex organisation. 
Nonetheless, a model that accommodates the criticisms and preserves the accurate 
illustrations of the above model can be drawn. Thus, the funnel-shaped model should 
be turned up-side down to illustrate the importance of the regional and local 
partnerships in relation to the national and EU level partnerships, but keeping the top-
down line of work process. Ideally, the model should also be able to illustrate that 
horizontal partnership processes are present in the administration structure. This, 
however, is a work in progress: in order to include these processes the individual 
partnerships need to be analysed more closely. Before such as task is taken on, the 
reversed funnel-shaped partnership model is illustrated: 
Model 8.2: The Reversed Funnel-Shaped Partnership Model 
 
Partnerships are organised at different levels of government reflecting that the policy 
is to some extent a top-down policy that seeps through a national implementation 
system based on a functional division of responsibilities with the individual levels of 
partnerships interacting with each other. Based on this model, the following analysis 
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attempts to examine the different levels of partnerships individually in terms of 
inclusion and process during the 2000-2006 programming period with reference to 
the development of partnership experiences in the preceding programming periods, 
as analysed above, by applying a network governance approach and the partnership 
theory presented by Åkerstrøm Andersen. The analysis will then be structured 
according to the above model where first the EU level is briefly analysed. The EU level 
will only be dealt with shortly in terms of its role as financially responsible of the 
policy, and thus, overall responsible of the operation and success of the policy. 
Second, the national level partnership was responsible of designing and preparing the 
national programme as well as monitoring its implementation. These tasks were part 
of the coordinating role which the national level assigned to itself after the 
termination of state dominance of regional policy-making. The largest amount of work 
lies in analysing the regional and local level partnership. This is the ambition of the 
third level of partnership analysis. This analysis uses the case of North Jutland to 
illustrate how regional and local level partnerships operated during the 2000-2006 
programming period based on the developments of partnership during the previous 
programming periods.  
8.3 European Level Partnership 
The EU level has always set the EU-wide objectives for regional policy. During the 
2000-2006 programming period this objective was based on the Agenda 2000 which 
was concerned with the financial perspectives of the EU when meeting the challenges 
of the future enlargements (European Commission, 1999, 3). Similarly, the Lisbon 
strategy, focusing on the EU becoming “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Rodrigues, 2004, 3), influenced the 
objectives of EU regional policy. Finally, the Third Cohesion Report set “the European 
Commission’s vision for the future of Europe’s policy to reduce disparities and to 
promote greater economic, social and territorial cohesion.” (European Commission, 
2004, iii) Three consistent themes can be found, i.e. convergence, competitiveness 
and cooperation; the objective of a more focused and targeted regional policy 
towards economic growth of the backward regions. In this sense, EU regional policy 
should be seen in the context of overall EU perspectives and objectives. 
The EU Commission is on the one hand a central player in EU regional policy, in that it 
was (and is) responsible of the effective employment of the Structural Funds in the 
member states. But on the other hand, it was not directly involved in the process. The 
Commission was faced with a kind of dilemma, in that it “has no formal say in national 
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policy execution but it (also) held responsible by other supranational institutions for 
implementation deficiencies.” (Bauer, 2006, 718) It is difficult to be held accountable 
of the implementation of a policy which the Commission itself was not directly 
involved, because it relied on others to carry out on its behalf. Therefore, the 
Commission was by way of the partnership principle seeking to become involved in 
national execution, albeit in an indirect role. First, the Commission was the initiator of 
all regulation regarding the implementation of the Structural Funds, thereby also the 
legal requirements for receiving the Funds such as the principles of additionality and 
partnership. Second, the Commission was involved in the process of designing and 
preparing national programmes and, in the end, the authority to approve the 
programme. Third, the Commission was represented in the Monitoring Committee, 
enabling it to oversee that programming took place as it was prescribed in the 
Programme. Although the Commission only held an observer position during the 
2000-2006 programming period, it was in a position to veto any decision made by the 
Monitoring Committee. Finally, the Commission received and evaluated the 
evaluations of the programmes which the member states were obliged to submit 
regularly. Thus, the Commission was in a relative strong position in the partnership 
regarding the overall framework of the Programme and its effective implementation 
(value for money). But the Commission was not involved in the day-to-day 
implementation as this was decentralised to the member states. Bauer concludes in 
his study on the role of the Commission in the implementation of EU regional policy 
that “there are indications that during the 2000 to 2006 funding period, the 
Commission has tried to keep a low profile regarding national implementation 
allowing for more flexible and decentralized execution.” (Bauer, 2006, 726) 
Apparently, the Commission withdrew from the implementation stage leaving more 
and more responsibility to the member states themselves.  
It is rather difficult to offer a network governance interpretation of the role of the 
Commission in the regional policy-making partnership as it only played a minor role in 
the vertical partnership. This is so because the Commission delegated implementation 
competences to the decentralised levels in the member states. Despite its retracted 
role, the Commission attempted to exercise meta-governance through the 
partnership definition in terms of controlling the inclusion of actors and requiring 
some kind of relational process to take place throughout the partnership. Whether 
the meta-governance of the Commission was successful depended on the national 
interpretation of these requirements according to national regulation and practices. 
Nonetheless, the Commission being the financial provider to the partnership and 
attempting to exercise meta-governance, held the weakest position in the partnership 
compared to the other partnership levels. 
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8.4 National Level Partnership 
Based on the functional division of responsibilities, the national level played a clear 
role in the Danish partnership. The national level was responsible of coordinating 
policy implementation between the EU and regional levels. It was responsible of 
providing the national regulatory framework, forwarding programme proposals to the 
Commission, suggesting overall policy design, matching ESF and ERDF funding, 
administering the ERDF and the ESF (control and payment of ERDF applications) 
according to the framework analysed in the previous analysis of ‘The Interaction 
between Danish and EU Regional Policy-Making’ (p. 190) as well as monitoring 
implementation and reporting to the Commission. Thus, the concern of the 
subsequent paragraphs is to study how the national level partnership carried out such 
a partnership role. 
8.4.1 Preparing and Designing the Programme 
According to the Objective 2 Programme, the Programme was designed and prepared 
in partnership in accordance with Regulation 1260/99 article 8 between the national 
level and regional and local partners. The national level, i.e. DATI, was overall 
responsible for coordinating the process and the direct contact to the Commission in 
the negotiations of the contents of the Programme. The process was initiated in 
February 1999 when DATI called representatives of the Danish counties, the 
Association of Danish Counties (amtsrådsforeningen), Local Government Denmark 
(Kommunernes Landsforening), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of the Environment 
to a meeting to initiate the process of preparing a new Programme. The following 
process was based upon the work of two working groups (representing the Eastern 
and the Western parts of Denmark (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000b, 3). In these 
working groups, sub-national representatives were involved in carrying out regional 
analyses of the future challenges to be addressed. “As a concrete foundation for 
launching coordinated and targeted business promotion within the region a thorough 
description of those conditions affecting business development should be available.” 
(translated from Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 1994, 8) These analyses of the regional 
conditions that potentially challenge future regional business development resulted in 
an overall framework for the 2000-2006 Objective 2 Programme, in which eligible 
regions could create their own regional complement programme. This implies that the 
national programme was the sum of all the complement programmes which 
established the framework describing broadly the focus areas that should be put into 
practice in the regions (Poulsen, head of the regional policy department at NAEC, 
personal interview). Thus, the national level was overall responsible of designing and 
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formulating the national Objective 2 Programme, but regional actors were also 
involved in the process. It must also be noticed that the room for manoeuvre of the 
national level and the working groups was not entirely boundless in that the 
objectives and focus areas of the Programme had to be in line with the guidelines 
formulated by the Commission as well as the overall EU objective such as the 
abovementioned Lisbon strategy, etc. (Gjerding, head of the Regional Policy 
Department in the North Jutland County 2000-2004, personal interview). Accordingly, 
the task of the involved actors was to apply the overall Commission guidelines to the 
needs and future challenges of Denmark and the subsequent eligible regions. In this 
way, the Commission was also indirectly involved in the process; likewise it must be 
remembered that the Programme had to be approved by the Commission in the end. 
This nicely reflected the reversed funnel-shaped model where the dotted lines 
indicate that the different partnerships across levels interact with each other during 
the regional policy-making process. 
Once the overall framework was in place, the next step of the process was for a 
regional partnership to formulate a specific regional approach to implement the 
overall strategies for national regional development. According to the Head of the 
Regional Policy Department in North Jutland from 2000 to 2004, Gjerding (personal 
interview), it was merely a formal process as the overall strategies had already been 
decided by the Commission guidelines. Nonetheless, the secretariat at the Regional 
Development Department at the County was the lead author, as the writing process 
was mostly about formalities regarding priorities and how to structure the effort that 
had already been established in the national Programme. The secretariat formulated 
the essence of the programme (i.e. the challenges that the region faced), the priorities 
to be pursued and the financial allocation between the ERDF and the ESF (Brask 
Pedersen, head of the Regional Policy Department in the North Jutland County 1998-
2000, personal interview). Although it appears that the secretariat was the only actor 
at the regional level to be involved in the programme design, other actors also 
influenced the process. As a technical specialist unit and the one most familiar with 
Commission regulations, requirements and guidelines, the secretariat was the most 
qualified body to carry out such task. It was also important to maintain the larger 
perspective ensuring presentation of a common strategy for the region and not 
interest-specific perspectives. A steering group consisting of six members (three 
municipal representatives, two social partners and one from the regional Labour 
Market Council) was appointed to reflect the knowledgeable interests that were 
present in the region. These actors were expected to be familiar with possible future 
challenges facing the region. In this capacity they were able to act as sparring partners 
to the secretariat. The role played by this working group was to suggest and formulate 
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the measures to be attached to the priorities defined in the national Programme and, 
thus, areas potentially eligible for support. Here it was a matter of prioritising areas of 
support according to future importance based on the SWOT analysis carried out by 
North Jutland County. Because it was a matter of prioritising, the specific interests of 
the involved partners might have shone through, thereby creating a breeding ground 
for discussions among the involved actors (F. Christensen, personal interview). 
Likewise, actors outside the working group (users of the previous Programmes) sought 
to influence the decisions concerning areas to be prioritised: for instance the business 
sector was interested in supporting industrial investments and education of the 
employed and the University wanted more funds for the expansion of the University 
(Brask Pedersen, personal interview and Nordjyllands Amt, 2000, 2). Once the North 
Jutland Complement Programme had been formulated municipalities and other 
affected local level actors affiliated with the North Jutland business sector were 
consulted regarding its contents (personal interview with a centrally positioned civil 
servant at the County Regional Policy Department).  
Before the North Jutland Complement Programme was sent to DATI for approval it 
was formally approved by the regional Steering Committee, NUF (Brask Pedersen, 
personal interview). This was normal practice, as it must be remembered how 
regional policy at the regional level was a compound policy area with different policy 
areas influencing it in the first place. Also, regional development policies in North 
Jutland were not only financed by EU funds. They were also funded by regional and 
national funds. These activities had to be coordinated, which was the task of NUF. For 
that reason, the objectives of the 2000-2006 Objective 2 Programme for North Jutland 
had to be in accordance with the overall strategy of North Jutland regional 
development and not overlap alternative initiatives. 
It is clear that the national level was overall responsible for designing and formulating 
the national Objective 2 Programme, and it played primarily a coordinating role in 
relations between the EU and regional levels in meeting the demands and requests of 
both levels. The national level was responsible for gathering a national Programme 
able to meet the demands of the Commission for obtaining funding, while at the same 
time engaging in dialogue with the regions to find region-specific models to 
accommodate regional challenges. The role of the national level was also to 
coordinate the Commission requirements and guidelines for the Programme with 
existing national policies affected by regional policy ensuring that the frames for a 
common national approach to Objective 2 programming could be formulated. Once 
the intermediate process of writing up regional Complement Programmes was 
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concluded and a final draft was ready, DATI was the lead negotiator with the 
Commission for its approval.  
From a network governance perspective, the programme design process was based 
on a network of relations between the national level (government and DATI) and the 
regional levels designing their own working groups for the purpose involving 
horizontal actors with the national level/DATI as the network administrator (being a 
lead organisation) ensuring a successful outcome of the process. The network was 
characterised by resource interdependencies in that, on the one hand, the national 
level was responsible of the coordination between the EU and the regional levels and 
ensuring that the Programme was in accordance with national legislation. On the 
other hand, the national level was not allowed to design the Objective 2 Programme 
itself as the partnership principle required that a vertical and horizontal partnership 
carried out this task. Therefore, the national level was dependent on other actors in 
this process. Moreover, the regional actors held information about the state of 
regional development at the regional level which the national level did not. 
8.4.2 Implementing the Programme 
The national Objective 2 Programme established the division of responsibilities among 
the partners in its implementation and defined the roles of each partner. This division 
builds on previous institutional structures, which have many advantages in the 
implementation process (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 56). The most important 
role played by the national level (represented by DATI which in 2002 changed its 
name to National Agency for Enterprise and Construction, NAEC) was that of the 
management authority for the ERDF, and later also the ESF which involved 
administration and implementation of the Programme including issuing approvals of 
projects and subsequent disbursement of ERDF funds. After 2003, the NAEC also 
became responsible of the same tasks regarding the ESF, which until then had been a 
regional level responsibility. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the 
Programme, the NAEC was involved in the evaluation and monitoring of the 
Programme. Like the design of the Programme prompted, the NAEC had a vertical 
coordinating role between the sub-national and EU levels in the implementation of 
the Programme. The approval of projects had to be in accordance with EU regulation 
and parallel national initiatives in order to avoid overlap and breech of national and 
EU rules and regulations. A considerable role played by the NAEC was to ensure that 
the Commission got value for its money within the frames of national institutional 
structures and affected policy areas (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 71). 
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The design of the Objective 2 Programme as well as its implementation was 
characterised by a network of relations, albeit in favour of the regional level. The 
national level was not directly involved in the implementation of the Programme 
based on the functional division of responsibilities in Danish regional policy-making, 
for which reason the national level had withdrawn from the central network 
administrator role it played in the design of the Programme. It was, however, 
financially responsible to the Commission. Arguably, the national level could easily 
withdraw from the implementation of the Programme and rely on other actors to 
carry out that task, as the implementing actors have to operate within the framework 
of the Programme which the national level has approved. Thus, the national level was 
situated in the background of the implementing network, but in the end still overall 
responsible of the outcomes produced by the implementing network. Despite the fact 
that the national level was not directly involved in day-to-day implementation, the 
DATI/NAEC was able to exercise some network governance in that the 
implementation of the Programme was regularly formally evaluated and monitored as 
analysed below. In a sense, the national level operated in the shadow of a regionally 
anchored implementation partnership. 
8.4.3 Monitoring the Programme 
The task of the Monitoring Committee according to Regulation 1059/2000 § 2 and 3 
was to ensure that the Programme was implemented effectively and with high quality. 
Decisions made in the Monitoring Committee must be unanimous. The responsibilities 
described in the regulation involved approving and launching the Complement 
Programmes; evaluate the specific progress made in each individual priority of the 
Programmes to secure a continuous flow of funds and when necessary reprioritisation 
of funds can be made; and evaluate the yearly reports on the progress of the 
Programmes to the Commission. The Monitoring Committee may also suggest 
adjustments or revisions of the Programmes in accordance with EU Regulation.  
When planning data collection (i.e. the interviews), all stages of the EU regional policy-
making process should ideally be included in order to have a full perspective of the 
interpretation and implementation of partnership, as research of other member 
states has argued that variance occurs across the different stages of the policy 
process. In order to illustrate this in the Danish case, a wide representation of 
interviewees from the Monitoring Committee was selected representing the various 
interests included. As it turned out, only a few interviews were needed to illustrate 
the roles and the relationships within the Monitoring Committee. A picture quickly 
formed in which the role of the Monitoring Committee in the implementation of the 
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Objective 2 Programme in Denmark was one of formal supervision of the 
implementation of the Programme and the distribution of the Funds available 
(Nielsen, Brask Pedersen, both represented in the Monitoring Committee, Lodberg, 
Head of Department at DATI concerned with the national approach to regional 
development 1995-2006, personal interviews). The Monitoring Committee only met 
twice a year discussing formal issues such as the launch of the Programme, whether 
the progress of the Programme in terms of spending was according to plan and 
whether the implementation of the Programme was in accordance with the 
requirements made in Brussels. As such, the role of the Monitoring Committee was a 
formal role in overseeing the progress of the Programme because it was required by 
the Commission. The meetings were concerned with finances and compliance with 
the EU rules and regulation. Each meeting was structured around an agenda that was 
followed strictly. Often the items on the agenda had informally been dealt with and 
discussed in other forums before the meeting, which tends to be a procedure that 
characterised the implementation system in Denmark, as will be seen later also. 
Problems tend to have been cleared at lower levels before finding their way to the 
agenda. This argument will be developed in the forthcoming analysis of the inclusion 
and process interpretation and implementation at the regional and local levels. For 
now it is sufficient to say that the Monitoring Committee did not play as crucial a role 
as could be expected. The fact that decisions made by the Monitoring Committees 
must be unanimous and that problems were cleared before they were put on the 
agenda aids the immediate conclusion that the actual influence of the Monitoring 
Committee was limited compared to the influence of lower levels of the partnership. 
In fact, the Monitoring Committee has been referred to as a “figurehead” (Lodberg, 
personal interview) or a “rubber stamp” (Brask Pedersen, personal interview), 
indicating the inferior role played in actual regional policy implementation. It was 
present because it was required by EU regulation. In a way the Monitoring Committee 
was the wing man of the Commission, for which reason it may not be considered an 
explicit partner in the implementing partnership. In other words, the Monitoring 
Committee can be characterised as a national level safety valve towards both the 
regional/local and EU levels. 
Since the Monitoring Committee meetings were only concerned with finances and 
compliance with EU regulation and not particular interests of the regions and specific 
details of the process of implementation, it might appear strange that the Monitoring 
Committee was composed of representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(the NAEC), the National Labour Market Authority (NLMA), other involved Ministries 
such as the Ministry for the Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries and the Labour Market Ministry, the regional Labour Market Councils, 
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county and municipal representatives as well as particular interested organisations 
chaired by the NAEC (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000a, 71). This is so because it was 
required by the partnership to legitimise the process and the coordinating role played 
by the national level between the regional and EU levels. Thus, the representation of 
the various interests and organisations clearly reflected the inclusion aspect of the 
partnership principle: all the required actors were involved.  
Another thing to be taken into consideration is that for the 2000-2006 programming 
period there was only one Objective 2 Programme and consequently also one 
Monitoring Committee whereas the previous programming period had two 
Programmes representing each region eligible (i.e. North Jutland and Lolland) and 
thus also two Monitoring Committees. It was argued that with a unitary national 
programme it did not make sense to have five individual Monitoring Committees since 
they all had to operate within the overall national framework anyway. Besides, it 
would be less complicated to transfer funds from one region to the other, as it would 
be easier to achieve a synergy in the development and management of the 
Programme. Using the minutes of a Monitoring Committee meeting on the 17
th
 June 
2004 to illustrate this point, a decision to transfer ESF funding from the Storstrøm, 
Århus and Ringkøbing Counties to North Jutland was made because North Jutland was 
in shortage of funding to support the increased number of unemployed people 
following a number of staff cuts in the businesses. Instead, North Jutland had excess 
ERDF funds for infrastructure; funds that could expectedly not be spent due to the 
changes following the work of the Commission on Administrative Reform 
(Strukturkommissionen). As a trade-off North Jutland received ESF funds and 
Storstrøm, Århus and Ringkøbing received ERDF funds for infrastructure in return. This 
decision was made easier given the Complement Programmes set within the overall 
national Objective 2 Programme and because all representatives of the affected 
regions met at the same time in the Monitoring Committee meeting (Nordjyllands 
Amt, 2004, 1).  
During the 1994-1999 programming period, it may be more correct to say that the 
Monitoring Committees were involved and anchored both in the region but also in the 
implementation of the programme as the representatives of the Monitoring 
Committees more closely mirrored the regional partnership. When the Objective 2 
Programme for the 2000-2006 programming period was merged into one and a 
common Monitoring Committee replaced region-specific interests of the previous 
structure, the present structure somehow lost its regional anchorage and ownership. 
One interviewee (Brask Pedersen, personal interview) argues that especially the North 
Jutland region felt that it was assigned a lower priority compared to previously. The 
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attention that the region had received previously was eliminated with this new 
structure. Despite this internal view point, it did not have any real influence on the 
work of the Monitoring Committee that it became more nationally oriented; it was 
merely cosmetic changes. On the other hand, it may have influenced the role of the 
Monitoring Committee in the 2000-2006 partnership compared to that of the 
previous programming period. It aids the argument regarding the inferiority of the 
Monitoring Committee in the partnership of the implementation process. This analysis 
is supported by the recollection of a representative of the regional Labour Market 
Council, Thomas Nielsen, who cannot think of one single time when it mattered 
whether he was present or not; his personal (representative or regional) arguments 
were not heard unless they had been accepted before the meeting. For instance, he 
could have been asked to prepare a recommendation to transfer some funds from 
one region to the other or from one priority to the other. In this sense, the floor was 
only his when it had been agreed beforehand and was on the agenda. There was not a 
culture for impulsive recommendations or ideas or indeed criticism. The meetings 
were very formal and structured (Nielsen, personal interview). 
Similar observations are found in the evaluation of the Objective 2 Programme in 
Denmark for the 2000-2006 programming period (Teknologisk Institut, 2005). 
Anonymous questionnaire replies had been gathered regarding the role of the 
Monitoring Committee. 25 have responded to the questionnaire of which four 
represent the ministerial level, 11 represent the regional level, five represent the 
social partners and another five represent other interest organisations. Although the 
majority (76 %) agree that the Monitoring Committee to some extent contributed to 
ensure that the Objective 2 Programme was implemented effectively and with high 
quality, a considerable number of respondents were critical towards its function. It 
was highlighted that the Monitoring Committee had to be able to deal with too broad 
a spectrum of issues, thereby making discussions too technical for everyone to 
participate: “the Monitoring Committee is a pronounced forum for technicians 
(specialist knowledge)” (translated from Teknologisk Institut, 2004, 118, italics my 
emphasis). It also implied that the members had to read through large amounts of 
data before the meetings in order to be informed. These two traits together created a 
forum for discussion that lacked any substance, especially towards the regional 
administrators that had more knowledge about the specificities of the issues. Thus, 
the Monitoring Committee was merely a legitimising body without any real influence 
in relation to the regional/local level. 
But the question is what the value of such a partnership was in the implementation of 
the Programme? If the role of the Monitoring Committee was inferior as the 
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interviewees suggest, it would not matter who was represented in the Monitoring 
Committee. It was merely there to meet the requirements of the EU. It may be 
speculated why this was so. An immediate argument is that a specific implementing 
culture had been established with the now more than 20 years of experience, where it 
was unnecessary for the national level or the EU level via the Monitoring Committee 
to interfere in day-to-day implementation. Problems were dealt with when they arose 
and for that reason they never became a threat to the process. The system had built-
in mechanisms for addressing such problems. Brask Pedersen refers to an implied 
understanding between the County and the NAEC ensuring that if problems arose 
they were to be cleared before they reached the Monitoring Committee; this was a 
tacit agreement (Brask Pedersen, representing Viborg County in the Monitoring 
Committee, personal interview). Another reading is that the structure of the 
partnership itself was the filter which absorbed quarrels. This can only be so because 
the partnership was based on close relations between the involved partners, trust 
among them and to some extent an implied understanding of the process. Obviously, 
disagreements may transpire especially between the different levels of partnership 
(i.e. between the local/regional and national and between the national and EU), 
because each level had its specific interests and preferences – this was unavoidable. 
But disagreements never seemed to overshadow the common objective of the overall 
partnership so agreements could not be reached.  
The role of a network to carry out monitoring of the implementation of the Objective 
2 Programme in Denmark can be questioned despite that it was an EU requirement, in 
that several observations confirmed its indifference to the overall implementation 
process. The composition of the network reflected the resources which the 
partnership requirements had in mind, thereby characterising the Monitoring 
Committee as a network involving both private and public actors at different levels of 
government. Apparently, the relations within the Monitoring Committee were 
characterised as very formal concerning financial decisions, which were primarily 
controlled by the NAEC despite being accountable to the Commission in the end. This 
implies that the NAEC may arguably be considered a network administrator ensuring 
the successful outcome of the process. In this connection, the criticism of Nielsen that 
his presence did not matter in the overall decision-making, in that often decisions had 
been reached before the meetings should not be ignored here. This criticism 
questions the value of the network (it is safe to say that the Monitoring Committee 
did not constitute a partnership in the Åkerstrøm Andersen sense, where the 
partnership is based on mutual agreements to make promises about making promises 
in the future concerning future cooperation). Network relations appeared to be 
superficial and a play to the gallery. 
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8.5 Regional/Local Level Partnership 
The analysis of the regional/local level partnership is a journey that goes far and wide 
based on the previous experiences with working in partnership as analysed in the 
beginning of this chapter, but extending the framework. This journey reflects the 
complex structure, composition and relations of the 2000-2006 partnership. It is 
important to make a distinction between formal and informal partnership 
organisations and their relations with each other. The formal partnership organisation 
easily reflected the inclusion requirement of the partnership principle and mirrored 
the gradually extended partnership analysed in the previous programming periods: 
the required partners were involved in the partnership; otherwise the NAEC and the 
Commission would not have approved it (personal interview with a centrally 
positioned civil servant at the County Regional Policy Department who wishes to be 
anonymous). The informal partnership is situated outside the formal structure; i.e. 
when the partners in the formal structure met with actors on the regional scene that 
were not directly involved in the formal partnership decision-making – with the 
primary network relations and other organisations interested and involved in regional 
development. Another example is the relations with partners/organisations which the 
formal partnership organisation itself established. Similarly, project applicants were 
found here. The informal partnership was in a position to lobby and influence the 
formal partnership organisation. Thus, the informal partnership’s relations with the 
formal partnership organisation reflected the process aspect of partnership; they 
supported and legitimised the partnership process as well as they were project 
applicants thereby proposing the direction of regional development. The following 
analysis will take a step-by-step approach and initially identify the partners and their 
internal organisation in the formal structure, followed by identification of the informal 
partners, their internal roles and organisation in the informal structure. The next step 
is to analyse their relations with each other; first relations within the formal 
partnership organisation and next the informal partnership. Soon a complex 
organisation consisting of many vertical and horizontal, formal and informal relations 
transpires.  
The analysis is inspired by the individual models of the partnership that the 
interviewees have been asked to draw during the course of the interview. They have 
offered their interpretation of the organisation with their individual perspectives. 
They all agree about the formal structure, but variances are found in the involvement 
of informal partners and their importance. Nonetheless, they all refer to more or less 
the same organisations and partners. It is only natural that the interviewees perceive 
the partnership differently from their own respective position in the partnership. They 
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have not all had the same relations with each other, which is based on the roles they 
have played and have been assigned. This, however, offers a lively and dynamic 
picture of the partnership. As such, this is a positive point of departure for the analysis 
of partnership in North Jutland during the 2000-2006 programming period. 
8.5.1 The Formal Partnership Organisation 
To begin with the formal organisation of the partnership, a preliminary model is 
presented. This model develops along with the development of the analysis as more 
and more layers are added. So this is the core on which the partnership is built: 
Model 8.3: The Formal Partnership Organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like the national Objective 2 Programme defined the national partnership, the 
regional Complement Objective 2 Programmes defined and legalised the formal 
partnership at the regional level. The Programme set up a Steering Committee and a 
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secretariat to assist the Committee in its work. “All cases are submitted to the 
Committee for approval unless it decides to delegate decision-making competences to 
another regionally anchored body. The Steering Committee can decide to set up a 
committee or a body with the objective of preparing cases to be submitted to the 
Committee like it can choose to delegate competences to that body/committee.” 
(Nordjyllands Amt, 2000, 83) The responsibility of the Steering Committee according 
to the Programme was to manage the implementation of the Programme unless a 
preparatory or a trial Committee was set up within the same organisation to carry out 
that task. The Regional Policy Department at the County served as a secretariat to the 
Steering Committee. Accordingly, the above organisation was defined in the North 
Jutland Objective 2 Programme. As can be seen from the model other actors were 
involved in the formal structure. Their roles and responsibilities will be investigated 
below. 
At the regional level, the counties were responsible for employing EU Structural Funds 
framework measures for programme development and evaluation of individual 
projects; they controlled the regional development budget of the Structural Funds and 
the administration of the regional Objective 2 Programme. In North Jutland, the 
organisation overall responsible for these tasks was the politically elected North 
Jutland County Council situated in the main city of the region, Aalborg (Halkier and 
Damborg, 2000, 95-6). EU Structural Funds implementation was organised within the 
existing national and regional institutional structure. This was also a consequence of 
the termination of the Regional Development Act in 1991, when a new institutional 
structure for the implementation of both national and EU regional policy was set up in 
an effort to coordinate the two approaches to avoid duplicate and parallel initiatives 
as a reaction to the bottom-up developments during the 1980s, and the subsequent 
institutionalisation of regional level competences following the experiment with the 
NordTek programme. Thus, the North Jutland County Council was responsible of 
balancing the regionally, nationally and EU supported regional policies. These 
individual policies were sought amalgamated into one regional approach of benefit to 
the entire region. The County’s regional policy objectives were based on the need to 
unite industrial policy, labour market policy and education policy into one common 
regional policy approach (Nielsen, personal interview), which is illustrated in the 
following model:  
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Model 8.4: The North Jutland Trinitarian Regional Policy Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1999, North Jutland County formulated a cohesive description of regional industrial 
policy for the first time. Until that time, industrial policy was generally characterised 
by individual contributions from the EU programmes, transport policy, tourism policy, 
etc. But then a coordination of the individual initiatives was introduced in order to 
ensure that North Jutland did not get detached from the positive development in the 
region. In this report, it was emphasised that industrial policy could no longer stand 
on its own as it was not able to address the regional challenges on its own. Its focus 
areas needed to be coordinated with other policies influencing regional development 
such as labour market policy and education policy. Perhaps this was a necessary step 
in that the focus of the regional industrial policy had been closely in line with the 
objective of EU regional policy, which at this time changed its focus towards the 
increased involvement of employment and human resources directed strategies (i.e. 
the Lisbon strategy). EU regional policy was no longer to be based solely on direct 
subsidies to businesses’ hard infrastructure. Rather, focus was targeted more on soft 
infrastructure. Likewise, a new round of programming was in preparation where 
Funds were expectedly cut down for the more wealthy regions in favour of the new 
poor CEE member regions. Accordingly, the regional development strategy needed 
revision and a clearer focus ensuring that Funds could be targeted and spent wisely in 
the areas in most need.  
The North Jutland Trinitarian policy approach involved horizontal cooperation among 
the affected policy areas, and in effect it also ensured the horizontal involvement of 
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actors associated with the policies. In the coordination of the three individual policies, 
each of them had a number of actors involved in decision-making and as practical 
suppliers of services within each policy area. Thus, actors were brought together with 
knowledge of their specific area. As it turned out some of the actors were repeated in 
all structures such as counties, municipalities and the social partners (Nordjyllands 
Amt, 1999, 3 and 10). These actors were considered relevant in the regional political 
implementation structure since the first NordTek Steering Committee was set up, so 
in this sense the ‘relevant actors’ to regional development had always been those 
involved in the three policy areas that were eventually officially coordinated in 1999. 
Arguably, this approach had been pursued for years but in 1999, for the first time, it 
was formally articulated.  
The North Jutland County Council was thus the main regional sponsor and 
administrator of regional development policy. Moreover, besides being represented in 
the key committees and boards, the North Jutland County Council also appointed the 
represented organisations and actors in these committees and boards.  
The Finance Committee was a specialist advisory body attached to the County Council 
represented by elected politicians that dealt with finances and the distribution of its 
funds. The County Council could decide to send a controversial application to the 
Finance Committee for advice regarding financial approval. Most often the Finance 
Committee was not involved in regional policy decision-making; only in cases of doubt 
(Gjerding, Head of the Regional Policy Department at the North Jutland County, 
personal interview). 
North Jutland Development Fund 
Throughout time, the North Jutland County Council decided to delegate authority to 
NUF as a coordinator of all regional policy relevant programmes as has been analysed 
above (see p. 230). The Regulation for NUF defined its purpose as “promoting the 
general industrial development in North Jutland” (translated from Nordjyllands Amt, 
2001c, § 4). In order to promote industrial development in North Jutland, especially 
two areas were of concern to NUF: to develop and implement regional industrial 
political programmes in cooperation with North Jutland County, and to initiate the 
implementation of regionally focused projects especially concerned with the 
promotion of trade (erhvervsfremme) in cooperation with North Jutland County, the 
municipalities of North Jutland, businesses and organisations. The coordination 
function of NUF was particularly important in that not all of the region’s municipalities 
were eligible for Structural Funds support. So, areas not covered by the Structural 
Funds programme could still be considered in the regionally financed approach in the 
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pursuit of overall development of the region, and not just the designated areas of the 
Objective 2 Programme resulting in more even development. Moreover, coordination 
was important in that North Jutland was made up of 27 different municipalities with 
their individual business structures and priorities. In order to achieve the goal of 
common regional development, uncoordinated developments in each of the sectors 
(that were seen across the region during the 1980s and into the 1990s) had to be 
avoided in the future (Simensen, personal interview).  
This delegation was based on voluntariness: decisions made by the County Council 
were based on recommendations made by NUF. This division of responsibility and this 
type of relations was a specific characteristic of the North Jutland approach to 
partnership that had developed since the NordTek programme; a similar approach 
had not been seen in any of the other Danish regions although some of them 
attempted to copy the structure (personal interview with a centrally positioned civil 
servant in the County Regional Policy Department). It was remarkable how NUF was 
responsible of dealing with Structural Funds applications, granting funds and at the 
same time discussing other industrial policy initiatives. The members of NUF were 
aware of this voluntary delegation of authority and knew that the County Council 
could decide not to set up the Committee again at any time. They knew that power 
rested with the County Council in the end. Perhaps because of this special treatment 
the members of NUF were especially concerned with living up to this trust. This 
division of responsibilities was also reflected in the fact that industrial political 
(regional political) issues were rarely on the County Council agenda; these issues had 
been dealt with by NUF. Although decision-making competences were delegated to 
NUF, the County Council remained the responsible authority that referred to the 
national level (Hav, County Mayor, personal interview). 
Thus, NUF was a body with similar responsibilities to those of the County Council. The 
difference was that NUF did not have final decision-making competences but referred 
to the County Council. The composition of NUF must necessarily be different to the 
County Council, which was a politically elected body not necessarily reflecting the 
needs for competences and resources relevant to regional policy-making. Although 
NUF was also composed of politicians, these were, in contrast to those in the County 
Council, not democratically elected by an electorate but appointed by their interest 
organisation with specific regional development knowledge and interests. Thus, NUF 
was composed of political actors that had specialist knowledge of the regional 
challenges, as discussed above in the analysis of the foundation of the NordTek 
Steering Committee and how its membership was extended and elaborated in the 
membership of NUF in 1992. The aim was to establish a body that had specialist 
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knowledge of the regional problems ensuring that initiatives, programmes and 
projects could be targeted at the right issues. The County Council did not necessarily 
have this knowledge. Thus, the composition of NUF has continuously reflected this 
demand and consequently changed according to the developments in the regional 
political context. This was also the case in the 2000-2006 programming period, when 
NUF was composed of:  
 North Jutland County, 3 members 
 Representatives of the municipalities in North Jutland, 3 members 
 Representatives of regional associations of industrial political cooperation, 3 
members 
 Social partners, 2 members 
 Personally appointed actors representing the business world, 4 members 
The composition and representation of members in NUF mirrored the overall 
Objectives of North Jutland’s regional policy approach, the areas of priority in the 
regional Objective 2 Programme, the network of actors that were outside the formal 
partnership structure, and past experiences with this organisation of cooperation. 
Basically, the idea was that the membership of NUF was supposed to legalise the 
decisions made in NUF regarding selective project selection. In order to legalise such 
decisions, those affected by the decisions must necessarily have an opportunity to be 
heard for which reason these interests were represented in NUF (and the Executive 
Committee). Especially, the personally appointed actors representing the business 
sector should be noticed in this connection, in that it was considered relevant to 
involve representation of the businesses directly influenced by the state of flux of the 
market. They were the primary beneficiaries of the North Jutland regional policy 
objectives for which reason they should be able to influence the direction of it. 
Besides, some of the businesses in North Jutland were highly ambitious and 
innovative and could for that reason be an inspiration to other businesses in the 
region by taking the lead to overall regional development. Thus, they were considered 
essential to create legitimacy of the decision-making process (Hesselholt, involved in 
the design of the NordTek programme, personal interview). 
The gallery of characters in NUF was replicated in the Steering Committee mentioned 
in the North Jutland Objective 2 Programme Complement. This structure was 
preferred in order to avoid setting up two parallel structures and ensure that NUF was 
able to coordinate the regional policy effort being informed and up-to date with all 
regional political initiatives and programmes of the region. The Steering Committee, 
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which had a more narrow focus than NUF, was established by the rules of procedures 
determined by the County Council. The rules of procedures defined the Steering 
Committee’s area of responsibility, its composition, its role and terms for meetings. 
The Steering Committee was “responsible of selecting and recommending projects in 
relation to the Objective 2 Programme based on the recommendations that the 
Executive Committee have prepared as well as supervise the implementation of the 
Programme.” (translated from Nordjyllands Amt, 2001a, § 2) So in practice, the tasks 
and roles of the Steering Committee coincided with those of NUF. From now on these 
two bodies are considered one, NUF being the Steering Committee. This relationship 
becomes clearer when considering that the Steering Committee delegated 
recommendation competences to the Executive Committee. 
The Executive Committee 
Throughout the previous programming periods, NUF delegated competences to the 
Executive Committee which was responsible for evaluation of project applications 
according to the requirements and priorities set up in the Objective 2 Programmes. 
Implied in the delegation of these responsibilities was that the civil servants of the 
Executive Committee had to be loyal to the politicians in NUF (Munk Nielsen, a civil 
servant representing the NES group, personal interview). The Executive Committee 
was, like the Steering Committee, set up based on rules of procedure for the 2000-
2006 programming period. The Committee’s composition, competences and terms for 
meetings were defined hereby. § 2 defined the role of the Executive Committee to 
involve evaluations of project applications presented by the secretariat to allow the 
Executive Committee to formulate recommendations to the Steering Committee. 
Selection of projects had to be based on existing EU rules and national laws 
(Nordjyllands Amt, 2001b). The Executive Committee was referred to as a specialist, 
technical body evaluating the projects on their contents and prospects for delivering 
regional development according to the criteria set up. It distributed the Funds 
between the projects and either approved or rejected the projects.  
NUF was responsible of deciding the composition of the Executive Committee, where 
the following authorities and organisations appointed their representative(s) 
(Nordjyllands Amt, 2001b, §1):  
 North Jutland County, 1 member (chair) 
 The Association of Municipalities in North Jutland, 2 members 
 The North Jutland Trade Promotion Officers (the NES group), 1 member 
 The Confederation of Danish Employers, 1 member 
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 The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, 1 member 
 Agricultural Organisations, 1 member 
 The Regional Labour Market Councils (RAR), 1 member 
 The Vocational Schools’ Coalition, 1 member 
The Executive Committee had a wider and deeper representation compared to the 
Steering Committee and NUF. In addition, organisations such as the vocational 
schools’ coalition, agricultural organisations and employment councils were also 
represented. Some of the organisations were represented in NUF as well, but here 
they had a different function. The widened and deepened representation of the 
Executive Committee compared to the Steering Committee was based on the 
different functions of the two bodies as well as on the previous experiences with the 
inclusion of actors into the formal partnership, as analysed in the developments of 
partnership experiences during the previous programming periods, where a gradual 
widening and deepening of actors was identified. As with the NAEC interpretation of 
the funnel-shaped partnership model, the regional level partnership was also based 
on a functional division of responsibilities. This structure was very clear as will be 
elaborated later.  
Compared to previous periods, the Executive Committee was expanded in the 2000-
2006 programming period inviting an increased number of municipalities and 
education institutions as well as organisations that were present in the former 
structure. In the previous period, only the municipality of Aalborg was represented, 
but in 2000 representation of the municipalities North and South of the region’s 
capital city were also invited (F. Christensen, Vice Head of the Regional Policy 
Department at the North Jutland County 2000-2007, personal interview). The gallery 
of characters of the Executive Committee was established taking into account its 
function as a specialist body dealing with evaluations of project applications, and that 
end users with potential to apply for support should be represented. Along the same 
lines, the priorities made in the Programme (the priorities determined who was 
eligible of funding) were similar to the arguments presented in the previous 
programming periods. In order to be able to evaluate the contents and prospects of a 
given application, these various interests had to be represented in the Committee. 
Having these actors represented in the Committee further legitimised the decisions 
made by it as Hesselholt (personal interview) has argued in the raison d’être of the 
establishment of NUF (see p. 218). This was so because all the actors in the formal 
partnership structure legitimised each other’s presence, roles and functions.   
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The North Jutland County Regional Policy Department  
Within the North Jutland County Council, the Regional Policy Department of the North 
Jutland County Council was the sole provider of financial subsidies to businesses in the 
region through the partners described above as well as responsible for funding for 
other development bodies and co-financing regional framework programmes. The 
Regional Policy Department was the administrative arm of the main political and 
financial sponsor of as well as secretariat to the Objective 2 Programme in North 
Jutland and the subsequent partnerships that were set up to implement these 
programmes. First and foremost, the secretariat supported the decision-making 
process of the above Committees by administering applications and preparing 
recommendations for committee meetings, monitoring the implemented projects, 
contributing to the evaluation of the implementation of the Objective 2 Programme 
and suggesting new policy initiatives (Gjerding, personal interview), which is also 
noted in Halkier’s 1997 study indicating stability in the roles played by the different 
Committees and secretariat in the formal partnership throughout time (Halkier, 1997, 
11). 
In fact, it may be argued that the first task concerning processing of applications and 
preparing recommendations for Committee meetings was to some extent also part of 
the portfolio of the Executive Committee: when processing and preparing applications 
to become ‘recommendable’ they had to be technically analysed, evaluated and 
formulated in terms of complying with EU rules (Regulations for granting and 
applications) and national laws. So in practice, the Regional Policy Department 
undertook a part of the task assigned to the Executive Committee because it would be 
difficult for the members of the Executive Committee to know all the rules and 
Regulations that applied. They had to rely on the Regional Policy Department for this 
specialist knowledge. Therefore, the Executive Committee merely lent its name to the 
evaluations and preparations made by the Regional Policy Department (H. 
Christensen, personal interview). Having these responsibilities the secretariat also had 
relations with the applicant businesses (or others) for financial support. There was a 
culture at the Regional Policy Department allowing business leaders and others with a 
project idea to knock on the Department’s door at any time for advice. This dialogue 
was important for the development of excellent projects in cooperation between for 
instance the business and the knowledgeable staff at the Regional Policy Department 
(F. Christensen and Gjerding, personal interviews). Hence, the Regional Policy 
Department was in an intermediate position between the political organisation (the 
formal partnership organisation) and the end users.  
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Clearly, the formal partnership organisation during the 2000-2006 programming 
period was a continuation of the organisation in the previous periods. Thus, the 
network organisation that was established in the NordTek programme was replicated 
in the succeeding programming periods establishing a stable decision-making 
environment, although the inclusion of actors into this organisation was gradually 
shifting as a response to the changing regional policy objectives generated from the 
varying challenges faced by the region. The network continued to be based on the 
need to involve actors and organisations with ‘relevant’ resources for the 
implementation of the policy. This type of network organisation required that certain 
resources were brought into play leading to the interdependent exchange of 
resources among the partners within the Committees and within the formal 
partnership, which is the focus of a subsequent section. Having analysed the roles and 
function of the partners in the formal partnership organisation, focus is already 
beginning to turn to the relations with the partners outside the formal organisation in 
that they represent the interests of organisations.  
8.5.2 The Informal Partnership 
The above analysis of the formal partnership structure mentioned the ‘primary 
network relations’ and how they influenced the actors and their relations in the 
formal partnership structure. It was made clear that the partners included in the 
formal partnership organisation ‘represented’ interest organisations in their decision-
making. These interest organisations constituted the primary network of the 
representatives within the formal partnership organisation. The primary network 
relations are exactly the core concern of this analysis. A number of primary network 
partners were placed outside the formal partnership structure with both formal and 
informal relations with the formal partnership. As the primary networks were placed 
outside the formal partnership, it implied that the interests of the primary networks 
were represented inside the formal structure and that the primary network relations 
had a certain degree of influence on the decisions made in the formal partnership 
structure as information flew back to the primary network from the representatives. 
Before analysing the informal partnership, a model of the informal partnership should 
be illustrated: 
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Model 8.5: The Informal Partnership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the model, a wide representation of interests was situated 
outside the formal partnership organisation with relational ties to different levels of 
the partnership although these have not yet been included in the model. These 
interests reflected the composition of the partnerships – at least those partners with 
relations to NUF and the Executive Committee – whereas the partners with relations 
to the Regional Development Department played more implicit and informal roles as 
they did not influence the decision-making process itself but rather functioned as 
advice services to the system. In a sense, all partners outside the formal partnership 
structure were potential project applicants, some with more activity than others. The 
following will present the partners in terms of their roles in the informal partnership 
one by one. 
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Locally Based Actors 
On a local level, local governments were overall responsible for political sponsorship. 
Nearly all municipalities had a local business development office but their structures, 
tasks and resources varied considerably. Within North Jutland, 27 municipalities were 
situated and 25 of these had local business development offices (three municipalities 
had a joint office). These offices were relatively small and generally managed by a 
local business council composed of representatives of local business, social partners 
and local government. The tasks of the local business development offices were to 
promote the municipality in attracting new businesses to the municipality, to 
participate in the preparation of development projects in the municipalities, to offer 
advice to entrepreneurs and SMEs (and also, in line with this, to organise meetings, 
courses and participation in international activities for these businesses), and to be 
the link between the regional level and local administration. One municipality, 
however, stood out, namely Aalborg. Aalborg is the largest municipality and city in 
North Jutland, and as such it had more resources available. Therefore, the Aalborg 
Commercial Council was able to offer more specialised advice and carry out larger 
development projects. Also, it had more resources available for marketing of the 
municipality (Gjerding, Head of the Regional Policy Department at North Jutland 
County 2000-2004, personal interview and Halkier and Damborg, 2000, 98). 
In addition to the local municipality business development offices, the municipalities 
had established cooperation across the municipalities. As was seen previously, these 
cross-municipalities networks were set up during the 1990s to address the problem of 
limited resources in the relatively small municipality offices and to create economies 
of scale. In this way, they were able to pool resources from each other and build up a 
stronger capacity to attract EU funding for the municipality’s development projects. It 
can also be argued that regional development benefitted from cross-municipal 
organisation and exchange of ideas and resources. Of these networks, the Aalborg 
Region Network was the biggest consisting of Støvring, Sejlflod, Nibe, Hals Hobro and 
Brovst besides Aalborg, but others such as Vendsyssel Development Council 
(Vendsyssel Udviklingsråd, VUR) and Himmerland Development Council (Himmerland 
Udviklingsråd, HUR) were also significant (Hedegaard, Mayor in the municipality of 
Brønderslev representing VUR, personal interview and Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 
pp. 98-9). HUR consisted of four municipalities (Nørager, Aars, Aalestrup and Farsø) in 
the Southern part of North Jutland and aimed, among other things, “to establish and 
develop the relations between the companies operating in our area and companies 
operating in other countries” (http://www.himur.dk) as well as to provide specialised 
advice to the municipalities’ businesses. Thus, the most important objective with the 
cross-municipal networks was to establish relations with each other to enable 
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companies within the area to exchange ideas and knowledge. VUR gradually 
developed to consist of eight North-Western municipalities (Hirtshals, Sindal, Hjørring, 
Løkken-Vrå, Brønderslev, Frederikshavn, Læsø and Sæby) with similar tasks as HUR 
and they both had their own secretariats as opposed to the Aalborg Region network 
(Gjerding, personal interview and Halkier and Damborg, 2000, 99).  
Though the argument for their establishment was that they did not have sufficient 
resources individually to attract funds to the municipalities and that regional 
development benefitted from cross-municipal cooperation, it cannot be avoided to 
speculate whether especially the establishment of VUR and HUR was influenced by 
the feeling of competition from the largest city, Aalborg, which was potentially in a 
more favourable position to attract funds due to its central position both as the home 
of the County Council and the University where the latter was seen as an engine of 
growth. According to Hav (County Mayor, personal interview), the problem of the 
peripheral areas was that they did not have many knowledge institutions to build their 
development on and only few businesses set up partnerships with the University in 
the development of new competences, technology and the like for their development. 
In order to promote such development the municipalities found it relevant to 
cooperate to be able to compete with the Aalborg Region for the funds. This does not 
imply that HUR and VUR set up cooperation to outmatch Aalborg; rather cooperation 
was internal in the two geographical areas to promote their own development. 
Moreover, the lack of direct ties between the peripheral businesses and the University 
necessitated to either establish this link and/or to set up cooperation between the 
local business development offices allowing exchange of experience, knowledge and 
other resources. It appears from the interviews that the three local networks had 
always competed and some interviewees have even stated that the other networks 
were favoured by the County Council (an anonymous representative of VUR, Munk 
Nielsen (representative of VUR), Gjerding, Stoustrup (representative of the Aalborg 
Region network), personal interviews).  
Of the three local level networks, VUR and the Aalborg Region network were the 
leading partners in terms of attracting funds. VUR attracted a great deal of funds, 
according to Gjerding (personal interview) because of its ability to work closely 
together in generating project proposals. VUR had great ambitions but not the funds 
to support them. In 2004, VUR drafted a Strategy for Growth in which it was 
emphasised that the prerequisite for growth was continued close cooperation. It was 
acknowledged that the area’s potential for growth was defined by the frames 
determined by EU and national regional policy. Therefore, the area had to manoeuvre 
within these conditions. The focus areas thus reflected the overall objectives of 
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national and EU regional policies: to attract businesses and people to the areas; to 
make the area more innovative with a special focus on entrepreneurship and 
innovative development of existing businesses; to improve the competences of the 
existing businesses and the work force (upgrading of skills and raise the level of 
education); to improve infrastructure in the area thereby strengthening cooperation 
with Norway, Sweden and the Aalborg Region. The Strategy went into detail with each 
of these focus areas concerning more targeted initiatives based on close cooperation 
between private and public actors of the area (Vendsyssel Udviklingsråd, Erhvervs- og 
Byggestyrelsen og Nordjyllands Amt, 2004). Thus, VUR was a central partner in 
regional development in North Jutland. 
The Aalborg Region was not as strong a partner as VUR because it was not as 
organised, although its position should not be underestimated due to its economic 
position; the Aalborg business development office was an autonomous actor that took 
the lead because it was ‘big enough’ to act alone (Nielsen, personal interview). 
Besides this office, the municipality also had an independent EU office that was to 
lobby the EU institutions. These two offices did not coordinate their activities with the 
neighbouring municipalities for improved conditions for the latter. Perhaps this was 
rooted in the relationship which Aalborg and the neighbouring municipalities set up 
following the shipyard closure during the late 1980s, where it was agreed to 
cooperate constructively and avoid stealing work places from each other, and that 
development of one municipality was to benefit the others, thereby implying the 
power relations between them – Aalborg in the lead. Aalborg always had a lead 
position due to the University being placed here. The University either attracted 
businesses to the area or spun off businesses that set up close to the University to 
continue to rely on its knowledge. The fact that the Aalborg area became a 
transitional Objective 2 area in 2000 implied that the area could not receive as much 
funds as it had hitherto. This fact toned down the role played by the network in its 
representation in either NUF or the Executive Committee; its position became more 
technical than interest driven. It was also argued by the Aalborg representative that 
Aalborg considered the County’s regional policy to be peripherally oriented thereby 
side-lining and challenging Aalborg (Stoustrup, personal interview). 
As Gjerding has stated “HUR spent most of its time being grumpy” (Gjerding, Head of 
the Regional Policy Department at North Jutland County 2000-2004, personal 
interview), implying that HUR did cooperate internally to the benefit of the companies 
in the area, but in the regional policy-making context, HUR was in disagreement with 
decisions reached – in particular, when they were not to the advantage of the HUR 
area. It is also seen in the other interviews that HUR was not so influential and 
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noticeable in the process – the interviewees refer more to the relationship between 
VUR and Aalborg. 
Besides the local business networks, a group of trade promotion officers (Nordjyske 
Erhvervschefer, the NES group) not including Aalborg Business Development Council 
was set up. This initiative was based on the fact that the industrial policy of the 
County was not necessarily in accordance with the ones of the municipalities. In order 
for the municipalities to be heard, it was argued, they had to speak with one voice. In 
the beginning the County politicians did not approve of this new group. It was a 
breach with traditional hierarchical administration relations between the state, the 
county and the municipality. The NES group disputed this relationship by questioning 
the dispositions made by these actors. To begin with, the NES group was established 
as a response to the establishment of NOVI and questioning the central role that 
technology should play in the region’s development; the NES group did not necessarily 
agree with the County disposition that technology and knowledge exchange, which 
NOVI stands for, was important to the development of businesses in the (peripheral) 
areas where traditional production industries were situated. But over the course of 
time, the NES group became a partner in dialogue (cf. their representation in the 
Executive Committee) to the County. According to Munk Nielsen (personal interview), 
who was chairman of the group for 13 years, it was crucial that the overall regional 
political objectives and strategies were formulated together, taking all perspectives 
into consideration.  
The NES group was not a harmonious group but consisted of trade promotion officers 
from different municipalities with different backgrounds, focus and emphasis on 
business development. Some municipalities had strong organisations, while others 
only set up business departments as an alibi to cover for the intentions to support 
business environment but in practice they did not set up any initiatives (Munk Nielsen, 
personal interview). In some municipalities they could be characterised as 
independent organisations ran by the business environment itself with the support of 
the municipality. At the other end of the spectrum was a municipality like Hirtshals 
where business development was of high priority: efforts were coordinated between 
the business and the planning departments into a united approach towards business 
development of the area (Simensen, personal interview). Moreover, some of the 
trade promotion officers were politicians while others were civil servants which also 
created differences of opinion and objectives. Munk Nielsen (personal interview) 
argues that the work of the NES group was politicised because the strategies of the 
individual business departments were assigned to the political objectives of the 
municipality. This was also to be expected in that the business environment itself did 
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not have resources to be influential on its own coordinated development – the 
managing directors were busy running their business. Only a few were directly 
involved in the decision-making system of regional policy (i.e. the personally 
designated partners of NUF - the ‘industrialists’). 
The Regional Labour Market Council 
As labour market policy was central to the Trinitarian basis on which regional policy in 
North Jutland was based, it is only natural that the actors involved in this policy area 
were represented in the regional policy-making partnership. They were thus 
represented in the formal partnership, but as argued the formal partnership was also 
reflected in the actors that were situated outside the formal organisation in the 
informal partnership. Here the Regional Labour Market Councils (RLMAs) were found. 
Labour market policy was the responsibility of the Ministry of Employment but was 
implemented by a number of public and private actors. It is important to notice that 
labour market policy traditionally was shaped and implemented in cooperation with 
the social partners. Instead of regulating labour market policy based on the law, it was 
based on regulation through agreement between the employer and employee 
organisations. This involvement was also reflected in the RLMAs, which were likewise 
represented by municipalities and the County Council besides the social partners 
(Jørgensen, 2009, 89). 
The Ministry of Employment hierarchically delegated authority to a number of 
councils and units with different responsibilities such as the National Labour Market 
Authority (NLMA), which was responsible of policy development of the active labour 
market policy focusing on the involvement of the unemployed (i.e. the unemployment 
benefit system). Here, NLMA was the central body for cooperation between the 
government and the social partners within the active labour market policy offering 
advice to the Minister of Employment. Then, in each region a RLMA was established 
to be responsible of monitoring the employment initiatives in the job centres in the 
region (Jørgensen, 2009, 89-93). 
Thus, the RLMAs were responsible of monitoring and analysing the development of 
the labour market in terms of the level of unemployment within the region, the state 
of the education and competence level of the workers. Every year, the RLMAs 
negotiated a contract with the Ministry of Employment that encompassed the 
objectives and the focus areas to be pursued in the following year. The work of the 
RLMAs was based on this contract (Hansen, 2002, 29). This implied that the RLMAs 
were one of the executing partners in national labour market policy.  
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To return to the North Jutland regional policy-making context, the RLMA was an 
obvious partner in its implementation since its representation was involved in day-to-
day implementation of the labour market policy objectives that were, to some extent, 
similar to those of the Objective 2 Programme. Because labour market policy was 
traditionally shaped around the social partners (a wide representation of 
organisations and specific interests), they had specialist knowledge about the 
employment situation in the region, which the County Council did not have to the 
same extent, although, the municipalities and the County Council were represented in 
the RLMA due to the coordination between national, regional and local initiatives and 
focus areas. Thus, the role of the RLMA was to offer specialist information about the 
labour market and employment situation in North Jutland, thereby directing the 
Objective 2 effort towards the relevant areas. This situation may change from year to 
year, month to month or even from week to week. The RMLA was informed about this 
development and was able to react to the changes to redirect the effort accordingly. 
Here, the primary network relations of the individual partners (especially the social 
partners) were of value: “The social partners can collect knowledge and information 
from a broad membership who are affected by the policy which may in turn be 
disseminated in the political decision-making processes… the parties have a 
extensively bifurcated network to the concrete implementing actors and institutions.” 
(Hansen, 2002, 14) The trade unions had a wide membership base in the work force 
and therefore direct information about the employment situation within the specific 
line of work which they represented. This knowledge could be used constructively in 
setting the objectives of regional policy-making in North Jutland. Similarly, the 
employers’ organisations also attained knowledge about the employment situation 
within the region, where focus was on the demand side and types of employees in 
demand: which types of employees were needed in which lines of business. Hence, 
together these two organisations could bring information to the table to reduce 
unemployment and re-educate the unemployed to meet the demands of the 
businesses.  
As labour market policy was regulated by the tripartite network, both employer and 
employee organisations were involved in the process representing opposing interests. 
As this was a highly political ideological milieu, it cannot be avoided that 
disagreements influenced the decision-making process within the organisation. As 
both parties (i.e. The Confederation of Danish Employers (LO) and the Danish 
Confederation of Trade Unions (DA)) represented their individual primary network 
relations, the latter invariably influenced the discussions. According to the 
interviewees (both parties), these fights did take place but only in times of collective 
bargaining and strike and mainly on a national political level. At the regional level, the 
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social partners were in agreement about the strategy pursued: central to cooperation 
was the overall development of North Jutland in terms of coordinating the three 
policy areas. Both the regional divisions of the two organisations were engaged in 
local municipal cooperation, implying that at local level the organisation had business 
development councils framing local political discussions where national political 
objectives were put aside. Moreover, cooperation was shaped by the long tradition of 
working together in North Jutland especially in labour market policy; since the two 
parties have worked together for so long they have come to know each other and 
know ‘how far they can go’ in negotiations (F. Christensen, Lang and Pedersen, 
representing both perspectives of the social partners, personal interviews). 
As the RLMA was supported with funds by the Ministry of Employment, this 
organisation had its own pool of resources to support specific initiatives. This implied 
that the RLMA was not a direct applicant of the Objective 2 funds. Rather, its role was 
to coordinate the Objective 2 initiatives and the national and regional labour market 
initiatives, thereby influencing the overall objectives of North Jutland regional policy; 
hence its representation in NUF. As such, the RLMA indirectly influenced decisions 
concerning the distribution of the Structural Funds in the employment area. 
The RLMA was organised with a secretariat that provided services to the council. This 
secretariat also had relations with the Executive Committee as a civil servant was 
represented in the Committee and it offered advice to the Regional Policy Department 
secretariat. This relationship was based on the same knowledge of the labour market 
policy developments as explained above. 
The Vocational Schools’ Coalition 
Education policy was also a core concern of regional policy in North Jutland. Education 
took place at different levels and directed at different lines of business. The University 
was often referred to as a key provider of knowledge to the businesses for their 
development. However, other education institutions may also be taken into 
consideration: the vocational schools directed themselves at the more practical 
professions such as construction, the food industry, retailing, production and the like. 
These lines of business were found across the region representing a large quantity of 
the businesses in the region. Therefore, their work was highly relevant in terms of 
upgrading employees, educating the unemployed and providing knowledge to the 
regional policy partnership in terms of necessary improvements and initiatives to be 
taken to accommodate the demand of the businesses for innovation, and especially in 
relation to the introduction of new technology. As the level of education in North 
Jutland was low compared to the rest of the country’s average since the mid-1980s, 
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upper secondary education was also relevant to improve the situation (Nordjyllands 
Amt, 2003b, 14). These schools entered into cooperation in providing these services 
to the potential work force that needed either upgrading or a basic education to enter 
into the labour market. With this knowledge about the education level and the 
demands of the businesses for education, this organisation was central to the regional 
development of North Jutland. 
Cooperation between the vocational schools was problematic because they all had 
the same customer base so to speak, which may have fostered competition among 
the schools instead of cooperation. This internal competition and disagreement 
influenced the role played by the vocational schools in the Executive Committee; their 
disagreement resulted in them not always participating in the meetings (Gjerding, 
personal interview). Officially, the director of AMU Nordjylland (being either an 
employer or an employee representative) was the representative, but this was not 
always accepted in the coalition. This implies that the representative of the vocational 
schools coalition was in a position of dual mandate: he should represent the interests 
of the entire vocational schools system, but it was potentially unavoidable that he 
glanced at either side of the employer/employee interests. Notwithstanding, it could 
be considered an advantage that the partners involved in the respective organisations 
had knowledge of more areas. The same was seen with the social partners involved in 
municipal business development policy and municipalities represented in the RLMA. 
Thus, some of the actors had dual roles thereby ensuring greater coordination of the 
regional development effort and illustrating the coordinated regional policy approach 
in North Jutland and the overlap of policy areas. The analysis of the cross-relations will 
be elaborated later in the analysis of the relations between the formal and informal 
partnership structures. 
Besides that the partners in the informal partnership were indirectly involved in the 
decision-making and implementation of the Objective 2 Programme in North Jutland 
through their representation in the formal partnership organisation, a variety of 
partners were involved either providing advice services to the system, or direct 
applicants or in their capacity of being created by the system (they were established 
on the initiative of actors within the formal partnership organisation). They were 
partners generating development projects through continuous financial support by 
the system either by the County’s own funds, national funds or the Structural Funds. 
Moreover, they offered advice to users of their services, implying that they can be 
considered implementers of the programme. Thus, they played several roles: they 
both provided advice and services to the partnership organisation, they constructed 
applications on behalf of their clients and they practically implemented the projects 
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which they had offered advice to. Both of these tasks were financed by regional and 
Objective 2 funding. This implies that different types of organisations were situated in 
the informal organisation: those which were directly represented in the formal 
organisation and those which were created by the organisation
12
 due to their required 
existence to support the organisation. 
North Jutland Business Service 
To begin with, the advice service system had been around for approximately three 
decades with the establishment of the nationally founded and supported 
Technological Information Centres (TICs) in 1975. The purpose of these centres was to 
offer service to businesses focusing more on softer forms of initiatives such as advice 
and networking contrary to the direct financial support to the businesses. This service 
was available to all businesses across the region. They dealt mainly with technology-
related matters which the other advisory bodies presented below were not 
specialised in.  
In the regions, the TIC advice service system was considered to be difficult to access 
due to its bombastic criteria for being eligible for advice. It only offered advice to a 
narrow segment of businesses; i.e. those involved in the development of production 
and production technology. Based on this inflexible system, it was suggested to 
establish a North Jutland counterpart – a regionally anchored growth oriented advice 
service (‘væksthus’). In 1994, the North Jutland Business Service was set up in order to 
be able to provide highly professional advisory services to individual businesses within 
North Jutland with a broader scope than the TICs (Hav, personal interview). Whereas 
the TICs were national in scope, the North Jutland Business Service aimed at offering 
free-of-charge-but-limited-in-time advisory services to SMEs within the North Jutland 
region specifically. Thus, the North Jutland Business Service played a comparable role 
to the TICs but with a more narrow North Jutland anchorage in terms of funding and 
regional development goals (Gjerding, personal interview). With the establishment of 
the North Jutland Business Service, the County promoted coordination of the business 
support already performed by the municipalities in their business development 
offices. With this coordinating role, the North Jutland Business Service could influence 
the overall business development of the regions: “here the general direction of 
development is decided” (Simensen, city manager in Frederikshavn, personal 
                                                                
12 One of these organisations was the tourism network. This sector network financed activities in promoting 
the tourism line of business in the region partly by Objective 2 funding. Consult Kvistgaard (2006) for more 
information. 
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interview) whereas the local business development offices only considered the 
promotion of the immediate environment. 
With the setting up of a regional advice service system the existence of the national 
TIC system was threatened in that the two parallel systems were competing for the 
same clients. Eventually, in 2000 this led to the amalgamation of both services into 
the North Jutland Business Service sponsored by national and regional funds. The 
North Jutland Business Service had three local offices geographically spread towards 
the North (Hjørring), the South (Aars) and in the centre (Aalborg), although the office 
in Aars was closed down in 2002. Each office was responsible of offering advice and 
dissemination of information to the businesses on an investigative and requested 
basis. The overall objective of this work was to identify the growth potential of the 
business, and to initiate development in cooperation with the business which was 
responsible of implementing the strategy. With this strategy, the intention was to 
improve the level of competences, the competitiveness and the export share of the 
businesses to increase the demand for labour (Nordjyllands Amt, 2000b, 6 and 
Nordjyllands Amt, 2003a, 16). Contacts to the SMEs were often facilitated by the local 
business development offices or private consultants. Over the years, the North Jutland 
Business Service offices adapted to the demand of the businesses and focused and 
specialised their competences to meet the demands. This development reflected the 
development of society and the development of the businesses in North Jutland 
(Nordjyllands Amt, 2002, 16). 
The Business and Innovation Centre North (BIC North) was established in 1997 based 
on an initiative of NUF, the adjacent Viborg County, the NOVI Science Park and sub-
regional actors. It became part of the existing advice service system. The centre 
covered both North Jutland and Viborg Counties and acted as a strategic partner 
offering specialised long-term advice to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
industrial development projects (Halkier and Flockhart, 2002, 96-8). Unlike, the 
services provided by the North Jutland Business Service, the BIC system was based on 
a ‘no cure no pay’ concept where businesses – often redirected from the overall 
business advice system or the local trade promotion officers to BIC – were offered 
consultancy support that was valued in a contract. Once the business started making 
money on the initiative, the business was supposed to pay BIC for its services. In the 
end, BIC was also amalgamated with the North Jutland Business Service as the ‘no 
cure no pay’ concept was not cost-effective (Gjerding, personal interview). 
With the North Jutland Business Service offering advice to businesses concerning their 
potential development, this organisation held knowledge about potential projects to 
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be pursued. This influenced the organisation’s role from advisory to applicant of funds 
to support the potential projects both for the individual business, but also projects for 
the organisation itself to be engaged in (i.e. specific areas or lines of businesses that 
needed advice services). Accordingly, this organisation played a dual role as advisory 
service to the partnership as well as applicant for the funds. 
NOVI Science Park 
NOVI Science Park was created by the North Jutland regional policy set up on the 
initiative of the County Council and Aalborg University. During the 1980s’ crises with 
business and shipyard closures, focus turned towards supporting the development of 
trade and industry in the region through investment in technology and innovation, 
which was also the overall focus of the NordTek Programme as portrayed previously. 
Therefore, in association with Aalborg University, the North Jutland County Council 
established a science park for the benefit of existing and future businesses in the 
region with a special focus on a connection between research and production. This 
implies that NOVI became a science broker to businesses. The intention was that NOVI 
should assist in creating new work places and be an incubator to new businesses (F. 
Christensen, personal interview) or in the words of Munk Nielsen (personal interview) 
“a platform for positive industrial development in North Jutland” leading to the 
establishment of new workplaces and the development of industry. Since then, NOVI 
has acted as a science park, and developed competences from being a knowledge 
centre where it used its own share capital for financing early stage product 
development, to become an innovation environment supporting new knowledge-
based businesses (including the launch of new businesses), evaluating project 
proposals, undertaking pre-projects as well as a venture capital provider with 
additional national funds.  
NOVI started out with a total budget of DKK 244 million of which 89 million was 
support from the Structural Funds. Since then, NOVI has applied for and received 
considerable amounts of funds to support its development and influence on regional 
development of the region. NOVI was managed as a business owner fund 
(erhvervsdrivende fond), the NOVI Property and Financing Fund (Ejendoms- og 
financieringsfond), with a board of directors that included representation of the 
County Council, the residential municipality, Aalborg University and the social 
partners (i.e. employers and employees organisation). NOVI Property Fund owns the 
Science Park buildings which sets the framework of its operation. The NOVI Property 
and Financing Fund were responsible of providing buildings for the use of people, 
businesses or organisations working with technology and industrial development 
(Hav, personal interview and http://novi.dk/da/om-novi/selskabskonstruktion.html). 
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Being created by the system, NOVI was primarily an applicant of the funds to support 
the task that it was intended to carry out: support and promotion of the level of 
technology in the businesses in the region in order to improve their competitiveness 
vis-à-vis competition within the country and internationally. In this sense, NOVI could 
also be considered an implementer of regional policy in North Jutland. In order to 
carry out this task, the fund relied on financial support from external investors such as 
the County and other private investments as well as the expected generation of 
capital from leasing the property to business owners. This implies that the role played 
by NOVI in the informal organisation was primarily one of applicant of funds, but at 
the same time it was significantly involved in the actual implementation of the policy 
in its role as a provider of specialist knowledge to improve the level of knowledge and 
technology in the business structure in North Jutland (http://novi.dk/da/om-
novi/selskabskonstruktion.html). 
Without mentioning it directly, the previous two sub-sections have been concerned 
with the inclusion of partners into the formal and informal partnership organisations 
based on their roles and responsibilities in the organisations. The following will 
elaborate on this inclusion. 
8.5.3 Inclusion in the Partnership 
The inclusion of actors in the partnership in the implementation of Structural Funds 
policy in North Jutland was arguably dependent on the North Jutland interpretation of 
partnership as required by the partnership principle, based on the long tradition of 
participation in regional development in North Jutland. As such, the North Jutland 
partnership organisation had a long tradition and had seen a gradual development in 
terms of inclusion of partners since its establishment during the 1980s without much 
reflection of the partnership definition. To begin with the inclusion of partners in the 
partnership depended on the County level to voluntarily delegate authority to the 
core decision-making organisations in the partnership, i.e. NUF and the Executive 
Committee, which dates back to the establishment of regional level competences to 
implement regional policy during the 1980s. These two Committees and their 
attached regional level secretariat made up the core of the partnership due to their 
decision-making competences; arguably they can be considered specialist think tanks 
of regional development and decision-making centres, in that they composed of 
specialised resourceful actors which the County Council itself did not hold. Inside the 
Committees, members were selected to represent the interests and organisations 
that were involved in and affected by regional industrial development. These interests 
and organisations were thus situated in the informal partnership surrounding the 
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formal partnership organisation. In its capacity as overall responsible of regional 
policy-making and Structural Funds implementation, the County formally designated 
the partners in the Committees, but in practise the County designated represented 
interest organisations and not particular actors, implying that the final say rested with 
the interested organisations. Thus, these actors were designated by their primary 
networks. For instance, the NUF member representing the RLMA was selected by the 
RLMA itself based on internal practise. Here, it was practise that both the employers’ 
and employees’ organisations selected a representative balancing the power of the 
two opposing parties equally. In other words, the composition of the partnership was 
the overall responsibility of the County, which was essentially based on the 
institutionalisation of regional level competences that occurred over the course of 
time, and the institutional position held by the regional level had in the coordinated 
regional policy institution in Denmark, but influenced by the primary networks which 
selected their representatives. Composing the partnership did not take place 
blindfolded but according to deliberate considerations concerning the roles of the 
actors in the partnership and the relations that these should foster; how to compose a 
decision-making organisation that was able to generate a successful and innovative 
regional development according to the institutional framework which EU regulation 
and the North Jutland regional policy approach together created; how to create an 
inspiring environment for constructive decision-making (where the actors could 
suggest and test new ideas and spar with each other); and how to compose a 
partnership that ensured a legitimate decision-making process. In these 
considerations, the different actors were involved based on certain resources, which 
they brought to the partnership over the course of time leading to a gradual inclusion 
of actors and organisations into the partnership. Naturally, during the preparation of 
the next Objective 2 Programme, the organisation to implement the Programme was 
up for revision, but considerations concerning the involvement of ‘relevant’ actors 
according to regional need rather than EU requirements were generally preferred. 
Partnership in North Jutland was both vertical (decision-making process) and 
horizontal involving actors across different organisational and policy contexts, based 
on the resources which the individual partners brought to the process, and based on 
specific North Jutland emphasis on coordinating industrial, labour market and 
education policies. Ever since the NordTek programme, the involvement of actors 
with ‘relevant’ resources was key to implementation of regional policy in North 
Jutland. A specific North Jutland partnership approach of involving ‘relevant actors’ 
developed based on the rationale of the first establishment of regional level capacity 
to implement EC regional policy, the need to stick together in tough times during the 
1980s, the cooperative culture that developed from here, the experiences with this 
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particular way of cooperating throughout time and the abovementioned 
considerations for composing a fruitful partnership. During the 2000-2006 
programming period, the inclusion aspect of partnership reflected these 
developments and experiences and a partnership approach developed that did not 
necessarily reflect the increased requirements of the partnership principle, unlike the 
North Jutland approach that was ahead of the EU requirements.  
From a network governance perspective, the inclusion of actors in the partnership 
was based on the consideration of the respective resources which they contributed, 
besides being ‘relevant actors’ participating in or influenced by regional industrial 
development. Four types of resources that appeared to have been considered 
relevant in this process can be identified: 1) the institutional position of the actors; 2) 
financial resources; 3) ideas and the ability to take the initiative to instigate new 
projects; and 4) personal network relations. 
Some actors were included in the formal partnership due to their institutional position 
in the region such as municipal mayors, social partners and representatives or the 
personally appointed actors (i.e. the ‘industrialists’). Their presence in the partnership 
in itself legitimised the process by representing the primary network relations, which 
arguably justified the existence of the formal partnership. It was vital that the 
decisions reached in the partnership for regional development had backing in the 
areas affected by the decisions. Here, the centrally positioned actors in the 
municipalities, for instance, were key to coordinate the wishes of the primary network 
area with the overall strategy of regional development in North Jutland as a whole, 
just as they were key to bring the wishes of the primary network area to the overall 
responsible decision-makers of regional development by being part of it themselves. 
Likewise, having the institutional position in their network, they were able to sell an 
idea to the primary network fostered in the regional policy-making partnership that 
may not be acceptable to the primary network in the first place. Besides, the structure 
of the partnership required political backing across the region in order to legitimise 
the decision-making process. Therefore, these resources were considered relevant 
and necessary. 
Financial resources appear to be an obvious resource that was demanded in the 
regional policy-making partnership. It required financial capacity to support regional 
development and as the Structural Funds could not alone support the development, 
but relied on additional funding as a condition for receiving it, it was crucial to involve 
partners that could raise additional funding. From a financial resources point of view, 
obviously, the County Council was in the strongest position in that it was responsible 
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of managing the EU funds in combination with its own regional policy budget and, 
thus, had financial resources available for that purpose. This put the County Council 
represented by NUF in a central position, although it relied on the financial and other 
resources of other partners. It was equally important that partners such as the 
municipality of Aalborg was financially resourceful, and that, for instance, North 
Jutland Business Service or the RLMA were able to attract private funds adding to the 
pool of funds.  
Creating regional development required the involved partners to be innovative and 
forward-looking and at times also ready to take an alternative position than expected. 
It was equally crucial that the actors involved in the partnership had ambitions for the 
development of North Jutland, and that they were able to bring new ideas to the 
table, to see things from a different perspective and seize the opportunity to develop 
innovative projects when they presented themselves. Thus, actors that were able to 
look beyond traditional ways of business conduct were involved. This type of resource 
was demanded already at the establishment of the regional policy-making institution 
in North Jutland. According to Hesselholt, one of the County civil servants being 
involved in the establishment and development of the NordTek programme, (personal 
interview), this was one of the requirements of the NordTek institutional organisation 
and further emphasised in the establishment of NUF during the early 1990s. This 
argument has been particularly put forward in the reasoning for including the 
personally appointed actors representing some of the most innovative businesses in 
the region. 
Finally, it is clear from the above analysis that networks of relations existed among the 
actors situated in the formal and informal partnerships. Partners situated in the 
formal partnership had network relations with their primary networks in the informal 
partnership, whereas within the informal partnership several networks represent 
different interests and organisations. Thus, being engaged in a network of relations 
outside the formal organisation was a considerable resource in legitimising the 
process in the first place, but also in ensuring a continuous production of suggestions 
for regional development projects. Similarly, it may be argued that VUR, HUR and the 
Aalborg Region network were set up in opposition to the relative power of the County 
in its role as financial administrator, regional political administrator and coordinator. 
In the decision-making concerning the distribution of regional development funds, 
speaking in one or three coordinated voices compared to 27 delicate voices had more 
impact. It would be easier to overrule the preferences of one municipality compared 
to a group of municipalities with the same preferences by the County Council which in 
the end had the final say. Thus, the cross-municipal networks constituted strategic 
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cooperation in terms of economies of scale (more value for money), more productive 
generation of project proposals as well as a way of flexing the muscles vis-à-vis other 
actors in the region. This was a two-way process in that project suggestions came 
from the actors situated in the informal partnership but often inspired by the 
knowledge and information of the representatives in the formal partnership 
organisation. Thus, exchange of information took place between the formal and 
informal partnership organisations. This becomes more evident in the following 
analysis of the relations between, among and within the formal and informal 
partnership organisations.  
To sum up, from a network governance point of view, the inclusion of partners in the 
formal partnership organisation was based on the resources which the potential 
partners could bring to the table in generating a prosperous regional development in 
North Jutland. These resources contributed to create tight interdependent relations 
between the partners within the formal partnership organisation and the relations 
with the informal partnership in the implementation of regional policy in North 
Jutland. These relations are the concern of the following section. 
8.5.4 Relations in the Partnership 
Having analysed the inclusion of actors in the formal and informal partnership 
organisations and the roles they played herein, it has become clear that relations 
between and among these actors existed crisscross. The following will attempt to 
dissect these relations. In order to do this as systematically as it is possible, first the 
relations within the formal partnership organisation are analysed. Next, the relations 
between the actors within the formal and informal partnership organisations are 
analysed. Relations also existed inside the informal partnership influencing the 
relational ties between the formal and informal organisations. In the end, the 
partnership model presented above is extended to include the relational ties that the 
following identifies. 
Relations in the Formal Partnership Organisation 
Relations internally in the formal structure and internally in the Committees were 
primarily concerned with the processing of applications and decision-making about 
the strategies pursued to promote regional development in North Jutland. This 
process was structured in a certain way that was built into the functional organisation 
itself. Things took place in a certain order and each Committee within the formal 
partnership organisation was expected to act in certain ways as explicated in the 
respective rules of procedure. This way of cooperating was developed over the years 
as a consequence of the institutionalisation of regional level capacity to implement 
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regional policy. A certain culture of cooperation developed with implied 
understandings, norms and procedures. 
To begin with, applicants contacted the Regional Policy Department for advice on an 
application, or later in the process, when submitting an application. Often, they wrote 
up the application together taking the project proposal, EU regulation, national and 
regional objectives and regulation into consideration through use of the advice that 
the Regional Policy Department offered to the applicant. Sometimes the initiator of a 
project application was the Department or the County Council itself. When projects 
were revised and improved to become eligible according to the requirements of EU 
regulation and the priorities set up in the Objective 2 Programme, they were sent to 
the Executive Committee for evaluation and prioritising (F. Christensen, Vice Head of 
the Regional Policy Department 2000-2007, personal interview). At the secretariat 
level (as well as throughout the system) it was agreed that projects to be forwarded 
into the decision-making system had to be legal and in accordance with the objectives 
of the Funds’ employment – everything had to be done by the book (Stoustrup 
representing the Aalborg Region network and Gjerding, Head of the Regional 
Development Department 2000-2004, personal interviews). Thus, the project 
application was carefully prepared. It was crucial for the further processing of the 
application that the preparatory work was precise and thorough. With this, the 
foundation of a relationship of trust and mutual respect was built shining through the 
entire system. 
The Executive Committee then formally discussed the eligibility of the projects, which 
was prepared by the Regional Policy Department. The Regional Policy Department 
would not submit an application to the Executive Committee unless it was in 
accordance with requirements. In such a case it could be wondered whether the 
Committee was obsolete if the work had already been carried out by the secretariat. 
This was not the case. It was difficult for the members of the Committee to have the 
same specialist knowledge of EU regulation as the secretariat did since it dealt with EU 
Regulation on a daily basis. Rather, the Committee members had other specialist 
knowledge that was more relevant in discussing the prioritising that was necessary in 
terms of pointing out areas and projects in need of support compared to others when 
administering and distributing the funds available to support the projects. The 
Regional Policy Department did not directly consider this when processing an 
application. The Committee members simply trusted the objectivity and professional 
competency of the secretariat staff in their evaluation of the legality of an application. 
So despite the theoretically clear functional division of responsibilities, these were 
somewhat overlapping and blurred in practice.  
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The Executive Committee pointed out projects to receive funding (in cases where 
there were more applications than funds) based on the eligibility evaluation and 
based on priorities that had funds left to support the project. The further along in a 
programming period the fewer funds were remaining. If a priority was running short 
of funds, serious prioritising needed to be made implying that other factors had to be 
considered as well, such as geographical distribution and whether a similar project 
was already receiving funds. This was a serious discussion that was concerned with 
creating jobs. F. Christensen (personal interview) emphasises the seriousness of these 
discussions and decisions: they were responsible of distributing huge amounts of 
funds and directing them to prosperous projects for the benefit of the region. This 
implied that some projects could not receive as much money as they applied for, if 
others also were meant to be able to receive support. In order to be able to make 
such difficult decisions, sometimes the tone among the members was spiced with 
humour although recognising the seriousness of the task. This illustrates that the 
personal relations between the members also influenced the decisions. Thus, 
meetings were both very formal because they were based on an agenda and concrete 
issues to relate to and they were, at times, informal because of the personal relations 
between the members. This proved to be an important condition to the well-
functioning of the partnership. 
In this discussion, it was also unavoidable that relations with the members’ primary 
network influenced the process, partly because the respective members had more 
knowledge of their own area, and partly because of lobbying taking place behind the 
scenes (informal relations with the primary network relations). This was so because 
when setting up an Executive Committee that ‘reflected North Jutland’, it was 
unavoidable to compose it of actors that had interests in specific development 
potentials; it was impossible to have ‘neutral’ members because of the limited size of 
the region. It was a challenge to balance, on the one hand, knowledge that was of 
benefit to the entire region but, on the other hand, not giving preferential treatment 
to some compared to other projects and areas based on for instance particular 
knowledge of a specific business or education institution (Pedersen, personal 
interview). Sometimes discussion centred on the development and support of 
members’ own immediate environment. “In a way the decision-makers are indirectly 
the project applicant” (H. Christensen, personal interview). Because the actors in the 
informal partnership were represented in the formal organisation, while at the same 
time working behind the scenes to create applications for their own projects, they 
indirectly became part of the decision-making process via their representative. Thus, a 
dual role was played by the representative establishing relational ties with the 
informal partnership either as an applicant or in the capacity of being an advisor. 
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When the general interest of the representative became a primary network interest, it 
was a different matter: a built-in mechanism concerning legal capacity (habilitet) was 
part of the rules of procedure implying that if a person was directly involved in an 
application he/she had to step outside the door when that application was discussed 
so that he/she could not influence the decision (Nordjyllands Amt, 2001b, §7). Despite 
the potential conflicts these dilemmas could generate, most interviewees agree that 
this was not the case. “It was possible to stand firm on one’s position (in regards to 
one’s primary network relations) and still be respected and have constructive 
discussions for then to reach a compromise which was necessary” (Pedersen, personal 
interview). It was necessary to take the political reality into consideration. Decisions 
were taken in majority, and generally decisions were characterised by consensus (H. 
Christensen, F. Christensen, Pedersen, personal interviews). Perhaps this was so 
because the Objective 2 Programme determined the framework in which these 
decisions had to be made; these were impossible to deviate from. Likewise, the 
overall North Jutland strategy decided by the County Council, on which regional policy 
should be based, also formed the basis against which decisions were made. It should 
be noticed, though, that reaching a decision did not necessarily imply that discussion 
did not take place. 
Applications could also be turned down here. Then they returned to the drawing 
board for revision in the hope that they could be improved and submitted later (H. 
Christensen, personal interview). 
The Executive Committee can be considered a preparatory committee that controlled 
the quality of projects, and where sensitive discussions took place. The Executive 
Committee consisting of civil servants could more easily objectively review a project 
as these discussions were not based on political ideals but more pragmatic 
redistribution of funds. The role of NUF was to politically support decisions made by 
the Executive Committee, thereby legitimising these decisions in the political 
organisation, which may also be reflected in the distribution of approved/rejected 
project recommendations
13
. As the Executive Committee made ‘recommendations’ to 
NUF, in theory, all recommendations could be overturned, but in practice this rarely 
happened. Most often NUF agreed with the decisions made by the Executive 
Committee. Only in few cases of doubt regarding legalities, a project was discussed in 
NUF.  
                                                                
13 Although it has not been possible to attain such statistics, the interviewees agree that it was very rare 
that NUF overturned a decision made by the Executive Committee. 
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As mentioned, the responsibility of NUF was to ensure political backing in the 
decisions and recommendations made by the Executive Committee, both internally in 
the decision-making system but also externally in the politicians’ primary networks, 
and to coordinate regional policy activities in labour market policy, industrial policy 
and education policy. These two tasks influenced the work and the relations within 
NUF. Especially the overall coordination appears to have challenged the cooperation 
between the actors, in that although some of them were municipal mayors with 
municipal political strategies, these had to be set aside to see the bigger North Jutland 
perspective. This manifested itself in two issues that influenced relations and 
exchange of views: first, there were geographically diverging viewpoints. The largest 
city of Aalborg represented one viewpoint whereas the smaller municipalities in the 
periphery of the region had diverging interests. This was particularly evident in the 
disagreement about who should receive the funds. The peripheral municipalities 
argued that the Aalborg area received the most funds and that the peripheral areas 
were neglected and vice-versa (anonymous representative from VUR, personal 
interview). According to Gjerding (Head of the Regional Policy Department at North 
Jutland County 2000-2004, personal interview), if looking at statistics, they would say 
that the Northern municipalities in Vendsyssel were the areas that received the most 
funds, despite their own different perception. This illustrates what Gjerding calls 
‘parochialism’
14
 implying that some municipalities were more concerned with how 
much funds were allotted to themselves compared to the neighbouring municipalities 
(and in particular the Aalborg area) instead of maintaining a birds eye perspective on 
things.  
These differing viewpoints were related to the second issue of discussion concerning 
whether development should be based on innovation and new technologies or 
traditional production. Some of the peripheral areas argued that new technology and 
innovation was not necessary to create new work places, rather focus should be on 
more simple projects. In a rough sketch, traditional industries were generally placed in 
the peripheral areas, whereas industries based on technologies were placed closer to 
Aalborg where the University was also situated. So, some of the municipalities in the 
peripheral areas argued that the regional policy objectives for North Jutland were 
                                                                
14 Parochialism refers to when Denmark was made up of small municipalities and counties before the public 
sector reform in 1970s establishing fewer and larger municipalities and counties in the effort to deal with 
the increasing uneven regional development problems due to socio-economic events (the work force 
moved from the rural areas to the cities) during the 1960s. In this set up, the small municipalities were 
often influenced by the parish council and was very locally oriented (looking out for one’s own, so to speak) 
(Gjerding, personal interview). 
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centralistic and only complying with the needs of the areas around Aalborg and not 
the development of the entire region. “It appeared that the more technical and 
academic the projects were, the easier it was to approve them” (anonymous 
representative of VUR, personal interview), implying that the projects initiated in the 
area around Aalborg with a clearer technological objective had a better chance of 
receiving funds, compared to project applications based on low-technology and 
development of production in the peripheral areas that were often turned down. 
Despite a different view of some of the peripheral areas, perhaps it was with good 
reason that the overall objective of the region’s development should be based on 
knowledge and technology innovation; this could also be of benefit to businesses that 
did not see the potential to begin with. Innovation, new technology and knowledge 
did not necessarily had to be as grandiloquent and intangible as the peripheral 
businesses imagined it to be. Rather, the point of departure should be in the needs of 
the specific business and the development of the existing competences and 
technology. Perhaps this has been a misunderstood dialogue between the different 
partners. These ideological struggles mostly took place between Aalborg and VUR, 
whereas HUR did not have any problems with cooperating with the Aalborg Region 
network as this was also of benefit to the Himmerland area (Mathiasen, personally 
designated ‘industrialist’ situated in Aars in the Southern part of the region, personal 
interview). Thus, this constituted a political struggle over the objective of the policy: 
whether focus should be on technology and knowledge exchange or whether the 
traditional business development should also be supported. 
Despite these differences of opinion, cooperation in NUF was based on mutual 
respect and the need to cooperate towards a common objective for the region. 
Everybody could put their local patriotism behind them and worked towards a 
common objective (Mathiasen, personal interview). Finding common ground was the 
overall objective of NUF. Most of this parochialism took place in the primary networks 
and not among the members of NUF. Nonetheless, all members had specific 
knowledge about their own areas which they brought to the discussion shedding light 
on the issue from different perspectives so that the best possible solution could be 
reached. Stoustrup, representing the Aalborg Region network (personal interview), 
highlights the relative importance of being in agreement with the primary network 
when discussing or supporting items on the agenda in relation to achieving the 
regional development strategy of the region. Here, the difference between the 
region’s overall regional policy objectives and the individual municipalities’ became 
evident. This implied that everybody was generally in agreement that common 
objectives and strategies (to promote development in the areas with the 
preconditions and qualifications for development in the existing business structure) 
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for the development of North Jutland had to be pursued, but how to pursue them the 
members could not always agree (anonymous representative from VUR, personal 
interview). Everybody agreed, though, that the development of a specific area (i.e. 
Aalborg or Vendsyssel) also benefitted the entire region. 
Committee meetings were structured around an agenda allowing NUF to approve or 
reject the projects recommended by the Executive Committee, as well as discuss the 
state of overall regional political objectives and specific projects and/or partnerships 
established in the surrounding network. Furthermore, this points in the direction of a 
highly institutionalised organisation for regional development. Moreover, it is an 
indication of the centrality and importance of regional policy-making in North Jutland, 
both with regards to North Jutland’s own development and meeting the requirements 
of the EU in order to receive the Funds; it is important to show the NAEC and next the 
Commission that in North Jutland everything was proceeding according to plan and by 
the book. This special organisation of regional policy-making with divided areas of 
responsibility between two Committees, based on clear institutionalised procedures 
on how to carry them out, emphasises that North Jutland wanted to be taken 
seriously at the national and EU levels. Perhaps this was the outcome of years of 
experience resulting in an apparently highly structured way of conduct with implied 
understandings, norms and organisation. A special culture of cooperation developed 
in North Jutland based on the NordTek experience in the mid-1980s – a culture that 
might appear rehearsed, organised and staged to the third party. 
Nonetheless, the Executive Committee was definitely influential in the decision-
making process; this was evident in the fact that the Executive Committee was 
represented by wider interests more in touch with the details in regional development 
than NUF, which was intended to have a bird’s-eye view on regional development to 
ensure that all initiatives were coordinated (the Executive Committee was responsible 
of the details of the initiatives supported by the Structural Funds in the Objective 2 
Programme). Thus, the Executive Committee members could make decisions 
independently regarding the distribution of regional policy-making funds. However, 
some of the interviewees do not completely agree with this statement. A 
representative of the Trade Promotion Officers (the NES-group) (Munk Nielsen, 
personal interview) argues that as long as the Executive Committee referred to NUF it 
was politically controlled by their guidelines and regional political preferences i.e. that 
the decision-making capacity was subordinated to the political actors. Similarly, the 
Mayor of the municipality of Brønderslev, Hedegaard (personal interview) agrees that 
some of the decisions made in the Executive Committee were political (civil servants 
making decisions on behalf of politicians), mainly in cases when the members could 
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not agree. It may be argued that it was not that risky for NUF to let the Executive 
Committee evaluate and decide the projects for recommendation (political or not) in 
that the rules of the game have been set in the preparatory work when the Objective 
2 Programme was designed. All decisions had to be in accordance with these priorities 
and objectives leaving very little room to fail.  
Therefore, NUF could easily rely on the Executive Committee to do its job. Maybe this 
was so because, traditionally the relationship between civil servants and politicians is 
characterised by hierarchy and the traditional division of responsibilities between civil 
servants and politicians; politicians rely on the civil servants to carry out the tasks 
decided by the politicians. Civil servants cannot work against the will of politicians; 
they are obliged to give advice to the politicians when they ask for it (Gjerding, 
personal interview). This implied that the decisions and recommendations of the 
Executive Committee could never stand alone without political support. In this sense, 
the two Committees were dependent on each other’s resources; i.e. NUF was 
dependent on the specialist knowledge and primary network relations of the 
Executive Committee, whereas the Executive Committee was dependent on the 
political authority of NUF to legitimise their decisions. So in the formal system, no 
Committee could function without the other. The same was the case with the 
secretariat: the system could not function without the secretariat and vice-versa. This 
system, and relationships within the system, was based on voluntary transfer of 
competences from the County Council to relevant partners in regional policy-making 
in North Jutland; therefore the voluntarilyly established partnership in North Jutland 
was dependent on the County Council for its existence. Lang (personal interview) 
provides an example of a case where the County Council instructed NUF to act 
according to their wishes: an international company was interested in setting up a 
branch in North Jutland. But in order for this to happen, representatives of this 
company argued that it was necessary to receive additional regional funds to support 
its establishment. Thus, NUF was compelled to set aside some millions for the project. 
This was purely a political decision to attract new companies to the region and create 
jobs. There was no particular focus on regional development. In this case, the 
voluntary partnership organisation was directed to act in a certain way that was a 
political priority of the County Council. So the partners (i.e. the County Council, the 
secretariat, the Executive Committee and NUF) within the formal partnership 
organisation were mutually dependent on each other’s resources and existence 
although asymmetries of power existed. 
On the face of it, the formal partnership structure appeared to be highly hierarchically 
organised as a clear division of responsibilities and hierarchy between those who 
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decided and those who prepared the basis for these decisions was in place. Arguably, 
this division of responsibilities and relationships appeared to be ‘staged’ to be shown 
to the surroundings (i.e. the EU) that cooperation was important and mattered to an 
effective implementation of regional policy. This was particularly evident in the fact 
that many links (Committees) had approved of a project before this was submitted to 
the NAEC for final approval. This line of work implied professionalism and strict 
employment of the modus operandi of EU regional policy implementation. This line of 
reasoning was supported by the argument presented above where decisions reached 
within the Executive Committee often were unanimous, which was probably the case 
due to the framework provided by the Objective 2 Programme and the regional policy 
objectives of the County Council (NUF). Arguments point to a highly formal way of 
structuring decision-making within the formal partnership. Based on this procedure, it 
could be discussed whether the formal partnership resembles a partnership or a 
network. It appears that the room for manoeuvre of the actors in the partnership was 
set by the institutionalisation of the Objective 2 Programme and the overall North 
Jutland regional policy objectives, leading to the immediate conclusion that 
partnership in North Jutland was perhaps best characterised as a network. Partnership 
is expected to be a ‘freer’ process where the partners engage in cooperation with 
each other based on promises to make new promises about future cooperation. 
Apparently, cooperation was set by formal and static rules for its operation. Thus, so 
far evidence of relations within the formal partnership organisation points towards a 
network rather than a partnership as Åkerstrøm Andersen suggests, but more 
evidence is needed to support this conclusion.  
Relations between the Formal and Informal Organisations 
As mentioned in the analysis of the actors and organisations situated in the informal 
partnership, two types of organisations were situated here. On the one hand, some 
organisations were indirectly involved in the decision-making in the formal 
partnership organisation through their representation. These organisations 
constituted the primary network relations of their representatives in the formal 
organisation, as well as project generators with particular interest in their own 
geographical or organisational area. On the other hand, other organisations played a 
different role as they were created by the partnership with the objective to be able to 
provide services and advice to the partnership and to implement its objectives. In this 
capacity, these organisations became both project applicants and implementers. 
Playing these roles influenced their relations with the formal partnership organisation.  
In a sense, all parties in the informal organisation had a stake in the decision-making 
of the formal partnership organisation as the decisions influenced their area or 
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organisation, implying that they became indirectly part of the formal organisation 
though they were situated outside it. This influenced the relations between the two 
organisations, and in turn, also the relations within the formal organisation. Here, the 
relations between the two organisations are analysed leading to more precise 
characterisation of the partnership in terms of process. Likewise, the members of the 
formal partnership organisation were also represented in the board of directors of the 
organisations outside the formal organisation. Thus, relations were dual. Arguably, 
this fact legitimised the regional policy-making process: it was not possible to create 
legitimacy about the decisions made in either Committee if the nominated project 
was not mirrored or represented in the decision-making of the Committees regarding 
its eligibility (Gjerding, personal interview). Thus, a preliminary conclusion could be 
that the informal partnership justified and legalised the formal partnership 
organisation. In other words, without the informal partnership, the formal partnership 
organisation could well have been any type of network to implement the objectives of 
a public policy or a traditional decision-making process where things were put on the 
agenda and processed as indicated in the analysis of the relations in the formal 
partnership. The informal partnership and its relations to the formal partnership 
organisation were key to understand the interpretation of the process aspect of the 
partnership principle in Denmark, and North Jutland in particular. Therefore, these 
relations are analysed in the following. 
First, it is crucial to consider the relations between the formal partnership 
organisation and the represented interests and potential applicants outside it, such as 
the locally based actors, VUR, HUR, the Aalborg Region Network and the trade 
promotion officers (the NES group), the RLMAs and the vocational schools’ coalition. 
Evidently, these organisations were all represented in the formal organisation and 
were able to influence, lobby or convince the decision-makers. Having representatives 
in the core decision-making of the distribution of the funds could be considered an 
advantage to the primary network relations, in that they, via their representative, had 
access to information about the priorities and potential needs for project applications, 
enabling them to apply for those attached funds. In this manner, the primary network 
relations could take advantage of the knowledge of the representatives concerning 
future strategies, rules and Regulation which had to be adhered to in order to initiate 
a project application. As H. Christensen (personal interview) argues: “it was crucial to 
formulate the application in such words that could open the money box”. This implies 
that when writing an application, it was important to utilise the right vocabulary to 
achieve the EU funds. The representative held information that was of value to the 
primary network relations for their development. In this sense, the primary network 
relations were in a position to take advantage of the knowledge of the representative 
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when formulating the application as he would be familiar with the requirements for 
receiving the funds. Moreover, the primary network relations would also be in a 
position to exploit the representative in different manners: to persuade him to argue 
in favour of projects that were rooted in the organisation or the area which it was 
attached to (e. g. the municipality). 
It might appear that the relationship between the representative and the primary 
network relations was only concerned with the primary network exploiting the 
position of the representative, but this was not the whole picture. Relations were also 
to the benefit of the representative, as they helped his preparations for meetings. A 
number of interviewees (Hedegaard, an anonymous representative of VUR, Stoustrup, 
personal interviews) have explained how the representatives consulted the primary 
network relations before meetings in order to be prepared. This was perhaps more 
pronounced with the members of NUF as politicians are traditionally fed with 
information from their civil servants or colleagues in the local business development 
offices. It was crucial for the members of the Committees to be prepared for the 
meetings to ensure that decisions were made on the most informed, unbiased and 
professional basis. Everybody involved in decision-making acknowledged the 
seriousness of the decisions as they administered huge amounts of money and 
influenced the future development of the region and the businesses within it. This 
implied that decisions were always made based on well-prepared work of the 
Committee members. Thus, the fact that the representatives were in fact 
‘representatives’ of the particular knowledge of certain organisations and actors in 
regional development legitimised the decision-making process, but, simultaneously, it 
forced the representative to be very careful not to let the primary network relations 
influence decisions to such an extent that it became unprofessional and biased. In 
order to avoid this, rules concerning legal capacity were set up; in cases when a 
representative was directly involved in an application he could not participate in the 
evaluation of it.  
Despite the potential for conflict concerning the preferential treatment of one’s own 
interests vis-à-vis others, this scenario rarely played out according to many 
interviewees (H. Christensen, Hav, an anonymous representative of VUR, Stoustrup, 
Simensen, personal interviews). Rather, discussions were constructive and based on 
the preparatory work of the Regional Policy Department, first, in formulating the 
applications together with the applicant; next, the preparatory work of the members 
of the Committees before the meetings so that they were informed about the issues 
that they had to discuss and decide upon; the trust and implied understanding among 
the members about the objectives of cooperation avoiding to spend time discussing 
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these irrelevant issues; and finally, the Objective 2 Programme and EU regulations 
against which decisions had to be made. In this connection, the influence of the 
primary network relations became a matter of legitimising the decisions made by the 
Committees and not a matter of influencing the outcome towards one’s own 
preferences. Moreover, the partners acknowledged that their task was to create jobs 
and generate development; a task that they had to carry out together in consensus. 
Focus was on implementation of the objectives of North Jutland regional 
development structuring the partnership. The Regulations and the Programme 
determined what the money can be spent on, the North Jutland partnership decides 
what the money was actually spent on (Hav, personal interview). 
Another perspective on the relations between the representative and the primary 
network relations was that the representative was not allowed to make decisions that 
conflicted with the position of his own primary network as he represented their point 
of view. This was particularly the case with the social partners which had opposing 
interests; one represented the employer side whereas the other represented the 
employees. The social partners were characterised by a political agenda that was 
centrally managed although in North Jutland, high ideological politics had not been on 
the agenda. Generally, both parties agreed that the overall objective was regional 
development and that everybody had to work together to achieve that aim. It was 
implied that in some areas, the two parties could not agree and cooperate, such as 
issues of collective agreement or work environment; these issues were discussed in 
other forums. As Pedersen (personal interview) formulates it: “we needed to take the 
political reality into consideration.” Thus, it would not make sense to demonstrate 
one’s political position if work places were lost as a cost of this fight; rather it would 
be more constructive to find solutions to the unemployment problem together. This 
would also benefit the businesses in the end. So in this sense, it was not considered 
legitimate to make decisions in the Executive Committee or NUF that conflicted with 
the perspectives of the primary networks, and it was accepted by the Committee 
members that it was necessary to consult the primary networks for their approval 
before a final decision was made in cases of doubt. In cases where the primary 
network relations overturned the decision, the respective member had to return to 
the Committee to re-evaluate the decision. This observation is supported by the 
County Mayor, Hav’s (personal interview) recollection of the partnership operation: 
he describes NUF as an organisation characterised by consensus based on the shared 
understanding that in cases of disagreement all actors could use their primary 
networks for consultancy, and in cases of their disagreement it was possible to 
renegotiate the issue. He cannot recollect that the Committee was compelled to vote 
on an issue of disagreement. This is in line with the argument of another interviewee 
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who claims that the decision-making system (internal in the formal organisation) was 
characterised by honesty which was based on trust among the members: when the 
members trusted one another they acted more freely and could be open about what 
they could agree to and where their limits were (Pedersen, personal interview). 
Apparently, trust among the members of the formal partnership organisation and 
their support base was crucial to the decision-making process.  
Trust was an issue in information-sharing within and between the formal and informal 
organisations. It was only natural that some members in the formal partnership had 
more knowledge about their own areas of interest or network compared to the others 
and vice-versa. This information was supposed to be used to the benefit of the 
development of North Jutland, implying that possessing this knowledge should not be 
used for one’s own benefit. It was practise that everybody shared their knowledge 
and resources ensuring the best possible decisions were made, although it could not 
be avoided that holding certain information could promote some projects to the 
detriment of others. Generally, decision-making was characterised by respect and 
mutual sharing of information. According to practically all interviewees, cooperation 
in the Committees was characterised by good relations, mutual trust and respect 
(Hav, Simensen, Hedegaard, Pedersen, an anonymous representative of VUR, H. 
Christensen, Mathiasen, personal interviews). Gjerding (personal interview) describes 
the trust relationship as a game in which the actors participated. They all know one 
another well because they were a relatively limited group of people. Knowing each 
other so well, it was not accepted to cheat one another; you only did that once and 
then you learned your lesson. As Lang (personal interview) formulates it: “there is no 
personal gain – it costs” implying that if a partner tried to influence a case to his own 
benefit, he would be punished by his co-partners later (maybe they would not listen 
to his advice). This was a game with clear unwritten norms that had been around for a 
long time based on the institutionalisation of the partnership dating back to the 
NordTek programme and the experiences made by the actors throughout time 
implementing regional policy in North Jutland. 
Besides the relations between the formal partnership organisation and the primary 
networks or the organisations indirectly involved in decision-making through 
representation, the organisations created by the system also influenced relations 
among and between the formal and informal organisations and the actors although 
the relational ties were more close with the secretariat at the Regional Policy 
Department at the County dealing with project applications. These organisations had 
been established by the partnership or at least NUF or the County Council with the 
objective of supporting the development in certain areas such as tourism and business 
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cooperation and promotion. Accordingly, these organisations were intended to be 
implementers of the County’s regional policy objectives, and as a consequence of this 
ambition they indirectly became project applicants in cooperation with their clients. 
For instance, NOVI or North Jutland Business Service provided services to existing 
businesses or businesses in the making. In order to finance this service, the two 
organisations depended on financial support of the County’s regional policy funds. 
Therefore, the funds which they received had a dual function: they financed the 
services which the two provided and indirectly supported the development of the 
business concerned. The formal partnership organisation benefitted from the work of 
these service organisations in that they participated in the actual implementation of 
the overall regional development objectives of the County, and with their specialised 
knowledge they provided information to the partnership. This was a fact because 
some of the actors in the formal partnership organisation were repeated in these 
cooperating organisations. For instance, the County Mayor as chairman of NUF and 
Lang representing the trade unions were also positioned in NOVI’s board of directors 
(Hav, Nielsen, Gjerding, personal interviews). According to Lang (personal interview), 
it was an advantage that an actor had several positions within the system in that it 
ensured greater coordination between the different organisations and actors through 
the experiences gained from the different positions. 
Similarly, the director of AMU Nordjylland (representing the vocational schools’ 
coalition), either an employer or an employee representative, played more than one 
role in the partnership. This implied that the representative of the vocational schools’ 
coalition was in a position of dual mandate: firstly, he should represent the interests 
of the entire vocational schools system and secondly, it might not be avoided that he 
would glance at either side of the employer/employee interests (Gjerding, personal 
interview). The role of the vocational schools’ coalition was in itself dual in that, on 
the one hand, it was represented in the Executive Committee as potential applicant, 
and on the other, it provided specialist advice to the secretariat concerning education 
of unemployed workers in certain lines of industry. But the dual role played by the 
representative should be noticed. The same dual role was played by other 
representatives in the partnership as well. Especially, representatives of the social 
partners were found in more than one context. The primary network of the social 
partners was their respective interested members, but in the partnership they 
represented the RLMAs. At the same time, they were also represented in the local 
business development offices. Correspondingly, it was seen in the presentation of the 
partners in the informal partnership that the municipalities and the County were 
represented in the RLMAs influencing their relations. A picture emerges with a 
relatively limited number of actors, organisations and interests overlapping otherwise 
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clear jurisdictions, pointing towards a web of relations that was based on the resource 
interdependencies identified in the analysis of the background to the inclusion of 
actors in the partnership. These relations are illustrated in the following model: 
Model 8.6: Relations among the Formal and Informal Partnership Organisations 
 
The above model is based on the analysis of the relations between and among the 
formal and informal partnership organisations, where it was found that the primary 
networks (i.e. lighter green boxes at the top of the model) had indirect influence on 
the decision-making in the formal partnership organisation (i.e. the darker green 
boxes framed by the boundary box) through representation and generation of project 
applications, hence the one-way black arrows. The dual black arrows, in contrast, 
illustrate the direct exchange of resources between the Regional Policy Department 
and the informal partnership (lighter green boxes in the bottom of the model) that 
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both provided advice to the formal partnership organisation and acted as project 
applicants. Concerning the grey arrows, the one-way arrows illustrate that actors 
situated in the organisation from which the arrow points was represented in the 
organisation to which the arrow points. The dual grey arrows implied dual 
representation: actors from the two organisations were represented in the other 
organisation and vice-versa. These relations were informal and did not directly 
influence decision-making in the formal partnership organisation like the black arrows 
did. The green box around the formal partnership organisation illustrates the 
boundary between the formal and informal partnership organisations and that formal 
and informal relations crossed this boundary. 
Thus, relations between and among the formal and informal partnership organisations 
were based on the resource interdependencies that the inclusion of these actors had 
generated. These relations influenced decision-making as a process of discussion and 
negotiation within the Committees (the formal partnership organisation) and parallel 
discussions and approvals with the primary network relations. In order to find support 
for a decision in the primary network relations or come up with an alternative 
outcome, much lobbying, negotiation and discussion took place behind the scenes – 
these were the informal relations between the formal and informal partnership 
organisations. Similarly, the formal decision-making process in the formal partnership 
organisation constituted negotiations among the members but were based on the 
informal discussions, lobbying and negotiations. So the formal partnership may not 
have functioned well without the informal relations with the primary network 
relations or the informal partnership. The informal links between the formal and 
informal partnership organisations were evident in that some groups of actors met in 
other forums before and after the meetings as preparation to the meetings. This was 
both to consult the primary network relations, but also because some actors played 
other roles in other organisations or board of directors. Gjerding (personal interview) 
provides an example of this elaborate work behind the scenes and preparation to 
ensure a smooth process of decision-making in the organisation: an issue of discussion 
was always the distribution of funds among VUR, HUR and the Aalborg Region 
Network. At one point, this discussion surfaced when the County Council had reserved 
a huge amount of funds for a specific project involving Aalborg University and 
businesses around Aalborg. The peripheral municipalities strongly rejected this 
suggestion based on the argument that the County was Aalborg friendly or Aalborg 
oriented disregarding the peripheral areas by affording Aalborg with its own pool of 
funds. These discussions took place preceding a NUF meeting, where in preparation of 
that meeting the secretariat at the Regional Policy Department had prepared several 
suggestions to the solution of the potential conflict to be presented and discussed at 
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the meeting. But as it turned out, these arguments were never discussed as in 
particular two actors, the County Mayor and the Director of the County civil servants, 
were informally lobbying the conflicting partners before the meeting making different 
promises and concessions in order to solve the problem. According to Gjerding, the 
problem was solved before the meeting based on close personal relations and the 
internal strength of the network. 
It appeared that relations between, among and within the formal and informal 
partnership organisations were very close, informal and formal. Relations were 
informal between the two partnership organisations and among the actors which 
were situated in the respective organisations in that much negotiation, discussion and 
lobbying took place behind the scenes, whereas within the formal organisation 
relations were both formal and informal in that the decisions that had to be made 
were structured against formal procedures for decision-making as established in the 
Objective 2 Programme and EU Regulation. The tone and relations among the 
partners were informal. This was the result of a partnership organisation that was 
centred around a relatively few number of centrally placed actors that were placed in 
several organisations or board of directors of these organisations. According to 
Gjerding (personal interview), this partnership organisation primarily functioned 
because North Jutland is a small region with relatively few actors involved in regional 
development. Thus, the partnership was composed of a core group of actors that 
represented networks that had relations with one another, thereby creating a close 
web of relations with each other. The tight relations among the networks and the 
limited membership generated an environment of trust where everybody knew each 
other well resulting in a smoother decision-making process where conflicts rarely 
transpired. A Danish phrase describes this: ‘Tordenskjolds soldater’ (Tordenskjold’s 
soldiers) referring to a relatively small group of people that play many different roles 
in related contexts; or put briefly ‘the usual suspects’. This phrase may have both 
positive and negative connotations, in that it may have positive effects that a few 
people work closely together in solving certain problems because they knew each 
other eased the process. An alternative reading is that only involving the ‘limited few’ 
could create an ‘inbred’ environment. This could lead to an elitist approach, rather 
than a network or partnership-like approach which are the diametrically opposite to 
elitism. In North Jutland, the preferred explanation was that bumping into ‘the usual 
suspects’ was positive in that the intimacy of the partnership created an environment 
of close personal relations and a smoother decision-making process because the core 
actors were in a position to mediate in difficult decisions avoiding breakdown of the 
partnership (Gjerding, personal interview). In North Jutland this was in fact 
unavoidable, since the region is very small and only a limited number of actors were 
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involved in regional development. Similarly, it was essential that a number of these 
actors had been involved in the partnership for many years thereby strengthening 
their relations and level of trust. 
Despite the positive interpretation, Nielsen (personal interview) raises a critical voice 
towards this close relationship within the partnership organisation. ‘Tordenskjold’s 
soldiers’ were not necessarily beneficial to decision-making although he does 
recognise the legitimacy of a core of actors controlling and coordinating the game; it 
made sense in relation to the generation of project suggestions and subsequently 
regional development that those deciding what was in the interest of North Jutland in 
terms of regional development were also closely linked to the potential projects and 
thereby able to identify the demands.  
On the face of it, he is particularly concerned with the decision-making process that 
appeared to be ritual and structured according to specific decision-making rules. 
Arguably, the decision to support specific projects appeared to have been taken 
already at an early stage in the process. Some would claim that already at the 
secretariat level some kind of filter was present; here the poorly formulated and non-
eligible projects were sorted out. There was no need for the members of the 
Executive Committee to waste their time on projects that definitely did not have the 
potential for growth and development generation. Thereby, decision-making in the 
Executive Committee was primarily concerned with the distribution of funds to the 
recommended projects from the secretariat. Also, the approval or rejection of 
projects on the political level in NUF appeared to be a ritual assessment as nearly all 
recommendations made by the Executive Committee were approved. The 
legitimisation of this apparently ritual processing could be questioned. The answer is 
the formal and informal relations with the informal partnership or the primary 
network relations, which approved or disapproved of the actions of their 
representatives behind the scenes. The processing in the formal partnership 
organisation was a necessary prerequisite for the actual decision-making of project 
eligibility and implementation; a formal body was required to make this process 
happen although the informal partnership legitimised the process. This was the 
characteristic of the North Jutland partnership approach.  
Although the North Jutland partnership appeared to be composed of a few core 
partners, asymmetries of power existed within the organisation, which is evident in 
the above analysis of the rivalry between VUR, HUR and the Aalborg region network. 
VUR and HUR were not as resourceful in terms of finances as were the Aalborg region, 
but stronger relational ties appeared to have been present within the two peripheral 
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networks. For instance, Gjerding (personal interview) argues that particularly VUR was 
a skilful project applicant with various suggestions for projects to be carried out within 
the geographical limits of the network. As has been argued, the network 
correspondingly received a considerable amount of funds to support these projects. 
Arguably, the network was a strong partner collaborating closely with the 
representative and the primary network relations as well as internally in the network. 
Thus, VUR presented itself as a strong partner in that its network was visionary and 
engineered many project proposals. Despite this powerful resource, VUR was never as 
strong a partner as the County Council.  
The same was the case with other partners such as the NES group which attempted to 
mobilise coordinated powers in reaction to the power held by the County. In the 
beginning, this networking was not approved as it challenged the vertical relations 
between the County and the municipalities as Munk Nielsen, a VUR representative, 
(personal interview) argues. Despite the mixed response, the NES group pooled 
resources and was eventually recognised by its surrounding networks and was 
included as an equal partner in the formal partnership organisation during the 2000-
2006 programming period. 
Nonetheless, the County Council and its administration appeared to have been the 
most resourceful partner as it held financial, institutional, network and ideas 
resources. Arguably, it was central to regional policy-making in North Jutland as it was 
overall responsible of the implementation and coordination of EU and North Jutland 
regional policy, but it voluntarilyly delegated decision-making authority to selected 
representation of North Jutland regional development actors. This claim is supported 
by a number of interviewees such as Stoustrup who argues that “it was part of the 
set-up that the County Council was the most powerful partner” (personal interview). 
According to her, it was a built-in mechanism that the County Council was the biggest 
player in the partnership – perhaps because the County Council was overall 
responsible of the success of the policy and hence regional development in North 
Jutland, but also because County level representatives were represented both within 
and outside the formal partnership organisation. This observation may be somewhat 
contradictory due to the fact that the County Council voluntarily delegated authority 
to the network. Despite delegation to other actors, the County Council was strongly 
represented in the network as well as in the informal organisation outside the formal 
partnership. From a network governance theoretical point of view, this was the result 
of the County Council exercising meta-governance. The County Council, being overall 
responsible at regional level of the successful implementation of the policy, was 
forced to ensure that this goal was achieved since it relied on other actors to carry out 
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this task. According to network governance theory, network management or meta-
governance is often required to ensure the goal of the policy through the employment 
of a number of strategies: designing the network, diagnosing disagreement, 
identifying policy alternatives and ensuring that negotiation continues. Meta-
governance attempts to consciously guide governance processes in the networks: it 
aims to initiate, guide and facilitate relation between actors, to generate and alter 
network arrangement so that coordination is improved. Clearly, all these strategies 
were employed by the County Council represented by the County Mayor and the 
Director of the civil servants. Although meta-governance and asymmetries of power 
existed in the network, it still had to reflect the requirements of partnership as 
defined by the Commission. Arguably, the meta-governance of the County Council 
was part of legitimising the partnership process, especially in terms of designing the 
partnership. The partnership should have a wide representation of ‘relevant’ partners 
that were somehow involved in or affected by regional development in North Jutland. 
Therefore, it was significant which partners were involved; they must bring certain 
resources to the partnership to contribute to its overall goal of successful regional 
development. Once the partnership was composed and in operation, legitimising the 
process was also concerned with ensuring a smooth process where disagreements 
were avoided or at least toned down so they did not overshadow the objective of 
cooperation. 
Although the County Council was the most resourceful partner in the partnership and 
that it exercised meta-governance, it did not appear that the partnership was 
hierarchically controlled by the County Council. Rather, relations between and among 
the partners in the partnership organisations appeared to be characterised by mutual 
respect and implied understanding of the overall objective of cooperation. Like the 
County level representatives had been exercising network management behind the 
scenes, so had other partners. Much negotiation and discussion took place among the 
different networks in the informal partnership preparing the ground for sound and 
professional decision-making in the formal partnership. This could not solely be 
ascribed to the effort of the County Council representatives; other centrally 
positioned partners were carrying out the same coordination, cf. their institutional 
position and network resources. Thus, continued uncoordinated efforts by the 
members of the network along with a coordinating effort by the NUF and Executive 
Committee chairmen representing the County level, took place. Arguably, these types 
of network governing were based on the interdependent relationship between the 
formal and informal partnership organisations: in the formal decision-making 
organisation, the partners provided ‘inside-information’ to the primary networks in 
the informal partnership whereas the networks in the informal partnership 
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constituted the basis for the pursuit of the objective of regional development in their 
project application generation. Without the project applications the formal 
partnership organisation could not make any decisions. 
Based on this interpretation of the relations within the partnership organisation, it 
may be wondered whether the partnership in North Jutland was actually a 
partnership as defined by Åkerstrøm Andersen or whether it resembled a network of 
relations involving vertical and horizontal cooperation as indicated above. This is the 
concern of the subsequent section. 
8.5.5 The Partnership Process 
In evaluating whether the relations analysed above constituted a partnership process 
as defined by Åkerstrøm Andersen or a network of relations, additional observations 
of the partnership must be included. First, I bring into play the argument presented by 
Åkerstrøm Andersen that partnership is a dynamic process. According to Åkerstrøm 
Andersen, partnership constitutes a process of partnering where partners make 
promises to each other to make new promises in the future. The partnering adjusts to 
the changing context in which it operates, thereby influencing the partnering. In this 
way, the partnership responds to the changing context making it a dynamic process 
that is potentially constantly exposed to change. In order to evaluate whether the 
North Jutland partnership organisation was dynamic or at least responded to the 
dynamic context in which it was situated, I will analyse three illustrative examples 
where the interviewees share their recollection of the functioning of the partnership. 
The interviewees talk about different projects or decisions that they were involved in 
and made an impression on them. Next, I return to the relations analysed above 
between the formal and informal partnership organisations applying Åkerstrøm 
Andersen’s definition of partnerships as second order contracts with long-term 
objectives for cooperation, dialogue, synergy and utilisation of the mutual differences 
of the partners. Partnerships are a kind of contractual arrangement to ensure future 
contract evolution; or in other words promises about making promises about future 
cooperation. Moreover, during the course of the interviews I have asked the 
interviewees to offer their definition of partnership, which has generated an 
interesting illustration of how they perceived their work in the partnership; their 
perception of the roles of their co-partners; and a general understanding of how 
partnership in North Jutland was perceived. These characterisations can be compared 
to the definition of Åkerstrøm Andersen as well as the process dimension of the 
partnership principle into a final consideration of the partnership process. 
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The Dynamics of the Partnership 
During the course of the interviews, the interviewees spontaneously referred to 
specific projects that they had been involved in or that had made a significant 
impression on them. Arguably, this illustrates the liveliness and dynamic nature which 
the partnership processes possesses, in that all the actors were engaged in the same 
projects or decisions, albeit more so in some than in others. Sometimes, this 
engagement reflected their institutional position and interests; other times the 
impression that a project reflected the partnership process itself and how it was 
perceived by the respective actor. It is particularly interesting when several actors 
refer to the same project or decision from their respective points of view thus painting 
different pictures of the same event. In these cases, for instance, two different actors 
may regard the project as their idea or see themselves as the initiator of the project. 
This illustrates the partners’ feeling of ownership of the implementation of regional 
policy in North Jutland and their intense involvement in the partnership process. 
Nonetheless, the process illustrates how the partnership operated and responded to 
the changing context.  
Especially two processes or projects were emphasised by the interviewees. The first 
concerns the decision to establish a venture capital fund (Lånefond) in 2004. The 
venture capital fund was established based on funds from the remaining Objective 2 
funds, businesses and banks. Businesses could apply for a loan from the fund for a 
project focusing on business development. If the project application was accepted, 
the business could loan money at low interest rates for their project. The idea was 
that the loans were to be paid back to the fund if the business was successful with the 
project, thereby making it self-sustaining and revolving funds generating recycling, 
although it was expected that eventually the fund would run out of money, but not 
necessarily during the 2000-2006 programming period. Thus, the concept resembled 
the BIC no-cure-no-pay concept (Gjerding, personal interview). According to the 
interviewees, the venture capital fund was based on three considerations regarding its 
objectives based on their perspective of the process: first it was agreed by some of 
the interviewees that the areas around Aalborg and Hjørring, which in 2000 became 
transitional Objective 2 areas and for that reason could not receive the same funds for 
support as the remaining areas in the region eligible of Objective 2 support, should 
still be supported. An alternative approach to ensure their support was needed 
(Hedegaard and Munk Nielsen, representing VUR and the NES group respectively, 
personal interviews). Second, the venture capital fund was created because the 
Objective 2 Programme for 2000-2006 was nearing the end and funds needed to be 
spent in order to avoid return flow to the EU (Munk Nielsen, personal interview). 
Third, the venture capital fund was an attempt to increase the level of knowledge in 
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the projects, because it was demanded that the University was involved in the 
projects together with the businesses. The secretariat in cooperation with the County 
considered the projects that had received support until then concluding that the level 
of knowledge in the projects was relatively low compared to the ambition in the 
County Council for the businesses and overall regional development. Moreover, it was 
hoped that the businesses would increase their cooperation and exchange of 
knowledge with each other as well. It was meant to become a long lasting concept 
through to the end of the 2000-2006 programming period that could contribute to 
long-term regional development (Gjerding, Head of the Regional Policy Department at 
North Jutland County, personal interview).  
This project appeared to be an example of a project that was initiated and supported 
widely in the partnership, as every partner and their primary network relations could 
identify with the objectives and potential results of the project, although the latter 
aided to the Aalborg vs. peripheral and technology vs. traditional craftsmanship 
discussions within the network. As those businesses that mostly benefitted from this 
initiative (i.e. those based on technology development) resided in the Aalborg area, 
the peripheral areas and businesses may have concluded that the Aalborg area was 
favoured, particularly because NOVI was situated in Aalborg. According to Gjerding 
(personal interview), this was not the ambition; rather it was the ambition to raise the 
level of long-term regional development compared to the ambitions of the Objective 2 
Programme that had been designed 5 years previously. In 2004, the situation was 
different in North Jutland than that which the Objective 2 Programme was based on. 
This may be interpreted as the County and the secretariat deliberately attempting to 
reinterpret the objectives of the Programme in order to ensure successful 
implementation of the Programme and regional development. In the context of 
Åkerstrøm Andersen’s definition of partnership, this is in compliance with the 
argument that partnerships respond and adjust to the dynamic context in which they 
operate. This is a clear example of the dynamics of the partnership responding to the 
changed socio-economic context in which it manoeuvres. Although, the initiative 
came from the County level representatives in the partnership, its indication of new 
perspectives for the remaining programming period received support from the 
partners in the partnership thereby emphasising the strength of the partnership and 
the partnering. 
A second project that made an impression on the interviewees and the surroundings, 
where it received much attention from the media, was the plan to build a centrally 
placed music house (Musikkens Hus) to host concerts and other musical events as well 
as house the music education at Aalborg University. In this way, it was possible to 
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build bridges between the theoretical education at the University and the practical 
employment of musicians working in the symphony orchestra. The initial idea to build 
the music house dates back to 1986 when locally interested actors established the 
association “Supporters of the Music House” to promote the idea to build a music 
house as a cultural and architectural landmark in North Jutland, or in their own words 
“to promote the establishment of a house in Aalborg to accommodate the needs of 
the local music life” 
(http://www.musikkenshus.dk/musikkenshus/baggrund/Pages/default.asx). Since 
then, the association fought for political support of the idea, which was granted in the 
year 2000 and subsequently initiated a process of raising financial support for the 
project. The project applied for Objective 2 funding which was granted in 2001 
together with additional funding from the municipality of Aalborg of a total of 50 
million DKK. Later an organisation that supports building construction in Denmark, 
Realdania, decided to invest 5 million DKK in the project as well. Having a total of 55 
million DKK for the establishment of the music house, the building project was sent 
into tender inviting architects to submit proposals for the architectural design of the 
house, which an Austrian architect company won.  
However, the project ran into trouble when the building was to be constructed. The 
construction of the building was sent into tender with the result that none of the bids 
were within the financial frames of the 55 million DKK. As a result, the developers (the 
Music House Fund and the state level board responsible of the state’s research and 
education buildings) decided to put the project to a hold. At this time, the project was 
nearing the deadline for employment of the Objective 2 funding within the 2000-2006 
programming period as a result of the N+2 rule
15
, which made the politically 
responsible body at regional level, NUF, consider whether the funds should still be 
earmarked for the project, as the funds risked having to be returned to the EU if they 
would not be spent within the time period required. NUF was not interested in 
returning funds to the EU. In order for the funds to continue to be earmarked for this 
project, NAEH needed a guarantee that the music house would in fact be built. Thus, 
North Jutland County and NUF had to employ an alternative strategy towards the 
NAEH to ensure the commitment of the funds to the project. To achieve this, 
representatives of the County in a meeting with NAEH promised that parts of the 
building would be built before the of the N+2 period in 2008 arguing that the rest of 
                                                                
15 According to the Council Regulation 1260/1999 Article 31, 2 within two years after the commitment of a 
project, the stakeholder is obliged to submit an acceptable documentation of the application of the funds 
for the project to the Commission otherwise the Commission shall automatically de-commit the project.  
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the building would consequently be built hereafter. This was the guarantee that the 
County could offer NAEH and the NAEH accepted the conditions (Gjerding, personal 
interview). This process was criticised by Gjerding as it appeared to be somewhat 
creative and bending the rules in favour of the project. 
As it turned out, the building of the music house did not proceed as planned, so in the 
meantime a reallocation of the funds was considered. Apparently, other municipalities 
were interested in the funds for their own music house, because as Gjerding argues, 
the reasoning in the peripheral areas was that if Aalborg could have a music house, so 
could they. This was based on the abovementioned rivalry among the Aalborg area 
network, VUR and HUR. During the process of establishing and building the music 
house in Aalborg, other municipalities had lobbied for funds to their counterpart. One 
of the lobbying municipalities was Aars situated in the Southern part of North Jutland. 
According to Mathiasen (personal interview), his role in the lobbying was as a 
representative of Aars’ interests. He put pressure on especially Aalborg 
representatives to renounce the funds in favour of other projects to the benefit of the 
region. The lobbying resulted in granting of funds for the establishment of a similar 
but smaller ‘music house’ in Aars (not comparable to the Aalborg music house, 
though). Within a short period of time, the ‘music house’ in Aars was built, according 
to Mathiasen, based on close relations in the community and the will to make it 
happen. This was a process and a result that Aars could be proud of, according to 
Mathiasen. The idea to build the ‘music house’ in Aars had been an ambition for 
nearly 10 years; therefore, it was easier to initiate and carry out this project, which 
probably explains why this exact project received some of the funds earmarked for 
the Aalborg music house. It was necessary to choose projects with a guaranteed 
employment of the funds within the short span of time left. A similar project that 
received some of the reserved funds was the building of the Utzon Centre housing the 
architectural design education at Aalborg University and exhibitions of the famous 
architect Jørn Utzon’s sketches close to the music house site at Aalborg’s waterfront 
(Stoustrup, personal interview), perhaps as compensation to Aalborg for not receiving 
the funds for the music house. Observing this process of lobbying and consequent 
decision-making concerning the reallocation of the earmarked funds and how 
different interviewees present the story from their perspectives from the outside, a 
political game of sorts appeared to have taken place. This observation is supported by 
the knowledge presented earlier, namely that in Aars a local North Jutland Business 
Service office was placed but closed in 2002 due to economy. It can be speculated 
that the decision to allocate funds to the establishment of a ‘music house’ in Aars 
without the same clout as the one it replaced in Aalborg was based on the quid pro 
quo negotiation that took place in NUF. The same may be true with the Utzon Centre. 
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Whether these decisions led to content decision-makers in the formal partnership 
should be left unstated, but the matter of the fact is that this is a fine illustration of 
the dynamics of the partnership, where it was able to adjust to changing 
circumstances in the context which determined its existence. Here new promises 
were made to make new promises about future cooperation by the involved partners 
in the interest of the existence and objectives of the partnership for regional 
development in North Jutland.  
Similarly, a number of other projects have been used as illustration of partnership 
dynamics by the interviewees, but the above examples serve as the best illustrations. 
To support the image of a dynamic partnership, a more political strategic manoeuvre 
made by the head of the County Regional Policy Department at the time, to structure 
the regional political work and objectives of the partnership serves as an illustration of 
how a dynamic partnership could not be structured and controlled from above.  
In 2002, after a few years of implementing the Objective 2 Programme in North 
Jutland and after many years of implementing regional policy in North Jutland, the 
Head of the Regional Policy Department at North Jutland County at the time set out to 
compose a more long-term strategy for regional development in North Jutland, as he 
was frustrated with the fact that the Objective 2 Programme and similar objectives for 
regional development in North Jutland had not been coordinated into a more binding 
and long-term strategy. Therefore, he initiated the drafting of the first ever ‘State of 
the Business Development in North Jutland’ (Nordjysk Erhvervsredegørelse) similar to 
the national State of the Danish Regions which was published in 1995 (see p. 168) but 
with a specific North Jutland perspective (Gjerding, personal interview). 
In the ‘State of the Business Development in North Jutland’, the evolvement of 
business development was analysed in an attempt to account for the driving forces 
behind this development, and the challenges that had characterised it leading to a 
characterisation of the specific challenges that the region expectedly could expect in 
the future. It was considered important that the region related and responded to the 
concrete challenges which the region faced. The high level of unemployment was 
identified to be the biggest challenge in the future as it was 2 percentage points above 
the national average for a number of years. This was a concrete issue to be addressed 
requiring a coordinated effort. Based on this challenge, a number of concrete focus 
areas to address it became the objective with regional business development in North 
Jutland in the years to come. The specific initiatives to be implemented in the future 
were 1) increased value added, productivity and level of knowledge in production, 2) 
conversion of the business structure to knowledge economy, 3) renewal of the North 
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Jutland labour market, and 4) internationalisation and export structure (Nordjyllands 
Amt, 2003b, 4-5). 
In 2003, the report was finished and sent into hearing in NUF, the Finance Committee 
and the County Council which all agreed that it was an interesting analysis identifying 
the problems and the focus areas to be addressed and that the strategy had to be 
considered. According to Gjerding this was all that happened. He had a feeling that 
the strategy was too binding with a long-term objective that would limit the room for 
manoeuvre of the politicians in regional policy-making. Politicians prefer to have room 
for manoeuvre to adjust political objectives to the changing context. For instance, a 
part of the regional political budget may be fixed, whereas the remaining funds should 
be available to be spent on addressing problems that arise along the way. Thus, 
Gjerding concluded that his agenda with the ‘State of the Business Development in 
North Jutland’ was mistaken: he wanted a business development policy that would 
influence everything relating to business development, whereas politicians preferred 
a business development policy that influenced parts of this while also absorbing and 
addressing externally imposed problems (Gjerding, personal interview). 
The account of the mistaken approach to make business development more binding 
and long-term is a good illustration of how the partnership functioned and why the 
above examples of projects that had made an impression on the interviewees were 
interpreted differently by the interviewees. The reason that the involved partners had 
different approaches to regional policy-making was that a common overall strategy 
for regional development did not exist. Generally, agreement about the overall 
objective with regional development existed, but the partners involved were not in 
agreement concerning the means to that end due to their representation of specific 
interests and their relations with their primary networks. This implied that policy-
making was characterised by day-to-day politics which is in accordance with the 
partnership definition of Åkerstrøm Andersen. Åkerstrøm Andersen argues that 
relations among the partners change as a response to the changes in the context, 
although they do have long-term objectives with the relations. In the same way the 
partners must make new agreements regularly. This is exactly what took place in the 
formal partnership both during the Committee meetings but also behind the scenes 
with the informal partnership between the meetings. The above example of the music 
house project is a fine illustration of how the partners responded to the changing 
context and sought to enter into agreement with the other partners about an 
alternative solution, when it was clear that the project could not be completed within 
the required time frame. 
306 
 
Gjerding evaluates the ‘State of the Business Development in North Jutland’ project to 
be a kind of contractual policy that was not wanted by the politicians. Subsequently, 
he realises that this form of contractual policy-making would render the political 
system and process static and kill the dynamism of the partnership and the bottom-up 
approach that characterised the organisation (Gjerding, personal interview). This is in 
line with the argument of Åkerstrøm Andersen who claims that partnerships are 
opposite to contracts that are fixed and binding; rather they are contracts of second 
order implying that they are dynamic and responding to the context in which they 
operate. 
Definitions of Partnership  
During the course of the interview, the interviewees were asked to offer their 
definition of partnership in order for me to analyse how they perceived the process 
that they had been involved in. This was to provide me with a clearer indication of to 
which extent the partnership organisation in North Jutland resembled a network or a 
partnership as defined by Åkerstrøm Andersen. Arguably, when the interviewees offer 
their perception of what constitutes a partnership, they base this definition on their 
own experience with working in partnership. Some differences in the interviewees’ 
perception of partnership have been found. It is possible to group the definitions into 
three different types of partnership understandings. Examples of how the 
interviewees perceive partnership are presented below.  
The first group is concerned with the inclusion of actors: 
“as a point of departure everybody is equal and everybody has 
influenced the objectives of the partnership. You should also agree in 
which direction the partnership should go or at least what the purpose 
of the partnership should be” (F. Christensen, personal interview) 
“partnership is concerned with something which the partners are 
mutually involved in. It is concerned with consensus and commitment” 
(H. Christensen, personal interview) 
Here, partnership is perceived to concern the equality of partners involved and the 
nature of their involvement. Everybody participates on the same grounds and 
consensus is central to the cooperation. If the partners do not agree, the partnership 
cannot be. These quotations reflect an understanding of partnership as a process that 
involves the commitment and equal participation of the partners, as well as the 
inclusion of partners that are willing to compromise so that a common objective can 
be reached. It is possible to draw some parallels to Åkerstrøm Andersen’s partnership 
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definition, which fundamentally perceives the partners in the partnership to be equal 
and involved in the partnership based on a mutual understanding of a common goal. 
Thus, these definitions clearly reflect the necessary condition for partnership: the 
inclusion of partners who are willing and interested to create a partnership. 
The following two groups of definitions are contrasting, one focusing on partnerships 
as non-contractual and based on mutual relations whereas the final group is focused 
on partnerships similar to contracts. 
The second group of definitions presents a variety of concepts covering the same 
theme, namely the partnership process: 
“partnership is not something static like a marriage; you should not 
count on it for ever” (anonymous centrally positioned civil servant at 
the County Regional Policy Department, personal interview) 
“partnership is like a marriage in that you make promises until you 
cannot live up to those promises any longer. If you run into trouble, 
you talk to the other partner and let him/her know that you cannot 
live up to those promises any longer” (Munk Nielsen, personal 
interview) 
“a partnership declaration does not embrace what partnership is 
about. Partnership involves that the involved partners show that they 
have the will, trust and ability to participate in partnership… 
fundamentally, it builds on simple, old-fashioned words: a man is a 
man, a word is a word” (Pedersen, personal interview)  
“partnership is something value-laden, that you do something 
together and that you make agreements that you benefit from” 
(Nielsen, personal interview) 
The first two interviewees make use of the word ‘marriage’ referring to a synonym 
and an antonym of partnership. In the first place, one would be led to the conclusion 
that they do not have the same perception of partnership, but when interpreting the 
sentences which describe the ‘marriage’, it is clear that partnership is concerned with 
making promises that you either live up to or not. In cases when you cannot live up to 
the promises that you have made you simply discuss the issue and make new 
promises. Similarly, both refer to the fact that a partnership is not forever unless you 
adjust along the way and make new promises about the future. This is in accordance 
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with the process dimension of Åkerstrøm Andersen, which argues that partnership is 
dynamic process that changes according to the context in which it is situated. 
According to these quotations, partnership is about the voluntary involvement of 
actors that are willing to engage in cooperation and negotiation with partners working 
towards a common goal. In this process, the partners must rely on the others to 
achieve the overall goal which involves will and trust of the involved partners. Thus, a 
partnership is trust-based and centred on negotiation among the actors. That a 
partnership is value-laden implies that the involved partners bring resources to the 
table in exchange for access to the resources of the other partners. That the exchange 
of resources should be fair is the point of departure for cooperation, thus depending 
on the mutual trust among the partners. Moreover, partnership is not contractual 
based on a partnership declaration, implying that partnership depends on the active 
engagement of the partners involved, and not on a theoretical signed agreement 
which the partnership declaration signifies. Rather, partnership is lively and based on 
relations. When comparing these perceptions of partnership to Åkerstrøm Andersen, 
similarities can be found. All perspectives perceive partnership as a dynamic process 
depending on the active involvement of partners through a process of trust exchange 
and willingness to adjust cooperation to the circumstances of the context towards the 
achievement of the commonly agreed goal. This goal may change along the way and 
in these circumstances the partnership process adjusts itself accordingly. Partnership 
is voluntary participation. The common denominator in these quotations is that 
partnership is a dynamic process based on mutual trust, negotiation and agreement 
about how to pursue a common regional policy objective although described through 
the utilisation of different phrases and words. 
Finally, three quotations point in a different direction; partnership is rather based on 
some kind of contractual agreement among the partners: 
“close cooperation among people or groups of people that is binding 
based on a common objective” (anonymous representative of VUR, 
personal interview) 
“partnership is more binding than a network in that partnership is 
based on agreements among the partners” (Hedegaard, personal 
interview) 
“partnership is that you want more than you can achieve by yourself. 
You should be willing to give up some of your own objectives and 
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ambitions because together you can achieve more” (Stoustrup, 
personal interview) 
According to these three interviewees, partnership is a binding process where the 
partners are committed to the process based on agreements made among the 
partners. Thus, partnership is not a network, which according to this interviewee, is 
more loose and institutionalised and not based on mutual agreement regarding the 
objective. On the face of it, these perceptions of partnership may be considered in 
contrast to the definition of Åkerstrøm Andersen as they use the word ‘binding’ and 
indicate a quid pro quo exchange of resources which Åkerstrøm associates with 
contracts opposite partnerships. However, when considering the quotations more 
closely, the interviewees perceive the partnership process as more contractual and 
when engaging in partnership you expect something in return for the resources which 
you bring to it. This does not necessarily imply that the partners are unwilling to 
adjust to the context. It is interesting to note, that these three interviewees represent 
different ‘trenches’ in the existing disagreement between the peripheral areas and 
the Aalborg Region network. Arguably, the quid pro quo position of the partners 
influenced their interaction in the partnership and clearly illustrates the inherent 
tensions within the partnership that have been analysed above. This also constitutes a 
tension between the long-term objectives with cooperation which the second group 
of definitions involve, and the more short-term objectives with the exchange of 
resources which the third group of definitions involve.  
As mentioned above, it may be argued that the interviewees’ perception of 
partnership is based on their own approach to working in partnership, the 
expectations they had to the partnership and based on their experiences with working 
together in the regional policy-making partnership in North Jutland. It is obvious that 
they are talking about the same cooperation, network or partnership in that most of 
them use similar characterisations of it, implying that according to them the 
partnership for implementing regional policy in North Jutland was based on a 
common objective such as discussed above in the examples of the projects that made 
an impression on the interviewees and the failure of the ‘State of the Business 
Development in North Jutland’ project. The objective with North Jutland regional 
development was clear and based on the same objectives, but the means to achieve 
that were different which was reflected in the numerous negotiations and deals made 
during the course of the process and the inherent tension or rivalry between the 
peripheral and Aalborg areas. Thus, if these conditions and premises were present in 
the North Jutland regional policy-making partnership, the partnership can definitely 
be considered a partnership organisation rather than a network. 
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An elaborated definition of the partnership that was present in North Jutland 
definitely supports this claim: 
“You cannot write up a contract because things may happen along the 
way that force you to change direction. We do not have a contract; the 
partnership depends on the agreements made by the involved partners 
without officially being made. Contracts make things too static…. A 
contract makes the partners goal oriented. In a partnership you are 
both goal and process oriented.” (Pedersen, personal interview) 
This definition emphasises that partnership in North Jutland was centred around close 
cooperation among the partners focused on the process of working together towards 
a commonly agreed goal. 
In this connection, it is interesting that when asked about partnership in regional 
policy-making (as a theme of the interview); many interviewees said that they had 
never thought about cooperation like this. It was just a natural way of cooperating 
that developed throughout time. Some of the interviewees were involved in regional 
policy-making since the 1980s when the NordTek programme was set up confirming 
this claim (Lang, Pedersen, Hesselholt, personal interviews). Therefore, their personal 
definition of a partnership can be considered to be based on their honest perception 
of what they were doing, although they never put into words what that was. They 
were used to work closely together when it was necessary; a particular culture of 
cooperation existed in North Jutland based on the project initiatives, as has been 
argued. But they may never have described it like a partnership before. 
According to two interviewees, the special North Jutland regional policy approach 
joining the three policy areas was particularly conducive to the process, i.e. industrial 
policy, labour market policy and education policy. The project developing culture had 
thus been centred on involvement of the relevant actors representing the respective 
policy areas towards the implementation of the policy which led to the inclusion of 
actors that in other regions had not been involved in regional policy-making as their 
regional political approach was not involving all three policy areas (Nielsen and 
Gjerding, personal interviews). Thus, the gradual increased inclusion of the ‘relevant’ 
actors appears to be determining for the subsequent partnership process, which will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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8.6 A Concluding Historical Institutionalist and Network 
Governance Interpretation  
The partnership in North Jutland was a particular interpretation of partnership that 
was structured around the special North Jutland approach to regional policy-making 
involving three associated policy areas, i.e. industrial policy, labour market policy and 
education policy and the Objective 2 Programme including EU regulation placed 
within the North Jutland regional policy-making framework and the subsequent 
involvement of ‘relevant’ actors. The gradual involvement of these actors led to a 
process of cooperation in implementing the objectives of the common North Jutland 
regional policy. In a sense, the process was also reversed in that the ‘relevant’ actors 
involved also set the objectives with the future regional policy. Thus, the process was 
self-sustaining which is characteristic of a partnership. Whether the organisational 
structure in North Jutland for implementing regional policy could be characterised as 
a network or a partnership can be discussed. The above analysis of the inclusion and 
process aspects of partnership points in two directions. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that due to the somewhat formal, rehearsed and structured character of the 
decision-making process in the formal partnership organisation that developed over 
the course of time as a consequence of the institutionalisation of the organisation; the 
‘inbred’ character of the network as questioned by Nielsen; and the central position 
and meta-governance of the County level partners, the partnership organisation in 
North Jutland should be considered a network. On the other hand, the evidence 
presented above analysing the process as perceived by the interviewees offers an 
alternative reading. So which is it? 
In order to make such an evaluation, it is necessary to go back to the analysis of when 
it all began with the coincidental introduction of EC level regional policy-making and 
trace the historical development of partnership in North Jutland. During these times, 
regional policy-making was a national level concern and responsibility, but bottom-up 
developments took place as a reaction to the socio-economically and politically 
changing contexts. At the regional level, different actors were mobilising in response 
to prolonged disregard of their capacity and knowledge of the regional state of 
regional development, the reduction in funds for the implementation of the Regional 
Development Act and deteriorating employment situation in some regions. Already at 
this time, a culture of sticking together was rooted. At the same time the increased 
need for a coordinated EC level regional policy was emerging as a consequence of 
enlargements of poor member states among other factors. These parallel events led 
to the establishment of regional level capacity in North Jutland to take regional policy-
making into their own hands. The establishment of regional level capacity was based 
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on voluntary involvement of interested actors at the time to solve the regional 
unemployment problem, and the requirement of the EC level to act as a ‘guinea pig’ 
to test EC level ambitions to organise a coordinated EC level regional policy-making 
effort. Accordingly, a peculiar composition of a decentralised network of actors 
representing regional, national and EC levels situated within the regional level 
institution for implementing regional policy took place. This was the beginning of the 
institutionalisation of actor inclusion in regional policy-making and the consequent 
foundation of a culture for working together in North Jutland.  
Institutionalisation of regional level capacity and inclusion of actors was emphasised 
in 1992 when the NordTek programme ran out and the Objective 2 Programme for 
North Jutland replaced it. Here, the structure was revised and changed according to 
regional needs and objectives, without considering the partnership requirements of 
inclusion. Thus, according to a historical institutionalist interpretation, the regional 
level partnership institution that was founded with the NordTek programme was 
changed gradually through conversion of the existing rules. This was particularly so 
because, already at this time, the North Jutland approach to ‘partnership’ was more 
inclusive than required by the partnership principle. Partner involvement in North 
Jutland was both vertical and horizontal in character at this time. During the 1990s, 
the coordinated regional policy approach in North Jutland was shaped by the 
involvement of industrial, labour market and education policies under the heading of 
regional development. Hence, the inclusion of the ‘relevant’ actors within these policy 
areas influenced the development of organisational constellations towards a 
regionally anchored network structure instead. Facing the 2000-2006 programming 
period, the ‘partnership’ or network in North Jutland was characterised by extended 
inclusion of actors compared to the requirements of the partnership principle, based 
on the gradual institutionalisation of regional level capacity that took place since the 
1980s.  
Similarly, throughout time a culture of cooperation developed based on the 
institutionalisation of the inclusion of regional, local, private and other actors. The 
inclusion of actors was not considered enough to implement the objectives of North 
Jutland regional policy; therefore, a process of cooperation, negotiation and exchange 
of resources to achieve that aim had to take place as a natural result. In its early years 
of existence, cooperation among the included actors was arguably characterised as a 
network of relations that was engineered by the County Council responsible of 
regional policy-making in the region. To some extent the inclusion of and cooperation 
among actors was based on the considerations and decisions of the County in 
structuring an implementing organisation to carry out the task on its behalf. Thus, the 
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County voluntarily transferred decision-making competences to two implementing 
bodies; the Steering Committee (for political back up) and the Executive Committee 
(for project evaluation) although ensuring its own representation in the Committees. 
Critics would argue that in this manner, the County positioned itself in a favourable 
position in order to exercise meta-governance in the network, a position it has 
maintained since then. This manoeuvre may be considered necessary in that the 
County remained accountable to the national and EC levels in implementing regional 
policy according to rules and regulation. The apparently formal, rehearsed and 
structured decision-making within the ‘partnership’ seen in the 2000-2006 
partnership analysis can be considered a result of the long-term exercise of meta-
governance on behalf of the County. It was a way to ensure a successful outcome of 
the decision-making process which the network was responsible for. But the question 
is whether this influenced the process in terms of the development of these relations 
towards becoming a partnership or whether it has remained a network. 
My guess is that through gradual inclusion of new partners, the long-term experiences 
with working together and the widespread acknowledgement of the need to stick 
together influenced the process towards increased partnership gradually replacing the 
network relations. Two equally valid arguments need to be taken into consideration in 
order to make this conclusion: first, the discussion of the relationship between and 
among the formal and informal partnership organisations needs to be revived. 
Second, the above analysis of the dynamic nature of the decision-making process in 
terms of the different perceptions of the interviewees regarding the cooperation aids 
to this evaluation. When considering the relations within the formal partnership 
organisation independently from the informal partnership, the process within it 
arguably resembled a network process like it did in its original form during the 1980s – 
especially taking the above meta-governance of the County into consideration - in 
that to some extent the network was self-regulating to the extent that the designated 
interest organisations themselves selected their representative; that the actors within 
the Committees represented horizontal interdependent actors; and that negotiations 
among the actors took place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary 
framework. 
However, taking the relations between the decision-making network (i.e. formal 
partnership organisation) and the primary networks and other partners in the 
informal partnership into consideration, relations became more complicated than 
those in a network based on partnering, pointing towards the development of 
partnership relations where promises made in the formal partnership organisation 
were either supported or rejected by the informal partnership, thereby legitimising 
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and justifying the decisions of the formal partnership organisation. Likewise, it 
justified the process that those affected by regional policy-making were represented 
in the formal decision-making network. Thus, the project applicants were in a position 
to directly stimulate and inspire the objectives of regional policy as they were typically 
familiar with where focus was needed. In other words, they affected the decisions and 
promises made in the formal partnership organisation, so the promises made came to 
involve both the partners in the formal and informal partnership organisations. The 
formal and informal partnership organisations became intertwined and 
interdependent. When this type of change happened exactly, has not been possible to 
detect. But it has definitely been a gradually evolving process where layering was 
added to the existing partnership institution.  
The lively and dynamic relationship between and among the formal and informal 
partnership organisations was exemplified by the storytelling of the interviewees in 
their description of specific cases and their definitions of partnership. This aids to the 
conclusion that the particular interpretation and implementation of partnership in 
North Jutland has developed to become a formal vertical partnership organisation 
that without its relational ties with the surrounding informal partnership constituted a 
network, but the defining characteristic that points towards a partnership as defined 
by Åkerstrøm Andersen was the formal partnership organisation’s support of and 
relationship with the informal partnership as it generated a self-sustaining partnership 
process.  
In this connection, it should also be reflected on how the size of the partnership 
influenced the gradual development of the partnership inclusion and process. It has 
been questioned whether the fact that the partnership within and across formal and 
informal partnership organisations constituted a limited number of actors had a 
negative impact on the partnership process. ‘Tordenskjold’s soldiers’ may have a 
negative connotation, but apparently, to the partnership in North Jutland it had a 
positive impact in that, according to the interviewees, the partnership was 
administered by a well-functioning group that had a long tradition of working closely 
together. One thing that conditioned this process was that North Jutland is a small 
region, and it may not have been possible involve more actors; all the relevant and 
affected actors or organisations were gradually involved through representation. 
Another thing to be considered is the in-built tension in partnering that marginalised 
some actors. In fact, it may be wondered whether a wide (in numbers) partnership 
was necessarily a more well-functioning and effective partnership, especially 
considering that throughout time the North Jutland partnership was always wider 
(horizontally) than required by the partnership principle despite its limited size. 
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Maybe partnerships are functioning better when only a limited number of partners 
are involved. It is arguably easier to establish trust among a few partners, as well as it 
is easier to make promises to make new promises about future cooperation when 
fewer partners are involved. 
It may be argued that an institutionalisation of the North Jutland partnership 
approach took place as a consequence of the development that the regional policy-
making institution underwent since its initial establishment in the mid-1980s. The 
partnership approach in North Jutland developed from being primarily centred on the 
inclusion of the relevant actors in implementing the policy as required by the EC and 
the government level as well as desired by the regional level, into a network that 
gradually became the overall responsibility of the County towards an increasingly 
mature partnership with relations between two interdependent partnership 
organisations that sustained the process. The maturity and experiences of the 
partnership should not be ignored, as partnership is about long-term commitment to 
partnering in the future. In the case of North Jutland, this was definitely a scenario 
that played out. Since the end of the 1980s, the network or partnership in North 
Jutland developed based on the experiences made underway and based on the 
internal agreements made between the partners over the years. The partnership was 
long-term in that the organisational structure was maintained through the three 
succeeding programming periods although new partners were included in the process. 
The partnership process gradually developed out of the long-term experiences with 
resource exchanges in the decision-making network and the underlying rationale of 
‘sticking together’ when necessary; this became the catchphrase in North Jutland 
regional policy-making. It became a natural way of working together that no one 
questioned; it was the norm. In this way, the partnership process in North Jutland 
became institutionalised, which was emphasised in the Objective 2 Programmes 
framing the partnership, towards long-term partnering.   
From a historical institutionalist point of view, the interpretation of the partnership 
principle in terms of inclusion and process has been a gradual process initiated by the 
first development of a regional level institution to implement regional policy in North 
Jutland. Once the experimental NordTek programme established a ‘partnership’ 
organisation in North Jutland, the development of it was initiated. First, the institution 
was gradually exposed to conversion where the existing rule with the inclusion of 
actors at regional and national and EC levels was reinterpreted and changed to 
constitute only regional actors. Following this and the subsequent Structural Funds 
reforms in 1993 and 1999, the partnership organisation was increasingly widened, or 
exposed to layering, although it kept its organisational structure. In this sense, the 
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partnership organisation in North Jutland has been institutionalised over the course of 
time to involve implied understandings and norms. This development was also 
conditional to the gradual development of the partnership process. Although it has 
not been possible to access adequate information about the process during the first 
years of existence, it can be speculated that initially the process was characterised by 
network relations that gradually extended to become more and more similar to 
partnering as the involved partners became familiarised with the institution of the 
partnership and developed an environment of trust and consensus about the 
preferred way to cooperate. The culture of ‘sticking together’ became integrated into 
the institution through the process. In this sense, the partnership process was also a 
gradually developing process of layering to the existing partnership institution. 
A final remark should be made regarding methodological considerations of the validity 
of the storytelling of the interviewees concerning how they have perceived the 
partnership process. On the one hand, it may be questioned whether the positive 
storytelling of how the partnership was based on consensus and sticking together has 
become a reinforcing instrument of the network itself. This storytelling may have 
been generated by the involved actors and passed on to the new actors in the 
network, repeating the story again and again until it became the truth. Evidence 
analysed above does point to disagreements and rivalry among some of the actors 
(especially the geographically rooted networks, VUR and the Aalborg Region Network) 
which arguably points to a more nuanced picture. So how can I convince myself and 
the reader to believe the storytelling when parts of the evidence point to a different 
reading? As is suggested in the methodology, data triangulation is a solution. 
However, here it is not possible to triangulate the interview data with other primary 
or secondary data to support the storytelling, as no such data exists. Instead, I have to 
triangulate within the interview data, implying that the interviews reveal other things 
than the storytelling. Two issues should be emphasised: first, it is worth investigating 
the rivalry between VUR and the Aalborg Region Network more closely. It has been 
argued above that despite that both sides of the opposing camps have claimed that 
the other area received more funds for their projects, the matter of the fact is that 
both areas received their share of the funds, as Gjerding argues (personal interview). 
Especially, the Aalborg area received a large amount of funds for projects (such as the 
Music House or the Utzon Centre as well as smaller projects). The storytelling of the 
Aalborg representative becomes central in that the municipality of Aalborg was in a 
powerful position to either attract funds to the area or to decide that funds should be 
allocated to other areas or projects, a role which Stoustrup emphasises (personal 
interview). Second, it is relevant to triangulate the storytelling with the actual 
partnering process, which illustrates that the partners do in fact stick together 
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regardless of the disagreements and quarrels that are unavoidably present in such a 
partnership organisation. This is evident in the extensive list of projects supported by 
the partnership (cf. all the interviewees have referred to projects that they remember 
to be especially interesting and to have made a contribution to the regional 
development of North Jutland). Moreover, it is evident in the historical development 
of the institutionalisation of regional level capacity and thus the partnership 
development itself. The institutionalisation of partnership was based on increased 
involvement of relevant actors in order to achieve a balanced partnership 
organisation where all interests were heard. Thus, ‘sticking together’ may reflect the 
‘inclusion’ and ‘process’ requirements of the partnership principle. 
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9. Conclusion 
When initiating this research, I set out to explore how Danish regional policy-making 
has changed during the course of time, as a result of the interpretation and 
implementation of the EU partnership principle inclusion and process requirements. 
In order to find specific answers to my inquiry, I proposed three inter-related 
questions: 
What types of change, if any, have been generated in Danish regional policy-making as 
a result of the Danish interpretation of the organisational requirements of the EU 
partnership principle until 2006? That is, 
 which consequence has the interaction between Danish regional policy-
making and the EU partnership inclusion requirements had for the inclusion 
of and relations between partners in Structural Funds implementation and 
why? 
 to which extent has the coordination between Danish regional policy-making 
and the EU partnership process requirements resulted in a partnership 
process? 
Thus, the research area under scrutiny was the historical development of the Danish 
regional policy-making institution based on its interpretation of the partnership 
principle inclusion and process requirements. Based on closer investigation than has 
hitherto been suggested, it has been argued that the partnership principle is 
composed of three elements, which in turn have implications for its implementation 
into the member states’ own regional policy-making institution: first and foremost, as 
the partnership principle has been extended in subsequent reforms, it has been 
increasingly emphasised that implementation of the partnership requirements has to 
be in accordance with the member states’ own institutional, legal and financial 
organisation. This certainly argues for closer investigation of the member states’ 
institutional organisation into which the partnership requirements are implemented. 
Moreover, this argument is supported by existing literature, which has found that 
implementation of the partnership principle has resulted in mixed experiences and 
results depending on the member state’s institutional organisation. Hence, this was 
the starting point of the study: regional policy-making institutional development. The 
second element of the partnership principle is that partnership involves inclusion of 
actors or organisations at different levels of government, as well as increasing 
involvement of private actors and organisations. The third element of the partnership 
principle, which has not been highlighted in existing research, is that in order for the 
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partnership to be operative, it requires some kind of process or relations with the 
involved actors and organisations towards the achievement of regional development 
in the regions. Arguably, the final two elements resemble a network.  
When implementing these partnership requirements, i.e. inclusion and process, the 
member state’s regional policy-making institution is expected to adjust to the 
institutional requirements demanded by the partnership principle as a condition to 
receive Structural Funds for regional development objectives. But how this 
adjustment takes place depends on the institutional organisation of the member 
state’s regional policy-making institution and its interpretation of the requirements. 
For this purpose, the understudied case of Denmark is utilised as an object of analysis. 
Moreover, Danish policy-making is characterised by a peculiar balance between 
decentralisation and centralisation of the political system. 
This study has been carried out within a theoretical framework of two theories, 
namely historical institutionalism and network governance, where historical 
institutionalism comprised the backbone of the analysis, when exploring change to 
the Danish regional policy-making institution in its interpretation and implementation 
of the partnership requirements. Network governance, in contrast, was utilised as a 
tool to analyse how the partnership requirements were employed on a practical level.  
According to historical institutionalism, the study of institutions is an analysis of how 
organisations acquire value and stability over time. In this connection, institutions are 
more than ‘rules of the game’. They distribute power, influence and the definition of 
interests to actors that in turn shape policy-making. According to Thelen (1999) 
institutions emerge as a result of historical conflict and constellations, which bring 
about change. Put differently, change occurs as an unintended consequence of 
interactions among different institutional orders and actors. Thus, change in the 
institution is both internal and external. Historical institutionalism identifies seven 
types of change: defection refers to when an actor that has hitherto followed the 
practices prescribed by an institution stops doing so. Re-interpretation is when an 
actor re-interprets the rules of the institution. The actor gradually changes his or her 
interpretation of the rules without defecting from or dismantling the formal 
institution itself. A more obvious way to institutional change is reform processes (Hall 
and Thelen, 1999). Displacement is often referred to as an abrupt change entailing a 
radical shift (as associated with the critical junctures in the earlier versions of 
historical institutionalism), but it may also be a slow evolving process. Layering occurs 
when new rules are attached to the existing ones, not replacing the institution. Drift 
occurs when rules remain formally the same, but the impact of them changes as a 
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result of shifts in the external context. Conversion occurs when rules remain the same, 
but are interpreted and enacted in new ways (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
Network governance offers a perspective on how the partnership principle inclusion 
and process requirements are practically employed by viewing partnerships as 
networks. The argument is that policy-making is more and more characterised by a 
process of negotiations and interactions among a number of public, semi-public and 
private actors that result in a relatively stable pattern of policy-making. This type of 
policy-making is referred to as governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a). 
Actors are included into the network based on the resources they contribute with in 
an exchange with other actors’ resources towards the goal of the network: effective 
policy implementation. This means that governance network actors are 
interdependent, but it does not imply that actors are necessarily contributing equally 
to the network; networks may be characterised by asymmetries of power. Interaction 
among network members transpires through negotiations on the distribution of 
resources. Governance networks are relatively self-regulating due to their horizontal 
character, although they are sometimes exposed to meta-governance in order to 
achieve the overall goal of the network (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a).  
However, it may not offer the whole ‘truth’: a specific version of a network approach 
is concerned with partnership and the partnership process which distinguishes itself 
from network relations in that the process or the relations among the actors involved 
is centred on what Åkerstrøm Andersen (2006) labels ‘partnering’, where the relations 
among the actors are based on long-term perspectives and cooperation. Partnerships 
can be characterised as ‘contracts of second order’ designed to handle the fact that 
the circumstances surrounding the partnership are constantly changing. Thus, 
partnership is considered to be some form of second order contracts: contracts to 
ensure contract evolution and consequently they are dynamic in nature. This means 
that partnerships produce opportunities for future cooperation, visions and ideas, 
which is core to the ‘partnering’, i.e. how they endure based on the partners’ mutual 
understanding of making promises about future promises, and how they are 
constantly developing. 
Based on the hermeneutic approach to the research, I have applied the three 
perspectives together in the investigation of the development of Danish regional 
policy-making resulting from the interpretation and implementation of the 
partnership principle requirements of inclusion and process with historical 
institutionalism constituting the overall framework of the analysis. The analysis was 
sub-divided into three chapters, each reflecting interdependent aspects of the 
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research question, i.e. the historical development of the Danish regional policy-
making institution independent from the interaction with the EC regional policy 
developing at the same time; the interaction between the two institutions and how 
that generated change; and how the partnership inclusion and process requirements 
have been interpreted and implemented as a result of the institutional change that 
the interaction between the two institutions has generated.   
The Danish regional policy-making institution was considered to be one overall 
institution within which the partnership requirements were implemented. Within this 
institution, as a result of the gradual change of the Danish regional policy-making 
institution, a gradual decentralisation and a functional division of responsibilities took 
place as a reaction to the internal (such as bottom-up) and external (such as the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds) developments. This development materialised into a 
‘division of institutional levels’ within the overall institution drawing on the Danish 
regional policy-making institution, which will explicated below. 
The first sub-analysis was concerned with the exploration of the historical 
development of the Danish regional policy-making institution independent from its 
interaction with the simultaneously developing EC/EU regional policy. This analysis 
was rooted in the argument that the interpretation and implementation of the 
partnership principle depends on the institutional context into which it is 
implemented, as partnerships are to be implemented according to the institutional, 
legal and financial organisation of the member state, which is continuously 
emphasised in the partnership principle definition. Seen from a historical 
institutionalist perspective, the development of the Danish regional policy-making 
institution is based on internal (and external) events and conditions leading to gradual 
change. The Danish regional policy-making institution can be traced back to the post-
war years, where changes in the socio-economic map and a need to address regional 
development problems, such as unevenly distributed unemployment problems 
between the rural areas and the cities, led to the first Regional Development Act in 
1958 focusing on the promotion of mobility and business development in areas with 
high unemployment. Regional development was the exclusive responsibility of the 
state level. The Regional Development Act can be considered the first 
institutionalisation of Danish regional policy-making and it introduced a new way of 
perceiving regional development (egnsudvikling) as a more balanced development 
outside the capital. Simultaneously, bottom-up developments took place, where 
business councils were established at the sub-national level bringing public and 
private actors together to promote regional development of their specific area. 
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Regional development during the years following the enactment of the Regional 
Development Act may be characterised as a gradual development towards increased 
decentralisation based on a number of internal and external events. During the 1960s, 
the Regional Development Act was reinforced constituting what historical 
institutionalism labels ‘layering’, where the subsequent reinforcements merely added 
rules to the existing institution without turnover of the existing institution by 
gradually transferring responsibility to the newly established Regional Development 
Directorate situated in Silkeborg in Jutland sub-ordinated to the state level. This was 
an internal development. External developments also took place during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, where several municipalities and counties established business councils 
as a response to a deteriorating economic situation following the oil crisis in 1973-4. 
These initiatives remained external to the Danish regional policy-making institution, in 
that at that time the sub-national level competences were limited to granting direct 
subsidies to individual companies. Thus, regional activities at the sub-national levels 
constituted more specifically providing advice, training or improving general 
conditions for businesses within the region. Nonetheless, these initiatives are central 
to understand the gradual development of the Danish regional policy-making 
institution, especially seen in the light of parallel external developments during the 
mid-1980s that led to internal manoeuvring in the Danish regional policy-making 
institution. The public debt had increased to a critical level, which made the 
Conservative Prime Minister introduce the so-called ‘potato diet’, which entailed 
extensive cuts in public and private expenditure. According to an interviewee, during 
the ‘potato diet’, regional development support was gradually reduced and removed 
from the yearly Finance Bills in 1987 and 1988. Arguably, this development 
constituted the gradual phasing out of the Regional Development Act with the 
reduction in support for regional development. Two other pieces of evidence support 
this claim: between 1984 and 1985, prioritisation of the funds for regional 
development was changed towards increased direct subsidies rather than loans. This 
probably took place because loans were more cost-effective compared to direct 
subsidies, so even with a reduction in the total national level expenditure the net 
gross expenditure remained the same when the loan disbursement was reduced 
considerably. Moreover, the discourse of the Finance Bills of 1987 and 1988 supports 
the gradual development argument. The overall frame of activities for regional 
development changed from ‘business economics’ (erhvervsøkonomiske 
foranstaltninger) to ‘industrial development’ (erhvervsfremme); a change of rhetoric 
that may be regarded as a symbolic indication of the new era. Thus, the bottom-up 
developments during the 1980s took place against this background: that funds for 
their regional development were gradually reduced forcing them to mobilise 
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themselves and work more closely together across the public-private divide and 
across levels of government to handle the regional development challenges. This 
points to a gradual development of the Danish regional policy-making institution. 
From a historical institutionalist perspective, this development is called ‘conversion’, 
where both the state and sub-national actors interpreted the rules in new ways. 
Existing research (such as Halkier, 2001 and Illeris, 2010) has characterised 1991 as an 
epoch-making year in that state-level exclusive responsibility of regional policy-
making was terminated ‘overnight’, and the objective with regional development was 
changed to improve the competitiveness of Danish companies rather than the region 
as a whole. However, evidence here points to a more nuanced reading of these 
events. Previous research was more concerned with explaining change to the 
institution through the ‘critical junctures’ terminology, as institutional development 
was considered to be characterised by path-dependence as earlier versions of 
historical institutionalism emphasised (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Apparently, it does look 
like a completely new institution was established with changed organisation and 
objectives after 1991, but the changes may not be so radical after all when 
considering the line of reasoning above. Rather, a sequence of events initiated during 
the 1950s’ bottom-up developments till the 1980s, as concluded above, has led to 
gradual development of the Danish regional policy-making institution through a 
reform of the existing institution as argued by the historical institutionalist 
perspective. 
The 1991 changes to the Danish regional policy-making institutions resulted in 
decentralised organisation of responsibilities involving the regional level in the policy 
process enabling them to design programmes, set up institutions and shape individual 
projects – a specific Danish bottom-up model to regional development was emerging. 
The division of responsibilities was based on a functional division where each level of 
government involved in regional policy-making became responsible for different 
aspects and processes of policy-making. At this point in time, it should not be 
forgotten that the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds had been introduced and was 
expected to generate change in the Danish regional policy-making institution. Thus, 
the responsibility of the national level became to promote the general framework 
conditions for businesses as well as it provided the Danish Agency for Trade and 
Industry (DATI) with increased competences in national regional policy-making. The 
regional level, in contrast, became the actual implementers of the policy as this level 
controlled their own programme resources and co-funded EC programmes. 
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With the changed division of responsibilities towards multi-level governance, the sub-
national actors were offered a window of opportunity to become increasingly and 
legally involved in regional development and in the promotion of their own areas. 
Similarly, the national level gradually took advantage of the ‘new’ institution by way of 
developing its own approach to partnership and closer interaction between the state 
level and the sub-national actors in implementing the objectives of the Danish 
regional policy. These developments, which took place during the 1990s and to some 
extent into the 2000s, may be regarded as gradual developments based on layering to 
the gradually developing Danish regional policy-making institution. 
As mentioned above, the parallel developments of the EC counterpart to regional 
policy-making are arguably similarly vital in explaining the development of the Danish 
regional policy-making institution in that in 1988 for the first time ever the EC 
introduced a regional policy where the member states could receive conditional 
Structural Funds for their regional development. In order to receive the Funds, the 
member states were required to establish competences to build partnerships across 
levels of government which most member states did not have any experience with. 
Thus, it was expected that the member states’ existing regional policy-making 
institution would have to be adjusted accordingly. This is also what existing research 
has illustrated: that variance in the implementation of the partnership principle had 
been identified across the member states. The present research has sought to present 
a more detailed analysis of this development in Denmark. 
The analysis of the interaction between the Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making 
institution begins in the 1970s when Denmark entered the EC, and the Community’s 
regional policy objectives came to influence national priorities, objectives and 
practices by being assigned to EC regulation. At this point in time, EC regional policy-
making was based on a quota scheme which left the member states – and Denmark – 
in control of the implementation and employment of the EC quota funds allocated to 
each member state. These funds were allocated to Greenland, but when Greenland 
decided to withdraw from the EC in 1984, the funds were instead delegated to the 
rest of the Danish regions. It should be noted that these developments took place 
prior to the ‘potato diet’, which arguably may have influenced the gradual 
developments surrounding the reduction in national funds prioritised for regional 
development, although it has not been articulated by the politicians. Thus, the relative 
importance of the Danish regions suddenly having a prospect of receiving additional 
funds for regional development should not be ignored in the above conclusion of the 
gradual development of the Danish regional policy-making institution – it aids to that 
development. Moreover, it aids to the conclusion reached that bottom-up 
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developments along the way have correspondingly resulted in gradual transformation 
of the Danish regional policy-making institution from that of a state responsibility 
towards a shared responsibility between levels of governments in that the availability 
of the EC funds for regional development by the regions themselves, may together 
with the increasing socio-economic deterioration during the 1970s and 1980s, have 
strengthened the relations between the regional level actors in an attempt to take 
destiny into their own hands. Thus, these developments support the conclusion 
reached above that the institutional development of the Danish regional policy-
making institution is characterised by gradual development based on a sequence of 
internal and external events pointing to a conversion of the institution in the terms of 
historical institutionalism. 
These sequential developments certainly prepared the ground for and set the stage 
for the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, which may expectedly have generated 
additional change to the Danish regional policy-making institution in that partnerships 
across levels of government were required. As it turned out, the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds did not make up the expected earthquake, it merely became situated 
in the chain of events that aided to the gradual development of Danish regional 
policy-making. Thus, the 1991 developments were inspired by the introduction of 
partnership requirements of the 1988 reform on the same premises as the socio-
economic, political and bottom-up events that took place in Denmark concurrently. 
For that reason, the 1991 developments cannot solely be ascribed to the introduction 
of new organisational requirements, but it has definitely inspired the division of 
responsibilities which came into effect post-1991, as it has offered a window of 
opportunity to legally involve the sub-national actors in regional development. Adding 
this event to the sequence of events leading to the gradual development of Danish 
regional policy-making, this type of change may be characterised as displacement 
which was generated as some of the actors affected by the institutional structure did 
not find it reasonable to adhere to that structure, rendering a change to that 
institution unavoidable. 
As mentioned above, the post-1991 regional policy-making institution in Denmark 
joining the Danish and the EC approaches resulted in a vertical multi-level governance 
structure with functional division of responsibilities ‘stratifying’ the Danish regional 
policy-making institution as explained above, which in many respects became similar 
to those of the EC. The EC level was responsible for regulating spatial designation and 
funding. The national level became a coordinator between EC regulation and regional 
level implementation in accordance with national legislation, withdrawing from its 
central position in Danish regional policy-making prior to 1991. The regional level 
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became responsible for implementation of the regional development programmes. 
This division of responsibilities has since then been operative. 
Two subsequent reforms of the Structural Funds widening and deepening the 
partnership requirements were decided in 1993 and 1999, expectedly influencing the 
development of the coordinated Danish and EC/EU regional policy-making institution. 
As it turned out, no considerable transformation of the existing organisation took 
place. The institution was merely emphasised and extended through strengthened 
coordination between the two as well as increased emphasis on partnership by 
layering.  
One of the most conspicuous changes to the existing Danish regional policy-making 
institution was the elevation of the regional level based on the bottom-up 
developments during the 1980s, and even back to the 1950s, as well as the 
opportunity for the regional level to become involved in regional policy 
implementation by the availability of EC funds justifying their legal position. North 
Jutland was chosen as a case study for exploring the practical implementation of the 
partnership principle requirements as well as for investigating the development of 
regional level capacity for implementing regional policy based on its long tradition of 
involvement in regional policy-making (a pioneering region in Denmark) and its 
versatile business structure to mirror the complex organisation of partnership. 
The institutionalisation of North Jutland regional policy-making competences was 
founded during the mid-1980s with the experimental NordTek programme, where, by 
some coincidence, regional level actors met with EC level civil servants resulting in a 
proposal for implementing an EC programme in the North Jutland context 
experimenting with a programme and a partnership approach. As such, this 
experiment was ahead of its time as it was operative within the frames of the 
Regional Development Act, where the regional level did not play any role in Danish 
regional policy-making. However, this experiment initiated a process of 
institutionalising capacity at the regional level in implementing EC, regional and 
national level regional development initiatives and inspiring other regions to set up 
similar structures. Therefore, when the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds was 
introduced, North Jutland was prepared to implement a form of partnership. The 
NordTek partnership was composed of EC, national and regional actors operating at 
the regional level, which, in a subsequent evaluation of its operation, was not 
considered adequate. Rather, the regional level partnership should represent regional 
interests and challenges. Thus, an institution was set up reflecting North Jutland, 
where competences were delegated from the politically elected County Council to 
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two interdependent Committees composed of politicians and civil servants 
respectively based on a functional division of responsibilities. This institutional 
organisation was emphasised and extended reflecting the 1993 and 1999 reforms of 
the Structural Funds adding layers to the regional level institution by including more 
and more actors into the organisation. Hence, the NordTek programme should be 
considered vital in the establishment and development of regional level capacity and 
partnerships, also in terms of inclusion and process as will be concluded later. 
First, however, the final sub-analysis took its point of departure in the vertical 
functional division of responsibilities in order to explore how partnerships were 
implemented on each level based on the interpretation of the partnership 
requirements within this organisation (as coordinated between the Danish and EU 
regional policy-making institutions). The first level explored was the EU level, which 
arguably was insignificant in Danish regional policy-making besides its role as the actor 
setting the rules of the game. As the Commission was not itself directly involved in 
day-to-day implementation it sought to influence the process by means of the 
exercise of meta-governance through the partnership principle definition. Whether 
this meta-governance was successful or not, depended on the member states and 
their interpretation of the principle. 
The next level which was explored in the vertical division of responsibilities was the 
national level partnerships. The national level played a clearer role in the Danish 
partnership as the coordinator of policy between the EU and regional levels; as the 
actor providing the national regulatory framework, forwarding programme proposals 
to the Commission, suggesting overall policy design, matching ESF and ERDF funding, 
administering the ERDF and ESF. The analysis of the national level partnership 
illustrated how the national level, in its coordinating role, was involved in and 
responsible for preparing and designing programmes and monitoring the 
programmes. These undertakings were carried out in partnership with actors below 
the national level, as well as the social partners and other public and private actors 
trying to influence the process and the consequent contents of the programmes. The 
national level was not directly involved in the implementation of the programmes, 
however, but was financially responsible to the Commission, for which reason it was 
involved in and chairing the Monitoring Committees set up to oversee the progress of 
the programmes. The role of the Monitoring Committee was disputed in the analysis 
as especially the interviewees questioned their role therein. The Monitoring 
Committee was referred to as a ‘figurehead’ or a ‘rubber stamp’ reflecting the formal 
decisions made concerning effective usage of the funds in projects with high quality. 
In this sense, the Monitoring Committee was merely present in the partnership 
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because the Commission dictated so. Evidently, this was not the level where the 
widest and deepest partnerships were found, although it did have vertical relations 
with the regional level. NAEH had relations with the County level (the Regional 
Development Department referring to the County Council) both when designing the 
programmes but also during the implementation of the programmes. The regional 
level was accountable to NAEH which in the end finally approved the project 
applications and disbursed the Funds to the projects. 
Arguably, the ‘real’ partnership was found at the regional level as the practical 
implementer of the policy. To explore the interpretation and implementation of the 
partnership inclusion and process requirements, the historical development of the 
partnership organisation in North Jutland was brought back as a case. As concluded 
above, the NordTek Programme became the launching pad for gradual development 
of regional level institutional competences to implement EC and regional level 
regional policy. At the same time, a specific approach to partnership in North Jutland 
also developed. During the late 1980s, North Jutland witnessed a deterioration of the 
economic situation when major work places closed down such as Aalborg shipyard, 
thereby increasing the unemployment level, while national funding for regional 
development was reduced following the ‘potato diet’. The North Jutland approach to 
partnership was based on these gloomy conditions leading to a coordinated regional 
development approach bringing different policy areas, such as labour market and 
industrial policy, together to address the problem more holistically. It was argued that 
in order to address the unemployment problem, a number of ‘relevant’ actors had to 
be brought together to exchange ideas and information. These actors were all 
affected by, or involved in, regional development. Although, the NordTek partnership 
was entirely composed according to these recommendations, but also according to 
the requirements of the national and EC levels, the influence of the NordTek 
partnership should not be understated in serving as a foundation upon which the 
North Jutland regional policy-making partnership was built. 
Obviously, considerations regarded both the objective of regional development but 
also the inclusion of actors to implement these objectives – these were considered to 
be interlinked. Therefore, when following the 1988 reform, a programme for North 
Jutland regional development was introduced, an extension of this approach came 
natural. A specific partnership organisation was firmly rooted in North Jutland as 
concluded above: a structure with two Committees for decision-making concerning 
implementation of policy objectives in North Jutland and EC regional policy was 
continued after the NordTek programme in the subsequent rounds of programming in 
1993 and 1999. Along with the new programming rounds and refined partnership 
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requirements, the partnership in North Jutland was also extended and widened but 
not necessarily based on the requirements of the partnership principle, but rather 
based on regional and local considerations regarding the state of regional challenge, 
the regional policy objectives and the subsequent addition of a third policy area to the 
North Jutland regional policy approach into a Trinitarian regional policy approach 
(labour market, industrial and education policies), where the regional policy objective 
constituted the overlapping area of the three. Thus, the partnership was gradually 
extended to include regional and local (municipal, business councils) actors, social 
partners as well as ‘industrialists’ who are business men representing particular 
innovative and respected businesses in the region. All of these actors were gradually 
included as they could each contribute with resources to the partnership towards the 
promotion of regional development in North Jutland. Additionally, more and more 
actors were included as the experience with cooperation in the North Jutland 
partnership matured, perhaps highlighting the need to involve new partners, or 
perhaps because new actors presented themselves on the regional scene. Although 
the development of the North Jutland partnership has not entirely reflected the 
development of the partnership principle requirements, it should be noted that even 
in its undeveloped form in the 1980s, the North Jutland partnership was well ahead of 
the requirements of the partnership principle definition in the 1988 reform, and even 
so in the subsequent reforms. In this sense, the North Jutland partnership did reflect 
the partnership inclusion requirements as they developed – otherwise the partnership 
would not have been accepted by the national and EC level, as one interviewee 
highlighted. 
Regarding the development of the process requirement, it was more difficult to make 
a firm conclusion as adequate data does not exist to illuminate the partnership 
process of the 1980s and 1990s, and the interviewees had difficulty remembering 
specific events and relations that long ago. It can be concluded, though, that following 
the inclusion of actors into the partnership, the web of relations among them must 
have become proportionally complex indicating that the process requirement of the 
partnership principle must have developed accordingly. Nonetheless, it was concluded 
that the North Jutland regional policy organisation had gradually developed into a 
network. 
A more detailed investigation of the practical interpretation and implementation of 
the inclusion and process requirements was carried out of the 2000-2006 
programming period where both the inclusion and process of the partnership were 
based on the experiences with the partnership organisation preceding this 
programming period, which is clear in the Objective 2 Programme for the period. The 
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2000-2006 partnership was composed of a formal and an informal partnership 
organisation. Within the formal partnership organisation the partnership organisation 
found in the previous programming periods consisted of the County Council (overall 
responsible for policy-making in North Jutland), NUF (resembling the Steering 
Committee composed of politicians to support political backing), the Executive 
Committee (composed of civil servants) and the Regional Policy Department at the 
County level. This organisation was a particular constellation that was not seen in 
other Danish regions with its separation of civil servants and politicians into two 
Committees. Outside the formal partnership organisation, an informal partnership 
existed resembling and representing the actors involved in the formal partnership 
Committees. Thus, the interests of the informal partnership actors were represented 
inside the formal organisation, which had consequences for the relations between the 
two organisations and the actors within them. Here, municipalities were represented 
through a number of actors (both politicians and civil servants) such as locally based 
actors, e.g. VUR, HUR and the Aalborg Region network, whom had a rivalling position 
in the partnership, the NES group and local business councils. Besides these, 
agricultural and education organisations and the social partners were represented 
through the RLMA as well as individually (both the employers’ organisations and the 
trade unions).  
These actors directly represented in the formal partnership organisation were 
situated in the informal partnership in order to legitimise the decision-making process 
in the formal partnership organisation, in that they would provide a platform for 
support of the negotiations between the interested partners in the formal 
partnership. Moreover, it was argued that the actors making the decisions concerning 
the development of the region should reflect those potentially applying for the 
regional development funds. Thus, the actors situated in the informal partnership 
organisation were also potential project applicants. Besides, these actors, a variety of 
actors or organisations such as NOVI and North Jutland Business Service, were 
involved providing services to the system or as direct applicants in their capacity of 
being created by the system (they were established on the initiative of actors within 
the formal partnership organisation) due to their required existence to support the 
organisation. 
Partnership in North Jutland was found in both the vertical decision-making process 
and in the surrounding horizontal partnership, involving actors across different 
organisational and policy contexts based on resources which the individual partners 
brought to the process, e.g. the institutional position of the actors, financial resources, 
ideas and the ability to take the initiative to instigate new projects and personal 
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network relations. These resources contributed to create tight interdependent 
relations between the partners within the formal partnership organisation, and the 
relations with the informal partnership in the implementation of regional policy in 
North Jutland. 
Two types of relations existed within the North Jutland partnership organisation. The 
first type of relation was the internal relations within the formal partnership 
organisation, which was mainly concerned with decision-making related to the policy 
objectives, and how to achieve them through recommendation of projects eligible of 
regional development to the national level National Agency for Enterprise and 
Housing (NAEH). A specific decision-making process developed over the years of 
experience with the institutionalisation of partnership, in which things took place in a 
certain order and each Committee within the formal partnership organisation played 
specific roles herein. This process involved implied understandings, norms and 
procedures for cooperation. On the face of it, the decision-making process appeared 
to be highly hierarchically organised with a clear division of responsibilities and 
hierarchy between those who decided and those who prepared the basis for those 
decisions. It was especially noticed how many levels a project application had to go 
through to be approved (first the Regional Policy Department, then the Executive 
Committee and finally NUF before sending the recommendation to NAEH), which 
would appear inefficient and obsolete. Rather, this line of work implied 
professionalism and strict employment of the modus operandi of EU regional policy 
implementation. In isolation, these relations appear to resemble a network of 
relations rather than a partnership as defined by Åkerstrøm Andersen. 
Investigating the second type of relations, i.e. those between the formal and informal 
partnership organisations adds to a more nuanced conclusion. These relations were 
affected by the roles played by the actors and organisations in the informal 
partnership: they were either indirectly involved in the formal partnership 
organisation through representation or they were created by the partnership in order 
to provide services to the system and be project applicants. It was argued, that, in a 
sense, all parties in the informal partnership had an interest in the decision-making of 
the formal partnership organisation as the decisions concerned their individual area 
or organisation. It was also found that members in the formal partnership 
organisations were represented in the board of directors of the organisations in the 
informal partnership pointing to dual relations. These crisscross relations legitimised 
the decision-making process, in that it was not possible to create legitimacy about the 
decisions made in either Committee if the nominated project could not see itself 
mirrored or represented in the Committees making the decision regarding its 
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eligibility. It can therefore be concluded that the informal partnership justified and 
legalised the formal partnership organisation, or that without the informal 
partnership, the formal partnership organisation did resemble a network. The 
informal partnership and its relations to the formal partnership organisation were key 
to understand the interpretation of the process requirement of the partnership 
principle in Denmark, and in North Jutland in particular. 
Relations between the actors and organisations in the two partnership organisations 
were very close, shifting between formal and informal and based on mutual trust and 
respect of each other’s position in the negotiations. Much negotiation, discussion and 
lobbying took place behind the scenes to ensure a smooth decision-making process in 
the formal partnership organisation to maintain the strict hierarchy of decision-
making. According to the interviewees, this was a rather easy process in that the 
partnership was made up of a relatively small number of central actors whom 
everybody knew. This was a consequence of North Jutland’s relatively small size. With 
a small partnership, a close web of relations was easily established generating trust 
among the actors. On the surface, it appeared that relations were generally good 
despite a rivalry between three (and in particular two) municipal networks: HUR, VUR 
and the Aalborg Region network. Of course, at times it could be more difficult to reach 
agreements when particular actors or organisations stood firmly on their position, but 
in the end a compromise was always reached to the overall benefit of the region, 
instead of mere local or organisational interests. 
To make a conclusion on whether these relations constituted a network of relations or 
a partnership process as defined by Åkerstrøm Andersen, it was necessary to find 
evidence that either confirm or reject the dynamic partnering process, where partners 
make promises to make new promises in the future in these relations. In the first 
place, three processes highlighted the dynamic nature of the decision-making process, 
where the partnering adjusts to the changing context in which it is situated. Especially 
two decisions, which were controversial to the partnership, illustrated how the 
situation surrounding the project application changed according to different 
conditions in the region and within the project itself, forcing the decision-making 
partnership to alter previous decisions to correspond to the changing context. This 
constituted the dynamic nature of the partnership: it was prepared to adjust its 
decisions to the changing context. This was confirmed when the then Head of the 
Regional Policy Department secretariat sought to write up a ‘State of the Business 
Development in North Jutland’ with a more long-term strategy to regional 
development than had hitherto been suggested. As it turned out, this was not a 
success in that politicians prefer shorter-term political strategies so they can adjust 
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them along the way. Hereby, the conclusion that the partnership in North Jutland 
resembled an Åkerstrøm Andersen partnership was strengthened. A final piece of 
evidence to support this conclusion was the analysis of the interviewees’ own 
understanding of a partnership and consequently also the partnership they had 
participated in in North Jutland regional policy-making reflecting both the dynamic 
nature of the partnership as well as the partnering process itself which presented 
definitions resembling the Åkerstrøm Andersen definition. 
It took a journey down a long winding road to answer the above research questions 
with many details of the historical development of the Danish regional policy-making 
institution composed of a complex network of institutions. Therefore, nearing the end 
of this research, I will attempt to further distil the above detailed conclusion. The 
simple conclusion to the complicated, multi-facetted research question is that the 
Danish regional policy-making institution has gradually developed from being an 
overall national level responsibility to being an increasingly decentralised vertical and 
horizontal partnership that was found at three levels of government (i.e. EC/EU, 
national and regional levels) based on a functional division of responsibility. The 
gradual movement towards increased decentralisation, and thus multi-level 
governance, has elevated the regional level and allowed for regional level capacity 
building that has materialised into a specific regional level partnership approach. This 
development was shaped by internal and external events. Internally, national 
economic, socio-economic, political and bottom-up developments spurred this 
development. Externally, the introduction of the 1988 reform and subsequent 
extensions of that reform have contributed to this development by offering the 
potential regional development actors at the regional level, in particular, a window of 
opportunity to become legally involved in regional development as well as offering 
additional funds for this development. Both national and regional level actors reacted 
to this. However, the development towards increased decentralisation and multi-level 
governance cannot solely be ascribed to the availability of additional funds and a new 
structure for organising regional policy; bottom-up developments in Denmark can be 
traced back to the 1950s well before EC regional policy became influential on member 
states’ regional policy-making. The specific partnership model in Denmark and in 
North Jutland in particular, may only partly be based on the partnership requirements, 
as the NordTek programme experiment preceded the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds where partnership was first introduced. Considerations in North Jutland were 
more oriented towards involving the relevant actors in regional development; i.e. 
actors or organisations directly affected by the (poor) development of the region. 
Hence, a Trinitarian regional policy approach involving labour market, industrial and 
education policies determined the relevant horizontal actors. Moreover, during the 
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1980s, North Jutland faced difficult times due to a high level of unemployment, which 
forced the public, business and other private actors, as well as the social partners, to 
stick together in addressing this problem. Since then this sense of sticking together 
has shaped regional policy-making in North Jutland creating and developing a 
partnership in the Åkerstrøm Andersen sense of the word. 
Thus, the ‘simple’ answer to the first bullet question “which consequence has the 
interaction between Danish regional policy-making and the EU partnership inclusion 
requirements had for the inclusion of and relations between partners in Structural 
Funds implementation and why?” is that partnership in Denmark was introduced prior 
to the 1988 reform partly based on internal changes to the Danish regional policy-
making institution, such as bottom-up developments of the 1980s, socio-economic 
and political changing conditions, and partly based on external events such as the 
accidental experiment between the regional level actors and the EC level leading to 
the establishment of regional level competences to implement regional policy. The 
establishment of a regional level institution into which the partnership requirements 
and its gradual development was implemented shaped the gradual inclusion of 
regional, local, public and private actors, social partners and the ‘industrialists’. The 
gradual inclusion of actors into the North Jutland partnership reflected the 
development of a particular North Jutland approach to regional policy based on the 
Trinitarian regional policy model involving three policy areas, i.e. labour market policy, 
industrial policy and education policy, where all these policy areas affected the 
regional development. Thus, actors affected by or involved in these policy areas were, 
throughout time, considered relevant to the implementation of regional policy 
objectives. Thereby, the partnership ‘reflected North Jutland’. These considerations 
were more based on addressing the regional development challenges in North Jutland 
than meeting the partnership inclusion requirements in the following reforms. 
Arguably, this was not necessary in that the first partnership preceding the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds was more inclusive than required in the subsequent 
reform. Therefore, the North Jutland partnership did not have any difficulties meeting 
those requirements even in the subsequent extensions of the partnership principle 
requirements. The relations within the North Jutland partnership were consequently 
based on the gradual inclusion of actors that reflected the state of the regional 
development challenges. The included actors in the formal partnership organisation 
represented interests and organisation situated outside the formal partnership 
organisation. These organisations and networks influenced and legitimised the formal 
decision-making by providing support to those decisions and by being direct project 
applicants. 
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Similarly, the simple answer to the second bullet question “to which extent has the 
coordination between Danish regional policy-making and the EU partnership process 
requirements resulted in a partnership process?” is that the formal and informal 
relations between the formal and informal partnership organisations constituted 
relations that mirrored the partnership definition of Åkerstrøm Andersen. These exact 
relations legitimised the partnership and made it a partnership rather than a network. 
When looking at the relations within the formal decision-making organisation in 
isolation, these may only be characterised as network relations as they were 
characterised by hierarchical and very structured relations which was a necessary 
condition in order for the partnership to be able to produce an acceptable and 
professional outcome (i.e. regional development) being held accountable, first, to the 
national level and, next, to the EU level. Thus, when taken together the partnership 
interpretation and implementation in North Jutland did resemble a partnership that 
gradually developed as experience with cooperation developed over the course of 
time. 
All in all, the overall answer to the research questions is that the Danish regional 
policy-making institution has witnessed a gradual development since the 1950s 
towards increased multi-level governance and a functional division of responsibilities 
elevating the regional level with its own competences to implement the partnership 
inclusion and process requirements. Within the regional level regional policy 
implementation institution drawing on the overall Danish regional policy-making 
institution a specific North Jutland approach to partnership and partnering has 
developed based on regional level considerations regarding the objectives with 
regional development, but inspired by the organisational framework presented by the 
EU regional policy. These developments may partly be ascribed to a sequence of 
internal and external conditions and events, such as socio-economic and political 
developments in Denmark, bottom-up developments stretching back to the 1950s and 
the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds offering a window of opportunity for the 
regional level to become legally involved in their own development with the 
availability of funds and an organisational framework for its implementation. 
This research has contributed with an alternative theoretical framework for 
understanding the interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle 
into the member states than the one most widely applied, i.e. multi-level governance. 
With the proposed framework of historical institutionalism and network governance 
this research has proved to be able to go in depth with the types of change generated 
by the interaction between national and EU regional policies in the member states. It 
has been verified that change has been generated in Danish regional policy-making as 
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a result of the this interaction as multi-level governance research has suggested, but 
on top of that, this theoretical framework offers additional tools to identify the nature 
of that change. In addition, this research has contributed with an in-depth analysis of 
the horizontal relations, which partnerships are expected to generate through the 
application of the Åkerstrøm Andersen partnership definition of ‘partnering’, but 
which existing research has not convincingly been able to clarify. Thus, based on the 
explorative nature of this research, the aim has partly been to explore the historical 
development of the Danish regional policy-making institution, and partly to develop 
an alternative and supplementary theoretical framework to multi-level governance in 
order to illuminate details of the interpretation and implementation of the 
partnership principle in the member states through a Danish case study. As such, this 
study has demonstrated the applicability of the theoretical framework in the Danish 
case, making it possible to carry out similar studies of other member states’ 
experience with the interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle 
within the framework. The weak link of this study is the fact that carrying out a 
historical analysis that goes well back in time may prove difficult in that accessing 
data, either primary or secondary material, is always problematic, especially when 
relying on the recollection of interviewees involved in the process. This was the case 
in the analysis of the historical development of the process requirement of the 
partnership principle. Despite this weakness, I believe that I have made a contribution 
to existing research of the interpretation and implementation of the partnership 
principle by suggesting an alternative approach to understanding the partnership 
principle definition, and its consequent different theoretical and empirical 
implications than those of the multi-level governance approach. The combination of 
the three theoretical perspectives offers a new approach to understanding the 
development of the Danish regional policy-making institution with a more nuanced 
perspective on gradual change (continuity vs. change) in a multi-level governance 
setting. 
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11. Executive Summary 
This research takes its point of departure in the institutional consequences of the 
partnership requirements for the member states’ regional policy-making institution. It 
analyses the historical development of the Danish regional policy-making institution 
with particular emphasis on the changes that were generated from the interpretation 
and implementation of the partnership organisational requirements. Notably, the 
ambition of this study departs from other studies carried out with this goal, such as 
the multi-level governance perspective based on a re-interpretation of the 
partnership principle requirements. I argue that the partnership principle contains 
three elements with theoretical and empirical implications for such an investigation: 
first, the partnership principle states that partnership employment should take place 
in the member states according to their institutional and legal backgrounds. This 
implies, like most multi-level governance research of the implementation of the 
partnership principle has revealed, that member states’ institutional contexts matter 
to its implementation. Thus, in order to understand its implementation into the 
member states, and the consequences for the member states’ institutional 
organisation, their existing regional policy-making institutions must be analysed in 
retrospect. The second element involved in the partnership principle definition is a 
requirement to include a specified number of actors in the partnership. The inclusion 
requirement has been extended in subsequent reforms of the Structural Funds to 
involve both vertical and horizontal actors and organisations. The third element is that 
partnership involves some kind of relations among the actors and organisations in the 
partnership. Thus, the institutional impact of the interpretation of the partnership 
requirements depends on the member states’ interpretation and implementation of 
them. Regardless of the interpretation, institutional change may be the expected 
outcome. 
So the aim is to explore how the interpretation and implementation of the 
partnership inclusion and process requirements generated change in a member 
state’s regional policy-making institution. The member state selected for this inquiry is 
Denmark, as it is an understudied member state in the regional policy-making 
research, while also a member state characterised by a peculiar relationship between 
centralised and decentralised public policy-making. 
In existing research of the implementation of partnership requirements, it has been 
argued that the member states’ institutional organisation gradually adjusts according 
to these requirements depending on the member states’ own institutional 
organisation, which is also inherent in the partnership principle itself. Arguably, 
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understanding the historical development of the Danish regional policy-making 
institution is key to understand the interpretation of the partnership requirements as 
the partnerships are expected to be implemented into the existing Danish regional 
policy-making institution. Historical institutionalism offers a theoretical perspective 
for analysis of interaction between the EC and Danish regional policy-making 
institutions, arguing that the institutional structure is historically rooted and has 
gradually developed based on internal (actors) and external (other institutions) 
conditions and events. Focus is on how decisions made in the past shape present 
decisions, and how institutions may change in the meeting with other institutions 
based on the reactions of the actors within the institution (Mahoney and Thelen 
(eds.), 2010, Hall and Thelen, 2009, Pollack, 2004). Thus, historical institutionalism 
offers two interrelated tools for this analysis: first it is able to analyse the context and 
the background to the institutional context into which the partnership requirements 
are implemented. Second, it offers tools to analyse the evolving interaction between 
the two institutions, i.e. the partnership principle and the national regional policy 
institutional structure. 
Within the historical institutionalist framework, network governance presents an 
appropriate theoretical tool for analysing the specific organisation of the regional 
policy-making organisation, expectedly based on a partnership approach. Based on 
the existing institutional organisation of Danish regional policy-making, the 
partnership principle is interpreted and implemented into the Danish organisation, 
expectedly leading to the establishment of partnerships. Arguably, partnerships 
resemble networks in terms of inclusion and relations between the actors involved. 
Network governance analyses the inclusion (and perhaps exclusion) of actors in the 
implementation process based on the argumentation of resource dependencies; 
actors are involved in networks because they bring certain resources to the network 
that the network members are dependent on and cannot obtain elsewhere (Sørensen 
and Torfing (eds.), 2007, Sørensen and Torfing, 2005 and Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). 
Within the governance network literature a specific approach to partnership as a form 
of network relations without being a network, is found. This approach by Åkerstrøm 
Andersen (2006) presents a definition of partnership based on ‘partnering’, where the 
partnership process is considered a dynamic process with relations between the 
partners based on ‘second order contracts’ (i.e. promises to make new promises 
about future cooperation) as a reaction to the changing context in which partnership 
operate. Hereby, it is possible to distinguish between the process requirement as a 
network of relations and as a partnering process. 
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Methodologically, the research is founded on a hermeneutic approach, which is 
concerned with parts and the whole and their relations, and how they in combination 
explain how the interpretation and implementation of the partnership requirements 
have generated change in the Danish regional policy-making institution. This study is 
based on analysis of primary and secondary data, as well as qualitative semi-
structured elite interviews with public and private, politicians and civil servant actors 
at different levels of government, who have been involved in Danish regional policy-
making until 2006, which is the dividing year for my study. North Jutland constitutes 
the case study region. A single case is preferred as the aim with this study is exploring 
the details of the partnership interpretation and implementation that have not been 
revealed in previous studies. In comparative studies, the detail level may not be as 
deep: complex networks are expectedly the result of the Danish interpretation of the 
partnership principle, and therefore the comparative analysis of two or more 
networks may only be superficial compared to a single case study. North Jutland is an 
appropriate case study region, in that North Jutland has a long history of involvement 
in regional policy-making as well as it has a versatile business structure thereby 
expectedly influencing the horizontal relations of the partnership. 
Through the employment of a hermeneutic approach to the exploration of the 
development of the Danish regional policy-making institution based on the 
interpretation and implementation of the partnership requirements, the analysis 
consists of three interrelated parts. The first part is concerned with analysis of the 
institutional development of the Danish regional policy-making institution 
independent from the EC/EU counterpart. This analysis takes its point of departure in 
the argument that the interpretation and implementation of the partnership principle 
depends on the institutional context into which it is implemented, as the partnerships 
are to be implemented according to the institutional, legal and financial organisation 
of the member state, as is continuously emphasised in the partnership principle 
definition. Seen from a historical institutionalist perspective, the development of the 
Danish regional policy-making institution is based on internal (and external) events 
and conditions leading to gradual change. Internally, the first Regional Development 
Act in 1958, focusing on the promotion of mobility and business development in areas 
with high unemployment, initiated an institutionalisation process of a Danish 
approach to regional policy-making introducing a new way to perceive regional 
development (egnsudvikling) towards a more balanced development outside the 
capital. Regional development was the exclusive responsibility of the state level. 
Regional development during the years following the enactment of the Regional 
Development Act may be characterised as a gradual development towards increased 
decentralisation through layering to the institution. In 1991, the regional policy-
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making institution framed by the Regional Development Act was changed into an 
apparently diametrically different organisation where state-level exclusive 
responsibility of regional policy-making was terminated ‘overnight’, and where the 
objective with regional development was changed to improve the competitiveness of 
Danish companies rather than the region as a whole, which existing literature has 
found to be epoch-making. However, this research does not support this claim. 
Rather, it is found that the 1991 change in the Danish regional policy-making 
institution was the result of a sequence of gradual developments, such as changing 
socio-economic conditions in Denmark during the course of time, political 
manoeuvring, bottom-up developments and the availability of EC funds for regional 
development during the mid-1980s, that altogether led to a reform of the institution. 
In this line of argument, the 1991 reform was also relevant in the sequence of events 
and changes that have shaped the gradual development of the Danish regional policy-
making institution.  
The second part of the analysis of types of changes generated as a result of the Danish 
interpretation and implementation of the partnership requirements is concerned with 
the interaction between the Danish and the simultaneously developing EC regional 
policy-making institution. As such, this analysis is based on the findings of the first 
analysis, where it was argued that the Danish regional policy-making institution was 
characterised by gradual change based on internal and external events and 
conditions. Here, the focus is particularly on the external conditions and events 
shaping this development: how the availability of EC Structural Funds and the 
introduction of a legal basis for regional level involvement in regional policy-making 
into an institution that was otherwise dominated by the national level offered a 
window of opportunity for sub-national actors to become involved in the 
development of their region, gradually elevating the regional level in Danish regional 
policy-making. Thus, these findings aid to the conclusion above that the Danish 
regional policy-making institution has gradually developed through a sequence of 
related events, where the introduction of EC regional policy-making constituted a link 
in that chain of events. An outcome of the 1991 regional policy-making institutional 
change was the development of a vertical division of responsibilities among the three 
involved government levels in coordinated regional policy-making in Denmark, 
arguably involving partnerships at all levels. The most noteworthy result of the 
development of the Danish regional policy-making institution was the elevation of the 
regional level and its establishment of competences to implement regional policy. The 
case of North Jutland illustrated how the institutionalisation of regional level 
competences was initiated prior to the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds as an 
experiment between regional and EC level actors in the NordTek programme, and 
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extended subsequently. By some coincidence, the regional level was elevated and 
initiated an institutionalisation process of regional level competences. Thus, an 
institution was set up reflecting North Jutland, where competences were delegated 
from the politically elected County Council to two interdependent Committees 
composed of politicians and civil servants respectively based on a functional division 
of responsibilities. This institutional organisation was emphasised and extended 
reflecting the 1993 and 1999 reforms of the Structural Funds adding layers to the 
regional level institution by including more and more actors into the organisation. 
Hence, the NordTek programme should be considered vital in the establishment and 
development of regional level capacity and partnerships, also in terms of inclusion and 
process. 
As mentioned above, partnerships are expectedly found at all levels (i.e. EC/EU, 
national and regional), but the widest and most inclusive partnership is found at the 
regional level, which according to its functional division of responsibilities, is 
responsible for implementing the policy. Moreover, partnership relations took place 
both vertically and horizontally within this functional division of responsibilities. Thus, 
partnership at the regional level was the core focus of the final part of the analysis. 
Here, the NordTek programme was the launching pad for a North Jutland approach to 
partnership rooted in the regional needs, socio-economic developments and political 
prioritising. These conditions, along with the parallel developments of the partnership 
requirements, shaped the gradual development of the partnership in North Jutland 
towards an inclusive partnership along vertical and horizontal lines involved in a 
partnership process. In North Jutland, a specific partnership developed involving 
actors ‘relevant’ to address the regional challenges, who themselves were affected by 
the regional challenges or otherwise involved in the process of creating projects to 
promote regional development across the public/private divide, the social partners 
and additional innovative business leaders. These actors were represented in a formal 
partnership organisation, where civil servants constituted one decision-making 
Committee (Executive Committee) and politicians composed a second decision-
making Committee (NUF). Based on the voluntary delegation of decision-making 
authority from the County Council, these two Committees in combination made the 
decisions regarding the recommendation of projects eligible of regional development 
support from the EU. 
Members of the formal partnership organisation represented organisations and 
networks situated outside the formal partnership organisation, whereby their 
interests and priorities influenced and legitimised the decision-making process in the 
formal partnership organisation in that they would provide a platform for support of 
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the negotiations between the interested partners in the formal partnership. Besides 
these actors, a variety of actors or organisations such as NOVI and North Jutland 
Business Service were involved as providers of services to the system, or as direct 
applicants in their capacity of being created by the system (they were established on 
the initiative of actors within the formal partnership organisation) due to their 
required existence to support the organisation. Thus, partnership in North Jutland was 
both vertical (decision-making process) and horizontal involving actors across 
different organisational and policy contexts based on the resources brought to the 
process by the individual partners, e.g. the institutional position of the actors, 
financial resources, ideas and the ability to take the initiative to instigate new projects 
and personal network relations. These resources had contributed to create tight 
interdependent relations between the partners within the formal partnership 
organisation, and the relations with the informal partnership in the implementation of 
regional policy in North Jutland. 
These relations were dual pointing towards a partnership in the Åkerstrøm Andersen 
sense of the concept. First, relations internally in the formal partnership organisation 
were mainly concerned with decision-making concerning the policy objectives, and 
how to achieve them through recommendation of projects eligible of regional 
development to the national level, National Agency for Enterprise and Housing 
(NAEH). A specific decision-making process had developed over the years of 
experience with the institutionalisation of partnership, in which things took place in a 
certain order and each Committee within the formal partnership organisation played 
specific roles herein. This process involved implied understandings, norms and 
procedures for cooperation. In isolation, these relations appear to resemble a 
network of relations rather than a partnership as defined by Åkerstrøm Andersen. But 
when considering the relations between the formal partnership organisation and the 
informal partnership, the relations appear more similar to a partnering process. These 
relations were affected by the roles played by the actors and organisations in the 
informal partnership: either through indirect involvement in the formal partnership 
organisation by means of representation or because they were created by the 
partnership to provide services to the system and be project applicants. It was argued, 
that in a sense, all parties in the informal partnership had a stake in the decision-
making of the formal partnership organisation as the decisions concerned their 
individual area or organisation. Therefore, the informal partnership justified and 
legalised the formal partnership organisation, or, in other words, without the informal 
partnership, the formal partnership organisation did resemble a network. The 
informal partnership and its relations to the formal partnership organisation were key 
to understand the interpretation of the process requirement of the partnership 
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principle in Denmark, and in North Jutland in particular. Relations among actors and 
organisations in the two partnership organisations were very close, shifting between 
formal and informal and based on mutual trust and respect of each other’s position in 
the negotiations, because the partnership was relatively small reflecting the size of 
the region. Much negotiation, discussion and lobbying took place behind the scenes to 
ensure a smooth decision-making process in the formal partnership organisation to 
maintain the strict hierarchy of decision-making highlighting the strength of the 
partnership and the partnering. Accordingly, partnering was at the centre of the North 
Jutland partnership organisation during the 2000-2006 programming period based on 
years of experience with interpreting and implementing partnership requirements 
since the NordTek programme, which laid the foundations to regional level 
partnership implementation. 
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12. Resumé  
Denne afhandling har udgangspunkt i de institutionelle konsekvenser af kravene fra 
EU’s partnerskabsprincip for medlemslandenes regionalpolitiske institutioner. 
Endvidere analyseres den historiske udvikling af den danske regionalpolitiske 
institution med særlig vægt på de forandringer, som fortolkningen og 
implementeringen af de organisatoriske partnerskabskrav har skabt. Imidlertid er 
ambitionerne med dette studie mere vidtrækkende end andre studier med samme 
mål såsom multi-level governance, idet det er baseret på en nyfortolkning af kravene 
fra partnerskabsprincippet. Jeg hævder, at partnerskabsprincippet består af tre 
elementer, som er af betydning for den teoretiske og empiriske ramme for en sådan 
undersøgelse: for det første erklærer partnerskabsprincippet at implementeringen af 
partnerskabet skal ske indenfor medlemslandenes respektive institutionelle og 
lovmæssige rammer. Dette indebærer, at medlemslandenes institutionelle kontekst 
har betydning for implementeringen af partnerskabsprincippet, hvilket allerede er 
fastslået i eksisterende undersøgelser af multi-level governance. For at forstå 
implementeringen af partnerskabsprincippet i medlemslandene, samt 
konsekvenserne af dette for medlemslandenes institutionelle organisation, er det 
nødvendigt at analysere medlemslandenes regionalpolitiske institution. For det andet 
stipulerer definitionen af partnerskabsprincippet et krav om inddragelse af bestemte 
aktører i partnerskabet. Inddragelseskravet er blevet udvidet i senere reformer af 
Strukturfondene, så både vertikale og horisontale aktører og organisationer er 
inddraget. For det tredje involverer partnerskab en form for samarbejde mellem 
aktørerne og organisationerne i partnerskabet. Derfor afhænger 
partnerskabskravenes institutionelle konsekvenser af medlemslandenes fortolkning 
og implementering af disse krav. Uanset fortolkningen kan det forventes, at 
slutresultatet er en form for forandring. 
Således er målet at undersøge hvordan fortolkning og implementering af 
partnerskabets krav til inddragelse og proces udmøntes i forandring af 
medlemslandenes regionalpolitiske institution. Danmarks regionalpolitiske institution 
er indtil nu ikke studeret i nogen særlig udstrækning sammenlignet med andre 
medlemslande. Derudover findes der en særegen balance mellem centralisering og 
decentralisering i offentlig politik i Danmark. Derfor er Danmark case-land i denne 
undersøgelse. 
Eksisterende undersøgelser af implementeringen af kravene til partnerskab hævder, 
at medlemslandenes institutionelle organisation gradvist tilpasses disse krav i henhold 
til medlemslandets egen institutionelle organisation. Dette er også indlejret i selve 
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partnerskabsprincippet. Forståelse af den historiske udvikling af den danske 
regionalpolitiske institution er væsentligt for at forstå fortolkningen af 
partnerskabskravene, da partnerskaberne forventes at blive implementeret i den 
eksisterende danske regionalpolitiske institution. Historisk institutionalisme leverer et 
teoretisk perspektiv til anvendelse i en analyse af interaktionen mellem EU’s og den 
danske regionalpolitiske institution, idet det postuleres at den institutionelle struktur 
har historiske rødder og har gennemgået en gradvis udvikling baseret på interne 
(aktører) og eksterne (andre institutioner) betingelser og begivenheder. Der fokuseres 
på hvordan fortidens beslutninger former nutidens beslutninger, og hvordan 
institutioner kan forandres i mødet med andre institutioner baseret på aktørernes 
opførsel indeni institutionen (Mahoney and Thelen (eds.), 2010, Hall and Thelen, 
2009, Pollack, 2004). Således leverer historisk institutionalisme to indbyrdes 
beslægtede værktøjer til denne analyse: For det første er det muligt at analysere den 
institutionelle kontekst, hvori partnerskabskravene skal implementeres, og dennes 
baggrund. For det andet er det muligt at analysere den gradvise udvikling af 
interaktionen mellem partnerskabsprincippet og den nationale regionalpolitiske 
institutionelle struktur. 
Indenfor rammerne af den historiske institutionalisme ses også den relaterede 
network governance tilgang. Network governance udgør et fordelagtigt teoretisk 
værktøj i analysen af den specifikke organisering af regionalpolitik, som forventes at 
være baseret på partnerskabstilgangen. Partnerskabsprincippet fortolkes og 
implementeres i den danske institution og forventes at føre til etableringen af 
partnerskaber baseret på den eksisterende institutionelle struktur af dansk 
regionalpolitik. Partnerskaber ligner netværk i forhold til inddragelse og relationer 
mellem involverede aktører. Network governance analyserer inddragelse (og måske 
udelukkelse) af aktører i implementeringen baseret på argumentet om 
ressourceafhængighed; aktører involveres i netværk fordi de bidrager med ressourcer, 
som medlemmerne af netværket er afhængige af og ikke kan levere selv (Sørensen 
and Torfing (eds.), 2007, Sørensen and Torfing, 2005 and Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). 
Der findes en specifik tilgang til partnerskab indenfor netværkslitteraturen, hvor 
partnerskab ses som en form for netværksrelation uden at være et netværk. Denne 
tilgang af Åkerstrøm Andersen (2006) definerer partnerskab baseret på 
’partnerskabelse’. Her ses partnerskabsprocessen som en dynamisk proces, der er 
baseret på ’kontrakter af anden orden’ (løfter om at lave nye løfter om fremtidigt 
samarbejde) som en reaktion på de omskiftelige og dynamiske sammenhænge, som 
partnerskabet opererer i. Dermed er det muligt at skelne mellem proceskravene som 
svarende til et netværk af relationer eller til en partnerskabelsesproces. 
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Den hermeneutiske tilgang udgør det metodiske fundament. Denne tilgang ser på 
enkeltdele og helheder og deres relation, og hvordan de sammen forklarer hvordan 
fortolkning og implementering af partnerskabskravene har medført forandring i den 
danske regionalpolitiske institution. Dette studie er baseret på analyse af primær og 
sekundær data, såvel som kvalitative semi-strukturerede eliteinterviews med 
offentlige og private aktører samt politikere og embedsmænd på forskellige 
regeringsniveauer, som har været involveret i dansk regionalpolitik indtil 2006, som er 
skelsåret i mit studie. Nordjylland er min case. Jeg har foretrukket at arbejde med en 
enkelt case, fordi målet med dette studie er at undersøge detaljer i 
partnerskabsfortolkningen og -implementeringen, som ikke er blevet afdækket 
tidligere. Komparative studier tillader ikke dybdegående inddragelse af detaljer: den 
danske fortolkning af partnerskabsprincippet forventes at udmønte sig i komplekse 
netværk, hvorfor komparativ analyse af to eller flere netværk uundgåeligt vil være 
mere overfladisk sammenlignet med en enkelt case. Nordjylland er en passende case, 
fordi Nordjylland har lang tids erfaring med regionalpolitik, ligesom det har en alsidig 
erhvervsstruktur som forventes at påvirke de horisontale relationer i partnerskabet. 
Anvendelsen af den hermeneutiske tilgang til undersøgelsen af udviklingen af den 
danske regionalpolitiske institution baseret på fortolkningen og implementeringen af 
partnerskabskravene deler analysen i 3 indbyrdes beslægtede dele. Den første del 
omhandler analysen af den institutionelle udvikling af den danske regionalpolitiske 
institution uafhængig af EF/EU pendanten. Denne analyse udspringer af argumentet 
om at fortolkningen og implementeringen af partnerskabsprincippet afhænger af den 
institutionelle kontekst, som det implementeres i, da partnerskaberne skal 
implementeres i henhold til medlemsstaternes institutionelle, lovmæssige og 
finansielle strukturer, hvilket understreges gentagne gange i definitionen af 
partnerskabsprincippet. Ud fra et historisk institutionalisme perspektiv er udviklingen 
af dansk regionalpolitik baseret på interne (og eksterne) begivenheder og betingelser, 
som medfører gradvis forandring. På det interne niveau påbegyndte den første 
Egnsudviklingslov i 1958 en institutionaliseringsproces af den danske regionalpolitik, 
hvor nye måder at opfatte egnsudvikling som mere afbalanceret udligning af regionale 
forskelle i arbejdsløshed og industribeskæftigelse udenfor hovedstaden blev 
introduceret med øget fokus på mobilitet og erhvervsudvikling i områder med høj 
arbejdsløshed. Egnsudvikling var alene statens ansvar. I årene efter vedtagelsen af 
Egnsudviklingsloven udviklede egnsudviklingen sig gradvist imod stigende 
decentralisering i form af det historisk institutionalisme beskriver som institutionel 
’layering’. I 1991 blev den regionalpolitiske institution, som før var rammesat af 
Egnsudviklingsloven, ændret til en umiddelbart diametralt anderledes organisation, 
hvor statens eneansvar for regionalpolitik ophørte fra den ene dag til den anden, og 
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hvor målet med regionaludvikling ændredes til at forbedre danske virksomheders 
konkurrenceevne i stedet for hele regionens konkurrenceevne, hvilket eksisterende 
litteratur finder epokegørende. Dog støtter dette studie ikke denne påstand. Dette 
studies undersøgelser finder at ændringerne i den danske regionalpolitiske institution 
i 1991 var resultatet af en serie af gradvise udviklinger, da omskiftelige 
socioøkonomiske betingelser i Danmark gennem tiden, politiske handlinger, bottom-
up udviklinger og tilgængeligheden af Strukturfondsmidler til regionaludvikling 
igennem midt-80erne tilsammen gradvist medførte en reform af institutionen. Ifølge 
dette arguments logik er reformen i 1991 også en relevant hændelse i den serie af 
begivenheder og forandringer, som formede den gradvise udvikling af den danske 
regionalpolitiske institution. 
Den anden del af analysen af typen af forandringer, som den danske fortolkning og 
implementering af partnerskabskravene skabte, omhandler interaktionen mellem den 
danske regionalpolitiske institution og EF’s pendant, som udviklede sig på samme tid. 
På den måde er denne analyse baseret på resultaterne af den første analyse, hvor det 
hævdes, at den danske regionalpolitiske institution var karakteriseret ved gradvis 
forandring baseret på interne og eksterne begivenheder og betingelser. Her fokuseres 
der i særlig grad på de eksterne betingelser og begivenheder, som formede denne 
udvikling: hvordan tilgængeligheden af EF’s Strukturfonde og introduktionen af 
lovgivning omkring inddragelse af det regionale niveau i regionalpolitik skabte en 
mulighed for at sub-nationale aktører gradvist kunne involveres i udviklingen af deres 
region og dermed løfte det regionale niveau i dansk regionalpolitik. Dermed støtter 
disse resultater ovenstående konklusion, som siger, at den danske regionalpolitiske 
institution gradvist har udviklet sig qua en serie af sammenhængende begivenheder, 
hvor introduktionen af EF’s Strukturfondspolitik udgør et led i denne kæde. 
Forandringen af den regionalpolitiske institution i 1991 medførte en udvikling af en 
vertikal opsplitning af ansvarsområder mellem de tre involverede regeringsniveauer, 
som dermed koordinerede regionalpolitik i Danmark, hvor partnerskab på alle 
niveauer blev involveret. Det mest iøjnefaldende resultat af udviklingen af den danske 
regionalpolitiske institution var etableringen af kompetencer og kapacitet til at 
implementere regionalpolitik på det regionale niveau, og dermed et løft af det 
regionale niveau. Casen om Nordjylland illustrerer hvordan institutionaliseringen af 
kompetencer og kapacitet på det regionale niveau blev påbegyndt før reformen af 
Strukturfondene i 1988 som et eksperiment mellem aktører på regionalt og EF niveau 
i NordTek Programmet. Det var ret tilfældigt, at det regionale niveau blev løftet og 
påbegyndte en institutionaliseringsproces. Således blev der oprettet en institution, 
der afspejlede Nordjylland, hvor kompetencer blev delegeret fra det politisk valgte 
Amtsråd til to indbyrdes afhængige komitéer bestående af politikere og embedsmænd 
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baseret på et princip om funktionel opdeling af ansvarsområder. Denne institutionelle 
organisation blev understreget og udvidet i henhold til reformerne af Strukturfondene 
i 1993 og 1999 gennem regionalpolitisk institutionel ’layering’ via inddragelse af flere 
og flere aktører i organisationen. Derfor bør NordTek programmet anerkendes som 
vital i forhold til etablering og udvikling af kapacitet og partnerskab på det regionale 
niveau – også i forhold til inddragelse og proces. 
Som nævnt ovenfor kan det forventes at partnerskaber findes på alle niveauer (fx 
EC/EU, nationale og regionale), men det bredeste og mest inddragende partnerskab 
findes på det regionale niveau, som ifølge den funktionelle opdeling af 
ansvarsområder er ansvarlig for at implementere politikken. Derudover fandtes der 
både vertikale og horisontale partnerskabsrelationer i denne funktionelle opdeling af 
ansvarsområder. Således udgør partnerskab på det regionale niveau kernen i den 
sidste del af analysen. Her fungerede NordTek programmet som fundamentet for en 
nordjysk tilgang til partnerskab med rødder i regionale behov, socioøkonomisk 
udvikling og politiske prioriteringer. Den gradvise udvikling af partnerskab i 
Nordjylland hen imod et horisontalt og vertikalt inkluderende partnerskab var formet 
af disse betingelser samt partnerskabskravene. I Nordjylland udvikledes et specifikt 
partnerskab, som involverede ’relevante’ aktører i forhold til regionale udfordringer, 
som også selv var påvirket af de regionale udfordringer eller på anden måde 
involveret i processen med at skabe projekter til at fremme udvikling af regionen på 
tværs af offentlige og private aktører, de sociale partnere og andre innovative 
erhvervsledere. Disse aktører var repræsenteret i en formel partnerskabsorganisation, 
hvor embedsmænd udgjorde én beslutningskomite (Indstillingsudvalget) og politikere 
udgjorde en anden beslutningskomite (NUF). Baseret på frivillig delegering af 
beslutningstagningskompetencer fra Amtsrådet tog disse to komiteer beslutninger 
sammen angående anbefalinger af projekter berettiget til støtte fra EU. 
Medlemmerne i den formelle partnerskabsorganisation repræsenterede 
organisationer og netværk, som var placeret udenfor den formelle 
partnerskabsorganisation, hvormed deres interesser og prioriteter påvirkede og 
legitimerede beslutningsprocessen i den formelle partnerskabsorganisation, idet de 
leverede en platform til understøttelse af forhandlingerne mellem interesserede 
partnere i det formelle partnerskab. Derudover blev andre aktører, fx NOVI og 
Nordjyllands Erhvervsservice, inkluderet i kraft af deres påkrævede rolle som støtte af 
organisationen som leverandører af services til systemet eller som direkte ansøgere. 
Således var partnerskabet i Nordjylland både vertikalt (beslutningsproces) og 
horisontalt involverende aktører på tværs af organisationsskel og politiske kontekster 
baseret på de ressourcer, som de individuelle partnere bidrog med til processen, fx 
378 
 
aktørernes institutionelle position, finansielle ressourcer, ideer og initiativer til nye 
projekter og netværksrelationer. Disse ressourcer bidrog til at skabe tæt relationel 
gensidig afhængighed mellem partnerne i den formelle partnerskabsorganisation, og 
relationerne med det uformelle partnerskab i implementeringen af regionalpolitik i 
Nordjylland.  
Disse relationer var dobbeltsporede og ledte hen imod et partnerskab i Åkerstrøm 
Andersens forståelse af begrebet. For det første var de interne relationer i den 
formelle partnerskabsorganisation mest optaget af beslutningsprocessen angående 
målene med politikken, og hvordan disse mål kunne opnås via anbefalinger af 
projekter, der var kvalificeret til regional udviklingsstøtte, til Erhvervs- og Bolig 
Styrelsen. En særlig beslutningsproces havde udviklet sig gennem års erfaring med 
institutionaliseringen af partnerskab, hvor tingene skete i en særlig rækkefølge, og 
hvor hver komité i den formelle partnerskabsorganisation spillede sin særlige rolle. 
Denne proces involverede underforståede normer og samarbejdsprocedurer. Isoleret 
set kan disse relationer kan godt ligne et netværk og ikke et partnerskab i Åkerstrøm 
Andersens forståelse. Men når man kigger nærmere på relationerne mellem den 
formelle partnerskabsorganisation og det uformelle partnerskab ligner relationerne 
mere ’partnerskabelse’. Disse relationer blev påvirket af de roller, som aktørerne og 
organisationerne spillede i det uformelle partnerskab; enten igennem indirekte 
involvering i den formelle partnerskabsorganisation via repræsentation, eller fordi de 
var skabt af partnerskabet til at levere services til systemet og til at være 
projektansøgere. Argumentet var at alle parter i det uformelle partnerskab på en 
måde havde en interesse i beslutningstagning i det formelle partnerskab, fordi 
beslutningerne berørte deres geografiske område eller organisation eller på anden 
måde. Herved blev den formelle partnerskabsorganisation retfærdiggjort og 
legitimeret af det uformelle partnerskab. Sagt med andre ord lignede den formelle 
partnerskabsorganisation et netværk uden det uformelle partnerskab. Det uformelle 
partnerskab og dets relation til den formelle partnerskabsorganisation var vigtig i 
forståelsen af fortolkningen af partnerskabsprincippets proceskrav i Danmark og i 
særdeleshed i Nordjylland. Relationerne var tætte blandt aktører og organisationer i 
de to partnerskabsorganisationer og skiftede mellem at være formelle og uformelle 
baseret på gensidig tillid og respekt for hverandres position i forhandlingerne, fordi 
partnerskabet var relativt småt ligesom regionen. Megen forhandling, diskussion og 
lobbyisme foregik bag lukkede døre for at sikre en glat beslutningstagningsproces i 
den formelle partnerskabsorganisation, så en strengt hierarkisk beslutningsproces 
kunne opretholdes, hvilket fremhæver styrken i partnerskabet og partnerskabelsen. 
Følgelig var partnerskabelse centralt i den nordjyske partnerskabsorganisation i 
programperioden 2000-2006 baseret på års erfaring med at fortolke og implementere 
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partnerskabskravene siden NordTek programmet, som lagde fundamentet for 
regional partnerskabsimplementering. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guides 
 
Interview Guide 1 (Henrik Lodberg) 
 
About you: 
 Name and position? 
 In what way have you been a part of Danish regional policy? 
 
Concerning the development of the EU and Danish regional policy-making up till 
2006 (this can concern other aspects than partnership, perhaps also general 
considerations concerning allocation of responsibilities in Danish regional policy-
making to the state, regional and local levels): 
 Tell me about Danish regional policy-making during the 1980s 
 What happened to Danish regional policy-making when the partnership 
principle was adopted in EC regional policy in 1988? 
 Tell me about Danish regional policy-making during the 1990s 
 The reform of the Structural Funds in 1993 changed the composition of the 
partners in the partnerships. Were there any consequences of this for Danish 
implementation of regional policy? (governance) 
 Did anything happen to Danish regional policy-making during the 1990s 
dependent on or independent of EU regional policy? 
 Another reform was implemented in 1999, which further expanded inclusion 
of partners in the partnerships. What influence did this reform have on 
Danish regional policy governance? 
 Tell me about Danish regional policy-making from the year 2000 and onwards 
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Concerning the partnership leading up to the year 2000: 
 What did the partnership look like in the earlier programming periods leading 
up to the 2000-2006 period? Does it reflect the developments of Danish 
regional policy-making? 
o The partnership structure? Same or other partners? Why? 
o Has the formulation of the partnership principle or the general 
development of EU regional policy meant anything for the 
composition of the partnership? 
 
Concerning partnership between 2000-2006: 
 Describe the operation and development (structure) of the partnership: 
o How is the partnership constructed? Can you draw a model of the 
partnership? Can you describe the relations between the different 
committees, organisations and secretariats? 
o How is the partnership interpreted in relation to the partnership 
principle? (The regulation says that partners from the EU, national, 
regional and local levels as well as private actors such as economic 
and social partners must be included). 
o Which partners are included (vertical and horizontal)? 
o Why are they included and not others? 
o Which other actors could be included? Why are they not? 
o Which resources do these partners contribute with? 
o How are the relations between the different partners 
(formal/informal, distribution of power, is power used)? Are the 
relations decided by the partnership structure or other? Examples? 
o Is there a kind of implied partnership ‘conduct’? If yes, what is it? 
o Are there different levels of partnerships within the overriding 
partnership? If yes, how are they related? 
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In conclusion: 
 Is there a particular partnership culture in Denmark or North Jutland? Explain 
 Have any experiences of insights been utilised in partnerships pointing 
forward? Have experiences from 1989-1993, 1994-1999 been transferred to 
the 2000-2006 programming period? How? Why? 
 Has involvement of partners changed over time? Are partners involved in 
2000-2006 that had not been involved before? Why? 
 Have relations between partners changed over time? How and why? 
 
Debriefing: 
 Agreement concerning treatment of interviews – would you like to review 
the interview or to be anonymous or other conditions? 
 Can I contact you again if I need elaborations of follow-ups? 
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Interview Guide 2 
 
About you: 
 Name and position 
 Which role (roles) did you play in the partnership? Who did you represent? 
Which position (positions) did you have in the partnership? 
 How long were you a part of the partnership? 
 
About the partnership between the years 2000-2006: 
 Describe the operation and development (structure) of the partnership: 
o How is the partnership constructed? Can you draw a model of the 
partnership? Can you describe the relations between the different 
committees, organisations and the secretariat? 
o How is the partnership interpreted in relation to the partnership 
principle? (The regulation says that partners from the EU, national, 
regional and local levels as well as private actors such as economic 
and social partners must be included). 
o Which partners are included (vertical and horizontal)? 
o Why are they included and not others? 
o Which other actors could be included? Why are they not? 
o Which resources do these partners contribute with? 
o How are the relations between the different partners 
(formal/informal, distribution of power, is power used)? Are the 
relations decided by the partnership structure or other? Examples? 
o Is there a kind of implied partnership ‘conduct’? If yes, what is it? 
o Are there different levels of partnerships within the overriding 
partnership? If yes, how are they related? 
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 How did you become part of the partnership? 
 How do you contribute to the partnership? Which decisions have you been 
involved in? Or how have you contributed to decision-making in the 
partnership? 
 Have you had the same role in the partnership the whole time? 
 How do you think other partners perceive of your role in the partnership? 
 How do you perceive the role of other partners in the partnership? 
 How does the partnership work in the different stages of regional policy-
making? 
o The programme design phase? Examples 
o The implementation stage/day-to-day management? Examples 
o Monitoring of projects and programmes? Examples 
 
Concerning the partnership up till the year 2000: 
 How did the partnership look in former programming periods compared to 
the 2000-2006 period? 
o The partnership structure? Same or other partners? Why? 
o Has the formulation of the partnership principle meant anything for 
the constitution of the partnership – or the general development of 
EU regional policy? 
o The role of partners? 
o The relations among partners? 
o If different, why? 
 Have any experiences of insights been utilised in partnerships pointing 
forward? Have experiences from 1989-1993, 1994-1999 been transferred to 
the 2000-2006 programming period? How? Why? 
 Has involvement of partners changed over time? Are partners involved in 
2000-2006 that had not been involved before? Why? 
 Have relations between partners changed over time? How and why? 
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In conclusion: 
 How do you understand and experience partnership? What is partnership to 
you? 
 Is there a particular partnership culture in Denmark or North Jutland? Explain 
 How does the 2007-2013 period look like in comparison with previous 
periods in relation to partnerships? 
 Is there anything else you think I should know that I have not mentioned? 
 
Debriefing: 
 Agreement concerning treatment of interviews – would you like to review 
the interview or to be anonymous or other conditions? 
 Can I contact you again if I need elaborations or follow-ups? 
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Appendix 2: Overview of Interviewees 
 
Anonymous centrally positioned civil servant at the North Jutland Regional Policy 
Department:  has been involved in the secretariat administration of the Structural 
Funds programmes and the formulation of project applications since 1991. 
Anonymous representative of VUR: member of NUF during the 2000-2006 
programming period representing business council interests of the Northern part of 
North Jutland. Has now retired. 
Christensen, Flemming: has played a dual role. First, he was a member of the 
Executive Committee representing the trade unions (between 1988 and 2000). 
Between 2000 and 2006 he was employed as Vice Head of the Regional Policy 
Department involved in the processing and formulation of project applications as a 
secretariat function to the County Council, NUF and the Executive Committee. 
Christensen, Henrik: member of the Executive Committee as a representative of the 
secretariat for the RLMA as its head of department since the 1990s.  
Gjerding, Allan Næs: Head of the North Jutland County Regional Policy Department 
between 2000 and 2004 where he was responsible for the administration of the 
secretariat to the County Council, NUF and the Executive Committee. Currently 
employed as an associate professor at Aalborg University. 
Gregersen, Preben: Head of Regional Department, NAEH, Silkeborg. Has been 
employed at NAEH since 1994 where he is responsible for administering the Structural 
Funds (ERDF) in Denmark, although he has taken two leaves of absence since then. 
Became chairman of the Monitoring Committee in 2004 when he returned to NAEH. 
Hav, Orla: County Mayor between 1998 and 2006. As a County Mayor he was the 
chairman of NUF, which is an in-built responsibility. Besides, he was member and chair 
of several boards of the organisations situated outside the formal partnership 
organisation such as NOVI and the RLMA through his position as a County Mayor. 
Currently Member of Parliament representing North Jutland interests. 
Hedegaard, Jens Arne: Municipal Mayor in Brønderslev, a municipality situated North 
of Aalborg representing VUR in NUF between 2000 and 2006. Before that also a 
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representative in the municipality’s business council. Today he is a Danish 
representative in the advisory Committee of the Regions. 
Hesselholt, Anders: from 1986 until the mid-1990s he was responsible for the 
industrial political activities in North Jutland and was one of the central actors in the 
establishment of the NordTek programme involved in the design of the programme 
and the inclusion of actors into the regional level organisation for its implementation. 
Moreover, he was involved in the establishment of NUF and the subsequent 
partnership organisation in North Jutland. Currently employed at the North Jutland 
Regional Employment Council (Beskæftigelsesregionen) 
Lang, Svend Erik: chairman of the trade unions in North Jutland County and involved 
in trade union work since the 1970s. In the capacity of chairman of the trade unions, 
he represented this side of the social partners in NUF. Besides, he was a member of 
some of the boards of the organisations situated outside the formal partnership 
organisation such as NOVI. Has now retired. 
Lodberg, Henrik: from 1995 until 2006 employed at the NAEH, Silkeborg as a chief 
consultant responsible for Danish regional development programmes 
(erhvervsfremme). He was responsible for administering and establishing the 
independent Danish regional development policy that changed focus in 1991 with the 
termination of the Regional Development Act. Especially, the focus was on 
establishing a Danish approach to partnership. Is co-owner of a private consultancy 
company offering analyses and solutions for regional and business development. 
Mathiasen, Finn: member of NUF as a personally selected ‘industrialist’ representing 
a visionary and innovative business in Himmerland, Lyngsoe. Director of Lyngsoe 
Systems in Aars, Himmerland. 
Nielsen, Jørn Munk: member of the Executive Committee representing the NES group 
of North Jutland trade promotion officers since 1994. Before that also involved in 
regional development in North Jutland representing the interests of Hirtshals. 
Currently employed as a business consultant in Hjørring municipality. 
Nielsen, Thomas: member of the Monitoring Committee for the 2000-2006 
programming period representing North Jutland. Is currently employed as an 
associate professor at Aalborg University as well as engaged in trade union work for 
the academics in North Jutland. 
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Pedersen, Henrik Brask: has played dual roles. First, as Head of the Regional Policy 
Department at North Jutland County between 1988 and 2000 carrying out secretariat 
functions for the County Council, NUF and the Executive Committee. Next, as a 
member of the Monitoring Committee for the Objective 2 Programme during the 
2000-2006 period representing the interests of Viborg County where he was 
employed as an EU consultant at a corresponding regional policy department. He is 
currently Head of Department for Regional Development in Region Midtjylland. 
Pedersen, Torben: member of the Executive Committee in the capacity of 
representative of the Vocational Schools’ Coalition and also a representative of the 
employers’ organisations. Traditionally, the representative of the Vocational Schools’ 
Coalition was represented by the director of AMU Nordjylland (being either an 
employer or an employee representative). Has been involved in the partnership since 
the beginning of the 1990s. 
Poulsen, Ebbe: Head of Department, NAEH, Silkeborg where he is the coordinator of 
the Danish Objective 2 Programme responsible for formulating and planning the 
programmes and secretary of the Monitoring Committee. Since the end of the 1980s, 
he has been involved in the administration of the ERDF. 
Simensen, Karsten: has played several roles in regional development in North Jutland. 
First he was city manager in Sejlflod (neighbouring Aalborg) during the 1980s when 
the shipyard closings took place. Next, he was Head of the Regional Policy Department 
at North Jutland County between 2004 and 2006. Thereafter, he became city manager 
in Frederikshavn. In the capacity of city manager he was a member of the Association 
of Municipalities in North Jutland which was represented in the Executive Committee. 
Currently employed as Regional Director of the North Jutland Regional Employment 
Council (Beskæftigelsesregionen) 
Stoustrup, Vibeke: Head of the Business Development Department in Aalborg 
municipality representing the Aalborg Region Network in the Executive Committee 
between 2001 and 2006. Currently Head of Business Department in Aalborg 
municipality. 
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APPENDIX 3: Overview of Organisations Involved in Danish 
Regional Policy-Making 
 
Ministries involved in regional policy-making: 
English translation Danish name 
Ministry of Trade and Industry or 
Ministry of Business Affairs 
Erhvervsministeriet 
 
Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs 
Økonomi- og erhvervsministeriet 
Ministry for Trade and Industry and 
Coordination 
Industri- og samordningsministeriet 
Ministry of Labour Arbejdsministeriet 
Labour Market Ministry Arbejdsmarkedsministeriet 
Ministry of Employment Beskæftigelsesministeriet 
Ministry of Housing Boligministeriet 
Ministry of the Interior Indenrigsministeriet 
Ministry of Development or  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Udenrigsministeriet 
Ministry of the Environment Miljøministeriet 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
Ministeriet for fødevarer, landbrug og fiskeri 
 
 
Different names for the same national level authority responsible for regional policy 
implementation: 
English translation Danish name 
Regional Development Agency Egnsudviklingsrådet 
Regional Development Directorate Egnsudviklingsdirektoratet 
Industrial and Business Agency Industri- og Handelsstyrelsen 
Danish Agency for Trade and Industry Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen 
National Agency for Enterprise and 
Housing 
Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen 
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Organisations involved in regional level regional policy-making: 
English translation Danish name 
  
National level organisations:  
Technological Information Centres  Teknologisk informationscentre 
National Labour Market Authority Nationale arbejdsmarkedsråd 
  
Regional level organisations:  
The Association of Municipalities in 
North Jutland 
Kommuneforeningen i Nordjylland 
North Jutland Business Council Nordjyllands Erhvervsråd 
North Jutland Information Technology 
Council 
Nordjysk Informatikråd 
County Council Finance Committee Økonomiudvalget for amtsrådet 
Aalborg Region Network Region Aalborg samarbejdet 
Association of Danish Counties Amtsrådsforeningen 
Local Government Denmark Kommunernes Landsforening 
North Jutland Development Fund 
(NUF) 
Nordjyllands Udviklingsfond (NUF) 
The North Jutland Trade Promotion 
Officers (the NES group) 
Nordjyske Erhvervschefer (NES gruppen) 
The Danish Confederation of Trade 
Unions 
Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO) 
The Confederation of Danish 
Employers 
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 
The Vocational Schools’ Coalition Erhvervsskolesamarbejdet 
The County Regional Policy 
Department 
Erhvervs- og arbejdsmarkedsafdelingen på 
Nordjyllands Amt 
Vendsyssel Development Council 
(VUR) 
Vendsyssels Udviklingsråd (VUR) 
Himmerland Development Council 
(HUR) 
Himmerland Udviklingsråd (HUR) 
NOVI Science Park NOVI Science Park 
North Jutland Business Service Nordjyllands Erhvervsservice 
Business Innovation Centre North BIC Nord 
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